<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel/configs, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arch, mm: promote DEBUG_WX to CHECK_WX</title>
<updated>2026-10-24T08:55:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)</name>
<email>rppt@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-26T09:29:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2e83e2ce34ff9200b58ac92f4c94a31c9adcba52'/>
<id>2e83e2ce34ff9200b58ac92f4c94a31c9adcba52</id>
<content type='text'>
Verification that the kernel does not have writable + executable mappings
is about detecting security risks rather than a pure debug feature.

Major distribution configurations enable it in their kernels as well as
defconfigs of most architectures that have ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_WX.

Rename relevant generic configuration options to use CHECK_WX and move
their definitions from mm/Kconfig.debug to mm/Kconfig.

Rename *debug_checkwx() funcitons and macros to *pgtable_checkwx().

For arm that does not widely enable it, only rename its variants of the
config options.

Enabling CHECK_WX adds a few kilobytes to the kernel binary and while the
added size can be slightly reduced with churny updates of architecture
implementations of ptdump, the core functionality takes most of the added
size.  It cannot be moved to .init.text because the verification has to
happen after init sections are freed.

With this, make generic CHECK_WX default to STRICT_KERNEL_RWX while
still leaving users targeting small kernels the possibility to opt-out.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260926-direct-map-verify-wx-v2-1-efcd64a6b74a@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) &lt;ljs@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Albert Ou &lt;aou@eecs.berkeley.edu&gt;
Cc: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alex@ghiti.fr&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christophe Leroy &lt;chleroy@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Liam R. Howlett &lt;liam@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@dabbelt.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Walmsley &lt;pjw@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) &lt;ritesh.list@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Shrikanth Hegde &lt;sshegde@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Verification that the kernel does not have writable + executable mappings
is about detecting security risks rather than a pure debug feature.

Major distribution configurations enable it in their kernels as well as
defconfigs of most architectures that have ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_WX.

Rename relevant generic configuration options to use CHECK_WX and move
their definitions from mm/Kconfig.debug to mm/Kconfig.

Rename *debug_checkwx() funcitons and macros to *pgtable_checkwx().

For arm that does not widely enable it, only rename its variants of the
config options.

Enabling CHECK_WX adds a few kilobytes to the kernel binary and while the
added size can be slightly reduced with churny updates of architecture
implementations of ptdump, the core functionality takes most of the added
size.  It cannot be moved to .init.text because the verification has to
happen after init sections are freed.

With this, make generic CHECK_WX default to STRICT_KERNEL_RWX while
still leaving users targeting small kernels the possibility to opt-out.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260926-direct-map-verify-wx-v2-1-efcd64a6b74a@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) &lt;ljs@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Albert Ou &lt;aou@eecs.berkeley.edu&gt;
Cc: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alex@ghiti.fr&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christophe Leroy &lt;chleroy@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Liam R. Howlett &lt;liam@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan &lt;maddy@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@dabbelt.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Walmsley &lt;pjw@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) &lt;ritesh.list@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Shrikanth Hegde &lt;sshegde@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>slab: support for compiler-assisted type-based slab cache partitioning</title>
<updated>2026-05-14T08:44:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marco Elver</name>
<email>elver@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-11T20:00:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=feb662d9168b63e1d4c02671ec96005410c6f3ce'/>
<id>feb662d9168b63e1d4c02671ec96005410c6f3ce</id>
<content type='text'>
Rework the general infrastructure around RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES into more
flexible KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES, with the former being a partitioning
mode of the latter.

Introduce a new mode, KMALLOC_PARTITION_TYPED, which leverages a feature
available in Clang 22 and later, called "allocation tokens" via
__builtin_infer_alloc_token() [1]. Unlike KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM
(formerly RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES), this mode deterministically assigns a
slab cache to an allocation of type T, regardless of allocation site.

The builtin __builtin_infer_alloc_token(&lt;malloc-args&gt;, ...) instructs
the compiler to infer an allocation type from arguments commonly passed
to memory-allocating functions and returns a type-derived token ID. The
implementation passes kmalloc-args to the builtin: the compiler performs
best-effort type inference, and then recognizes common patterns such as
`kmalloc(sizeof(T), ...)`, `kmalloc(sizeof(T) * n, ...)`, but also
`(T *)kmalloc(...)`. Where the compiler fails to infer a type the
fallback token (default: 0) is chosen.

Note: kmalloc_obj(..) APIs fix the pattern how size and result type are
expressed, and therefore ensures there's not much drift in which
patterns the compiler needs to recognize. Specifically, kmalloc_obj()
and friends expand to `(TYPE *)KMALLOC(__obj_size, GFP)`, which the
compiler recognizes via the cast to TYPE*.

Clang's default token ID calculation is described as [1]:

   typehashpointersplit: This mode assigns a token ID based on the hash
   of the allocated type's name, where the top half ID-space is reserved
   for types that contain pointers and the bottom half for types that do
   not contain pointers.

Separating pointer-containing objects from pointerless objects and data
allocations can help mitigate certain classes of memory corruption
exploits [2]: attackers who gains a buffer overflow on a primitive
buffer cannot use it to directly corrupt pointers or other critical
metadata in an object residing in a different, isolated heap region.

It is important to note that heap isolation strategies offer a
best-effort approach, and do not provide a 100% security guarantee,
albeit achievable at relatively low performance cost. Note that this
also does not prevent cross-cache attacks: while waiting for future
features like SLAB_VIRTUAL [3] to provide physical page isolation, this
feature should be deployed alongside SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR and
init_on_free=1 to mitigate cross-cache attacks and page-reuse attacks as
much as possible today.

With all that, my kernel (x86 defconfig) shows me a histogram of slab
cache object distribution per /proc/slabinfo (after boot):

  &lt;slab cache&gt;      &lt;objs&gt; &lt;hist&gt;
  kmalloc-part-15    1465  ++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-14    2988  +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-13    1656  ++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-12    1045  ++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-11    1697  ++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-10    1489  ++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-09     965  +++++++++
  kmalloc-part-08     710  +++++++
  kmalloc-part-07     100  +
  kmalloc-part-06     217  ++
  kmalloc-part-05     105  +
  kmalloc-part-04    4047  ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-03     183  +
  kmalloc-part-02     283  ++
  kmalloc-part-01     316  +++
  kmalloc            1422  ++++++++++++++

The above /proc/slabinfo snapshot shows me there are 6673 allocated
objects (slabs 00 - 07) that the compiler claims contain no pointers or
it was unable to infer the type of, and 12015 objects that contain
pointers (slabs 08 - 15). On a whole, this looks relatively sane.

Additionally, when I compile my kernel with -Rpass=alloc-token, which
provides diagnostics where (after dead-code elimination) type inference
failed, I see 186 allocation sites where the compiler failed to identify
a type (down from 966 when I sent the RFC [4]). Some initial review
confirms these are mostly variable sized buffers, but also include
structs with trailing flexible length arrays.

Link: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AllocToken.html [1]
Link: https://blog.dfsec.com/ios/2025/05/30/blasting-past-ios-18/ [2]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/944647/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250825154505.1558444-1-elver@google.com/ [4]
Link: https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-a-framework-for-allocator-partitioning-hints/87434
Acked-by: GONG Ruiqi &lt;gongruiqi1@huawei.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) &lt;harry@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) &lt;harry@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) &lt;harry@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260511200136.3201646-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rework the general infrastructure around RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES into more
flexible KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES, with the former being a partitioning
mode of the latter.

Introduce a new mode, KMALLOC_PARTITION_TYPED, which leverages a feature
available in Clang 22 and later, called "allocation tokens" via
__builtin_infer_alloc_token() [1]. Unlike KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM
(formerly RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES), this mode deterministically assigns a
slab cache to an allocation of type T, regardless of allocation site.

The builtin __builtin_infer_alloc_token(&lt;malloc-args&gt;, ...) instructs
the compiler to infer an allocation type from arguments commonly passed
to memory-allocating functions and returns a type-derived token ID. The
implementation passes kmalloc-args to the builtin: the compiler performs
best-effort type inference, and then recognizes common patterns such as
`kmalloc(sizeof(T), ...)`, `kmalloc(sizeof(T) * n, ...)`, but also
`(T *)kmalloc(...)`. Where the compiler fails to infer a type the
fallback token (default: 0) is chosen.

Note: kmalloc_obj(..) APIs fix the pattern how size and result type are
expressed, and therefore ensures there's not much drift in which
patterns the compiler needs to recognize. Specifically, kmalloc_obj()
and friends expand to `(TYPE *)KMALLOC(__obj_size, GFP)`, which the
compiler recognizes via the cast to TYPE*.

Clang's default token ID calculation is described as [1]:

   typehashpointersplit: This mode assigns a token ID based on the hash
   of the allocated type's name, where the top half ID-space is reserved
   for types that contain pointers and the bottom half for types that do
   not contain pointers.

Separating pointer-containing objects from pointerless objects and data
allocations can help mitigate certain classes of memory corruption
exploits [2]: attackers who gains a buffer overflow on a primitive
buffer cannot use it to directly corrupt pointers or other critical
metadata in an object residing in a different, isolated heap region.

It is important to note that heap isolation strategies offer a
best-effort approach, and do not provide a 100% security guarantee,
albeit achievable at relatively low performance cost. Note that this
also does not prevent cross-cache attacks: while waiting for future
features like SLAB_VIRTUAL [3] to provide physical page isolation, this
feature should be deployed alongside SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR and
init_on_free=1 to mitigate cross-cache attacks and page-reuse attacks as
much as possible today.

With all that, my kernel (x86 defconfig) shows me a histogram of slab
cache object distribution per /proc/slabinfo (after boot):

  &lt;slab cache&gt;      &lt;objs&gt; &lt;hist&gt;
  kmalloc-part-15    1465  ++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-14    2988  +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-13    1656  ++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-12    1045  ++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-11    1697  ++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-10    1489  ++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-09     965  +++++++++
  kmalloc-part-08     710  +++++++
  kmalloc-part-07     100  +
  kmalloc-part-06     217  ++
  kmalloc-part-05     105  +
  kmalloc-part-04    4047  ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  kmalloc-part-03     183  +
  kmalloc-part-02     283  ++
  kmalloc-part-01     316  +++
  kmalloc            1422  ++++++++++++++

The above /proc/slabinfo snapshot shows me there are 6673 allocated
objects (slabs 00 - 07) that the compiler claims contain no pointers or
it was unable to infer the type of, and 12015 objects that contain
pointers (slabs 08 - 15). On a whole, this looks relatively sane.

Additionally, when I compile my kernel with -Rpass=alloc-token, which
provides diagnostics where (after dead-code elimination) type inference
failed, I see 186 allocation sites where the compiler failed to identify
a type (down from 966 when I sent the RFC [4]). Some initial review
confirms these are mostly variable sized buffers, but also include
structs with trailing flexible length arrays.

Link: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AllocToken.html [1]
Link: https://blog.dfsec.com/ios/2025/05/30/blasting-past-ios-18/ [2]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/944647/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250825154505.1558444-1-elver@google.com/ [4]
Link: https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-a-framework-for-allocator-partitioning-hints/87434
Acked-by: GONG Ruiqi &lt;gongruiqi1@huawei.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) &lt;harry@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) &lt;harry@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) &lt;harry@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260511200136.3201646-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM kernel config option</title>
<updated>2026-02-23T19:18:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-23T19:18:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7dff99b354601dd01829e1511711846e04340a69'/>
<id>7dff99b354601dd01829e1511711846e04340a69</id>
<content type='text'>
This config option goes way back - it used to be an internal debug
option to random.c (at that point called DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT), then was
renamed and exposed as a config option as CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM,
and then further renamed to the current CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.

It was all done with the best of intentions: the more limited
rate-limited reports were reporting some cases, but if you wanted to see
all the gory details, you'd enable this "ALL" option.

However, it turns out - perhaps not surprisingly - that when people
don't care about and fix the first rate-limited cases, they most
certainly don't care about any others either, and so warning about all
of them isn't actually helping anything.

And the non-ratelimited reporting causes problems, where well-meaning
people enable debug options, but the excessive flood of messages that
nobody cares about will hide actual real information when things go
wrong.

I just got a kernel bug report (which had nothing to do with randomness)
where two thirds of the the truncated dmesg was just variations of

   random: get_random_u32 called from __get_random_u32_below+0x10/0x70 with crng_init=0

and in the process early boot messages had been lost (in addition to
making the messages that _hadn't_ been lost harder to read).

The proper way to find these things for the hypothetical developer that
cares - if such a person exists - is almost certainly with boot time
tracing.  That gives you the option to get call graphs etc too, which is
likely a requirement for fixing any problems anyway.

See Documentation/trace/boottime-trace.rst for that option.

And if we for some reason do want to re-introduce actual printing of
these things, it will need to have some uniqueness filtering rather than
this "just print it all" model.

Fixes: cc1e127bfa95 ("random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness")
Acked-by: Jason Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This config option goes way back - it used to be an internal debug
option to random.c (at that point called DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT), then was
renamed and exposed as a config option as CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM,
and then further renamed to the current CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.

It was all done with the best of intentions: the more limited
rate-limited reports were reporting some cases, but if you wanted to see
all the gory details, you'd enable this "ALL" option.

However, it turns out - perhaps not surprisingly - that when people
don't care about and fix the first rate-limited cases, they most
certainly don't care about any others either, and so warning about all
of them isn't actually helping anything.

And the non-ratelimited reporting causes problems, where well-meaning
people enable debug options, but the excessive flood of messages that
nobody cares about will hide actual real information when things go
wrong.

I just got a kernel bug report (which had nothing to do with randomness)
where two thirds of the the truncated dmesg was just variations of

   random: get_random_u32 called from __get_random_u32_below+0x10/0x70 with crng_init=0

and in the process early boot messages had been lost (in addition to
making the messages that _hadn't_ been lost harder to read).

The proper way to find these things for the hypothetical developer that
cares - if such a person exists - is almost certainly with boot time
tracing.  That gives you the option to get call graphs etc too, which is
likely a requirement for fixing any problems anyway.

See Documentation/trace/boottime-trace.rst for that option.

And if we for some reason do want to re-introduce actual printing of
these things, it will need to have some uniqueness filtering rather than
this "just print it all" model.

Fixes: cc1e127bfa95 ("random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness")
Acked-by: Jason Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>watchdog: softlockup: panic when lockup duration exceeds N thresholds</title>
<updated>2026-01-21T03:44:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li RongQing</name>
<email>lirongqing@baidu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-16T07:45:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e700f5d1560798aacf0e56fdcc70ee2c20bf56ec'/>
<id>e700f5d1560798aacf0e56fdcc70ee2c20bf56ec</id>
<content type='text'>
The softlockup_panic sysctl is currently a binary option: panic
immediately or never panic on soft lockups.

Panicking on any soft lockup, regardless of duration, can be overly
aggressive for brief stalls that may be caused by legitimate operations. 
Conversely, never panicking may allow severe system hangs to persist
undetected.

Extend softlockup_panic to accept an integer threshold, allowing the
kernel to panic only when the normalized lockup duration exceeds N
watchdog threshold periods.  This provides finer-grained control to
distinguish between transient delays and persistent system failures.

The accepted values are:
- 0: Don't panic (unchanged)
- 1: Panic when duration &gt;= 1 * threshold (20s default, original behavior)
- N &gt; 1: Panic when duration &gt;= N * threshold (e.g., 2 = 40s, 3 = 60s.)

The original behavior is preserved for values 0 and 1, maintaining full
backward compatibility while allowing systems to tolerate brief lockups
while still catching severe, persistent hangs.

[lirongqing@baidu.com: v2]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251218074300.4080-1-lirongqing@baidu.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251216074521.2796-1-lirongqing@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing &lt;lirongqing@baidu.com&gt;
Cc: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hao Luo &lt;haoluo@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Cc: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The softlockup_panic sysctl is currently a binary option: panic
immediately or never panic on soft lockups.

Panicking on any soft lockup, regardless of duration, can be overly
aggressive for brief stalls that may be caused by legitimate operations. 
Conversely, never panicking may allow severe system hangs to persist
undetected.

Extend softlockup_panic to accept an integer threshold, allowing the
kernel to panic only when the normalized lockup duration exceeds N
watchdog threshold periods.  This provides finer-grained control to
distinguish between transient delays and persistent system failures.

The accepted values are:
- 0: Don't panic (unchanged)
- 1: Panic when duration &gt;= 1 * threshold (20s default, original behavior)
- N &gt; 1: Panic when duration &gt;= N * threshold (e.g., 2 = 40s, 3 = 60s.)

The original behavior is preserved for values 0 and 1, maintaining full
backward compatibility while allowing systems to tolerate brief lockups
while still catching severe, persistent hangs.

[lirongqing@baidu.com: v2]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251218074300.4080-1-lirongqing@baidu.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251216074521.2796-1-lirongqing@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing &lt;lirongqing@baidu.com&gt;
Cc: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Hao Luo &lt;haoluo@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;martin.lau@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Cc: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hung_task: panic when there are more than N hung tasks at the same time</title>
<updated>2025-11-12T18:00:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Li RongQing</name>
<email>lirongqing@baidu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-15T06:36:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9544f9e6947f6508d29f0d0cc2dacaa749fc1613'/>
<id>9544f9e6947f6508d29f0d0cc2dacaa749fc1613</id>
<content type='text'>
The hung_task_panic sysctl is currently a blunt instrument: it's all or
nothing.

Panicking on a single hung task can be an overreaction to a transient
glitch.  A more reliable indicator of a systemic problem is when
multiple tasks hang simultaneously.

Extend hung_task_panic to accept an integer threshold, allowing the
kernel to panic only when N hung tasks are detected in a single scan. 
This provides finer control to distinguish between isolated incidents
and system-wide failures.

The accepted values are:
- 0: Don't panic (unchanged)
- 1: Panic on the first hung task (unchanged)
- N &gt; 1: Panic after N hung tasks are detected in a single scan

The original behavior is preserved for values 0 and 1, maintaining full
backward compatibility.

[lance.yang@linux.dev: new changelog]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251015063615.2632-1-lirongqing@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing &lt;lirongqing@baidu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Tested-by: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew Jeffery &lt;andrew@codeconstruct.com.au&gt; [aspeed_g5_defconfig]
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Wesphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Jakub Kacinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Granados &lt;joel.granados@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The hung_task_panic sysctl is currently a blunt instrument: it's all or
nothing.

Panicking on a single hung task can be an overreaction to a transient
glitch.  A more reliable indicator of a systemic problem is when
multiple tasks hang simultaneously.

Extend hung_task_panic to accept an integer threshold, allowing the
kernel to panic only when N hung tasks are detected in a single scan. 
This provides finer control to distinguish between isolated incidents
and system-wide failures.

The accepted values are:
- 0: Don't panic (unchanged)
- 1: Panic on the first hung task (unchanged)
- N &gt; 1: Panic after N hung tasks are detected in a single scan

The original behavior is preserved for values 0 and 1, maintaining full
backward compatibility.

[lance.yang@linux.dev: new changelog]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251015063615.2632-1-lirongqing@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing &lt;lirongqing@baidu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Tested-by: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew Jeffery &lt;andrew@codeconstruct.com.au&gt; [aspeed_g5_defconfig]
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Wesphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Jakub Kacinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Granados &lt;joel.granados@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Joel Stanley &lt;joel@jms.id.au&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@fomichev.me&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcfi: Rename CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to CONFIG_CFI</title>
<updated>2025-09-24T21:29:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-23T21:34:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=23ef9d439769d5f35353650e771c63d13824235b'/>
<id>23ef9d439769d5f35353650e771c63d13824235b</id>
<content type='text'>
The kernel's CFI implementation uses the KCFI ABI specifically, and is
not strictly tied to a particular compiler. In preparation for GCC
supporting KCFI, rename CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to CONFIG_CFI (along with
associated options).

Use new "transitional" Kconfig option for old CONFIG_CFI_CLANG that will
enable CONFIG_CFI during olddefconfig.

Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250923213422.1105654-3-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The kernel's CFI implementation uses the KCFI ABI specifically, and is
not strictly tied to a particular compiler. In preparation for GCC
supporting KCFI, rename CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to CONFIG_CFI (along with
associated options).

Use new "transitional" Kconfig option for old CONFIG_CFI_CLANG that will
enable CONFIG_CFI during olddefconfig.

Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij &lt;linus.walleij@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250923213422.1105654-3-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON</title>
<updated>2025-07-22T04:41:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-17T23:25:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=437641a72d0a675242ae3e649a30b4c51b3ad450'/>
<id>437641a72d0a675242ae3e649a30b4c51b3ad450</id>
<content type='text'>
To reduce stale data lifetimes, enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON as
well. This matches the addition of CONFIG_STACKLEAK=y, which is doing
similar for stack memory.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717232519.2984886-13-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
To reduce stale data lifetimes, enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON as
well. This matches the addition of CONFIG_STACKLEAK=y, which is doing
similar for stack memory.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717232519.2984886-13-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE</title>
<updated>2025-07-22T04:41:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-17T23:25:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4c56d9f7e75eb2a137584f708fa262d7e8c8a2d8'/>
<id>4c56d9f7e75eb2a137584f708fa262d7e8c8a2d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Since we can wipe the stack with both Clang and GCC plugins, enable this
for the "hardening.config" for wider testing.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717232519.2984886-12-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since we can wipe the stack with both Clang and GCC plugins, enable this
for the "hardening.config" for wider testing.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717232519.2984886-12-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'kbuild-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild</title>
<updated>2025-06-07T17:05:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-07T17:05:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8630c59e99363c4b655788fd01134aef9bcd9264'/>
<id>8630c59e99363c4b655788fd01134aef9bcd9264</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:

 - Add support for the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() macro, which
   exports a symbol only to specified modules

 - Improve ABI handling in gendwarfksyms

 - Forcibly link lib-y objects to vmlinux even if CONFIG_MODULES=n

 - Add checkers for redundant or missing &lt;linux/export.h&gt; inclusion

 - Deprecate the extra-y syntax

 - Fix a genksyms bug when including enum constants from *.symref files

* tag 'kbuild-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (28 commits)
  genksyms: Fix enum consts from a reference affecting new values
  arch: use always-$(KBUILD_BUILTIN) for vmlinux.lds
  kbuild: set y instead of 1 to KBUILD_{BUILTIN,MODULES}
  efi/libstub: use 'targets' instead of extra-y in Makefile
  module: make __mod_device_table__* symbols static
  scripts/misc-check: check unnecessary #include &lt;linux/export.h&gt; when W=1
  scripts/misc-check: check missing #include &lt;linux/export.h&gt; when W=1
  scripts/misc-check: add double-quotes to satisfy shellcheck
  kbuild: move W=1 check for scripts/misc-check to top-level Makefile
  scripts/tags.sh: allow to use alternative ctags implementation
  kconfig: introduce menu type enum
  docs: symbol-namespaces: fix reST warning with literal block
  kbuild: link lib-y objects to vmlinux forcibly even when CONFIG_MODULES=n
  tinyconfig: enable CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
  docs/core-api/symbol-namespaces: drop table of contents and section numbering
  modpost: check forbidden MODULE_IMPORT_NS("module:") at compile time
  kbuild: move kbuild syntax processing to scripts/Makefile.build
  Makefile: remove dependency on archscripts for header installation
  Documentation/kbuild: Add new gendwarfksyms kABI rules
  Documentation/kbuild: Drop section numbers
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:

 - Add support for the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() macro, which
   exports a symbol only to specified modules

 - Improve ABI handling in gendwarfksyms

 - Forcibly link lib-y objects to vmlinux even if CONFIG_MODULES=n

 - Add checkers for redundant or missing &lt;linux/export.h&gt; inclusion

 - Deprecate the extra-y syntax

 - Fix a genksyms bug when including enum constants from *.symref files

* tag 'kbuild-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (28 commits)
  genksyms: Fix enum consts from a reference affecting new values
  arch: use always-$(KBUILD_BUILTIN) for vmlinux.lds
  kbuild: set y instead of 1 to KBUILD_{BUILTIN,MODULES}
  efi/libstub: use 'targets' instead of extra-y in Makefile
  module: make __mod_device_table__* symbols static
  scripts/misc-check: check unnecessary #include &lt;linux/export.h&gt; when W=1
  scripts/misc-check: check missing #include &lt;linux/export.h&gt; when W=1
  scripts/misc-check: add double-quotes to satisfy shellcheck
  kbuild: move W=1 check for scripts/misc-check to top-level Makefile
  scripts/tags.sh: allow to use alternative ctags implementation
  kconfig: introduce menu type enum
  docs: symbol-namespaces: fix reST warning with literal block
  kbuild: link lib-y objects to vmlinux forcibly even when CONFIG_MODULES=n
  tinyconfig: enable CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
  docs/core-api/symbol-namespaces: drop table of contents and section numbering
  modpost: check forbidden MODULE_IMPORT_NS("module:") at compile time
  kbuild: move kbuild syntax processing to scripts/Makefile.build
  Makefile: remove dependency on archscripts for header installation
  Documentation/kbuild: Add new gendwarfksyms kABI rules
  Documentation/kbuild: Drop section numbers
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tinyconfig: enable CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION</title>
<updated>2025-06-05T20:40:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-26T09:07:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=81a93bf93f0e5963d8695a3596ac50b5ceea87c3'/>
<id>81a93bf93f0e5963d8695a3596ac50b5ceea87c3</id>
<content type='text'>
This CONFIG option, if supported by the architecture, helps reduce the
size of vmlinux.

For example, the size of vmlinux with ARCH=arm tinyconfig decreases as
follows:

   text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex	filename
 631684	 104500	  18176	 754360	  b82b8	vmlinux.before
 455316	  93404	  15472	 564192	  89be0	vmlinux.after

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This CONFIG option, if supported by the architecture, helps reduce the
size of vmlinux.

For example, the size of vmlinux with ARCH=arm tinyconfig decreases as
follows:

   text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex	filename
 631684	 104500	  18176	 754360	  b82b8	vmlinux.before
 455316	  93404	  15472	 564192	  89be0	vmlinux.after

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
