linux-toradex.git/kernel/bpf/syscall.c, branch v4.18-rc4

bpf: fix attach type BPF_LIRC_MODE2 dependency wrt CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF

2018-06-26T09:28:38+00:00

If the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF not enabled, it is not
possible to attach, detach or query IR BPF programs to /dev/lircN devices,
making them impossible to use. For embedded devices, it should be possible
to use IR decoding without cgroups or CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF enabled.

This change requires some refactoring, since bpf_prog_{attach,detach,query}
functions are now always compiled, but their code paths for cgroups need
moving out. Rather than a #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF in kernel/bpf/syscall.c,
moving them to kernel/bpf/cgroup.c and kernel/bpf/sockmap.c does not
require #ifdefs since that is already conditionally compiled.

Fixes: f4364dcfc86d ("media: rc: introduce BPF_PROG_LIRC_MODE2")
Signed-off-by: Sean Young 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock

2018-06-15T18:14:25+00:00

We currently lock any JITed image as read-only via bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro()
as well as the BPF image as read-only through bpf_prog_lock_ro(). In
the case any of these would fail we throw a WARN_ON_ONCE() in order to
yell loudly to the log. Perhaps, to some extend, this may be comparable
to an allocation where __GFP_NOWARN is explicitly not set.

Added via 65869a47f348 ("bpf: improve read-only handling"), this behavior
is slightly different compared to any of the other in-kernel set_memory_ro()
users who do not check the return code of set_memory_ro() and friends /at
all/ (e.g. in the case of module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro()). Given
in BPF this is mandatory hardening step, we want to know whether there
are any issues that would leave both BPF data writable. So it happens
that syzkaller enabled fault injection and it triggered memory allocation
failure deep inside x86's change_page_attr_set_clr() which was triggered
from set_memory_ro().

Now, there are two options: i) leaving everything as is, and ii) reworking
the image locking code in order to have a final checkpoint out of the
central bpf_prog_select_runtime() which probes whether any of the calls
during prog setup weren't successful, and then bailing out with an error.
Option ii) is a better approach since this additional paranoia avoids
altogether leaving any potential W+X pages from BPF side in the system.
Therefore, lets be strict about it, and reject programs in such unlikely
occasion. While testing I noticed also that one bpf_prog_lock_ro()
call was missing on the outer dummy prog in case of calls, e.g. in the
destructor we call bpf_prog_free_deferred() on the main prog where we
try to bpf_prog_unlock_free() the program, and since we go via
bpf_prog_select_runtime() do that as well.

Reported-by: syzbot+3b889862e65a98317058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+9e762b52dd17e616a7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: fix panic in prog load calls cleanup

2018-06-15T18:14:25+00:00

While testing I found that when hitting error path in bpf_prog_load()
where we jump to free_used_maps and prog contained BPF to BPF calls
that were JITed earlier, then we never clean up the bpf_prog_kallsyms_add()
done under jit_subprogs(). Add proper API to make BPF kallsyms deletion
more clear and fix that.

Fixes: 1c2a088a6626 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: show prog and map id in fdinfo

2018-06-03T14:42:06+00:00

Its trivial and straight forward to expose it for scripts that can
then use it along with bpftool in order to inspect an individual
application's used maps and progs. Right now we dump some basic
information in the fdinfo file but with the help of the map/prog
id full introspection becomes possible now.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Song Liu 
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

media: rc: introduce BPF_PROG_LIRC_MODE2

2018-05-30T10:38:40+00:00

Add support for BPF_PROG_LIRC_MODE2. This type of BPF program can call
rc_keydown() to reported decoded IR scancodes, or rc_repeat() to report
that the last key should be repeated.

The bpf program can be attached to using the bpf(BPF_PROG_ATTACH) syscall;
the target_fd must be the /dev/lircN device.

Acked-by: Yonghong Song 
Signed-off-by: Sean Young 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg

2018-05-28T15:41:02+00:00

In addition to already existing BPF hooks for sys_bind and sys_connect,
the patch provides new hooks for sys_sendmsg.

It leverages existing BPF program type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR`
that provides access to socket itlself (properties like family, type,
protocol) and user-passed `struct sockaddr *` so that BPF program can
override destination IP and port for system calls such as sendto(2) or
sendmsg(2) and/or assign source IP to the socket.

The hooks are implemented as two new attach types:
`BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_SENDMSG` and `BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_SENDMSG` for UDPv4 and
UDPv6 correspondingly.

UDPv4 and UDPv6 separate attach types for same reason as sys_bind and
sys_connect hooks, i.e. to prevent reading from / writing to e.g.
user_ip6 fields when user passes sockaddr_in since it'd be out-of-bound.

The difference with already existing hooks is sys_sendmsg are
implemented only for unconnected UDP.

For TCP it doesn't make sense to change user-provided `struct sockaddr *`
at sendto(2)/sendmsg(2) time since socket either was already connected
and has source/destination set or wasn't connected and call to
sendto(2)/sendmsg(2) would lead to ENOTCONN anyway.

Connected UDP is already handled by sys_connect hooks that can override
source/destination at connect time and use fast-path later, i.e. these
hooks don't affect UDP fast-path.

Rewriting source IP is implemented differently than that in sys_connect
hooks. When sys_sendmsg is used with unconnected UDP it doesn't work to
just bind socket to desired local IP address since source IP can be set
on per-packet basis by using ancillary data (cmsg(3)). So no matter if
socket is bound or not, source IP has to be rewritten on every call to
sys_sendmsg.

To do so two new fields are added to UAPI `struct bpf_sock_addr`;
* `msg_src_ip4` to set source IPv4 for UDPv4;
* `msg_src_ip6` to set source IPv6 for UDPv6.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: introduce bpf subcommand BPF_TASK_FD_QUERY

2018-05-25T01:18:19+00:00

Currently, suppose a userspace application has loaded a bpf program
and attached it to a tracepoint/kprobe/uprobe, and a bpf
introspection tool, e.g., bpftool, wants to show which bpf program
is attached to which tracepoint/kprobe/uprobe. Such attachment
information will be really useful to understand the overall bpf
deployment in the system.

There is a name field (16 bytes) for each program, which could
be used to encode the attachment point. There are some drawbacks
for this approaches. First, bpftool user (e.g., an admin) may not
really understand the association between the name and the
attachment point. Second, if one program is attached to multiple
places, encoding a proper name which can imply all these
attachments becomes difficult.

This patch introduces a new bpf subcommand BPF_TASK_FD_QUERY.
Given a pid and fd, if the  is associated with a
tracepoint/kprobe/uprobe perf event, BPF_TASK_FD_QUERY will return
   . prog_id
   . tracepoint name, or
   . k[ret]probe funcname + offset or kernel addr, or
   . u[ret]probe filename + offset
to the userspace.
The user can use "bpftool prog" to find more information about
bpf program itself with prog_id.

Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: get JITed image lengths of functions via syscall

2018-05-24T07:20:49+00:00

This adds new two new fields to struct bpf_prog_info. For
multi-function programs, these fields can be used to pass
a list of the JITed image lengths of each function for a
given program to userspace using the bpf system call with
the BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD command.

This can be used by userspace applications like bpftool
to split up the contiguous JITed dump, also obtained via
the system call, into more relatable chunks corresponding
to each function.

Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: fix multi-function JITed dump obtained via syscall

2018-05-24T07:20:49+00:00

Currently, for multi-function programs, we cannot get the JITed
instructions using the bpf system call's BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
command. Because of this, userspace tools such as bpftool fail
to identify a multi-function program as being JITed or not.

With the JIT enabled and the test program running, this can be
verified as follows:

  # cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
  1

Before applying this patch:

  # bpftool prog list
  1: kprobe  name foo  tag b811aab41a39ad3d  gpl
          loaded_at 2018-05-16T11:43:38+0530  uid 0
          xlated 216B  not jited  memlock 65536B
  ...

  # bpftool prog dump jited id 1
  no instructions returned

After applying this patch:

  # bpftool prog list
  1: kprobe  name foo  tag b811aab41a39ad3d  gpl
          loaded_at 2018-05-16T12:13:01+0530  uid 0
          xlated 216B  jited 308B  memlock 65536B
  ...

  # bpftool prog dump jited id 1
     0:   nop
     4:   nop
     8:   mflr    r0
     c:   std     r0,16(r1)
    10:   stdu    r1,-112(r1)
    14:   std     r31,104(r1)
    18:   addi    r31,r1,48
    1c:   li      r3,10
  ...

Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: get kernel symbol addresses via syscall

2018-05-24T07:20:49+00:00

This adds new two new fields to struct bpf_prog_info. For
multi-function programs, these fields can be used to pass
a list of kernel symbol addresses for all functions in a
given program to userspace using the bpf system call with
the BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD command.

When bpf_jit_kallsyms is enabled, we can get the address
of the corresponding kernel symbol for a callee function
and resolve the symbol's name. The address is determined
by adding the value of the call instruction's imm field
to __bpf_call_base. This offset gets assigned to the imm
field by the verifier.

For some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
is not large enough to hold this offset.

We resolve this by:

[1] Assigning the subprog id to the imm field of a call
    instruction in the verifier instead of the offset of
    the callee's symbol's address from __bpf_call_base.

[2] Determining the address of a callee's corresponding
    symbol by using the imm field as an index for the
    list of kernel symbol addresses now available from
    the program info.

Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann