linux-toradex.git/include, branch v3.2.32

ipvs: fix oops on NAT reply in br_nf context

2012-10-17T02:50:07+00:00

commit 9e33ce453f8ac8452649802bee1f410319408f4b upstream.

IPVS should not reset skb->nf_bridge in FORWARD hook
by calling nf_reset for NAT replies. It triggers oops in
br_nf_forward_finish.

[  579.781508] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
[  579.781669] IP: [] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112
[  579.781792] PGD 218f9067 PUD 0
[  579.781865] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  579.781945] CPU 0
[  579.781983] Modules linked in:
[  579.782047]
[  579.782080]
[  579.782114] Pid: 4644, comm: qemu Tainted: G        W    3.5.0-rc5-00006-g95e69f9 #282 Hewlett-Packard  /30E8
[  579.782300] RIP: 0010:[]  [] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112
[  579.782455] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b003a98  EFLAGS: 00010287
[  579.782541] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8800762ead00 RCX: 000000000001670a
[  579.782653] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff8800762ead00
[  579.782845] RBP: ffff88007b003ac8 R08: 0000000000016630 R09: ffff88007b003a90
[  579.782957] R10: ffff88007b0038e8 R11: ffff88002da37540 R12: ffff88002da01a02
[  579.783066] R13: ffff88002da01a80 R14: ffff88002d83c000 R15: ffff88002d82a000
[  579.783177] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007b000000(0063) knlGS:00000000f62d1b70
[  579.783306] CS:  0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 000000008005003b
[  579.783395] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000000218fe000 CR4: 00000000000027f0
[  579.783505] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  579.783684] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  579.783795] Process qemu (pid: 4644, threadinfo ffff880021b20000, task ffff880021aba760)
[  579.783919] Stack:
[  579.783959]  ffff88007693cedc ffff8800762ead00 ffff88002da01a02 ffff8800762ead00
[  579.784110]  ffff88002da01a02 ffff88002da01a80 ffff88007b003b18 ffffffff817b26c7
[  579.784260]  ffff880080000000 ffffffff81ef59f0 ffff8800762ead00 ffffffff81ef58b0
[  579.784477] Call Trace:
[  579.784523]  
[  579.784562]
[  579.784603]  [] br_nf_forward_ip+0x275/0x2c8
[  579.784707]  [] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d
[  579.784797]  [] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae
[  579.784906]  [] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102
[  579.784995]  [] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae
[  579.785175]  [] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x19/0x1b
[  579.785179]  [] __br_forward+0x97/0xa2
[  579.785179]  [] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1a6/0x257
[  579.785179]  [] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x26d/0x2cb
[  579.785179]  [] br_nf_pre_routing+0x55d/0x5c1
[  579.785179]  [] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d
[  579.785179]  [] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44
[  579.785179]  [] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102
[  579.785179]  [] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44
[  579.785179]  [] ? sky2_poll+0xb35/0xb54
[  579.785179]  [] br_handle_frame+0x213/0x229
[  579.785179]  [] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x257/0x257
[  579.785179]  [] __netif_receive_skb+0x2b4/0x3f1
[  579.785179]  [] process_backlog+0x99/0x1e2
[  579.785179]  [] net_rx_action+0xdf/0x242
[  579.785179]  [] __do_softirq+0xc1/0x1e0
[  579.785179]  [] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x3a/0x6c
[  579.785179]  [] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30

The steps to reproduce as follow,

1. On Host1, setup brige br0(192.168.1.106)
2. Boot a kvm guest(192.168.1.105) on Host1 and start httpd
3. Start IPVS service on Host1
   ipvsadm -A -t 192.168.1.106:80 -s rr
   ipvsadm -a -t 192.168.1.106:80 -r 192.168.1.105:80 -m
4. Run apache benchmark on Host2(192.168.1.101)
   ab -n 1000 http://192.168.1.106/

ip_vs_reply4
  ip_vs_out
    handle_response
      ip_vs_notrack
        nf_reset()
        {
          skb->nf_bridge = NULL;
        }

Actually, IPVS wants in this case just to replace nfct
with untracked version. So replace the nf_reset(skb) call
in ip_vs_notrack() with a nf_conntrack_put(skb->nfct) call.

Signed-off-by: Lin Ming 
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov 
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

mempolicy: fix a race in shared_policy_replace()

2012-10-17T02:49:58+00:00

commit b22d127a39ddd10d93deee3d96e643657ad53a49 upstream.

shared_policy_replace() use of sp_alloc() is unsafe.  1) sp_node cannot
be dereferenced if sp->lock is not held and 2) another thread can modify
sp_node between spin_unlock for allocating a new sp node and next
spin_lock.  The bug was introduced before 2.6.12-rc2.

Kosaki's original patch for this problem was to allocate an sp node and
policy within shared_policy_replace and initialise it when the lock is
reacquired.  I was not keen on this approach because it partially
duplicates sp_alloc().  As the paths were sp->lock is taken are not that
performance critical this patch converts sp->lock to sp->mutex so it can
sleep when calling sp_alloc().

[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: Original patch]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman 
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

serial: set correct baud_base for EXSYS EX-41092 Dual 16950

2012-10-17T02:49:01+00:00

commit 26e8220adb0aec43b7acafa0f1431760eee28522 upstream.

Apparently the same card model has two IDs, so this patch
complements the commit 39aced68d664291db3324d0fcf0985ab5626aac2
adding the missing one.

Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid

2012-10-10T02:31:25+00:00

[ Upstream commit ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720 ]

The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:

1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
   code later on.

2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
   memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
   CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.

To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.

To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).

Cc: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: Martin Willi 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto

2012-10-10T02:31:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3b59df46a449ec9975146d71318c4777ad086744 ]

ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the
sequence number counters are always up to date. However,
this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed.

If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence
number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of
the sequence number. This leads to a DOS.

We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number,
(used for authentication) with the upper sequence number
computed after the async processing. We drop the packet
if these numbers are different.

To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this
check in the ESN case.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

HID: fix return value of hidraw_report_event() when !CONFIG_HIDRAW

2012-10-10T02:31:16+00:00

commit d6d7c873529abd622897cad5e36f1fd7d82f5110 upstream.

Commit b6787242f327 ("HID: hidraw: add proper error handling to raw event
reporting") forgot to update the static inline version of
hidraw_report_event() for the case when CONFIG_HIDRAW is unset. Fix that
up.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

HID: hidraw: add proper error handling to raw event reporting

2012-10-10T02:31:16+00:00

commit b6787242f32700377d3da3b8d788ab3928bab849 upstream.

If kmemdup() in hidraw_report_event() fails, we are not propagating
this fact properly.

Let hidraw_report_event() and hid_report_raw_event() return an error
value to the caller.

Reported-by: Oliver Neukum 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

Bluetooth: Change signature of smp_conn_security()

2012-10-10T02:31:11+00:00

commit cc110922da7e902b62d18641a370fec01a9fa794 upstream.

To make it clear that it may be called from contexts that may not have
any knowledge of L2CAP, we change the connection parameter, to receive
a hci_conn.

This also makes it clear that it is checking the security of the link.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes 
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

tracing: Don't call page_to_pfn() if page is NULL

2012-10-10T02:31:00+00:00

commit 85f2a2ef1d0ab99523e0b947a2b723f5650ed6aa upstream.

When allocating memory fails, page is NULL. page_to_pfn() will
cause the kernel panicked if we don't use sparsemem vmemmap.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/505AB1FF.8020104@cn.fujitsu.com

Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Acked-by: Mel Gorman 
Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim 
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

vfs: dcache: use DCACHE_DENTRY_KILLED instead of DCACHE_DISCONNECTED in d_kill()

2012-10-10T02:30:48+00:00

commit b161dfa6937ae46d50adce8a7c6b12233e96e7bd upstream.

IBM reported a soft lockup after applying the fix for the rename_lock
deadlock.  Commit c83ce989cb5f ("VFS: Fix the nfs sillyrename regression
in kernel 2.6.38") was found to be the culprit.

The nfs sillyrename fix used DCACHE_DISCONNECTED to indicate that the
dentry was killed.  This flag can be set on non-killed dentries too,
which results in infinite retries when trying to traverse the dentry
tree.

This patch introduces a separate flag: DCACHE_DENTRY_KILLED, which is
only set in d_kill() and makes try_to_ascend() test only this flag.

IBM reported successful test results with this patch.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Cc: Trond Myklebust 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings