linux-toradex.git/kernel/exit.c, branch v2.6.32.50

sched: Remove remaining USER_SCHED code

2011-02-17T23:37:19+00:00

Commit: 32bd7eb5a7f4596c8440dd9440322fe9e686634d upstream

This is left over from commit 7c9414385e ("sched: Remove USER_SCHED"")

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan 
Acked-by: Dhaval Giani 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: David Howells 
LKML-Reference: <4BA9A05F.7010407@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra

posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems with mt exec

2011-01-07T22:43:19+00:00

commit e0a70217107e6f9844628120412cb27bb4cea194 upstream.

posix-cpu-timers.c correctly assumes that the dying process does
posix_cpu_timers_exit_group() and removes all !CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD
timers from signal->cpu_timers list.

But, it also assumes that timer->it.cpu.task is always the group
leader, and thus the dead ->task means the dead thread group.

This is obviously not true after de_thread() changes the leader.
After that almost every posix_cpu_timer_ method has problems.

It is not simple to fix this bug correctly. First of all, I think
that timer->it.cpu should use struct pid instead of task_struct.
Also, the locking should be reworked completely. In particular,
tasklist_lock should not be used at all. This all needs a lot of
nontrivial and hard-to-test changes.

Change __exit_signal() to do posix_cpu_timers_exit_group() when
the old leader dies during exec. This is not the fix, just the
temporary hack to hide the problem for 2.6.37 and stable. IOW,
this is obviously wrong but this is what we currently have anyway:
cpu timers do not work after mt exec.

In theory this change adds another race. The exiting leader can
detach the timers which were attached to the new leader. However,
the window between de_thread() and release_task() is small, we
can pretend that sys_timer_create() was called before de_thread().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

do_exit(): make sure that we run with get_fs() == USER_DS

2010-12-09T21:27:01+00:00

commit 33dd94ae1ccbfb7bf0fb6c692bc3d1c4269e6177 upstream.

If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not
otherwise reset before do_exit().  do_exit may later (via mm_release in
fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing
a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory.

This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this
potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's
worth fixing.  I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along
with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so
I've tested that this is not theoretical.

A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has
occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing
every architecture, in multiple places.

Let's just stick it in do_exit instead.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update code comment]
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage 
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Fix unprotected access to task credentials in waitid()

2010-09-27T00:21:35+00:00

commit f362b73244fb16ea4ae127ced1467dd8adaa7733 upstream.

Using a program like the following:

	#include 
	#include 
	#include 
	#include 

	int main() {
		id_t id;
		siginfo_t infop;
		pid_t res;

		id = fork();
		if (id == 0) { sleep(1); exit(0); }
		kill(id, SIGSTOP);
		alarm(1);
		waitid(P_PID, id, &infop, WCONTINUED);
		return 0;
	}

to call waitid() on a stopped process results in access to the child task's
credentials without the RCU read lock being held - which may be replaced in the
meantime - eliciting the following warning:

	===================================================
	[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
	---------------------------------------------------
	kernel/exit.c:1460 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!

	other info that might help us debug this:

	rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
	2 locks held by waitid02/22252:
	 #0:  (tasklist_lock){.?.?..}, at: [] do_wait+0xc5/0x310
	 #1:  (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){-.-...}, at: []
	wait_consider_task+0x19a/0xbe0

	stack backtrace:
	Pid: 22252, comm: waitid02 Not tainted 2.6.35-323cd+ #3
	Call Trace:
	 [] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xa4/0xc0
	 [] wait_consider_task+0xaf1/0xbe0
	 [] do_wait+0xf5/0x310
	 [] sys_waitid+0x86/0x1f0
	 [] ? child_wait_callback+0x0/0x70
	 [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

This is fixed by holding the RCU read lock in wait_task_continued() to ensure
that the task's current credentials aren't destroyed between us reading the
cred pointer and us reading the UID from those credentials.

Furthermore, protect wait_task_stopped() in the same way.

We don't need to keep holding the RCU read lock once we've read the UID from
the credentials as holding the RCU read lock doesn't stop the target task from
changing its creds under us - so the credentials may be outdated immediately
after we've read the pointer, lock or no lock.

Signed-off-by: Daniel J Blueman 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched, cputime: Introduce thread_group_times()

2010-08-13T20:20:14+00:00

commit 0cf55e1ec08bb5a22e068309e2d8ba1180ab4239 upstream.

This is a real fix for problem of utime/stime values decreasing
described in the thread:

   http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/11/3/522

Now cputime is accounted in the following way:

 - {u,s}time in task_struct are increased every time when the thread
   is interrupted by a tick (timer interrupt).

 - When a thread exits, its {u,s}time are added to signal->{u,s}time,
   after adjusted by task_times().

 - When all threads in a thread_group exits, accumulated {u,s}time
   (and also c{u,s}time) in signal struct are added to c{u,s}time
   in signal struct of the group's parent.

So {u,s}time in task struct are "raw" tick count, while
{u,s}time and c{u,s}time in signal struct are "adjusted" values.

And accounted values are used by:

 - task_times(), to get cputime of a thread:
   This function returns adjusted values that originates from raw
   {u,s}time and scaled by sum_exec_runtime that accounted by CFS.

 - thread_group_cputime(), to get cputime of a thread group:
   This function returns sum of all {u,s}time of living threads in
   the group, plus {u,s}time in the signal struct that is sum of
   adjusted cputimes of all exited threads belonged to the group.

The problem is the return value of thread_group_cputime(),
because it is mixed sum of "raw" value and "adjusted" value:

  group's {u,s}time = foreach(thread){{u,s}time} + exited({u,s}time)

This misbehavior can break {u,s}time monotonicity.
Assume that if there is a thread that have raw values greater
than adjusted values (e.g. interrupted by 1000Hz ticks 50 times
but only runs 45ms) and if it exits, cputime will decrease (e.g.
-5ms).

To fix this, we could do:

  group's {u,s}time = foreach(t){task_times(t)} + exited({u,s}time)

But task_times() contains hard divisions, so applying it for
every thread should be avoided.

This patch fixes the above problem in the following way:

 - Modify thread's exit (= __exit_signal()) not to use task_times().
   It means {u,s}time in signal struct accumulates raw values instead
   of adjusted values.  As the result it makes thread_group_cputime()
   to return pure sum of "raw" values.

 - Introduce a new function thread_group_times(*task, *utime, *stime)
   that converts "raw" values of thread_group_cputime() to "adjusted"
   values, in same calculation procedure as task_times().

 - Modify group's exit (= wait_task_zombie()) to use this introduced
   thread_group_times().  It make c{u,s}time in signal struct to
   have adjusted values like before this patch.

 - Replace some thread_group_cputime() by thread_group_times().
   This replacements are only applied where conveys the "adjusted"
   cputime to users, and where already uses task_times() near by it.
   (i.e. sys_times(), getrusage(), and /proc//stat.)

This patch have a positive side effect:

 - Before this patch, if a group contains many short-life threads
   (e.g. runs 0.9ms and not interrupted by ticks), the group's
   cputime could be invisible since thread's cputime was accumulated
   after adjusted: imagine adjustment function as adj(ticks, runtime),
     {adj(0, 0.9) + adj(0, 0.9) + ....} = {0 + 0 + ....} = 0.
   After this patch it will not happen because the adjustment is
   applied after accumulated.

v2:
 - remove if()s, put new variables into signal_struct.

Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Spencer Candland 
Cc: Americo Wang 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Balbir Singh 
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka 
LKML-Reference: <4B162517.8040909@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

connector: fix regression introduced by sid connector

2009-10-29T14:39:25+00:00

Since commit 02b51df1b07b4e9ca823c89284e704cadb323cd1 (proc connector: add
event for process becoming session leader) we have the following warning:

Badness at kernel/softirq.c:143
[...]
Krnl PSW : 0404c00180000000 00000000001481d4 (local_bh_enable+0xb0/0xe0)
[...]
Call Trace:
([<000000013fe04100>] 0x13fe04100)
 [<000000000048a946>] sk_filter+0x9a/0xd0
 [<000000000049d938>] netlink_broadcast+0x2c0/0x53c
 [<00000000003ba9ae>] cn_netlink_send+0x272/0x2b0
 [<00000000003baef0>] proc_sid_connector+0xc4/0xd4
 [<0000000000142604>] __set_special_pids+0x58/0x90
 [<0000000000159938>] sys_setsid+0xb4/0xd8
 [<00000000001187fe>] sysc_noemu+0x10/0x16
 [<00000041616cb266>] 0x41616cb266

The warning is
--->    WARN_ON_ONCE(in_irq() || irqs_disabled());

The network code must not be called with disabled interrupts but
sys_setsid holds the tasklist_lock with spinlock_irq while calling the
connector.

After a discussion we agreed that we can move proc_sid_connector from
__set_special_pids to sys_setsid.

We also agreed that it is sufficient to change the check from
task_session(curr) != pid into err > 0, since if we don't change the
session, this means we were already the leader and return -EPERM.

One last thing:
There is also daemonize(), and some people might want to get a
notification in that case. Since daemonize() is only needed if a user
space does kernel_thread this does not look important (and there seems
to be no consensus if this connector should be called in daemonize). If
we really want this, we can add proc_sid_connector to daemonize() in an
additional patch (Scott?)

Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger 
Cc: Scott James Remnant 
Cc: Matt Helsley 
Cc: David S. Miller 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov 
Acked-by: David Rientjes 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'core-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip

2009-10-08T19:16:35+00:00

* 'core-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  futex: fix requeue_pi key imbalance
  futex: Fix typo in FUTEX_WAIT/WAKE_BITSET_PRIVATE definitions
  rcu: Place root rcu_node structure in separate lockdep class
  rcu: Make hot-unplugged CPU relinquish its own RCU callbacks
  rcu: Move rcu_barrier() to rcutree
  futex: Move exit_pi_state() call to release_mm()
  futex: Nullify robust lists after cleanup
  futex: Fix locking imbalance
  panic: Fix panic message visibility by calling bust_spinlocks(0) before dying
  rcu: Replace the rcu_barrier enum with pointer to call_rcu*() function
  rcu: Clean up code based on review feedback from Josh Triplett, part 4
  rcu: Clean up code based on review feedback from Josh Triplett, part 3
  rcu: Fix rcu_lock_map build failure on CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y
  rcu: Clean up code to address Ingo's checkpatch feedback
  rcu: Clean up code based on review feedback from Josh Triplett, part 2
  rcu: Clean up code based on review feedback from Josh Triplett

futex: Move exit_pi_state() call to release_mm()

2009-10-06T15:00:01+00:00

exit_pi_state() is called from do_exit() but not from do_execve().
Move it to release_mm() so it gets called from do_execve() as well.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
LKML-Reference: 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Anirban Sinha 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra

task_struct cleanup: move binfmt field to mm_struct

2009-09-24T14:21:05+00:00

Because the binfmt is not different between threads in the same process,
it can be moved from task_struct to mm_struct.  And binfmt moudle is
handled per mm_struct instead of task_struct.

Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Rusty Russell 
Acked-by: Roland McGrath 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

wait_noreap_copyout(): check for ->wo_info != NULL

2009-09-24T14:21:00+00:00

Current behaviour of sys_waitid() looks odd.  If user passes infop ==
NULL, sys_waitid() returns success.  When user additionally specifies flag
WNOWAIT, sys_waitid() returns -EFAULT on the same conditions.  When user
combines WNOWAIT with WCONTINUED, sys_waitid() again returns success.

This patch adds check for ->wo_info in wait_noreap_copyout().

User-visible change: starting from this commit, sys_waitid() always checks
infop != NULL and does not fail if it is NULL.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh 
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Roland McGrath 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds