linux-toradex.git/kernel/fork.c, branch v4.18-rc7

mm: introduce vma_init()

2018-07-27T02:38:03+00:00

Not all VMAs allocated with vm_area_alloc().  Some of them allocated on
stack or in data segment.

The new helper can be use to initialize VMA properly regardless where it
was allocated.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180724121139.62570-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: make vm_area_alloc() initialize core fields

2018-07-21T22:24:03+00:00

Like vm_area_dup(), it initializes the anon_vma_chain head, and the
basic mm pointer.

The rest of the fields end up being different for different users,
although the plan is to also initialize the 'vm_ops' field to a dummy
entry.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: make vm_area_dup() actually copy the old vma data

2018-07-21T21:48:45+00:00

.. and re-initialize th eanon_vma_chain head.

This removes some boiler-plate from the users, and also makes it clear
why it didn't need use the 'zalloc()' version.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: use helper functions for allocating and freeing vm_area structs

2018-07-21T20:48:51+00:00

The vm_area_struct is one of the most fundamental memory management
objects, but the management of it is entirely open-coded evertwhere,
ranging from allocation and freeing (using kmem_cache_[z]alloc and
kmem_cache_free) to initializing all the fields.

We want to unify this in order to end up having some unified
initialization of the vmas, and the first step to this is to at least
have basic allocation functions.

Right now those functions are literally just wrappers around the
kmem_cache_*() calls.  This is a purely mechanical conversion:

    # new vma:
    kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) -> vm_area_alloc()

    # copy old vma
    kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) -> vm_area_dup(old)

    # free vma
    kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma) -> vm_area_free(vma)

to the point where the old vma passed in to the vm_area_dup() function
isn't even used yet (because I've left all the old manual initialization
alone).

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: check for SIGKILL inside dup_mmap() loop

2018-06-14T22:55:24+00:00

As a theoretical problem, dup_mmap() of an mm_struct with 60000+ vmas
can loop while potentially allocating memory, with mm->mmap_sem held for
write by current thread.  This is bad if current thread was selected as
an OOM victim, for current thread will continue allocations using memory
reserves while OOM reaper is unable to reclaim memory.

As an actually observable problem, it is not difficult to make OOM
reaper unable to reclaim memory if the OOM victim is blocked at
i_mmap_lock_write() in this loop.  Unfortunately, since nobody can
explain whether it is safe to use killable wait there, let's check for
SIGKILL before trying to allocate memory.  Even without an OOM event,
there is no point with continuing the loop from the beginning if current
thread is killed.

I tested with debug printk().  This patch should be safe because we
already fail if security_vm_enough_memory_mm() or
kmem_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL) fails and exit_mmap() handles it.

   ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
   ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
   ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
   ***** Aborting dup_mmap() due to SIGKILL *****
   ***** Aborting exit_mmap() due to NULL mmap *****

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201804071938.CDE04681.SOFVQJFtMHOOLF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables

2018-06-14T03:21:18+00:00

The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.

That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.

HOWEVER.

It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y

and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y

That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.

The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one.  This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).

This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:

  CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
  CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
  CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
  CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y

where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.

Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2018-06-10T17:17:09+00:00

Pull restartable sequence support from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The restartable sequences syscall (finally):

  After a lot of back and forth discussion and massive delays caused by
  the speculative distraction of maintainers, the core set of
  restartable sequences has finally reached a consensus.

  It comes with the basic non disputed core implementation along with
  support for arm, powerpc and x86 and a full set of selftests

  It was exposed to linux-next earlier this week, so it does not fully
  comply with the merge window requirements, but there is really no
  point to drag it out for yet another cycle"

* 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  rseq/selftests: Provide Makefile, scripts, gitignore
  rseq/selftests: Provide parametrized tests
  rseq/selftests: Provide basic percpu ops test
  rseq/selftests: Provide basic test
  rseq/selftests: Provide rseq library
  selftests/lib.mk: Introduce OVERRIDE_TARGETS
  powerpc: Wire up restartable sequences system call
  powerpc: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
  powerpc: Add support for restartable sequences
  x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call
  x86: Add support for restartable sequences
  arm: Wire up restartable sequences system call
  arm: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences
  arm: Add restartable sequences support
  rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call
  uapi/headers: Provide types_32_64.h

mm: introduce arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct

2018-06-08T00:34:34+00:00

mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is
abused too.  It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when
reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make
sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and
not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R.

And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below:

INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
       Tainted: G            E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1
 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this
message.
 ps              D    0 14018      1 0x00000004
 Call Trace:
   schedule+0x36/0x80
   rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150
   call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30
   down_read+0x20/0x40
   proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0
   __vfs_read+0x37/0x150
   vfs_read+0x96/0x130
   SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5

Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock
for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem.

So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent
access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace
write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and
sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more
friendly to other VM operations.

This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve
the above hung task warning completely since the later
access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem.  The mmap_sem
scalability issue will be solved in the future.

[yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi 
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Cc: Kirill Tkhai 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

2018-06-06T23:34:00+00:00

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches
  in total.

  The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four
  categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state
  stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable
  names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the
  audit subsystem.

  The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the
  changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers,
  but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would
  be good to get them in now.

  The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging
  improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging;
  starting with this patchset the changes in
  /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the
  standard kernel logging and audit.

  As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to
  merge cleanly with your tree"

[ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that
  also came in from Paul   - Linus ]

* tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID
  audit: use existing session info function
  audit: normalize loginuid read access
  audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged
  audit: use inline function to set audit context
  audit: use inline function to get audit context
  audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro
  seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging
  seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl
  seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string
  seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl
  audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable
  audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records

rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call

2018-06-06T09:58:31+00:00

Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace
memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two
purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the
current CPU number value from user-space.

* Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics)

Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on
per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations.

The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started
by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of
critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a
few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other
architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path.

Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases.

Test hardware:

arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core
x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading

The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread.

* Per-CPU statistic counter increment

                getcpu+atomic (ns/op)    rseq (ns/op)    speedup
arm32:                344.0                 31.4          11.0
x86-64:                15.3                  2.0           7.7

* LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer
             per-cpu buffer

                getcpu+atomic (ns/op)    rseq (ns/op)    speedup
arm32:               2502.0                 2250.0         1.1
x86-64:               117.4                   98.0         1.2

* liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word

                getcpu+atomic (ns/op)    rseq (ns/op)    speedup
arm32:                751.0                 128.5          5.8
x86-64:                53.4                  28.6          1.9

* jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq

Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on
rseq 2016 implementation):

The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and
the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%.

* Reading the current CPU number

Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is
running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the
cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done
by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the
current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler
updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory
area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from
memory.

Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and
user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read
the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over
alternative approaches:

- 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc
- 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso
  executing a "lsl" instruction,
- 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction,
- Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline
  assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable
  sequences.
- The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared
  between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the
  case for the lsl-based x86 vdso.

On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment
selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs
similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is
not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already
using the gs segment selector for other purposes.

Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number:

ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l)
Machine model: Cubietruck
- Baseline (empty loop):                                    8.4 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id:                               16.7 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register):               19.8 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu:                           301.8 ns
- getcpu system call:                                     234.9 ns

x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz:
- Baseline (empty loop):                                    0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id:                                0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register):                0.8 ns
- Read using gs segment selector:                           0.8 ns
- "lsl" inline assembly:                                   13.0 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu:                              16.6 ns
- getcpu system call:                                      53.9 ns

- Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset)

Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to
expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the
scheduler:

Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @
2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy
saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1
kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig,
restartable sequences series applied.

* CONFIG_RSEQ=n

avg.:      41.37 s
std.dev.:   0.36 s

* CONFIG_RSEQ=y

avg.:      40.46 s
std.dev.:   0.33 s

- Size

On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is
567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes.

[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/
[2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Joel Fernandes 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Dave Watson 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Chris Lameter 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Andrew Hunter 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" 
Cc: Paul Turner 
Cc: Boqun Feng 
Cc: Josh Triplett 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Ben Maurer 
Cc: Alexander Viro 
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com