<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel/Makefile, branch v5.9-rc7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>all arch: remove system call sys_sysctl</title>
<updated>2020-08-15T02:56:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiaoming Ni</name>
<email>nixiaoming@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-15T00:31:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=88db0aa2421666d2f73486d15b239a4521983d55'/>
<id>88db0aa2421666d2f73486d15b239a4521983d55</id>
<content type='text'>
Since commit 61a47c1ad3a4dc ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.

We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users.  Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.

So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.

[nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni &lt;nixiaoming@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;		[arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Bin Meng &lt;bin.meng@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: chenzefeng &lt;chenzefeng2@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Cc: Chris Zankel &lt;chris@zankel.net&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò &lt;flameeyes@flameeyes.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Iurii Zaikin &lt;yzaikin@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky &lt;ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kars de Jong &lt;jongk@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Turner &lt;mattst88@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Michal Simek &lt;monstr@monstr.eu&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Naveen N. Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Cc: Paul Burton &lt;paulburton@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Henderson &lt;rth@twiddle.net&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Sudeep Holla &lt;sudeep.holla@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@stackframe.org&gt;
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Zhou Yanjie &lt;zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since commit 61a47c1ad3a4dc ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.

We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users.  Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.

So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.

[nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni &lt;nixiaoming@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;		[arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Aleksa Sarai &lt;cyphar@cyphar.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Bin Meng &lt;bin.meng@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: chenzefeng &lt;chenzefeng2@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Cc: Chris Zankel &lt;chris@zankel.net&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò &lt;flameeyes@flameeyes.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Iurii Zaikin &lt;yzaikin@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky &lt;ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kars de Jong &lt;jongk@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Turner &lt;mattst88@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Max Filippov &lt;jcmvbkbc@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Michal Simek &lt;monstr@monstr.eu&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Naveen N. Rao &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Cc: Paul Burton &lt;paulburton@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Henderson &lt;rth@twiddle.net&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Sudeep Holla &lt;sudeep.holla@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@stackframe.org&gt;
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Zhou Yanjie &lt;zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcov: unconditionally add -fno-stack-protector to compiler options</title>
<updated>2020-08-12T17:58:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marco Elver</name>
<email>elver@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-12T01:36:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=31a1b9878c0667945b078c92bce907552f57f2b6'/>
<id>31a1b9878c0667945b078c92bce907552f57f2b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Unconditionally add -fno-stack-protector to KCOV's compiler options, as
all supported compilers support the option.  This saves a compiler
invocation to determine if the option is supported.

Because Clang does not support -fno-conserve-stack, and
-fno-stack-protector was wrapped in the same cc-option, we were missing
-fno-stack-protector with Clang. Unconditionally adding this option
fixes this for Clang.

Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200615184302.7591-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Unconditionally add -fno-stack-protector to KCOV's compiler options, as
all supported compilers support the option.  This saves a compiler
invocation to determine if the option is supported.

Because Clang does not support -fno-conserve-stack, and
-fno-stack-protector was wrapped in the same cc-option, we were missing
-fno-stack-protector with Clang. Unconditionally adding this option
fixes this for Clang.

Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200615184302.7591-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'work.regset' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2020-08-07T16:29:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-07T16:29:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=19b39c38abf68591edbd698740d410c37ee075cc'/>
<id>19b39c38abf68591edbd698740d410c37ee075cc</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull ptrace regset updates from Al Viro:
 "Internal regset API changes:

   - regularize copy_regset_{to,from}_user() callers

   - switch to saner calling conventions for -&gt;get()

   - kill user_regset_copyout()

  The -&gt;put() side of things will have to wait for the next cycle,
  unfortunately.

  The balance is about -1KLoC and replacements for -&gt;get() instances are
  a lot saner"

* 'work.regset' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
  regset: kill user_regset_copyout{,_zero}()
  regset(): kill -&gt;get_size()
  regset: kill -&gt;get()
  csky: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  xtensa: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  parisc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  nds32: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  nios2: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  hexagon: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  h8300: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  openrisc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  riscv: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  c6x: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  ia64: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  arc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  arm: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  sh: convert to -&gt;regset_get()
  arm64: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  mips: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  sparc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull ptrace regset updates from Al Viro:
 "Internal regset API changes:

   - regularize copy_regset_{to,from}_user() callers

   - switch to saner calling conventions for -&gt;get()

   - kill user_regset_copyout()

  The -&gt;put() side of things will have to wait for the next cycle,
  unfortunately.

  The balance is about -1KLoC and replacements for -&gt;get() instances are
  a lot saner"

* 'work.regset' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
  regset: kill user_regset_copyout{,_zero}()
  regset(): kill -&gt;get_size()
  regset: kill -&gt;get()
  csky: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  xtensa: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  parisc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  nds32: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  nios2: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  hexagon: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  h8300: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  openrisc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  riscv: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  c6x: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  ia64: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  arc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  arm: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  sh: convert to -&gt;regset_get()
  arm64: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  mips: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  sparc: switch to -&gt;regset_get()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'core-entry-2020-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2020-08-05T04:00:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-05T04:00:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3f0d6ecdf1ab35ac54cabb759f748fb0bffd26a5'/>
<id>3f0d6ecdf1ab35ac54cabb759f748fb0bffd26a5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull generic kernel entry/exit code from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Generic implementation of common syscall, interrupt and exception
  entry/exit functionality based on the recent X86 effort to ensure
  correctness of entry/exit vs RCU and instrumentation.

  As this functionality and the required entry/exit sequences are not
  architecture specific, sharing them allows other architectures to
  benefit instead of copying the same code over and over again.

  This branch was kept standalone to allow others to work on it. The
  conversion of x86 comes in a seperate pull request which obviously is
  based on this branch"

* tag 'core-entry-2020-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  entry: Correct __secure_computing() stub
  entry: Correct 'noinstr' attributes
  entry: Provide infrastructure for work before transitioning to guest mode
  entry: Provide generic interrupt entry/exit code
  entry: Provide generic syscall exit function
  entry: Provide generic syscall entry functionality
  seccomp: Provide stub for __secure_computing()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull generic kernel entry/exit code from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Generic implementation of common syscall, interrupt and exception
  entry/exit functionality based on the recent X86 effort to ensure
  correctness of entry/exit vs RCU and instrumentation.

  As this functionality and the required entry/exit sequences are not
  architecture specific, sharing them allows other architectures to
  benefit instead of copying the same code over and over again.

  This branch was kept standalone to allow others to work on it. The
  conversion of x86 comes in a seperate pull request which obviously is
  based on this branch"

* tag 'core-entry-2020-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  entry: Correct __secure_computing() stub
  entry: Correct 'noinstr' attributes
  entry: Provide infrastructure for work before transitioning to guest mode
  entry: Provide generic interrupt entry/exit code
  entry: Provide generic syscall exit function
  entry: Provide generic syscall entry functionality
  seccomp: Provide stub for __secure_computing()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2020-08-04T21:27:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-04T21:27:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3950e975431bc914f7e81b8f2a2dbdf2064acb0f'/>
<id>3950e975431bc914f7e81b8f2a2dbdf2064acb0f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
 "During the development of v5.7 I ran into bugs and quality of
  implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily fixed
  because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been diggin into
  exec and cleaning up what I can.

  This cycle I have been looking at different ideas and different
  implementations to see what is possible to improve exec, and cleaning
  the way exec interfaces with in kernel users. Only cleaning up the
  interfaces of exec with rest of the kernel has managed to stabalize
  and make it through review in time for v5.9-rc1 resulting in 2 sets of
  changes this cycle.

   - Implement kernel_execve

   - Make the user mode driver code a better citizen

  With kernel_execve the code size got a little larger as the copying of
  parameters from userspace and copying of parameters from userspace is
  now separate. The good news is kernel threads no longer need to play
  games with set_fs to use exec. Which when combined with the rest of
  Christophs set_fs changes should security bugs with set_fs much more
  difficult"

* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (23 commits)
  exec: Implement kernel_execve
  exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages
  exec: Factor bprm_execve out of do_execve_common
  exec: Move bprm_mm_init into alloc_bprm
  exec: Move initialization of bprm-&gt;filename into alloc_bprm
  exec: Factor out alloc_bprm
  exec: Remove unnecessary spaces from binfmts.h
  umd: Stop using split_argv
  umd: Remove exit_umh
  bpfilter: Take advantage of the facilities of struct pid
  exit: Factor thread_group_exited out of pidfd_poll
  umd: Track user space drivers with struct pid
  bpfilter: Move bpfilter_umh back into init data
  exec: Remove do_execve_file
  umh: Stop calling do_execve_file
  umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into fork_usermode_driver
  umd: Rename umd_info.cmdline umd_info.driver_name
  umd: For clarity rename umh_info umd_info
  umh: Separate the user mode driver and the user mode helper support
  umh: Remove call_usermodehelper_setup_file.
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
 "During the development of v5.7 I ran into bugs and quality of
  implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily fixed
  because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been diggin into
  exec and cleaning up what I can.

  This cycle I have been looking at different ideas and different
  implementations to see what is possible to improve exec, and cleaning
  the way exec interfaces with in kernel users. Only cleaning up the
  interfaces of exec with rest of the kernel has managed to stabalize
  and make it through review in time for v5.9-rc1 resulting in 2 sets of
  changes this cycle.

   - Implement kernel_execve

   - Make the user mode driver code a better citizen

  With kernel_execve the code size got a little larger as the copying of
  parameters from userspace and copying of parameters from userspace is
  now separate. The good news is kernel threads no longer need to play
  games with set_fs to use exec. Which when combined with the rest of
  Christophs set_fs changes should security bugs with set_fs much more
  difficult"

* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (23 commits)
  exec: Implement kernel_execve
  exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages
  exec: Factor bprm_execve out of do_execve_common
  exec: Move bprm_mm_init into alloc_bprm
  exec: Move initialization of bprm-&gt;filename into alloc_bprm
  exec: Factor out alloc_bprm
  exec: Remove unnecessary spaces from binfmts.h
  umd: Stop using split_argv
  umd: Remove exit_umh
  bpfilter: Take advantage of the facilities of struct pid
  exit: Factor thread_group_exited out of pidfd_poll
  umd: Track user space drivers with struct pid
  bpfilter: Move bpfilter_umh back into init data
  exec: Remove do_execve_file
  umh: Stop calling do_execve_file
  umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into fork_usermode_driver
  umd: Rename umd_info.cmdline umd_info.driver_name
  umd: For clarity rename umh_info umd_info
  umh: Separate the user mode driver and the user mode helper support
  umh: Remove call_usermodehelper_setup_file.
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>introduction of regset -&gt;get() wrappers, switching ELF coredumps to those</title>
<updated>2020-07-27T18:24:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-01T23:42:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b4e9c9549f62329d2412f899635fddc5212b9cd4'/>
<id>b4e9c9549f62329d2412f899635fddc5212b9cd4</id>
<content type='text'>
Two new helpers: given a process and regset, dump into a buffer.
regset_get() takes a buffer and size, regset_get_alloc() takes size
and allocates a buffer.

Return value in both cases is the amount of data actually dumped in
case of success or -E...  on error.

In both cases the size is capped by regset-&gt;n * regset-&gt;size, so
-&gt;get() is called with offset 0 and size no more than what regset
expects.

binfmt_elf.c callers of -&gt;get() are switched to using those; the other
caller (copy_regset_to_user()) will need some preparations to switch.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Two new helpers: given a process and regset, dump into a buffer.
regset_get() takes a buffer and size, regset_get_alloc() takes size
and allocates a buffer.

Return value in both cases is the amount of data actually dumped in
case of success or -E...  on error.

In both cases the size is capped by regset-&gt;n * regset-&gt;size, so
-&gt;get() is called with offset 0 and size no more than what regset
expects.

binfmt_elf.c callers of -&gt;get() are switched to using those; the other
caller (copy_regset_to_user()) will need some preparations to switch.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>entry: Provide generic syscall entry functionality</title>
<updated>2020-07-24T12:59:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-22T21:59:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=142781e108b13b2b0e8f035cfb5bfbbc8f14d887'/>
<id>142781e108b13b2b0e8f035cfb5bfbbc8f14d887</id>
<content type='text'>
On syscall entry certain work needs to be done:

   - Establish state (lockdep, context tracking, tracing)
   - Conditional work (ptrace, seccomp, audit...)

This code is needlessly duplicated and  different in all
architectures.

Provide a generic version based on the x86 implementation which has all the
RCU and instrumentation bits right.

As interrupt/exception entry from user space needs parts of the same
functionality, provide a function for this as well.

syscall_enter_from_user_mode() and irqentry_enter_from_user_mode() must be
called right after the low level ASM entry. The calling code must be
non-instrumentable. After the functions returns state is correct and the
subsequent functions can be instrumented.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220519.513463269@linutronix.de

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On syscall entry certain work needs to be done:

   - Establish state (lockdep, context tracking, tracing)
   - Conditional work (ptrace, seccomp, audit...)

This code is needlessly duplicated and  different in all
architectures.

Provide a generic version based on the x86 implementation which has all the
RCU and instrumentation bits right.

As interrupt/exception entry from user space needs parts of the same
functionality, provide a function for this as well.

syscall_enter_from_user_mode() and irqentry_enter_from_user_mode() must be
called right after the low level ASM entry. The calling code must be
non-instrumentable. After the functions returns state is correct and the
subsequent functions can be instrumented.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220519.513463269@linutronix.de

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>umh: Separate the user mode driver and the user mode helper support</title>
<updated>2020-07-04T14:34:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-26T17:23:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=884c5e683b67dbc52892e24c29eed864f330ec08'/>
<id>884c5e683b67dbc52892e24c29eed864f330ec08</id>
<content type='text'>
This makes it clear which code is part of the core user mode
helper support and which code is needed to implement user mode
drivers.

This makes the kernel smaller for everyone who does not use a usermode
driver.

v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87tuyyf0ln.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87imf963s6.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200702164140.4468-5-ebiederm@xmission.com
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This makes it clear which code is part of the core user mode
helper support and which code is needed to implement user mode
drivers.

This makes the kernel smaller for everyone who does not use a usermode
driver.

v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87tuyyf0ln.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87imf963s6.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200702164140.4468-5-ebiederm@xmission.com
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gcc-plugins/stackleak: Don't instrument itself</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T14:48:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Popov</name>
<email>alex.popov@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-24T12:33:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=005e696df65d0ff90468ecf38a50aa584dc82421'/>
<id>005e696df65d0ff90468ecf38a50aa584dc82421</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no need to try instrumenting functions in kernel/stackleak.c.
Otherwise that can cause issues if the cleanup pass of stackleak gcc plugin
is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200624123330.83226-2-alex.popov@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is no need to try instrumenting functions in kernel/stackleak.c.
Otherwise that can cause issues if the cleanup pass of stackleak gcc plugin
is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200624123330.83226-2-alex.popov@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2020-06-13T16:56:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-13T16:56:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6c3297841472b4e53e22e53826eea9e483d993e5'/>
<id>6c3297841472b4e53e22e53826eea9e483d993e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux &amp; Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&amp;co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &amp;filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe-&gt;mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe-&gt;mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux &amp; Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&amp;co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &amp;filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe-&gt;mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe-&gt;mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
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