linux-toradex.git/kernel/events/uprobes.c, branch v4.9.117

mm, uprobes: fix multiple free of ->uprobes_state.xol_area

2017-09-07T06:35:39+00:00

commit 355627f518978b5167256d27492fe0b343aaf2f2 upstream.

Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().

However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
the new mm_struct's ->uprobes_state.xol_area has been set to NULL after
being copied from the old mm_struct by the memcpy in dup_mm().  For a
task that has previously hit a uprobe tracepoint, this resulted in the
'struct xol_area' being freed multiple times if the task was killed at
just the right time while forking.

Fix it by setting ->uprobes_state.xol_area to NULL in mm_init() rather
than in uprobe_dup_mmap().

With CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS=y, the bug can be reproduced by the same C
program given by commit 2b7e8665b4ff ("fork: fix incorrect fput of
->exe_file causing use-after-free"), provided that a uprobe tracepoint
has been set on the fork_thread() function.  For example:

    $ gcc reproducer.c -o reproducer -lpthread
    $ nm reproducer | grep fork_thread
    0000000000400719 t fork_thread
    $ echo "p $PWD/reproducer:0x719" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/uprobe_events
    $ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
    $ ./reproducer

Here is the use-after-free reported by KASAN:

    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200
    Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800320a8b88 by task reproducer/198

    CPU: 1 PID: 198 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.13.0-rc7-00015-g36fde05f3fb5 #255
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0xdb/0x185
     print_address_description+0x7e/0x290
     kasan_report+0x23b/0x350
     __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20
     uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200
     mmput+0xd6/0x360
     do_exit+0x740/0x1670
     do_group_exit+0x13f/0x380
     get_signal+0x597/0x17d0
     do_signal+0x99/0x1df0
     exit_to_usermode_loop+0x166/0x1e0
     syscall_return_slowpath+0x258/0x2c0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xbc/0xbe

    ...

    Allocated by task 199:
     save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
     kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x180
     kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf3/0x330
     __create_xol_area+0x10f/0x780
     uprobe_notify_resume+0x1674/0x2210
     exit_to_usermode_loop+0x150/0x1e0
     prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x14b/0x180
     retint_user+0x8/0x20

    Freed by task 199:
     save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
     kasan_slab_free+0xa8/0x1a0
     kfree+0xba/0x210
     uprobe_clear_state+0x151/0x200
     mmput+0xd6/0x360
     copy_process.part.8+0x605f/0x65d0
     _do_fork+0x1a5/0xbd0
     SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
     do_syscall_64+0x22f/0x660
     return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a

Note: without KASAN, you may instead see a "Bad page state" message, or
simply a general protection fault.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170830033303.17927-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Mark Rutland 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: replace get_user_pages_remote() write/force parameters with gup_flags

2016-10-19T15:12:02+00:00

This removes the 'write' and 'force' from get_user_pages_remote() and
replaces them with 'gup_flags' to make the use of FOLL_FORCE explicit in
callers as use of this flag can result in surprising behaviour (and
hence bugs) within the mm subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

uprobes: Rename the "struct page *" args of __replace_page()

2016-08-18T08:03:50+00:00

Purely cosmetic, no changes in the compiled code.

Perhaps it is just me but I can hardly read __replace_page() because I can't
distinguish "page" from "kpage" and because I need to look at the caller to
to ensure that, say, kpage is really the new page and the code is correct.
Rename them to old_page and new_page, this matches the caller.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Brenden Blanco 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vladimir Davydov 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817153704.GC29724@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

uprobes: Fix the memcg accounting

2016-08-18T08:03:26+00:00

__replace_page() wronlgy calls mem_cgroup_cancel_charge() in "success" path,
it should only do this if page_check_address() fails.

This means that every enable/disable leads to unbalanced mem_cgroup_uncharge()
from put_page(old_page), it is trivial to underflow the page_counter->count
and trigger OOM.

Reported-and-tested-by: Brenden Blanco 
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reviewed-by: Johannes Weiner 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vladimir Davydov 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Fixes: 00501b531c47 ("mm: memcontrol: rewrite charge API")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817153629.GB29724@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

uprobes: wait for mmap_sem for write killable

2016-05-24T00:04:14+00:00

xol_add_vma needs mmap_sem for write.  If the waiting task gets killed
by the oom killer it would block oom_reaper from asynchronous address
space reclaim and reduce the chances of timely OOM resolving.  Wait for
the lock in the killable mode and return with EINTR if the task got
killed while waiting.

Do not warn in dup_xol_work if __create_xol_area failed due to fatal
signal pending because this is usually considered a kernel issue.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

x86: remove more uaccess_32.h complexity

2016-05-23T00:21:27+00:00

I'm looking at trying to possibly merge the 32-bit and 64-bit versions
of the x86 uaccess.h implementation, but first this needs to be cleaned
up.

For example, the 32-bit version of "__copy_from_user_inatomic()" is
mostly the special cases for the constant size, and it's actually almost
never relevant.  Most users aren't actually using a constant size
anyway, and the few cases that do small constant copies are better off
just using __get_user() instead.

So get rid of the unnecessary complexity.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros

2016-04-04T17:41:08+00:00

PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time
ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page
cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE.

This promise never materialized.  And unlikely will.

We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to
PAGE_SIZE.  And it's constant source of confusion on whether
PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case,
especially on the border between fs and mm.

Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much
breakage to be doable.

Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special.  They are
not.

The changes are pretty straight-forward:

 -  << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> ;

 -  >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> ;

 - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN};

 - page_cache_get() -> get_page();

 - page_cache_release() -> put_page();

This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using
script below.  For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files.
I've called spatch for them manually.

The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to
PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later.

There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach.  I'll
fix them manually in a separate patch.  Comments and documentation also
will be addressed with the separate patch.

virtual patch

@@
expression E;
@@
- E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E

@@
expression E;
@@
- E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E

@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT
+ PAGE_SHIFT

@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
+ PAGE_SIZE

@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_MASK
+ PAGE_MASK

@@
expression E;
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E)
+ PAGE_ALIGN(E)

@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_get(E)
+ get_page(E)

@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_release(E)
+ put_page(E)

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2016-03-21T02:08:56+00:00

Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature
  that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys).

  There's a background article at LWN.net:

      https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/

  The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of
  user-controllable permission masks in the pte.  So instead of having a
  fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change
  and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of)
  protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively
  cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected
  virtual memory range.

  This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large
  amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions.  It also
  allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the
  executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that
  below).

  This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for
  that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys -
  if a user-space application calls:

        mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);

  or

        mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);

  (note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice
  this special case, and will set a special protection key on this
  memory range.  It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection
  Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable
  and unwritable.

  So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true'
  PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies
  PROT_READ as well.  Unreadable executable mappings have security
  advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out
  ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they
  cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either.

  We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC
  mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new
  feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion.

  There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system
  call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this
  pull request.

  Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature
  (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled
  (like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime
  overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment.  If there's
  any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or
  flip the default"

* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits
  mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support
  x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags
  x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register
  x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state
  x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey()
  mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()
  x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU
  x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option
  x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps
  x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
  x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()
  mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
  um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods
  mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
  x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling
  ...

uprobes: __create_xol_area() must nullify xol_mapping.fault

2016-02-29T07:47:51+00:00

As Jiri pointed out, this recent commit:

 f872f5400cc0 ("mm: Add a vm_special_mapping.fault() method")

breaks uprobes: __create_xol_area() doesn't initialize the new ->fault()
method and this obviously leads to kernel crash when the application
tries to execute the probed insn after bp hit.

We probably want to add uprobes_special_mapping_fault(), this allows to
turn xol_area->xol_mapping into a single instance of vm_special_mapping.
But we need a simple fix, so lets change __create_xol() to nullify the
new member as Jiri suggests.

Suggested-by: Jiri Olsa 
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa 
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Pratyush Anand 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160227221128.GA29565@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

mm/gup: Introduce get_user_pages_remote()

2016-02-16T09:04:09+00:00

For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections
should be enforced in software or not.  In general, we enforce
protections when working on our own task, but not when on others.
We call these "current" and "remote" operations.

This patch introduces a new get_user_pages() variant:

        get_user_pages_remote()

Which is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on
non-current tsk/mm.

We also introduce a new gup flag: FOLL_REMOTE which can be used
for the "__" gup variants to get this new behavior.

The uprobes is_trap_at_addr() location holds mmap_sem and
calls get_user_pages(current->mm) on an instruction address.  This
makes it a pretty unique gup caller.  Being an instruction access
and also really originating from the kernel (vs. the app), I opted
to consider this a 'remote' access where protection keys will not
be enforced.

Without protection keys, this patch should not change any behavior.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: jack@suse.cz
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210154.3F0E51EA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar