linux-toradex.git/init/main.c, branch v5.3-rc6

Merge branch 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2019-07-19T17:42:02+00:00

Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "The first part of mount updates.

  Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"

* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
  constify ksys_mount() string arguments
  don't bother with registering rootfs
  init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
  vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
  convenience helper: get_tree_single()
  convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
  vfs: Kill sget_userns()
  ...

mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time

2019-07-12T18:05:46+00:00

Print the currently enabled stack and heap initialization modes.

Stack initialization is enabled by a config flag, while heap
initialization is configured at boot time with defaults being set in the
config.  It's more convenient for the user to have all information about
these hardening measures in one place at boot, so the user can reason
about the expected behavior of the running system.

The possible options for stack are:
 - "all" for CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL;
 - "byref_all" for CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL;
 - "byref" for CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF;
 - "__user" for CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER;
 - "off" otherwise.

Depending on the values of init_on_alloc and init_on_free boottime options
we also report "heap alloc" and "heap free" as "on"/"off".

In the init_on_free mode initializing pages at boot time may take a while,
so print a notice about that as well.  This depends on how much memory is
installed, the memory bandwidth, etc.  On a relatively modern x86 system,
it takes about 0.75s/GB to wipe all memory:

  [    0.418722] mem auto-init: stack:byref_all, heap alloc:off, heap free:on
  [    0.419765] mem auto-init: clearing system memory may take some time...
  [   12.376605] Memory: 16408564K/16776672K available (14339K kernel code, 1397K rwdata, 3756K rodata, 1636K init, 11460K bss, 368108K reserved, 0K cma-reserved)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-3-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko 
Suggested-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Kostya Serebryany 
Cc: Laura Abbott 
Cc: Mark Rutland 
Cc: Masahiro Yamada 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Nick Desaulniers 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Cc: Sandeep Patil 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Souptick Joarder 
Cc: Marco Elver 
Cc: Kaiwan N Billimoria 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally

2019-07-05T02:01:59+00:00

No point having two call sites (earlier in init_rootfs() from
mnt_init() in case we are going to use shmem-style rootfs,
later from do_basic_setup() unconditionally), along with the
logics in shmem_init() itself to make the second call a no-op...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files

2019-05-21T08:50:45+00:00

Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
   initial scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

init: free_initmem: poison freed init memory

2019-05-14T16:47:47+00:00

Various architectures including x86 poison the freed init memory.  Do the
same in the generic free_initmem implementation and switch sparc32
architecture that is identical to the generic code over to it now.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1550515285-17446-4-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

init: provide a generic free_initmem implementation

2019-05-14T16:47:47+00:00

Patch series "provide a generic free_initmem implementation", v2.

Many architectures implement free_initmem() in exactly the same or very
similar way: they wrap the call to free_initmem_default() with sometimes
different 'poison' parameter.

These patches switch those architectures to use a generic implementation
that does free_initmem_default(POISON_FREE_INITMEM).

This was inspired by Christoph's patches for free_initrd_mem [1] and I
shamelessly copied changelog entries from his patches :)

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190213174621.29297-1-hch@lst.de/

This patch (of 2):

For most architectures free_initmem just a wrapper for the same
free_initmem_default(-1) call.  Provide that as a generic implementation
marked __weak.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1550515285-17446-2-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random

2019-05-08T04:42:23+00:00

Pull randomness updates from Ted Ts'o:

 - initialize the random driver earler

 - fix CRNG initialization when we trust the CPU's RNG on NUMA systems

 - other miscellaneous cleanups and fixes.

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: add a spinlock_t to struct batched_entropy
  random: document get_random_int() family
  random: fix CRNG initialization when random.trust_cpu=1
  random: move rand_initialize() earlier
  random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits
  drivers/char/random.c: make primary_crng static
  drivers/char/random.c: remove unused stuct poolinfo::poolbits
  drivers/char/random.c: constify poolinfo_table

Merge tag 'printk-for-5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk

2019-05-07T16:18:12+00:00

Pull printk updates from Petr Mladek:

 - Allow state reset of printk_once() calls.

 - Prevent crashes when dereferencing invalid pointers in vsprintf().
   Only the first byte is checked for simplicity.

 - Make vsprintf warnings consistent and inlined.

 - Treewide conversion of obsolete %pf, %pF to %ps, %pF printf
   modifiers.

 - Some clean up of vsprintf and test_printf code.

* tag 'printk-for-5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk:
  lib/vsprintf: Make function pointer_string static
  vsprintf: Limit the length of inlined error messages
  vsprintf: Avoid confusion between invalid address and value
  vsprintf: Prevent crash when dereferencing invalid pointers
  vsprintf: Consolidate handling of unknown pointer specifiers
  vsprintf: Factor out %pO handler as kobject_string()
  vsprintf: Factor out %pV handler as va_format()
  vsprintf: Factor out %p[iI] handler as ip_addr_string()
  vsprintf: Do not check address of well-known strings
  vsprintf: Consistent %pK handling for kptr_restrict == 0
  vsprintf: Shuffle restricted_pointer()
  printk: Tie printk_once / printk_deferred_once into .data.once for reset
  treewide: Switch printk users from %pf and %pF to %ps and %pS, respectively
  lib/test_printf: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()

x86/mm: Initialize PGD cache during mm initialization

2019-05-05T18:32:46+00:00

Poking-mm initialization might require to duplicate the PGD in early
stage. Initialize the PGD cache earlier to prevent boot failures.

Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rick Edgecombe 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Fixes: 4fc19708b165 ("x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patching")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190505011124.39692-1-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patching

2019-04-30T10:37:52+00:00

To prevent improper use of the PTEs that are used for text patching, the
next patches will use a temporary mm struct. Initailize it by copying
the init mm.

The address that will be used for patching is taken from the lower area
that is usually used for the task memory. Doing so prevents the need to
frequently synchronize the temporary-mm (e.g., when BPF programs are
installed), since different PGDs are used for the task memory.

Finally, randomize the address of the PTEs to harden against exploits
that use these PTEs.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit 
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: deneen.t.dock@intel.com
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: kristen@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux_dti@icloud.com
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426232303.28381-8-nadav.amit@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar