linux-toradex.git/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c, branch v6.0-rc1

ipc: Remove extra braces

2022-05-03T22:25:58+00:00

Fix coding style. In the previous commit, I added braces because,
in addition to changing .data, .extra1 also changed. Now this is not
needed.

Fixes: 1f5c135ee509 ("ipc: Store ipc sysctls in the ipc namespace")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/37687827f630bc150210f5b8abeeb00f1336814e.1651584847.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

ipc: Check permissions for checkpoint_restart sysctls at open time

2022-05-03T22:25:58+00:00

As Eric Biederman pointed out, it is possible not to use a custom
proc_handler and check permissions for every write, but to use a
.permission handler. That will allow the checkpoint_restart sysctls to
perform all of their permission checks at open time, and not need any
other special code.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87czib9g38.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org/
Fixes: 1f5c135ee509 ("ipc: Store ipc sysctls in the ipc namespace")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/65fa8459803830608da4610a39f33c76aa933eb9.1651584847.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

ipc: Remove extra1 field abuse to pass ipc namespace

2022-05-03T22:25:58+00:00

Eric Biederman pointed out that using .extra1 to pass ipc namespace
looks like an ugly hack and there is a better solution. We can get the
ipc_namespace using the .data field.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87czib9g38.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org/
Fixes: 1f5c135ee509 ("ipc: Store ipc sysctls in the ipc namespace")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/93df64a8fe93ba20ebbe1d9f8eda484b2f325426.1651584847.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

ipc: Use the same namespace to modify and validate

2022-05-03T22:25:58+00:00

In the 1f5c135ee509 ("ipc: Store ipc sysctls in the ipc namespace") I
missed that in addition to the modification of sem_ctls[3], the change
is validated. This validation must occur in the same namespace.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/875ymnvryb.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org/
Fixes: 1f5c135ee509 ("ipc: Store ipc sysctls in the ipc namespace")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b3cb9a25cce6becbef77186bc1216071a08a969b.1651584847.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

ipc: Store ipc sysctls in the ipc namespace

2022-03-08T19:39:40+00:00

The ipc sysctls are not available for modification inside the user
namespace. Following the mqueue sysctls, we changed the implementation
to be more userns friendly.

So far, the changes do not provide additional access to files. This
will be done in a future patch.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/be6f9d014276f4dddd0c3aa05a86052856c1c555.1644862280.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

ipc/ipc_sysctl.c: remove fallback for !CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL

2021-11-09T18:02:53+00:00

Compilation of ipc/ipc_sysctl.c is controlled by
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL)
[see ipc/Makefile]

And CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL depends on SYSCTL
[see init/Kconfig]

An SYSCTL is selected by PROC_SYSCTL.
[see fs/proc/Kconfig]

Thus: #ifndef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL in ipc/ipc_sysctl.c is impossible, the
fallback can be removed.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210918145337.3369-1-manfred@colorfullife.com
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul 
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Manfred Spraul 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc: check checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() to modify C/R proc files

2021-11-09T18:02:53+00:00

This commit removes the requirement to be root to modify sem_next_id,
msg_next_id and shm_next_id and checks checkpoint_restore_ns_capable
instead.

Since those files are specific to the IPC namespace, there is no reason
they should require root privileges.  This is similar to ns_last_pid,
which also only checks checkpoint_restore_ns_capable.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: ipc/ipc_sysctl.c needs capability.h for checkpoint_restore_ns_capable()]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210916163717.3179496-1-mclapinski@google.com
Signed-off-by: Michal Clapinski 
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Reviewed-by: Manfred Spraul 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc: adjust proc_ipc_sem_dointvec definition to match prototype

2020-09-05T19:14:29+00:00

Commit 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler")
changed ctl_table.proc_handler to take a kernel pointer.  Adjust the
signature of proc_ipc_sem_dointvec to match ctl_table.proc_handler which
fixes the following sparse error/warning:

  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:94:47: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:94:47:    expected void *buffer
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:94:47:    got void [noderef] __user *buffer
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:194:35: warning: incorrect type in initializer (incompatible argument 3 (different address spaces))
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:194:35:    expected int ( [usertype] *proc_handler )( ... )
  ipc/ipc_sysctl.c:194:35:    got int ( * )( ... )

Fixes: 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200825105846.5193-1-tklauser@distanz.ch
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler

2020-04-27T06:07:40+00:00

Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which
is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and
from  userspace in common code.  This also means that the strings are
always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit
safer.

As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers
a lot of the changes are mechnical.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check

2019-07-19T00:08:07+00:00

In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to
validate the user supplied value between an allowed range.  This
function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as
minimum and maximum allowed value.

On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some
readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned
to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced.

The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range
boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1,
int_max=INT_MAX in different source files:

    $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l
    248

Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some
macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them
instead of creating a local one for every object file.

This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary
compiled with the default Fedora config:

    # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o
    add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164)
    Data                                         old     new   delta
    sysctl_vals                                    -      12     +12
    __kstrtab_sysctl_vals                          -      12     +12
    max                                           14      10      -4
    int_max                                       16       -     -16
    one                                           68       -     -68
    zero                                         128      28    -100
    Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00%

[mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c]
[arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce 
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds