linux-toradex.git/kernel/ptrace.c, branch v2.6.18

[PATCH] sched: cleanup, remove task_t, convert to struct task_struct

2006-07-03T22:27:11+00:00

cleanup: remove task_t and convert all the uses to struct task_struct. I
introduced it for the scheduler anno and it was a mistake.

Conversion was mostly scripted, the result was reviewed and all
secondary whitespace and style impact (if any) was fixed up by hand.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] coredump: kill ptrace related stuff

2006-06-26T16:58:27+00:00

With this patch zap_process() sets SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT while sending SIGKILL to
the thread group.  This means that a TASK_TRACED task

	1. Will be awakened by signal_wake_up(1)

	2. Can't sleep again via ptrace_notify()

	3. Can't go to do_signal_stop() after return
	   from ptrace_stop() in get_signal_to_deliver()

So we can remove all ptrace related stuff from coredump path.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Roland McGrath 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] proc: Cleanup proc_fd_access_allowed

2006-06-26T16:58:26+00:00

In process of getting proc_fd_access_allowed to work it has developed a few
warts.  In particular the special case that always allows introspection and
the special case to allow inspection of kernel threads.

The special case for introspection is needed for /proc/self/mem.

The special case for kernel threads really should be overridable
by security modules.

So consolidate these checks into ptrace.c:may_attach().

The check to always allow introspection is trivial.

The check to allow access to kernel threads, and zombies is a little
trickier.  mem_read and mem_write already verify an mm exists so it isn't
needed twice.  proc_fd_access_allowed only doesn't want a check to verify
task->mm exits, s it prevents all access to kernel threads.  So just move
the task->mm check into ptrace_attach where it is needed for practical
reasons.

I did a quick audit and none of the security modules in the kernel seem to
care if they are passed a task without an mm into security_ptrace.  So the
above move should be safe and it allows security modules to come up with
more restrictive policy.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Stephen Smalley 
Cc: Chris Wright 
Cc: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ptrace_attach: fix possible deadlock schenario with irqs

2006-05-11T18:08:49+00:00

Eric Biederman points out that we can't take the task_lock while holding
tasklist_lock for writing, because another CPU that holds the task lock
might take an interrupt that then tries to take tasklist_lock for writing.

Which would be a nasty deadlock, with one CPU spinning forever in an
interrupt handler (although admittedly you need to really work at
triggering it ;)

Since the ptrace_attach() code is special and very unusual, just make it
be extra careful, and use trylock+repeat to avoid the possible deadlock.

Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Roland McGrath 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Fix ptrace_attach()/ptrace_traceme()/de_thread() race

2006-05-07T17:49:33+00:00

This holds the task lock (and, for ptrace_attach, the tasklist_lock)
over the actual attach event, which closes a race between attacking to a
thread that is either doing a PTRACE_TRACEME or getting de-threaded.

Thanks to Oleg Nesterov for reminding me about this, and Chris Wright
for noticing a lost return value in my first version.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] fix non-leader exec under ptrace

2006-04-14T15:59:13+00:00

This reverts most of commit 30e0fca6c1d7d26f3f2daa4dd2b12c51dadc778a.
It broke the case of non-leader MT exec when ptraced.
I think the bug it was intended to fix was already addressed by commit
788e05a67c343fa22f2ae1d3ca264e7f15c25eaf.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

BUG_ON() Conversion in kernel/ptrace.c

2006-04-02T11:43:40+00:00

this changes if() BUG(); constructs to BUG_ON() which is
cleaner, contains unlikely() and can better optimized away.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn 
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk

[PATCH] don't use REMOVE_LINKS/SET_LINKS for reparenting

2006-03-29T02:36:41+00:00

There are places where kernel uses REMOVE_LINKS/SET_LINKS while changing
process's ->parent.  Use add_parent/remove_parent instead, they don't abuse
of global process list.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] fix zap_thread's ptrace related problems

2006-02-15T19:05:43+00:00

1. The tracee can go from ptrace_stop() to do_signal_stop()
   after __ptrace_unlink(p).

2. It is unsafe to __ptrace_unlink(p) while p->parent may wait
   for tasklist_lock in ptrace_detach().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Roland McGrath 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] compound page: no access_process_vm check

2006-02-15T00:09:33+00:00

The PageCompound check before access_process_vm's set_page_dirty_lock is no
longer necessary, so remove it.  But leave the PageCompound checks in
bio_set_pages_dirty, dio_bio_complete and nfs_free_user_pages: at least some
of those were introduced as a little optimization on hugetlb pages.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds