<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel/sched, branch v3.8.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>sched/debug: Fix sd-&gt;*_idx limit range avoiding overflow</title>
<updated>2013-04-25T19:51:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>libin</name>
<email>huawei.libin@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-08T06:39:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dd135b0d8977ef119c7908c0153c3e94d8110e58'/>
<id>dd135b0d8977ef119c7908c0153c3e94d8110e58</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fd9b86d37a600488dbd80fe60cca46b822bff1cd upstream.

Commit 201c373e8e ("sched/debug: Limit sd-&gt;*_idx range on
sysctl") was an incomplete bug fix.

This patch fixes sd-&gt;*_idx limit range to [0 ~ CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX-1]
avoiding array overflow caused by setting sd-&gt;*_idx to CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX
on sysctl.

Signed-off-by: Libin &lt;huawei.libin@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;jiang.liu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;guohanjun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51626610.2040607@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi &lt;jhbird.choi@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fd9b86d37a600488dbd80fe60cca46b822bff1cd upstream.

Commit 201c373e8e ("sched/debug: Limit sd-&gt;*_idx range on
sysctl") was an incomplete bug fix.

This patch fixes sd-&gt;*_idx limit range to [0 ~ CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX-1]
avoiding array overflow caused by setting sd-&gt;*_idx to CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX
on sysctl.

Signed-off-by: Libin &lt;huawei.libin@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;jiang.liu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;guohanjun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51626610.2040607@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi &lt;jhbird.choi@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Convert BUG_ON()s in try_to_wake_up_local() to WARN_ON_ONCE()s</title>
<updated>2013-04-25T19:51:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-03-18T19:22:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4f795d18597696cc0da217c5177ddd8e2fbbb932'/>
<id>4f795d18597696cc0da217c5177ddd8e2fbbb932</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 383efcd00053ec40023010ce5034bd702e7ab373 upstream.

try_to_wake_up_local() should only be invoked to wake up another
task in the same runqueue and BUG_ON()s are used to enforce the
rule. Missing try_to_wake_up_local() can stall workqueue
execution but such stalls are likely to be finite either by
another work item being queued or the one blocked getting
unblocked.  There's no reason to trigger BUG while holding rq
lock crashing the whole system.

Convert BUG_ON()s in try_to_wake_up_local() to WARN_ON_ONCE()s.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130318192234.GD3042@htj.dyndns.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 383efcd00053ec40023010ce5034bd702e7ab373 upstream.

try_to_wake_up_local() should only be invoked to wake up another
task in the same runqueue and BUG_ON()s are used to enforce the
rule. Missing try_to_wake_up_local() can stall workqueue
execution but such stalls are likely to be finite either by
another work item being queued or the one blocked getting
unblocked.  There's no reason to trigger BUG while holding rq
lock crashing the whole system.

Convert BUG_ON()s in try_to_wake_up_local() to WARN_ON_ONCE()s.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130318192234.GD3042@htj.dyndns.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched_clock: Prevent 64bit inatomicity on 32bit systems</title>
<updated>2013-04-17T04:48:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-06T08:10:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=092c48c05b0b25fdfca630441f34fd99b83deb1c'/>
<id>092c48c05b0b25fdfca630441f34fd99b83deb1c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a1cbcaa9ea87b87a96b9fc465951dcf36e459ca2 upstream.

The sched_clock_remote() implementation has the following inatomicity
problem on 32bit systems when accessing the remote scd-&gt;clock, which
is a 64bit value.

CPU0			CPU1

sched_clock_local()	sched_clock_remote(CPU0)
...
			remote_clock = scd[CPU0]-&gt;clock
			    read_low32bit(scd[CPU0]-&gt;clock)
cmpxchg64(scd-&gt;clock,...)
			    read_high32bit(scd[CPU0]-&gt;clock)

While the update of scd-&gt;clock is using an atomic64 mechanism, the
readout on the remote cpu is not, which can cause completely bogus
readouts.

It is a quite rare problem, because it requires the update to hit the
narrow race window between the low/high readout and the update must go
across the 32bit boundary.

The resulting misbehaviour is, that CPU1 will see the sched_clock on
CPU1 ~4 seconds ahead of it's own and update CPU1s sched_clock value
to this bogus timestamp. This stays that way due to the clamping
implementation for about 4 seconds until the synchronization with
CLOCK_MONOTONIC undoes the problem.

The issue is hard to observe, because it might only result in a less
accurate SCHED_OTHER timeslicing behaviour. To create observable
damage on realtime scheduling classes, it is necessary that the bogus
update of CPU1 sched_clock happens in the context of an realtime
thread, which then gets charged 4 seconds of RT runtime, which results
in the RT throttler mechanism to trigger and prevent scheduling of RT
tasks for a little less than 4 seconds. So this is quite unlikely as
well.

The issue was quite hard to decode as the reproduction time is between
2 days and 3 weeks and intrusive tracing makes it less likely, but the
following trace recorded with trace_clock=global, which uses
sched_clock_local(), gave the final hint:

  &lt;idle&gt;-0   0d..30 400269.477150: hrtimer_cancel: hrtimer=0xf7061e80
  &lt;idle&gt;-0   0d..30 400269.477151: hrtimer_start:  hrtimer=0xf7061e80 ...
irq/20-S-587 1d..32 400273.772118: sched_wakeup:   comm= ... target_cpu=0
  &lt;idle&gt;-0   0dN.30 400273.772118: hrtimer_cancel: hrtimer=0xf7061e80

What happens is that CPU0 goes idle and invokes
sched_clock_idle_sleep_event() which invokes sched_clock_local() and
CPU1 runs a remote wakeup for CPU0 at the same time, which invokes
sched_remote_clock(). The time jump gets propagated to CPU0 via
sched_remote_clock() and stays stale on both cores for ~4 seconds.

There are only two other possibilities, which could cause a stale
sched clock:

1) ktime_get() which reads out CLOCK_MONOTONIC returns a sporadic
   wrong value.

2) sched_clock() which reads the TSC returns a sporadic wrong value.

#1 can be excluded because sched_clock would continue to increase for
   one jiffy and then go stale.

#2 can be excluded because it would not make the clock jump
   forward. It would just result in a stale sched_clock for one jiffy.

After quite some brain twisting and finding the same pattern on other
traces, sched_clock_remote() remained the only place which could cause
such a problem and as explained above it's indeed racy on 32bit
systems.

So while on 64bit systems the readout is atomic, we need to verify the
remote readout on 32bit machines. We need to protect the local-&gt;clock
readout in sched_clock_remote() on 32bit as well because an NMI could
hit between the low and the high readout, call sched_clock_local() and
modify local-&gt;clock.

Thanks to Siegfried Wulsch for bearing with my debug requests and
going through the tedious tasks of running a bunch of reproducer
systems to generate the debug information which let me decode the
issue.

Reported-by: Siegfried Wulsch &lt;Siegfried.Wulsch@rovema.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1304051544160.21884@ionos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a1cbcaa9ea87b87a96b9fc465951dcf36e459ca2 upstream.

The sched_clock_remote() implementation has the following inatomicity
problem on 32bit systems when accessing the remote scd-&gt;clock, which
is a 64bit value.

CPU0			CPU1

sched_clock_local()	sched_clock_remote(CPU0)
...
			remote_clock = scd[CPU0]-&gt;clock
			    read_low32bit(scd[CPU0]-&gt;clock)
cmpxchg64(scd-&gt;clock,...)
			    read_high32bit(scd[CPU0]-&gt;clock)

While the update of scd-&gt;clock is using an atomic64 mechanism, the
readout on the remote cpu is not, which can cause completely bogus
readouts.

It is a quite rare problem, because it requires the update to hit the
narrow race window between the low/high readout and the update must go
across the 32bit boundary.

The resulting misbehaviour is, that CPU1 will see the sched_clock on
CPU1 ~4 seconds ahead of it's own and update CPU1s sched_clock value
to this bogus timestamp. This stays that way due to the clamping
implementation for about 4 seconds until the synchronization with
CLOCK_MONOTONIC undoes the problem.

The issue is hard to observe, because it might only result in a less
accurate SCHED_OTHER timeslicing behaviour. To create observable
damage on realtime scheduling classes, it is necessary that the bogus
update of CPU1 sched_clock happens in the context of an realtime
thread, which then gets charged 4 seconds of RT runtime, which results
in the RT throttler mechanism to trigger and prevent scheduling of RT
tasks for a little less than 4 seconds. So this is quite unlikely as
well.

The issue was quite hard to decode as the reproduction time is between
2 days and 3 weeks and intrusive tracing makes it less likely, but the
following trace recorded with trace_clock=global, which uses
sched_clock_local(), gave the final hint:

  &lt;idle&gt;-0   0d..30 400269.477150: hrtimer_cancel: hrtimer=0xf7061e80
  &lt;idle&gt;-0   0d..30 400269.477151: hrtimer_start:  hrtimer=0xf7061e80 ...
irq/20-S-587 1d..32 400273.772118: sched_wakeup:   comm= ... target_cpu=0
  &lt;idle&gt;-0   0dN.30 400273.772118: hrtimer_cancel: hrtimer=0xf7061e80

What happens is that CPU0 goes idle and invokes
sched_clock_idle_sleep_event() which invokes sched_clock_local() and
CPU1 runs a remote wakeup for CPU0 at the same time, which invokes
sched_remote_clock(). The time jump gets propagated to CPU0 via
sched_remote_clock() and stays stale on both cores for ~4 seconds.

There are only two other possibilities, which could cause a stale
sched clock:

1) ktime_get() which reads out CLOCK_MONOTONIC returns a sporadic
   wrong value.

2) sched_clock() which reads the TSC returns a sporadic wrong value.

#1 can be excluded because sched_clock would continue to increase for
   one jiffy and then go stale.

#2 can be excluded because it would not make the clock jump
   forward. It would just result in a stale sched_clock for one jiffy.

After quite some brain twisting and finding the same pattern on other
traces, sched_clock_remote() remained the only place which could cause
such a problem and as explained above it's indeed racy on 32bit
systems.

So while on 64bit systems the readout is atomic, we need to verify the
remote readout on 32bit machines. We need to protect the local-&gt;clock
readout in sched_clock_remote() on 32bit as well because an NMI could
hit between the low and the high readout, call sched_clock_local() and
modify local-&gt;clock.

Thanks to Siegfried Wulsch for bearing with my debug requests and
going through the tedious tasks of running a bunch of reproducer
systems to generate the debug information which let me decode the
issue.

Reported-by: Siegfried Wulsch &lt;Siegfried.Wulsch@rovema.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1304051544160.21884@ionos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/debug: Fix format string for 32-bit platforms</title>
<updated>2013-01-25T14:23:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-25T14:14:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cff3c124a7e82ca0ea1d6864b27ef18c403c0773'/>
<id>cff3c124a7e82ca0ea1d6864b27ef18c403c0773</id>
<content type='text'>
The type returned from atomic64_t can be either unsigned
long or unsigned long long, depending on the architecture.
Using a cast to unsigned long long lets us use the same
format string for all architectures.

Without this patch, building with scheduler debugging
enabled results in:

  kernel/sched/debug.c: In function 'print_cfs_rq':
  kernel/sched/debug.c:225:2: warning: format '%ld' expects argument of type 'long int', but argument 4 has type 'long long int' [-Wformat]
  kernel/sched/debug.c:225:2: warning: format '%ld' expects argument of type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'long long int' [-Wformat]

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Turner &lt;pjt@google.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@list.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359123276-15833-7-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The type returned from atomic64_t can be either unsigned
long or unsigned long long, depending on the architecture.
Using a cast to unsigned long long lets us use the same
format string for all architectures.

Without this patch, building with scheduler debugging
enabled results in:

  kernel/sched/debug.c: In function 'print_cfs_rq':
  kernel/sched/debug.c:225:2: warning: format '%ld' expects argument of type 'long int', but argument 4 has type 'long long int' [-Wformat]
  kernel/sched/debug.c:225:2: warning: format '%ld' expects argument of type 'long int', but argument 3 has type 'long long int' [-Wformat]

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Turner &lt;pjt@google.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@list.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359123276-15833-7-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix warning in kernel/sched/fair.c</title>
<updated>2013-01-25T14:23:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-25T14:14:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=38dc3348e36d6cbe6ad51d771e4db948cda5b0e3'/>
<id>38dc3348e36d6cbe6ad51d771e4db948cda5b0e3</id>
<content type='text'>
a4c96ae319 "sched: Unthrottle rt runqueues in
__disable_runtime()" turned the unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs
function into a static symbol, which now triggers a warning
about it being potentially unused:

  kernel/sched/fair.c:2055:13: warning: 'unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]

Marking it __maybe_unused shuts up the gcc warning and lets the
compiler safely drop the function body when it's not being used.

To reproduce, build the ARM bcm2835_defconfig.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Boonstoppel &lt;pboonstoppel@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Paul Turner &lt;pjt@google.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@list.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359123276-15833-6-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
a4c96ae319 "sched: Unthrottle rt runqueues in
__disable_runtime()" turned the unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs
function into a static symbol, which now triggers a warning
about it being potentially unused:

  kernel/sched/fair.c:2055:13: warning: 'unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]

Marking it __maybe_unused shuts up the gcc warning and lets the
compiler safely drop the function body when it's not being used.

To reproduce, build the ARM bcm2835_defconfig.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Boonstoppel &lt;pboonstoppel@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Paul Turner &lt;pjt@google.com&gt;
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@list.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359123276-15833-6-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/rt: Use root_domain of rt_rq not current processor</title>
<updated>2013-01-25T07:20:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shawn Bohrer</name>
<email>sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-14T17:55:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=aa7f67304d1a03180f463258aa6f15a8b434e77d'/>
<id>aa7f67304d1a03180f463258aa6f15a8b434e77d</id>
<content type='text'>
When the system has multiple domains do_sched_rt_period_timer()
can run on any CPU and may iterate over all rt_rq in
cpu_online_mask.  This means when balance_runtime() is run for a
given rt_rq that rt_rq may be in a different rd than the current
processor.  Thus if we use smp_processor_id() to get rd in
do_balance_runtime() we may borrow runtime from a rt_rq that is
not part of our rd.

This changes do_balance_runtime to get the rd from the passed in
rt_rq ensuring that we borrow runtime only from the correct rd
for the given rt_rq.

This fixes a BUG at kernel/sched/rt.c:687! in __disable_runtime
when we try reclaim runtime lent to other rt_rq but runtime has
been lent to a rt_rq in another rd.

Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer &lt;sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;bitbucket@online.de&gt;
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358186131-29494-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When the system has multiple domains do_sched_rt_period_timer()
can run on any CPU and may iterate over all rt_rq in
cpu_online_mask.  This means when balance_runtime() is run for a
given rt_rq that rt_rq may be in a different rd than the current
processor.  Thus if we use smp_processor_id() to get rd in
do_balance_runtime() we may borrow runtime from a rt_rq that is
not part of our rd.

This changes do_balance_runtime to get the rd from the passed in
rt_rq ensuring that we borrow runtime only from the correct rd
for the given rt_rq.

This fixes a BUG at kernel/sched/rt.c:687! in __disable_runtime
when we try reclaim runtime lent to other rt_rq but runtime has
been lent to a rt_rq in another rd.

Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer &lt;sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;bitbucket@online.de&gt;
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1358186131-29494-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wake_up_process() should be never used to wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task</title>
<updated>2013-01-22T18:08:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-21T19:48:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9067ac85d533651b98c2ff903182a20cbb361fcb'/>
<id>9067ac85d533651b98c2ff903182a20cbb361fcb</id>
<content type='text'>
wake_up_process() should never wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task.
Change it to use TASK_NORMAL and add the WARN_ON().

TASK_ALL has no other users, probably can be killed.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
wake_up_process() should never wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task.
Change it to use TASK_NORMAL and add the WARN_ON().

TASK_ALL has no other users, probably can be killed.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: numa: ksm: fix oops in task_numa_placment()</title>
<updated>2012-12-20T15:06:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-20T01:42:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2832bc19f6668fd00116f61f821105040599ef8b'/>
<id>2832bc19f6668fd00116f61f821105040599ef8b</id>
<content type='text'>
task_numa_placement() oopsed on NULL p-&gt;mm when task_numa_fault() got
called in the handling of break_ksm() for ksmd.  That might be a
peculiar case, which perhaps KSM could takes steps to avoid? but it's
more robust if task_numa_placement() allows for such a possibility.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
task_numa_placement() oopsed on NULL p-&gt;mm when task_numa_fault() got
called in the handling of break_ksm() for ksmd.  That might be a
peculiar case, which perhaps KSM could takes steps to avoid? but it's
more robust if task_numa_placement() allows for such a possibility.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-12-17T23:44:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-17T23:44:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6a2b60b17b3e48a418695a94bd2420f6ab32e519'/>
<id>6a2b60b17b3e48a418695a94bd2420f6ab32e519</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
 "While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to
  containers in general and user namespaces in particular.  The user
  space interface is now complete.

  This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user
  namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces.
  The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from
  using cool new kernel features is broken.

  This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for
  the pid, user, mount namespaces.

  This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace
  cleanups/simplifications.  Of particular significance is the rework of
  the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out
  tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation.  At
  least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been converted from regular files
  to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS,
  ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is
  currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission
  checks are always applied.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers
  so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same
  namespaces.

  Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the
  permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user
  namespace root to usefully use the networking stack.  Similar changes
  for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my
  tree.

  Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn
  in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the
  /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ files in this tree.

  Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs,
  ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the
  Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from
  being built when any of those filesystems are enabled.

  Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial
  user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits)
  proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.
  proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.
  proc: Generalize proc inode allocation
  userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs
  userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file
  procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file
  userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
  userns: Implent proc namespace operations
  userns: Kill task_user_ns
  userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter
  userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces
  userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid.
  userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces.
  userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped
  userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure
  vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.
  vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces
  vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
 "While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to
  containers in general and user namespaces in particular.  The user
  space interface is now complete.

  This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user
  namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces.
  The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from
  using cool new kernel features is broken.

  This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for
  the pid, user, mount namespaces.

  This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace
  cleanups/simplifications.  Of particular significance is the rework of
  the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out
  tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation.  At
  least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been converted from regular files
  to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS,
  ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is
  currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission
  checks are always applied.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers
  so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same
  namespaces.

  Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the
  permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user
  namespace root to usefully use the networking stack.  Similar changes
  for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my
  tree.

  Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn
  in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the
  /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ files in this tree.

  Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs,
  ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the
  Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from
  being built when any of those filesystems are enabled.

  Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial
  user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits)
  proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.
  proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.
  proc: Generalize proc inode allocation
  userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs
  userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file
  procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file
  userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
  userns: Implent proc namespace operations
  userns: Kill task_user_ns
  userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter
  userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces
  userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid.
  userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces.
  userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped
  userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure
  vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.
  vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces
  vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: numa: Fix build error if CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING &amp;&amp; !CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE</title>
<updated>2012-12-17T16:25:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mel Gorman</name>
<email>mgorman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-17T14:05:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=221392c3ad0432e39fd74a349364f66cb0ed78f6'/>
<id>221392c3ad0432e39fd74a349364f66cb0ed78f6</id>
<content type='text'>
Michal Hocko reported that the following build error occurs if
CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING is set without THP support

  kernel/sched/fair.c: In function ‘task_numa_work’:
  kernel/sched/fair.c:932:55: error: call to ‘__build_bug_failed’ declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG failed

The problem is that HPAGE_PMD_SHIFT triggers a BUILD_BUG() on
!CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE. This patch addresses the problem.

Reported-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Michal Hocko reported that the following build error occurs if
CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING is set without THP support

  kernel/sched/fair.c: In function ‘task_numa_work’:
  kernel/sched/fair.c:932:55: error: call to ‘__build_bug_failed’ declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG failed

The problem is that HPAGE_PMD_SHIFT triggers a BUILD_BUG() on
!CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE. This patch addresses the problem.

Reported-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
