<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel/bpf/syscall.c, branch v5.19-rc1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: refine kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled behaviour</title>
<updated>2022-05-21T02:48:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alan Maguire</name>
<email>alan.maguire@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-19T14:25:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c8644cd0efe719608ddcb341bcf087d4bc0bf6b8'/>
<id>c8644cd0efe719608ddcb341bcf087d4bc0bf6b8</id>
<content type='text'>
With unprivileged BPF disabled, all cmds associated with the BPF syscall
are blocked to users without CAP_BPF/CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  However there are
use cases where we may wish to allow interactions with BPF programs
without being able to load and attach them.  So for example, a process
with required capabilities loads/attaches a BPF program, and a process
with less capabilities interacts with it; retrieving perf/ring buffer
events, modifying map-specified config etc.  With all BPF syscall
commands blocked as a result of unprivileged BPF being disabled,
this mode of interaction becomes impossible for processes without
CAP_BPF.

As Alexei notes

"The bpf ACL model is the same as traditional file's ACL.
The creds and ACLs are checked at open().  Then during file's write/read
additional checks might be performed. BPF has such functionality already.
Different map_creates have capability checks while map_lookup has:
map_get_sys_perms(map, f) &amp; FMODE_CAN_READ.
In other words it's enough to gate FD-receiving parts of bpf
with unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl.
The rest is handled by availability of FD and access to files in bpffs."

So key fd creation syscall commands BPF_PROG_LOAD and BPF_MAP_CREATE
are blocked with unprivileged BPF disabled and no CAP_BPF.

And as Alexei notes, map creation with unprivileged BPF disabled off
blocks creation of maps aside from array, hash and ringbuf maps.

Programs responsible for loading and attaching the BPF program
can still control access to its pinned representation by restricting
permissions on the pin path, as with normal files.

Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire &lt;alan.maguire@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652970334-30510-2-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With unprivileged BPF disabled, all cmds associated with the BPF syscall
are blocked to users without CAP_BPF/CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  However there are
use cases where we may wish to allow interactions with BPF programs
without being able to load and attach them.  So for example, a process
with required capabilities loads/attaches a BPF program, and a process
with less capabilities interacts with it; retrieving perf/ring buffer
events, modifying map-specified config etc.  With all BPF syscall
commands blocked as a result of unprivileged BPF being disabled,
this mode of interaction becomes impossible for processes without
CAP_BPF.

As Alexei notes

"The bpf ACL model is the same as traditional file's ACL.
The creds and ACLs are checked at open().  Then during file's write/read
additional checks might be performed. BPF has such functionality already.
Different map_creates have capability checks while map_lookup has:
map_get_sys_perms(map, f) &amp; FMODE_CAN_READ.
In other words it's enough to gate FD-receiving parts of bpf
with unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl.
The rest is handled by availability of FD and access to files in bpffs."

So key fd creation syscall commands BPF_PROG_LOAD and BPF_MAP_CREATE
are blocked with unprivileged BPF disabled and no CAP_BPF.

And as Alexei notes, map creation with unprivileged BPF disabled off
blocks creation of maps aside from array, hash and ringbuf maps.

Programs responsible for loading and attaching the BPF program
can still control access to its pinned representation by restricting
permissions on the pin path, as with normal files.

Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire &lt;alan.maguire@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652970334-30510-2-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, x86: Attach a cookie to fentry/fexit/fmod_ret/lsm.</title>
<updated>2022-05-11T04:58:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kui-Feng Lee</name>
<email>kuifeng@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-10T20:59:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2fcc82411e74e5e6aba336561cf56fb899bfae4e'/>
<id>2fcc82411e74e5e6aba336561cf56fb899bfae4e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pass a cookie along with BPF_LINK_CREATE requests.

Add a bpf_cookie field to struct bpf_tracing_link to attach a cookie.
The cookie of a bpf_tracing_link is available by calling
bpf_get_attach_cookie when running the BPF program of the attached
link.

The value of a cookie will be set at bpf_tramp_run_ctx by the
trampoline of the link.

Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220510205923.3206889-4-kuifeng@fb.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pass a cookie along with BPF_LINK_CREATE requests.

Add a bpf_cookie field to struct bpf_tracing_link to attach a cookie.
The cookie of a bpf_tracing_link is available by calling
bpf_get_attach_cookie when running the BPF program of the attached
link.

The value of a cookie will be set at bpf_tramp_run_ctx by the
trampoline of the link.

Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220510205923.3206889-4-kuifeng@fb.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, x86: Create bpf_tramp_run_ctx on the caller thread's stack</title>
<updated>2022-05-11T00:50:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kui-Feng Lee</name>
<email>kuifeng@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-10T20:59:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e384c7b7b46d0a5f4bf3c554f963e6e9622d0ab1'/>
<id>e384c7b7b46d0a5f4bf3c554f963e6e9622d0ab1</id>
<content type='text'>
BPF trampolines will create a bpf_tramp_run_ctx, a bpf_run_ctx, on
stacks and set/reset the current bpf_run_ctx before/after calling a
bpf_prog.

Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220510205923.3206889-3-kuifeng@fb.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
BPF trampolines will create a bpf_tramp_run_ctx, a bpf_run_ctx, on
stacks and set/reset the current bpf_run_ctx before/after calling a
bpf_prog.

Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220510205923.3206889-3-kuifeng@fb.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, x86: Generate trampolines from bpf_tramp_links</title>
<updated>2022-05-11T00:50:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kui-Feng Lee</name>
<email>kuifeng@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-10T20:59:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f7e0beaf39d3868dc700d4954b26cf8443c5d423'/>
<id>f7e0beaf39d3868dc700d4954b26cf8443c5d423</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace struct bpf_tramp_progs with struct bpf_tramp_links to collect
struct bpf_tramp_link(s) for a trampoline.  struct bpf_tramp_link
extends bpf_link to act as a linked list node.

arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline() accepts a struct bpf_tramp_links to
collects all bpf_tramp_link(s) that a trampoline should call.

Change BPF trampoline and bpf_struct_ops to pass bpf_tramp_links
instead of bpf_tramp_progs.

Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220510205923.3206889-2-kuifeng@fb.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Replace struct bpf_tramp_progs with struct bpf_tramp_links to collect
struct bpf_tramp_link(s) for a trampoline.  struct bpf_tramp_link
extends bpf_link to act as a linked list node.

arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline() accepts a struct bpf_tramp_links to
collects all bpf_tramp_link(s) that a trampoline should call.

Change BPF trampoline and bpf_struct_ops to pass bpf_tramp_links
instead of bpf_tramp_progs.

Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220510205923.3206889-2-kuifeng@fb.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add bpf_link iterator</title>
<updated>2022-05-10T18:20:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitrii Dolgov</name>
<email>9erthalion6@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-10T15:52:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f88361273082825d9f0d13a543d49f9fa0d44a8'/>
<id>9f88361273082825d9f0d13a543d49f9fa0d44a8</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement bpf_link iterator to traverse links via bpf_seq_file
operations. The changeset is mostly shamelessly copied from
commit a228a64fc1e4 ("bpf: Add bpf_prog iterator")

Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Dolgov &lt;9erthalion6@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510155233.9815-2-9erthalion6@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Implement bpf_link iterator to traverse links via bpf_seq_file
operations. The changeset is mostly shamelessly copied from
commit a228a64fc1e4 ("bpf: Add bpf_prog iterator")

Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Dolgov &lt;9erthalion6@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510155233.9815-2-9erthalion6@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Wire up freeing of referenced kptr</title>
<updated>2022-04-26T03:26:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-24T21:48:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=14a324f6a67ef6a53e04362a70160a47eb8afffa'/>
<id>14a324f6a67ef6a53e04362a70160a47eb8afffa</id>
<content type='text'>
A destructor kfunc can be defined as void func(type *), where type may
be void or any other pointer type as per convenience.

In this patch, we ensure that the type is sane and capture the function
pointer into off_desc of ptr_off_tab for the specific pointer offset,
with the invariant that the dtor pointer is always set when 'kptr_ref'
tag is applied to the pointer's pointee type, which is indicated by the
flag BPF_MAP_VALUE_OFF_F_REF.

Note that only BTF IDs whose destructor kfunc is registered, thus become
the allowed BTF IDs for embedding as referenced kptr. Hence it serves
the purpose of finding dtor kfunc BTF ID, as well acting as a check
against the whitelist of allowed BTF IDs for this purpose.

Finally, wire up the actual freeing of the referenced pointer if any at
all available offsets, so that no references are leaked after the BPF
map goes away and the BPF program previously moved the ownership a
referenced pointer into it.

The behavior is similar to BPF timers, where bpf_map_{update,delete}_elem
will free any existing referenced kptr. The same case is with LRU map's
bpf_lru_push_free/htab_lru_push_free functions, which are extended to
reset unreferenced and free referenced kptr.

Note that unlike BPF timers, kptr is not reset or freed when map uref
drops to zero.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220424214901.2743946-8-memxor@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A destructor kfunc can be defined as void func(type *), where type may
be void or any other pointer type as per convenience.

In this patch, we ensure that the type is sane and capture the function
pointer into off_desc of ptr_off_tab for the specific pointer offset,
with the invariant that the dtor pointer is always set when 'kptr_ref'
tag is applied to the pointer's pointee type, which is indicated by the
flag BPF_MAP_VALUE_OFF_F_REF.

Note that only BTF IDs whose destructor kfunc is registered, thus become
the allowed BTF IDs for embedding as referenced kptr. Hence it serves
the purpose of finding dtor kfunc BTF ID, as well acting as a check
against the whitelist of allowed BTF IDs for this purpose.

Finally, wire up the actual freeing of the referenced pointer if any at
all available offsets, so that no references are leaked after the BPF
map goes away and the BPF program previously moved the ownership a
referenced pointer into it.

The behavior is similar to BPF timers, where bpf_map_{update,delete}_elem
will free any existing referenced kptr. The same case is with LRU map's
bpf_lru_push_free/htab_lru_push_free functions, which are extended to
reset unreferenced and free referenced kptr.

Note that unlike BPF timers, kptr is not reset or freed when map uref
drops to zero.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220424214901.2743946-8-memxor@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Adapt copy_map_value for multiple offset case</title>
<updated>2022-04-26T03:26:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-24T21:48:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4d7d7f69f4b104b2ddeec6a1e7fcfd2d044ed8c4'/>
<id>4d7d7f69f4b104b2ddeec6a1e7fcfd2d044ed8c4</id>
<content type='text'>
Since now there might be at most 10 offsets that need handling in
copy_map_value, the manual shuffling and special case is no longer going
to work. Hence, let's generalise the copy_map_value function by using
a sorted array of offsets to skip regions that must be avoided while
copying into and out of a map value.

When the map is created, we populate the offset array in struct map,
Then, copy_map_value uses this sorted offset array is used to memcpy
while skipping timer, spin lock, and kptr. The array is allocated as
in most cases none of these special fields would be present in map
value, hence we can save on space for the common case by not embedding
the entire object inside bpf_map struct.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220424214901.2743946-6-memxor@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since now there might be at most 10 offsets that need handling in
copy_map_value, the manual shuffling and special case is no longer going
to work. Hence, let's generalise the copy_map_value function by using
a sorted array of offsets to skip regions that must be avoided while
copying into and out of a map value.

When the map is created, we populate the offset array in struct map,
Then, copy_map_value uses this sorted offset array is used to memcpy
while skipping timer, spin lock, and kptr. The array is allocated as
in most cases none of these special fields would be present in map
value, hence we can save on space for the common case by not embedding
the entire object inside bpf_map struct.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220424214901.2743946-6-memxor@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Allow storing unreferenced kptr in map</title>
<updated>2022-04-26T00:31:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-24T21:48:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=61df10c7799e27807ad5e459eec9d77cddf8bf45'/>
<id>61df10c7799e27807ad5e459eec9d77cddf8bf45</id>
<content type='text'>
This commit introduces a new pointer type 'kptr' which can be embedded
in a map value to hold a PTR_TO_BTF_ID stored by a BPF program during
its invocation. When storing such a kptr, BPF program's PTR_TO_BTF_ID
register must have the same type as in the map value's BTF, and loading
a kptr marks the destination register as PTR_TO_BTF_ID with the correct
kernel BTF and BTF ID.

Such kptr are unreferenced, i.e. by the time another invocation of the
BPF program loads this pointer, the object which the pointer points to
may not longer exist. Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID loads (using BPF_LDX) are
patched to PROBE_MEM loads by the verifier, it would safe to allow user
to still access such invalid pointer, but passing such pointers into
BPF helpers and kfuncs should not be permitted. A future patch in this
series will close this gap.

The flexibility offered by allowing programs to dereference such invalid
pointers while being safe at runtime frees the verifier from doing
complex lifetime tracking. As long as the user may ensure that the
object remains valid, it can ensure data read by it from the kernel
object is valid.

The user indicates that a certain pointer must be treated as kptr
capable of accepting stores of PTR_TO_BTF_ID of a certain type, by using
a BTF type tag 'kptr' on the pointed to type of the pointer. Then, this
information is recorded in the object BTF which will be passed into the
kernel by way of map's BTF information. The name and kind from the map
value BTF is used to look up the in-kernel type, and the actual BTF and
BTF ID is recorded in the map struct in a new kptr_off_tab member. For
now, only storing pointers to structs is permitted.

An example of this specification is shown below:

	#define __kptr __attribute__((btf_type_tag("kptr")))

	struct map_value {
		...
		struct task_struct __kptr *task;
		...
	};

Then, in a BPF program, user may store PTR_TO_BTF_ID with the type
task_struct into the map, and then load it later.

Note that the destination register is marked PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL, as
the verifier cannot know whether the value is NULL or not statically, it
must treat all potential loads at that map value offset as loading a
possibly NULL pointer.

Only BPF_LDX, BPF_STX, and BPF_ST (with insn-&gt;imm = 0 to denote NULL)
are allowed instructions that can access such a pointer. On BPF_LDX, the
destination register is updated to be a PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and on BPF_STX,
it is checked whether the source register type is a PTR_TO_BTF_ID with
same BTF type as specified in the map BTF. The access size must always
be BPF_DW.

For the map in map support, the kptr_off_tab for outer map is copied
from the inner map's kptr_off_tab. It was chosen to do a deep copy
instead of introducing a refcount to kptr_off_tab, because the copy only
needs to be done when paramterizing using inner_map_fd in the map in map
case, hence would be unnecessary for all other users.

It is not permitted to use MAP_FREEZE command and mmap for BPF map
having kptrs, similar to the bpf_timer case. A kptr also requires that
BPF program has both read and write access to the map (hence both
BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG are disallowed).

Note that check_map_access must be called from both
check_helper_mem_access and for the BPF instructions, hence the kptr
check must distinguish between ACCESS_DIRECT and ACCESS_HELPER, and
reject ACCESS_HELPER cases. We rename stack_access_src to bpf_access_src
and reuse it for this purpose.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220424214901.2743946-2-memxor@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This commit introduces a new pointer type 'kptr' which can be embedded
in a map value to hold a PTR_TO_BTF_ID stored by a BPF program during
its invocation. When storing such a kptr, BPF program's PTR_TO_BTF_ID
register must have the same type as in the map value's BTF, and loading
a kptr marks the destination register as PTR_TO_BTF_ID with the correct
kernel BTF and BTF ID.

Such kptr are unreferenced, i.e. by the time another invocation of the
BPF program loads this pointer, the object which the pointer points to
may not longer exist. Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID loads (using BPF_LDX) are
patched to PROBE_MEM loads by the verifier, it would safe to allow user
to still access such invalid pointer, but passing such pointers into
BPF helpers and kfuncs should not be permitted. A future patch in this
series will close this gap.

The flexibility offered by allowing programs to dereference such invalid
pointers while being safe at runtime frees the verifier from doing
complex lifetime tracking. As long as the user may ensure that the
object remains valid, it can ensure data read by it from the kernel
object is valid.

The user indicates that a certain pointer must be treated as kptr
capable of accepting stores of PTR_TO_BTF_ID of a certain type, by using
a BTF type tag 'kptr' on the pointed to type of the pointer. Then, this
information is recorded in the object BTF which will be passed into the
kernel by way of map's BTF information. The name and kind from the map
value BTF is used to look up the in-kernel type, and the actual BTF and
BTF ID is recorded in the map struct in a new kptr_off_tab member. For
now, only storing pointers to structs is permitted.

An example of this specification is shown below:

	#define __kptr __attribute__((btf_type_tag("kptr")))

	struct map_value {
		...
		struct task_struct __kptr *task;
		...
	};

Then, in a BPF program, user may store PTR_TO_BTF_ID with the type
task_struct into the map, and then load it later.

Note that the destination register is marked PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL, as
the verifier cannot know whether the value is NULL or not statically, it
must treat all potential loads at that map value offset as loading a
possibly NULL pointer.

Only BPF_LDX, BPF_STX, and BPF_ST (with insn-&gt;imm = 0 to denote NULL)
are allowed instructions that can access such a pointer. On BPF_LDX, the
destination register is updated to be a PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and on BPF_STX,
it is checked whether the source register type is a PTR_TO_BTF_ID with
same BTF type as specified in the map BTF. The access size must always
be BPF_DW.

For the map in map support, the kptr_off_tab for outer map is copied
from the inner map's kptr_off_tab. It was chosen to do a deep copy
instead of introducing a refcount to kptr_off_tab, because the copy only
needs to be done when paramterizing using inner_map_fd in the map in map
case, hence would be unnecessary for all other users.

It is not permitted to use MAP_FREEZE command and mmap for BPF map
having kptrs, similar to the bpf_timer case. A kptr also requires that
BPF program has both read and write access to the map (hence both
BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG and BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG are disallowed).

Note that check_map_access must be called from both
check_helper_mem_access and for the BPF instructions, hence the kptr
check must distinguish between ACCESS_DIRECT and ACCESS_HELPER, and
reject ACCESS_HELPER cases. We rename stack_access_src to bpf_access_src
and reuse it for this purpose.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220424214901.2743946-2-memxor@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Allow attach TRACING programs through LINK_CREATE command</title>
<updated>2022-04-22T22:36:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andrii@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-21T03:39:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=df86ca0d2f0fa6be525a25b0b3d836d361f85754'/>
<id>df86ca0d2f0fa6be525a25b0b3d836d361f85754</id>
<content type='text'>
Allow attaching BTF-aware TRACING programs, previously attachable only
through BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN command, through LINK_CREATE command:

  - BTF-aware raw tracepoints (tp_btf in libbpf lingo);
  - fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs;
  - BPF LSM programs.

This change converges all bpf_link-based attachments under LINK_CREATE
command allowing to further extend the API with features like BPF cookie
under "multiplexed" link_create section of bpf_attr.

Non-BTF-aware raw tracepoints are left under BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN,
but there is nothing preventing opening them up to LINK_CREATE as well.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuifeng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220421033945.3602803-2-andrii@kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Allow attaching BTF-aware TRACING programs, previously attachable only
through BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN command, through LINK_CREATE command:

  - BTF-aware raw tracepoints (tp_btf in libbpf lingo);
  - fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs;
  - BPF LSM programs.

This change converges all bpf_link-based attachments under LINK_CREATE
command allowing to further extend the API with features like BPF cookie
under "multiplexed" link_create section of bpf_attr.

Non-BTF-aware raw tracepoints are left under BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN,
but there is nothing preventing opening them up to LINK_CREATE as well.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuifeng Lee &lt;kuifeng@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220421033945.3602803-2-andrii@kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Move BPF sysctls from kernel/sysctl.c to BPF core</title>
<updated>2022-04-13T19:36:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yan Zhu</name>
<email>zhuyan34@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-07T07:07:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2900005ea287b11dcc8c1b9fcf24893b7ff41d6d'/>
<id>2900005ea287b11dcc8c1b9fcf24893b7ff41d6d</id>
<content type='text'>
We're moving sysctls out of kernel/sysctl.c as it is a mess. We
already moved all filesystem sysctls out. And with time the goal
is to move all sysctls out to their own subsystem/actual user.

kernel/sysctl.c has grown to an insane mess and its easy to run
into conflicts with it. The effort to move them out into various
subsystems is part of this.

Signed-off-by: Yan Zhu &lt;zhuyan34@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220407070759.29506-1-zhuyan34@huawei.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We're moving sysctls out of kernel/sysctl.c as it is a mess. We
already moved all filesystem sysctls out. And with time the goal
is to move all sysctls out to their own subsystem/actual user.

kernel/sysctl.c has grown to an insane mess and its easy to run
into conflicts with it. The effort to move them out into various
subsystems is part of this.

Signed-off-by: Yan Zhu &lt;zhuyan34@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberlain &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220407070759.29506-1-zhuyan34@huawei.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
