linux-toradex.git/kernel/events/core.c, branch v4.4.13

perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race

2016-06-01T19:15:47+00:00

commit 79c9ce57eb2d5f1497546a3946b4ae21b6fdc438 upstream.

Jann reported that the ptrace_may_access() check in
find_lively_task_by_vpid() is racy against exec().

Specifically:

  perf_event_open()		execve()

  ptrace_may_access()
				commit_creds()
  ...				if (get_dumpable() != SUID_DUMP_USER)
				  perf_event_exit_task();
  perf_install_in_context()

would result in installing a counter across the creds boundary.

Fix this by wrapping lots of perf_event_open() in cred_guard_mutex.
This should be fine as perf_event_exit_task() is already called with
cred_guard_mutex held, so all perf locks already nest inside it.

Reported-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: He Kuang 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Cure event->pending_disable race

2016-04-20T06:42:14+00:00

commit 28a967c3a2f99fa3b5f762f25cb2a319d933571b upstream.

Because event_sched_out() checks event->pending_disable _before_
actually disabling the event, it can happen that the event fires after
it checks but before it gets disabled.

This would leave event->pending_disable set and the queued irq_work
will try and process it.

However, if the event trigger was during schedule(), the event might
have been de-scheduled by the time the irq_work runs, and
perf_event_disable_local() will fail.

Fix this by checking event->pending_disable _after_ we call
event->pmu->del(). This depends on the latter being a compiler
barrier, such that the compiler does not lift the load and re-creates
the problem.

Tested-by: Alexander Shishkin 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: eranian@google.com
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: panand@redhat.com
Cc: sasha.levin@oracle.com
Cc: vince@deater.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160224174948.040469884@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Do not double free

2016-04-20T06:42:14+00:00

commit 130056275ade730e7a79c110212c8815202773ee upstream.

In case of: err_file: fput(event_file), we'll end up calling
perf_release() which in turn will free the event.

Do not then free the event _again_.

Tested-by: Alexander Shishkin 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: eranian@google.com
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: panand@redhat.com
Cc: sasha.levin@oracle.com
Cc: vince@deater.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160224174947.697350349@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf/core: Fix perf_sched_count derailment

2016-04-12T16:08:34+00:00

commit 927a5570855836e5d5859a80ce7e91e963545e8f upstream.

The error path in perf_event_open() is such that asking for a sampling
event on a PMU that doesn't generate interrupts will end up in dropping
the perf_sched_count even though it hasn't been incremented for this
event yet.

Given a sufficient amount of these calls, we'll end up disabling
scheduler's jump label even though we'd still have active events in the
system, thereby facilitating the arrival of the infernal regions upon us.

I'm fixing this by moving account_event() inside perf_event_alloc().

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Cc: vince@deater.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456917854-29427-1-git-send-email-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-02-25T20:01:16+00:00

commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2016-01-08T21:52:59+00:00

Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two core subsystem fixes, plus a handful of tooling fixes"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf: Fix race in swevent hash
  perf: Fix race in perf_event_exec()
  perf list: Robustify event printing routine
  perf list: Add support for PERF_COUNT_SW_BPF_OUT
  perf hists browser: Fix segfault if use symbol filter in cmdline
  perf hists browser: Reset selection when refresh
  perf hists browser: Add NULL pointer check to prevent crash
  perf buildid-list: Fix return value of perf buildid-list -k
  perf buildid-list: Show running kernel build id fix

perf: Fix race in swevent hash

2016-01-06T09:52:39+00:00

There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.

Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.

When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.

Reported-by: Sasha Levin 
Tested-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

perf: Fix race in perf_event_exec()

2016-01-06T09:52:38+00:00

I managed to tickle this warning:

  [ 2338.884942] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [ 2338.890112] WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 35162 at ../kernel/events/core.c:2702 task_ctx_sched_out+0x6b/0x80()
  [ 2338.900504] Modules linked in:
  [ 2338.903933] CPU: 13 PID: 35162 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.4.0-rc4-dirty #244
  [ 2338.911610] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600GZ/S2600GZ, BIOS SE5C600.86B.02.02.0002.122320131210 12/23/2013
  [ 2338.923071]  ffffffff81f1468e ffff8807c6457cb8 ffffffff815c680c 0000000000000000
  [ 2338.931382]  ffff8807c6457cf0 ffffffff810c8a56 ffffe8ffff8c1bd0 ffff8808132ed400
  [ 2338.939678]  0000000000000286 ffff880813170380 ffff8808132ed400 ffff8807c6457d00
  [ 2338.947987] Call Trace:
  [ 2338.950726]  [] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82
  [ 2338.956474]  [] warn_slowpath_common+0x86/0xc0
  [ 2338.963195]  [] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
  [ 2338.969720]  [] task_ctx_sched_out+0x6b/0x80
  [ 2338.976244]  [] perf_event_exec+0xe2/0x180
  [ 2338.982575]  [] setup_new_exec+0x6f/0x1b0
  [ 2338.988810]  [] load_elf_binary+0x393/0x1660
  [ 2338.995339]  [] ? get_user_pages+0x52/0x60
  [ 2339.001669]  [] search_binary_handler+0x97/0x200
  [ 2339.008581]  [] do_execveat_common.isra.33+0x543/0x6e0
  [ 2339.016072]  [] SyS_execve+0x3a/0x50
  [ 2339.021819]  [] stub_execve+0x5/0x5
  [ 2339.027469]  [] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
  [ 2339.034860] ---[ end trace ee1337c59a0ddeac ]---

Which is a WARN_ON_ONCE() indicating that cpuctx->task_ctx is not
what we expected it to be.

This is because context switches can swap the task_struct::perf_event_ctxp[]
pointer around. Therefore you have to either disable preemption when looking
at current, or hold ctx->lock.

Fix perf_event_enable_on_exec(), it loads current->perf_event_ctxp[]
before disabling interrupts, therefore a preemption in the right place
can swap contexts around and we're using the wrong one.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Kostya Serebryany 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Cc: syzkaller 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210195740.GG6357@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Merge branch 'for-4.4-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup

2015-12-08T21:35:52+00:00

Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
 "More change than I'd have liked at this stage.  The pids controller
  and the changes made to cgroup core to support it introduced and
  revealed several important issues.

   - Assigning membership to a newly created task and migrating it can
     race leading to incorrect accounting.  Oleg fixed it by widening
     threadgroup synchronization.  It looks like we'll be able to merge
     it with a different percpu rwsem which is used in fork path making
     things simpler and cheaper.

   - The recent change to extend cgroup membership to zombies (so that
     pid accounting can extend till the pid is actually released) missed
     pinning the underlying data structures leading to use-after-free.
     Fixed.

   - v2 hierarchy was calling subsystem callbacks with the wrong target
     cgroup_subsys_state based on the incorrect assumption that they
     share the same target.  pids is the first controller affected by
     this.  Subsys callbacks updated so that they can deal with
     multi-target migrations"

* 'for-4.4-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  cgroup_pids: don't account for the root cgroup
  cgroup: fix handling of multi-destination migration from subtree_control enabling
  cgroup_freezer: simplify propagation of CGROUP_FROZEN clearing in freezer_attach()
  cgroup: pids: kill pids_fork(), simplify pids_can_fork() and pids_cancel_fork()
  cgroup: pids: fix race between cgroup_post_fork() and cgroup_migrate()
  cgroup: make css_set pin its css's to avoid use-afer-free
  cgroup: fix cftype->file_offset handling

perf: Do not send exit event twice

2015-12-06T11:54:49+00:00

In case we monitor events system wide, we get EXIT event
(when configured) twice for each task that exited.

Note doubled lines with same pid/tid in following example:

  $ sudo ./perf record -a
  ^C[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.480 MB perf.data (2518 samples) ]
  $ sudo ./perf report -D | grep EXIT

  0 60290687567581 0x59910 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1250:1250):(1250:1250)
  0 60290687568354 0x59948 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1250:1250):(1250:1250)
  0 60290687988744 0x59ad8 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1250:1250):(1250:1250)
  0 60290687989198 0x59b10 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1250:1250):(1250:1250)
  1 60290692567895 0x62af0 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1253:1253):(1253:1253)
  1 60290692568322 0x62b28 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1253:1253):(1253:1253)
  2 60290692739276 0x69a18 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1252:1252):(1252:1252)
  2 60290692739910 0x69a50 [0x38]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(1252:1252):(1252:1252)

The reason is that the cpu contexts are processes each time
we call perf_event_task. I'm changing the perf_event_aux logic
to serve task_ctx and cpu contexts separately, which ensure we
don't get EXIT event generated twice on same cpu context.

This does not affect other auxiliary events, as they don't
use task_ctx at all.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: David Ahern 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Namhyung Kim 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1446649205-5822-1-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar