<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel/bpf/verifier.c, branch v5.12-rc8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:52:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-24T09:38:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0'/>
<id>7fedb63a8307dda0ec3b8969a3b233a1dd7ea8e0</id>
<content type='text'>
This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic
in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in
the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value
pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory
via side-channel to user space.

Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper
represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left
which is then fed as aux-&gt;alu_limit to generate masking instructions against
the offset register. After the change, the derived aux-&gt;alu_limit represents
the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which
is just a narrower subset of the former limit.

For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points
in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu
operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before
the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the
verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation,
in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer
out-of-bounds.

In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute
distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit
via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail
out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification
paths with different states.

Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter &lt;benedict.schlueter@rub.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter &lt;benedict.schlueter@rub.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This work tightens the offset mask we use for unprivileged pointer arithmetic
in order to mitigate a corner case reported by Piotr and Benedict where in
the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value
pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-bounds in order to leak kernel memory
via side-channel to user space.

Before this change, the computed ptr_limit for retrieve_ptr_limit() helper
represents largest valid distance when moving pointer to the right or left
which is then fed as aux-&gt;alu_limit to generate masking instructions against
the offset register. After the change, the derived aux-&gt;alu_limit represents
the largest potential value of the offset register which we mask against which
is just a narrower subset of the former limit.

For minimal complexity, we call sanitize_ptr_alu() from 2 observation points
in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), that is, before and after the simulated alu
operation. In the first step, we retieve the alu_state and alu_limit before
the operation as well as we branch-off a verifier path and push it to the
verification stack as we did before which checks the dst_reg under truncation,
in other words, when the speculative domain would attempt to move the pointer
out-of-bounds.

In the second step, we retrieve the new alu_limit and calculate the absolute
distance between both. Moreover, we commit the alu_state and final alu_limit
via update_alu_sanitation_state() to the env's instruction aux data, and bail
out from there if there is a mismatch due to coming from different verification
paths with different states.

Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter &lt;benedict.schlueter@rub.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Benedict Schlueter &lt;benedict.schlueter@rub.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:51:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-24T10:25:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f528819334881fd622fdadeddb3f7edaed8b7c9b'/>
<id>f528819334881fd622fdadeddb3f7edaed8b7c9b</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a small sanitize_needed() helper function and move sanitize_val_alu()
out of the main opcode switch. In upcoming work, we'll move sanitize_ptr_alu()
as well out of its opcode switch so this helps to streamline both.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a small sanitize_needed() helper function and move sanitize_val_alu()
out of the main opcode switch. In upcoming work, we'll move sanitize_ptr_alu()
as well out of its opcode switch so this helps to streamline both.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:51:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-23T14:05:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4'/>
<id>073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:51:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-23T08:30:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a6aaece00a57fa6f22575364b3903dfbccf5345d'/>
<id>a6aaece00a57fa6f22575364b3903dfbccf5345d</id>
<content type='text'>
Consolidate all error handling and provide more user-friendly error messages
from sanitize_ptr_alu() and sanitize_val_alu().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Consolidate all error handling and provide more user-friendly error messages
from sanitize_ptr_alu() and sanitize_val_alu().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:51:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-23T08:04:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b658bbb844e28f1862867f37e8ca11a8e2aa94a3'/>
<id>b658bbb844e28f1862867f37e8ca11a8e2aa94a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Small refactor with no semantic changes in order to consolidate the max
ptr_limit boundary check.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Small refactor with no semantic changes in order to consolidate the max
ptr_limit boundary check.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:51:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-23T07:51:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=24c109bb1537c12c02aeed2d51a347b4d6a9b76e'/>
<id>24c109bb1537c12c02aeed2d51a347b4d6a9b76e</id>
<content type='text'>
The mixed signed bounds check really belongs into retrieve_ptr_limit()
instead of outside of it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). The reason is
that this check is not tied to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE only, but to all pointer
types that we handle in retrieve_ptr_limit() and given errors from the latter
propagate back to adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() and lead to rejection of the
program, it's a better place to reside to avoid anything slipping through
for future types. The reason why we must reject such off_reg is that we
otherwise would not be able to derive a mask, see details in 9d7eceede769
("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged").

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The mixed signed bounds check really belongs into retrieve_ptr_limit()
instead of outside of it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). The reason is
that this check is not tied to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE only, but to all pointer
types that we handle in retrieve_ptr_limit() and given errors from the latter
propagate back to adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() and lead to rejection of the
program, it's a better place to reside to avoid anything slipping through
for future types. The reason why we must reject such off_reg is that we
otherwise would not be able to derive a mask, see details in 9d7eceede769
("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged").

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:51:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T14:45:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6f55b2f2a1178856c19bbce2f71449926e731914'/>
<id>6f55b2f2a1178856c19bbce2f71449926e731914</id>
<content type='text'>
Small refactor to drag off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu(), so we later on can
use off_reg for generalizing some of the checks for all pointer types.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Small refactor to drag off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu(), so we later on can
use off_reg for generalizing some of the checks for all pointer types.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Use correct permission flag for mixed signed bounds arithmetic</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T21:51:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-23T07:32:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9601148392520e2e134936e76788fc2a6371e7be'/>
<id>9601148392520e2e134936e76788fc2a6371e7be</id>
<content type='text'>
We forbid adding unknown scalars with mixed signed bounds due to the
spectre v1 masking mitigation. Hence this also needs bypass_spec_v1
flag instead of allow_ptr_leaks.

Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We forbid adding unknown scalars with mixed signed bounds due to the
spectre v1 masking mitigation. Hence this also needs bypass_spec_v1
flag instead of allow_ptr_leaks.

Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Enforce that struct_ops programs be GPL-only</title>
<updated>2021-03-26T16:50:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Toke Høiland-Jørgensen</name>
<email>toke@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-26T10:03:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=12aa8a9467b354ef893ce0fc5719a4de4949a9fb'/>
<id>12aa8a9467b354ef893ce0fc5719a4de4949a9fb</id>
<content type='text'>
With the introduction of the struct_ops program type, it became possible to
implement kernel functionality in BPF, making it viable to use BPF in place
of a regular kernel module for these particular operations.

Thus far, the only user of this mechanism is for implementing TCP
congestion control algorithms. These are clearly marked as GPL-only when
implemented as modules (as seen by the use of EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL for
tcp_register_congestion_control()), so it seems like an oversight that this
was not carried over to BPF implementations. Since this is the only user
of the struct_ops mechanism, just enforcing GPL-only for the struct_ops
program type seems like the simplest way to fix this.

Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210326100314.121853-1-toke@redhat.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With the introduction of the struct_ops program type, it became possible to
implement kernel functionality in BPF, making it viable to use BPF in place
of a regular kernel module for these particular operations.

Thus far, the only user of this mechanism is for implementing TCP
congestion control algorithms. These are clearly marked as GPL-only when
implemented as modules (as seen by the use of EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL for
tcp_register_congestion_control()), so it seems like an oversight that this
was not carried over to BPF implementations. Since this is the only user
of the struct_ops mechanism, just enforcing GPL-only for the struct_ops
program type seems like the simplest way to fix this.

Fixes: 0baf26b0fcd7 ("bpf: tcp: Support tcp_congestion_ops in bpf")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210326100314.121853-1-toke@redhat.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add sanity check for upper ptr_limit</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T20:57:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Piotr Krysiuk</name>
<email>piotras@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-16T08:47:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1b1597e64e1a610c7a96710fc4717158e98a08b3'/>
<id>1b1597e64e1a610c7a96710fc4717158e98a08b3</id>
<content type='text'>
Given we know the max possible value of ptr_limit at the time of retrieving
the latter, add basic assertions, so that the verifier can bail out if
anything looks odd and reject the program. Nothing triggered this so far,
but it also does not hurt to have these.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Given we know the max possible value of ptr_limit at the time of retrieving
the latter, add basic assertions, so that the verifier can bail out if
anything looks odd and reject the program. Nothing triggered this so far,
but it also does not hurt to have these.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
