<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include, branch v3.4.71</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests</title>
<updated>2013-11-29T18:50:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-12T23:11:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c0d30628ff1b424f041d83fee37daea5f84eb0a2'/>
<id>c0d30628ff1b424f041d83fee37daea5f84eb0a2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 upstream.

The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean.  Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0).  The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state.  Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.

Wrong logic:
    if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }

Correct logic:
    if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }

Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user.  (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)

The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.

CVE-2013-2929

Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "Luck, Tony" &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 upstream.

The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean.  Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0).  The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state.  Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.

Wrong logic:
    if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }

Correct logic:
    if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
        or
    if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }

Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user.  (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)

The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.

CVE-2013-2929

Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: "Luck, Tony" &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/linux/fs.h: disable preempt when acquire i_size_seqcount write lock</title>
<updated>2013-11-29T18:50:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fan Du</name>
<email>fan.du@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-30T22:27:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f22ff9d05def87a049c5c8c7b86539bd4f8e3172'/>
<id>f22ff9d05def87a049c5c8c7b86539bd4f8e3172</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 74e3d1e17b2e11d175970b85acd44f5927000ba2 upstream.

Two rt tasks bind to one CPU core.

The higher priority rt task A preempts a lower priority rt task B which
has already taken the write seq lock, and then the higher priority rt
task A try to acquire read seq lock, it's doomed to lockup.

rt task A with lower priority: call write
i_size_write                                        rt task B with higher priority: call sync, and preempt task A
  write_seqcount_begin(&amp;inode-&gt;i_size_seqcount);    i_size_read
  inode-&gt;i_size = i_size;                             read_seqcount_begin &lt;-- lockup here...

So disable preempt when acquiring every i_size_seqcount *write* lock will
cure the problem.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 74e3d1e17b2e11d175970b85acd44f5927000ba2 upstream.

Two rt tasks bind to one CPU core.

The higher priority rt task A preempts a lower priority rt task B which
has already taken the write seq lock, and then the higher priority rt
task A try to acquire read seq lock, it's doomed to lockup.

rt task A with lower priority: call write
i_size_write                                        rt task B with higher priority: call sync, and preempt task A
  write_seqcount_begin(&amp;inode-&gt;i_size_seqcount);    i_size_read
  inode-&gt;i_size = i_size;                             read_seqcount_begin &lt;-- lockup here...

So disable preempt when acquiring every i_size_seqcount *write* lock will
cure the problem.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: do not abuse -&gt;cred_guard_mutex in threadgroup_lock()</title>
<updated>2013-11-29T18:50:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-30T22:28:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=df4011e050b4e80165a317424e6b3367dfa7697c'/>
<id>df4011e050b4e80165a317424e6b3367dfa7697c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e56fb2874015370e3b7f8d85051f6dce26051df9 upstream.

threadgroup_lock() takes signal-&gt;cred_guard_mutex to ensure that
thread_group_leader() is stable.  This doesn't look nice, the scope of
this lock in do_execve() is huge.

And as Dave pointed out this can lead to deadlock, we have the
following dependencies:

	do_execve:		cred_guard_mutex -&gt; i_mutex
	cgroup_mount:		i_mutex -&gt; cgroup_mutex
	attach_task_by_pid:	cgroup_mutex -&gt; cred_guard_mutex

Change de_thread() to take threadgroup_change_begin() around the
switch-the-leader code and change threadgroup_lock() to avoid
-&gt;cred_guard_mutex.

Note that de_thread() can't sleep with -&gt;group_rwsem held, this can
obviously deadlock with the exiting leader if the writer is active, so it
does threadgroup_change_end() before schedule().

Reported-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ zhj: adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e56fb2874015370e3b7f8d85051f6dce26051df9 upstream.

threadgroup_lock() takes signal-&gt;cred_guard_mutex to ensure that
thread_group_leader() is stable.  This doesn't look nice, the scope of
this lock in do_execve() is huge.

And as Dave pointed out this can lead to deadlock, we have the
following dependencies:

	do_execve:		cred_guard_mutex -&gt; i_mutex
	cgroup_mount:		i_mutex -&gt; cgroup_mutex
	attach_task_by_pid:	cgroup_mutex -&gt; cred_guard_mutex

Change de_thread() to take threadgroup_change_begin() around the
switch-the-leader code and change threadgroup_lock() to avoid
-&gt;cred_guard_mutex.

Note that de_thread() can't sleep with -&gt;group_rwsem held, this can
obviously deadlock with the exiting leader if the writer is active, so it
does threadgroup_change_end() before schedule().

Reported-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ zhj: adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: fix possible memory corruption with UDP_CORK and UFO</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-21T22:07:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=478e9a72b5e0cc9ecd8b787db90dec01d283123c'/>
<id>478e9a72b5e0cc9ecd8b787db90dec01d283123c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]

This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:

"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)

Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled.  If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.

This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.

The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).

Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]

This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:

"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)

Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled.  If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.

This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.

The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).

Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix cipso packet validation when !NETLABEL</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Seif Mazareeb</name>
<email>seif@marvell.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-18T03:33:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2b5f6d110ee835cba1742c999cabd30a54c10b76'/>
<id>2b5f6d110ee835cba1742c999cabd30a54c10b76</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f2e5ddcc0d12f9c4c7b254358ad245c9dddce13b ]

When CONFIG_NETLABEL is disabled, the cipso_v4_validate() function could loop
forever in the main loop if opt[opt_iter +1] == 0, this will causing a kernel
crash in an SMP system, since the CPU executing this function will
stall /not respond to IPIs.

This problem can be reproduced by running the IP Stack Integrity Checker
(http://isic.sourceforge.net) using the following command on a Linux machine
connected to DUT:

"icmpsic -s rand -d &lt;DUT IP address&gt; -r 123456"
wait (1-2 min)

Signed-off-by: Seif Mazareeb &lt;seif@marvell.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f2e5ddcc0d12f9c4c7b254358ad245c9dddce13b ]

When CONFIG_NETLABEL is disabled, the cipso_v4_validate() function could loop
forever in the main loop if opt[opt_iter +1] == 0, this will causing a kernel
crash in an SMP system, since the CPU executing this function will
stall /not respond to IPIs.

This problem can be reproduced by running the IP Stack Integrity Checker
(http://isic.sourceforge.net) using the following command on a Linux machine
connected to DUT:

"icmpsic -s rand -d &lt;DUT IP address&gt; -r 123456"
wait (1-2 min)

Signed-off-by: Seif Mazareeb &lt;seif@marvell.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dst: provide accessor function to dst-&gt;xfrm</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vyasevich@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-16T02:01:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3e5d72cd013a30bbd3a835243b635f0b85c4dd0a'/>
<id>3e5d72cd013a30bbd3a835243b635f0b85c4dd0a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e87b3998d795123b4139bc3f25490dd236f68212 ]

dst-&gt;xfrm is conditionally defined.  Provide accessor funtion that
is always available.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e87b3998d795123b4139bc3f25490dd236f68212 ]

dst-&gt;xfrm is conditionally defined.  Provide accessor funtion that
is always available.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: must unclone packets before mangling them</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-15T18:54:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=11db1e4cee071defc371d0fc7f1740024fbe5b06'/>
<id>11db1e4cee071defc371d0fc7f1740024fbe5b06</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c52e2421f7368fd36cbe330d2cf41b10452e39a9 ]

TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them.

We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size
was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor
of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit
packets that are still in Qdisc.

Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using
ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo-&gt;gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack.

We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed.

This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another
fix of this kind.

Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible
using small MSS.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c52e2421f7368fd36cbe330d2cf41b10452e39a9 ]

TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them.

We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size
was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor
of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit
packets that are still in Qdisc.

Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using
ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo-&gt;gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack.

We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed.

This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another
fix of this kind.

Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible
using small MSS.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls</title>
<updated>2013-10-22T08:02:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-10T14:52:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c2f271001295e9d4b1cca3a01502795e4f0d1639'/>
<id>c2f271001295e9d4b1cca3a01502795e4f0d1639</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 47d06e532e95b71c0db3839ebdef3fe8812fca2c upstream.

The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as
late_initcalls for some unknown reason.  So make sure
random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are
run.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 47d06e532e95b71c0db3839ebdef3fe8812fca2c upstream.

The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as
late_initcalls for some unknown reason.  So make sure
random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are
run.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, show_mem: suppress page counts in non-blockable contexts</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T22:42:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Rientjes</name>
<email>rientjes@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-29T22:06:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=022a41db8aa1bc0b4ff4c013f889292324a1c465'/>
<id>022a41db8aa1bc0b4ff4c013f889292324a1c465</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4b59e6c4730978679b414a8da61514a2518da512 upstream.

On large systems with a lot of memory, walking all RAM to determine page
types may take a half second or even more.

In non-blockable contexts, the page allocator will emit a page allocation
failure warning unless __GFP_NOWARN is specified.  In such contexts, irqs
are typically disabled and such a lengthy delay may even result in NMI
watchdog timeouts.

To fix this, suppress the page walk in such contexts when printing the
page allocation failure warning.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Xishi Qiu &lt;qiuxishi@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4b59e6c4730978679b414a8da61514a2518da512 upstream.

On large systems with a lot of memory, walking all RAM to determine page
types may take a half second or even more.

In non-blockable contexts, the page allocator will emit a page allocation
failure warning unless __GFP_NOWARN is specified.  In such contexts, irqs
are typically disabled and such a lengthy delay may even result in NMI
watchdog timeouts.

To fix this, suppress the page walk in such contexts when printing the
page allocation failure warning.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Xishi Qiu &lt;qiuxishi@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip: generate unique IP identificator if local fragmentation is allowed</title>
<updated>2013-10-13T22:42:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ansis Atteka</name>
<email>aatteka@nicira.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-18T22:29:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f72299da3e1a010a3d77fbed0b9ee6abd0a19911'/>
<id>f72299da3e1a010a3d77fbed0b9ee6abd0a19911</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 703133de331a7a7df47f31fb9de51dc6f68a9de8 ]

If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.

For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.

Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka &lt;aatteka@nicira.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 703133de331a7a7df47f31fb9de51dc6f68a9de8 ]

If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.

For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.

Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka &lt;aatteka@nicira.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
