<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/include, branch v4.9.20</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation</title>
<updated>2017-03-31T08:31:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-21T23:07:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2984e52c75c657db7901f6189f02e0251ca963c2'/>
<id>2984e52c75c657db7901f6189f02e0251ca963c2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.

Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again.  This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.

This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired.  Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory.  Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem.  In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.

In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches.  But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.

This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y).  Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.

Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.

Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again.  This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.

This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired.  Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory.  Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem.  In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.

In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches.  But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.

This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y).  Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.

Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm: reference count event-&gt;completion</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:41:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Vetter</name>
<email>daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-21T10:23:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c75fe7899538890109aad7bbf92b2f304389e825'/>
<id>c75fe7899538890109aad7bbf92b2f304389e825</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 24835e442f289813aa568d142a755672a740503c upstream.

When writing the generic nonblocking commit code I assumed that
through clever lifetime management I can assure that the completion
(stored in drm_crtc_commit) only gets freed after it is completed. And
that worked.

I also wanted to make nonblocking helpers resilient against driver
bugs, by having timeouts everywhere. And that worked too.

Unfortunately taking boths things together results in oopses :( Well,
at least sometimes: What seems to happen is that the drm event hangs
around forever stuck in limbo land. The nonblocking helpers eventually
time out, move on and release it. Now the bug I tested all this
against is drivers that just entirely fail to deliver the vblank
events like they should, and in those cases the event is simply
leaked. But what seems to happen, at least sometimes, on i915 is that
the event is set up correctly, but somohow the vblank fails to fire in
time. Which means the event isn't leaked, it's still there waiting for
eventually a vblank to fire. That tends to happen when re-enabling the
pipe, and then the trap springs and the kernel oopses.

The correct fix here is simply to refcount the crtc commit to make
sure that the event sticks around even for drivers which only
sometimes fail to deliver vblanks for some arbitrary reasons. Since
crtc commits are already refcounted that's easy to do.

References: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=96781
Cc: Jim Rees &lt;rees@umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@intel.com&gt;
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20161221102331.31033-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 24835e442f289813aa568d142a755672a740503c upstream.

When writing the generic nonblocking commit code I assumed that
through clever lifetime management I can assure that the completion
(stored in drm_crtc_commit) only gets freed after it is completed. And
that worked.

I also wanted to make nonblocking helpers resilient against driver
bugs, by having timeouts everywhere. And that worked too.

Unfortunately taking boths things together results in oopses :( Well,
at least sometimes: What seems to happen is that the drm event hangs
around forever stuck in limbo land. The nonblocking helpers eventually
time out, move on and release it. Now the bug I tested all this
against is drivers that just entirely fail to deliver the vblank
events like they should, and in those cases the event is simply
leaked. But what seems to happen, at least sometimes, on i915 is that
the event is set up correctly, but somohow the vblank fails to fire in
time. Which means the event isn't leaked, it's still there waiting for
eventually a vblank to fire. That tends to happen when re-enabling the
pipe, and then the trap springs and the kernel oopses.

The correct fix here is simply to refcount the crtc commit to make
sure that the event sticks around even for drivers which only
sometimes fail to deliver vblanks for some arbitrary reasons. Since
crtc commits are already refcounted that's easy to do.

References: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=96781
Cc: Jim Rees &lt;rees@umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jani Nikula &lt;jani.nikula@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@intel.com&gt;
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20161221102331.31033-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: ccp - Assign DMA commands to the channel's CCP</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:41:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gary R Hook</name>
<email>ghook@amd.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-10T18:28:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b1ef9daa50cc88dfc82fa1646da66550c9c0af3f'/>
<id>b1ef9daa50cc88dfc82fa1646da66550c9c0af3f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7c468447f40645fbf2a033dfdaa92b1957130d50 upstream.

The CCP driver generally uses a round-robin approach when
assigning operations to available CCPs. For the DMA engine,
however, the DMA mappings of the SGs are associated with a
specific CCP. When an IOMMU is enabled, the IOMMU is
programmed based on this specific device.

If the DMA operations are not performed by that specific
CCP then addressing errors and I/O page faults will occur.

Update the CCP driver to allow a specific CCP device to be
requested for an operation and use this in the DMA engine
support.

Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook &lt;gary.hook@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7c468447f40645fbf2a033dfdaa92b1957130d50 upstream.

The CCP driver generally uses a round-robin approach when
assigning operations to available CCPs. For the DMA engine,
however, the DMA mappings of the SGs are associated with a
specific CCP. When an IOMMU is enabled, the IOMMU is
programmed based on this specific device.

If the DMA operations are not performed by that specific
CCP then addressing errors and I/O page faults will occur.

Update the CCP driver to allow a specific CCP device to be
requested for an operation and use this in the DMA engine
support.

Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook &lt;gary.hook@amd.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iio: sw-device: Fix config group initialization</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:41:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lars-Peter Clausen</name>
<email>lars@metafoo.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-09T16:20:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cf43d679ccc51a11fe4488bfc13389fa634ddaee'/>
<id>cf43d679ccc51a11fe4488bfc13389fa634ddaee</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c42f8218610aa09d7d3795e5810387673c1f84b6 upstream.

Use the IS_ENABLED() helper macro to ensure that the configfs group is
initialized either when configfs is built-in or when configfs is built as a
module. Otherwise software device creation will result in undefined
behaviour when configfs is built as a module since the configfs group for
the device not properly initialized.

Similar to commit b2f0c09664b7 ("iio: sw-trigger: Fix config group
initialization").

Fixes: 0f3a8c3f34f7 ("iio: Add support for creating IIO devices via configfs")
Reported-by: Miguel Robles &lt;miguel.robles@farole.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen &lt;lars@metafoo.de&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Baluta &lt;daniel.baluta@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c42f8218610aa09d7d3795e5810387673c1f84b6 upstream.

Use the IS_ENABLED() helper macro to ensure that the configfs group is
initialized either when configfs is built-in or when configfs is built as a
module. Otherwise software device creation will result in undefined
behaviour when configfs is built as a module since the configfs group for
the device not properly initialized.

Similar to commit b2f0c09664b7 ("iio: sw-trigger: Fix config group
initialization").

Fixes: 0f3a8c3f34f7 ("iio: Add support for creating IIO devices via configfs")
Reported-by: Miguel Robles &lt;miguel.robles@farole.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen &lt;lars@metafoo.de&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Baluta &lt;daniel.baluta@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usb-core: Add LINEAR_FRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL USB quirk</title>
<updated>2017-03-30T07:41:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Samuel Thibault</name>
<email>samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-13T19:50:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=222ccd4f837b543c6481fb120954fc1ebc773251'/>
<id>222ccd4f837b543c6481fb120954fc1ebc773251</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3243367b209faed5c320a4e5f9a565ee2a2ba958 upstream.

Some USB 2.0 devices erroneously report millisecond values in
bInterval. The generic config code manages to catch most of them,
but in some cases it's not completely enough.

The case at stake here is a USB 2.0 braille device, which wants to
announce 10ms and thus sets bInterval to 10, but with the USB 2.0
computation that yields to 64ms.  It happens that one can type fast
enough to reach this interval and get the device buffers overflown,
leading to problematic latencies.  The generic config code does not
catch this case because the 64ms is considered a sane enough value.

This change thus adds a USB_QUIRK_LINEAR_FRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL quirk
to mark devices which actually report milliseconds in bInterval,
and marks Vario Ultra devices as needing it.

Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault &lt;samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3243367b209faed5c320a4e5f9a565ee2a2ba958 upstream.

Some USB 2.0 devices erroneously report millisecond values in
bInterval. The generic config code manages to catch most of them,
but in some cases it's not completely enough.

The case at stake here is a USB 2.0 braille device, which wants to
announce 10ms and thus sets bInterval to 10, but with the USB 2.0
computation that yields to 64ms.  It happens that one can type fast
enough to reach this interval and get the device buffers overflown,
leading to problematic latencies.  The generic config code does not
catch this case because the 64ms is considered a sane enough value.

This change thus adds a USB_QUIRK_LINEAR_FRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL quirk
to mark devices which actually report milliseconds in bInterval,
and marks Vario Ultra devices as needing it.

Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault &lt;samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: libiscsi: add lock around task lists to fix list corruption regression</title>
<updated>2017-03-26T11:05:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Leech</name>
<email>cleech@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-28T00:58:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=de1ff848c74fcc5b172323c1d5fac88dc1ab0281'/>
<id>de1ff848c74fcc5b172323c1d5fac88dc1ab0281</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6f8830f5bbab16e54f261de187f3df4644a5b977 upstream.

There's a rather long standing regression from the commit "libiscsi:
Reduce locking contention in fast path"

Depending on iSCSI target behavior, it's possible to hit the case in
iscsi_complete_task where the task is still on a pending list
(!list_empty(&amp;task-&gt;running)).  When that happens the task is removed
from the list while holding the session back_lock, but other task list
modification occur under the frwd_lock.  That leads to linked list
corruption and eventually a panicked system.

Rather than back out the session lock split entirely, in order to try
and keep some of the performance gains this patch adds another lock to
maintain the task lists integrity.

Major enterprise supported kernels have been backing out the lock split
for while now, thanks to the efforts at IBM where a lab setup has the
most reliable reproducer I've seen on this issue.  This patch has been
tested there successfully.

Signed-off-by: Chris Leech &lt;cleech@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 659743b02c41 ("[SCSI] libiscsi: Reduce locking contention in fast path")
Reported-by: Prashantha Subbarao &lt;psubbara@us.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6f8830f5bbab16e54f261de187f3df4644a5b977 upstream.

There's a rather long standing regression from the commit "libiscsi:
Reduce locking contention in fast path"

Depending on iSCSI target behavior, it's possible to hit the case in
iscsi_complete_task where the task is still on a pending list
(!list_empty(&amp;task-&gt;running)).  When that happens the task is removed
from the list while holding the session back_lock, but other task list
modification occur under the frwd_lock.  That leads to linked list
corruption and eventually a panicked system.

Rather than back out the session lock split entirely, in order to try
and keep some of the performance gains this patch adds another lock to
maintain the task lists integrity.

Major enterprise supported kernels have been backing out the lock split
for while now, thanks to the efforts at IBM where a lab setup has the
most reliable reproducer I've seen on this issue.  This patch has been
tested there successfully.

Signed-off-by: Chris Leech &lt;cleech@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 659743b02c41 ("[SCSI] libiscsi: Reduce locking contention in fast path")
Reported-by: Prashantha Subbarao &lt;psubbara@us.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>give up on gcc ilog2() constant optimizations</title>
<updated>2017-03-26T11:05:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-02T20:17:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=85f687708c811563df33c70c9cec9b5c2733acf8'/>
<id>85f687708c811563df33c70c9cec9b5c2733acf8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 474c90156c8dcc2fa815e6716cc9394d7930cb9c upstream.

gcc-7 has an "optimization" pass that completely screws up, and
generates the code expansion for the (impossible) case of calling
ilog2() with a zero constant, even when the code gcc compiles does not
actually have a zero constant.

And we try to generate a compile-time error for anybody doing ilog2() on
a constant where that doesn't make sense (be it zero or negative).  So
now gcc7 will fail the build due to our sanity checking, because it
created that constant-zero case that didn't actually exist in the source
code.

There's a whole long discussion on the kernel mailing about how to work
around this gcc bug.  The gcc people themselevs have discussed their
"feature" in

   https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=72785

but it's all water under the bridge, because while it looked at one
point like it would be solved by the time gcc7 was released, that was
not to be.

So now we have to deal with this compiler braindamage.

And the only simple approach seems to be to just delete the code that
tries to warn about bad uses of ilog2().

So now "ilog2()" will just return 0 not just for the value 1, but for
any non-positive value too.

It's not like I can recall anybody having ever actually tried to use
this function on any invalid value, but maybe the sanity check just
meant that such code never made it out in public.

Reported-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;,
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 474c90156c8dcc2fa815e6716cc9394d7930cb9c upstream.

gcc-7 has an "optimization" pass that completely screws up, and
generates the code expansion for the (impossible) case of calling
ilog2() with a zero constant, even when the code gcc compiles does not
actually have a zero constant.

And we try to generate a compile-time error for anybody doing ilog2() on
a constant where that doesn't make sense (be it zero or negative).  So
now gcc7 will fail the build due to our sanity checking, because it
created that constant-zero case that didn't actually exist in the source
code.

There's a whole long discussion on the kernel mailing about how to work
around this gcc bug.  The gcc people themselevs have discussed their
"feature" in

   https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=72785

but it's all water under the bridge, because while it looked at one
point like it would be solved by the time gcc7 was released, that was
not to be.

So now we have to deal with this compiler braindamage.

And the only simple approach seems to be to just delete the code that
tries to warn about bad uses of ilog2().

So now "ilog2()" will just return 0 not just for the value 1, but for
any non-positive value too.

It's not like I can recall anybody having ever actually tried to use
this function on any invalid value, but maybe the sanity check just
meant that such code never made it out in public.

Reported-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;,
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Drivers: hv: ring_buffer: count on wrap around mappings in get_next_pkt_raw() (v2)</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:43:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vitaly Kuznetsov</name>
<email>vkuznets@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-17T00:48:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3c0cbb47a8d634978225a52764691096a7fc1468'/>
<id>3c0cbb47a8d634978225a52764691096a7fc1468</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fa32ff6576623616c1751562edaed8c164ca5199 ]

With wrap around mappings in place we can always provide drivers with
direct links to packets on the ring buffer, even when they wrap around.
Do the required updates to get_next_pkt_raw()/put_pkt_raw()

The first version of this commit was reverted (65a532f3d50a) to deal with
cross-tree merge issues which are (hopefully) resolved now.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fa32ff6576623616c1751562edaed8c164ca5199 ]

With wrap around mappings in place we can always provide drivers with
direct links to packets on the ring buffer, even when they wrap around.
Do the required updates to get_next_pkt_raw()/put_pkt_raw()

The first version of this commit was reverted (65a532f3d50a) to deal with
cross-tree merge issues which are (hopefully) resolved now.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov &lt;vkuznets@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan &lt;kys@microsoft.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix state equivalence</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:43:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-07T18:57:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b7f5aa1ca0bedbd109be7563f6a94c9a37714537'/>
<id>b7f5aa1ca0bedbd109be7563f6a94c9a37714537</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d2a4dd37f6b41fbcad76efbf63124eb3126c66fe ]

Commmits 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
and 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") by themselves
are correct, but in combination they make state equivalence ignore 'id' field
of the register state which can lead to accepting invalid program.

Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d2a4dd37f6b41fbcad76efbf63124eb3126c66fe ]

Commmits 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
and 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") by themselves
are correct, but in combination they make state equivalence ignore 'id' field
of the register state which can lead to accepting invalid program.

Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers</title>
<updated>2017-03-22T11:43:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Graf</name>
<email>tgraf@suug.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-18T17:51:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1411707acb85c514c603f692327c98db48127900'/>
<id>1411707acb85c514c603f692327c98db48127900</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0 ]

A BPF program is required to check the return register of a
map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps
track of this by converting the type of the result register from
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional
jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed
for the result register 0.

In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG
instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes
them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the
verifier objects when the register is accessed:

0: (b7) r1 = 10
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
2: (bf) r2 = r10
3: (07) r2 += -8
4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000
6: (85) call 1
7: (bf) r4 = r0
8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp
9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0
R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'

This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by
assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional
jump is observed.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;jbacik@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0 ]

A BPF program is required to check the return register of a
map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps
track of this by converting the type of the result register from
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional
jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed
for the result register 0.

In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG
instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes
them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the
verifier objects when the register is accessed:

0: (b7) r1 = 10
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
2: (bf) r2 = r10
3: (07) r2 += -8
4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000
6: (85) call 1
7: (bf) r4 = r0
8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp
9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0
R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'

This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by
assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional
jump is observed.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik &lt;jbacik@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
