linux-toradex.git/kernel/bpf, branch v4.9.76

bpf/verifier: Fix states_equal() comparison of pointer and UNKNOWN

2017-12-29T16:43:00+00:00

An UNKNOWN_VALUE is not supposed to be derived from a pointer, unless
pointer leaks are allowed.  Therefore, states_equal() must not treat
a state with a pointer in a register as "equal" to a state with an
UNKNOWN_VALUE in that register.

This was fixed differently upstream, but the code around here was
largely rewritten in 4.14 by commit f1174f77b50c "bpf/verifier: rework
value tracking".  The bug can be detected by the bpf/verifier sub-test
"pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 1)".

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Edward Cree 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()

2017-12-25T13:23:47+00:00

From: Jann Horn 

[ Upstream commit 95a762e2c8c942780948091f8f2a4f32fce1ac6f ]

Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.

Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.

Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.

v3:
 - add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)

Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Edward Cree 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: reject out-of-bounds stack pointer calculation

2017-12-25T13:23:47+00:00

From: Jann Horn 

Reject programs that compute wildly out-of-bounds stack pointers.
Otherwise, pointers can be computed with an offset that doesn't fit into an
`int`, causing security issues in the stack memory access check (as well as
signed integer overflow during offset addition).

This is a fix specifically for the v4.9 stable tree because the mainline
code looks very different at this point.

Fixes: 7bca0a9702edf ("bpf: enhance verifier to understand stack pointer arithmetic")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix branch pruning logic

2017-12-25T13:23:47+00:00

From: Alexei Starovoitov 

[ Upstream commit c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467 ]

when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns

2017-12-25T13:23:47+00:00

From: Alexei Starovoitov 

[ Upstream commit 8041902dae5299c1f194ba42d14383f734631009 ]

convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of
instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching.
It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops
have matching insn and insn_aux_data.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix lockdep splat

2017-12-14T08:28:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit 89ad2fa3f043a1e8daae193bcb5fe34d5f8caf28 ]

pcpu_freelist_pop() needs the same lockdep awareness than
pcpu_freelist_populate() to avoid a false positive.

 [ INFO: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected ]

 switchto-defaul/12508 [HC0[0]:SC0[6]:HE0:SE0] is trying to acquire:
  (&htab->buckets[i].lock){......}, at: [] __htab_percpu_map_update_elem+0x1cb/0x300

 and this task is already holding:
  (dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2){+.-...}, at: [] __dev_queue_xmit+0
x868/0x1240
 which would create a new lock dependency:
  (dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2){+.-...} -> (&htab->buckets[i].lock){......}

 but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
  (dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2){+.-...}
 ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at:
   [] __lock_acquire+0x42b/0x1f10
   [] lock_acquire+0xbc/0x1b0
   [] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
   [] __dev_queue_xmit+0x868/0x1240
   [] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
   [] ip_finish_output2+0x439/0x590
   [] ip_finish_output+0x150/0x2f0
   [] ip_output+0x7d/0x260
   [] ip_local_out+0x5e/0xe0
   [] ip_queue_xmit+0x205/0x620
   [] tcp_transmit_skb+0x5a8/0xcb0
   [] tcp_write_xmit+0x242/0x1070
   [] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x3c/0xf0
   [] tcp_rcv_established+0x312/0x700
   [] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x11c/0x200
   [] tcp_v4_rcv+0xaa2/0xc30
   [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa7/0x240
   [] ip_local_deliver+0x66/0x200
   [] ip_rcv_finish+0xdd/0x560
   [] ip_rcv+0x295/0x510
   [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x988/0x1020
   [] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70
   [] process_backlog+0x6f/0x230
   [] net_rx_action+0x229/0x420
   [] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x43d
   [] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
   [] do_softirq+0x55/0x60
   [] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa8/0xb0
   [] cpu_startup_entry+0x1c7/0x500
   [] start_secondary+0x113/0x140

 to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
  (&head->lock){+.+...}
 ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at:
 ...  [] __lock_acquire+0x82f/0x1f10
   [] lock_acquire+0xbc/0x1b0
   [] _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
   [] pcpu_freelist_pop+0x7a/0xb0
   [] htab_map_alloc+0x50c/0x5f0
   [] SyS_bpf+0x265/0x1200
   [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2 --> &htab->buckets[i].lock --> &head->lock

  Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&head->lock);
                                local_irq_disable();
                                lock(dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2);
                                lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
   
     lock(dev_queue->dev->qdisc_class ?: &qdisc_tx_lock#2);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: e19494edab82 ("bpf: introduce percpu_freelist")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf/verifier: reject BPF_ALU64|BPF_END

2017-10-12T09:51:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit e67b8a685c7c984e834e3181ef4619cd7025a136 ]

Neither ___bpf_prog_run nor the JITs accept it.
Also adds a new test case.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf/verifier: fix min/max handling in BPF_SUB

2017-08-30T08:21:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9305706c2e808ae59f1eb201867f82f1ddf6d7a6 ]

We have to subtract the src max from the dst min, and vice-versa, since
 (e.g.) the smallest result comes from the largest subtrahend.

Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds

2017-08-30T08:21:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4cabc5b186b5427b9ee5a7495172542af105f02b ]

Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds
tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints
on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such
as the following should have been rejected:

   0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   1: (bf) r2 = r10
   2: (07) r2 += -8
   3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400
   5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
   7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = -1
  10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0
  R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
  11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1
  R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
  12: (0f) r0 += r1
  13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
  R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1
  R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
  14: (b7) r0 = 0
  15: (95) exit

What happens is that in the first part ...

   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = -1
  10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3

... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned
against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in
reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation
is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's
minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is
larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being
'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now
'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ...

  11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2

... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here,
verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare
is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that
in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum
bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having
the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that
the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced.
When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj)
type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through
check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that
will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based
on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since
the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit
fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{,
_adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the
semantics.

It's worth to note in this context that in the current code,
min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i)
dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since
commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory")
ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a
memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length
pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value
defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that
case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the
direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue
also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program
based on the same principle must be rejected as well:

   0: (b7) r2 = 0
   1: (bf) r3 = r10
   2: (07) r3 += -512
   3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   5: (b7) r6 = -1
   6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5
  R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512
  R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp
   7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4
  R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512
  R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1
  R10=fp
   8: (07) r4 += 1
   9: (b7) r5 = 0
  10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0
  11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26
  12: (b7) r0 = 0
  13: (95) exit

Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the
verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we
pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper.
Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges.
Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one
of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be
created that uses values which are within range, thus also here
learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed
test to create a range:

   0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   1: (bf) r2 = r10
   2: (07) r2 += -8
   3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00
   5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
   7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = 2
  10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0
  R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  12: (0f) r0 += r1
  13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
  R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4
  R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  14: (b7) r0 = 0
  15: (95) exit

This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate
all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii)
to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as
done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout
the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this
patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either
from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the
case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU
operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries
on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged
on the dst reg must get rejected, too:

   0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   1: (bf) r2 = r10
   2: (07) r2 += -8
   3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00
   5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
   7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8
   8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
   9: (b7) r2 = 2
  10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp
  11: (b7) r7 = 1
  12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp
  13: (b7) r0 = 0
  14: (95) exit

  from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0
  R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp
  15: (0f) r7 += r1
  16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2
  R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp
  17: (0f) r0 += r7
  18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0
  R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3
  R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp
  19: (b7) r0 = 0
  20: (95) exit

Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range
values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/
unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value
as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries.
Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or
compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they
can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries
established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value
where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is
possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that,
meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual
access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg,
or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover
would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map
value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on
pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ
and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers
which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending
on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated
for them.

In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered
as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values.
With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small
risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could
occur and mixing compares probably unlikely.

Joint work with Josef and Edward.

  [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html

Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Reported-by: Edward Cree 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree 
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types

2017-08-30T08:21:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit fce366a9dd0ddc47e7ce05611c266e8574a45116 ]

While looking into map_value_adj, I noticed that alu operations
directly on the map_value() resp. map_value_adj() register (any
alu operation on a map_value() register will turn it into a
map_value_adj() typed register) are not sufficiently protected
against some of the operations. Two non-exhaustive examples are
provided that the verifier needs to reject:

 i) BPF_AND on r0 (map_value_adj):

  0: (bf) r2 = r10
  1: (07) r2 += -8
  2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
  3: (18) r1 = 0xbf842a00
  5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
  6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  7: (57) r0 &= 8
  8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 22
   R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=8 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit

  from 6 to 9: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit
  processed 10 insns

ii) BPF_ADD in 32 bit mode on r0 (map_value_adj):

  0: (bf) r2 = r10
  1: (07) r2 += -8
  2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
  3: (18) r1 = 0xc24eee00
  5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
  6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  7: (04) (u32) r0 += (u32) 0
  8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 22
   R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit

  from 6 to 9: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
  9: (95) exit
  processed 10 insns

Issue is, while min_value / max_value boundaries for the access
are adjusted appropriately, we change the pointer value in a way
that cannot be sufficiently tracked anymore from its origin.
Operations like BPF_{AND,OR,DIV,MUL,etc} on a destination register
that is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} was probably unintended, in fact,
all the test cases coming with 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access
into map value arrays") perform BPF_ADD only on the destination
register that is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ.

Only for UNKNOWN_VALUE register types such operations make sense,
f.e. with unknown memory content fetched initially from a constant
offset from the map value memory into a register. That register is
then later tested against lower / upper bounds, so that the verifier
can then do the tracking of min_value / max_value, and properly
check once that UNKNOWN_VALUE register is added to the destination
register with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ}. This is also what the
original use-case is solving. Note, tracking on what is being
added is done through adjust_reg_min_max_vals() and later access
to the map value enforced with these boundaries and the given offset
from the insn through check_map_access_adj().

Tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer
arithmetic, in particular in check_alu_op(), we bail out on the
is_pointer_value() check on the dst_reg (which is false in root
case as we allow for pointer arithmetic via env->allow_ptr_leaks).

Similarly to PTR_TO_PACKET, one way to fix it is to restrict the
allowed operations on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} registers to 64 bit
mode BPF_ADD. The test_verifier suite runs fine after the patch
and it also rejects mentioned test cases.

Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman