<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel/seccomp.c, branch v4.4.93</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: fix the usage of get/put_seccomp_filter() in seccomp_get_filter()</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:41:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-27T15:25:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9237605e0bfb0e469b54344a4455e6b241d6c0c9'/>
<id>9237605e0bfb0e469b54344a4455e6b241d6c0c9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66a733ea6b611aecf0119514d2dddab5f9d6c01e upstream.

As Chris explains, get_seccomp_filter() and put_seccomp_filter() can end
up using different filters. Once we drop -&gt;siglock it is possible for
task-&gt;seccomp.filter to have been replaced by SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC.

Fixes: f8e529ed941b ("seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters")
Reported-by: Chris Salls &lt;chrissalls5@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
[tycho: add __get_seccomp_filter vs. open coding refcount_inc()]
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho@docker.com&gt;
[kees: tweak commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 66a733ea6b611aecf0119514d2dddab5f9d6c01e upstream.

As Chris explains, get_seccomp_filter() and put_seccomp_filter() can end
up using different filters. Once we drop -&gt;siglock it is possible for
task-&gt;seccomp.filter to have been replaced by SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC.

Fixes: f8e529ed941b ("seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters")
Reported-by: Chris Salls &lt;chrissalls5@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
[tycho: add __get_seccomp_filter vs. open coding refcount_inc()]
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho@docker.com&gt;
[kees: tweak commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: always propagate NO_NEW_PRIVS on tsync</title>
<updated>2016-03-03T23:07:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jann@thejh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-26T05:00:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=df86161e4460cfd4ba504d5c5fd6ba218c75d4aa'/>
<id>df86161e4460cfd4ba504d5c5fd6ba218c75d4aa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 103502a35cfce0710909da874f092cb44823ca03 upstream.

Before this patch, a process with some permissive seccomp filter
that was applied by root without NO_NEW_PRIVS was able to add
more filters to itself without setting NO_NEW_PRIVS by setting
the new filter from a throwaway thread with NO_NEW_PRIVS.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 103502a35cfce0710909da874f092cb44823ca03 upstream.

Before this patch, a process with some permissive seccomp filter
that was applied by root without NO_NEW_PRIVS was able to add
more filters to itself without setting NO_NEW_PRIVS by setting
the new filter from a throwaway thread with NO_NEW_PRIVS.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters</title>
<updated>2015-10-28T02:55:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen</name>
<email>tycho.andersen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-27T00:23:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f8e529ed941ba2bbcbf310b575d968159ce7e895'/>
<id>f8e529ed941ba2bbcbf310b575d968159ce7e895</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
filters via ptrace.

PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith
filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith
filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter.

A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.

v2: * make save_orig const
    * check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when
       grows eBPF support it will be)
    * s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace
    * count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset

v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode
    * use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value

v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks

v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON

v6: * rebase on net-next

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
CC: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
CC: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
CC: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
CC: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
CC: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
filters via ptrace.

PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith
filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith
filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter.

A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.

v2: * make save_orig const
    * check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when
       grows eBPF support it will be)
    * s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace
    * count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset

v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode
    * use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value

v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks

v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON

v6: * rebase on net-next

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
CC: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
CC: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
CC: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
CC: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
CC: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, seccomp: prepare for upcoming criu support</title>
<updated>2015-10-05T13:47:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-02T13:17:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bab18991871545dfbd10c931eb0fe8f7637156a9'/>
<id>bab18991871545dfbd10c931eb0fe8f7637156a9</id>
<content type='text'>
The current ongoing effort to dump existing cBPF seccomp filters back
to user space requires to hold the pre-transformed instructions like
we do in case of socket filters from sk_attach_filter() side, so they
can be reloaded in original form at a later point in time by utilities
such as criu.

To prepare for this, simply extend the bpf_prog_create_from_user()
API to hold a flag that tells whether we should store the original
or not. Also, fanout filters could make use of that in future for
things like diag. While fanout filters already use bpf_prog_destroy(),
move seccomp over to them as well to handle original programs when
present.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The current ongoing effort to dump existing cBPF seccomp filters back
to user space requires to hold the pre-transformed instructions like
we do in case of socket filters from sk_attach_filter() side, so they
can be reloaded in original form at a later point in time by utilities
such as criu.

To prepare for this, simply extend the bpf_prog_create_from_user()
API to hold a flag that tells whether we should store the original
or not. Also, fanout filters could make use of that in future for
things like diag. While fanout filters already use bpf_prog_destroy(),
move seccomp over to them as well to handle original programs when
present.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'seccomp-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux into next</title>
<updated>2015-07-20T07:19:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-20T07:19:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fe6c59dc17908effd4e2caa666795b9ad984005b'/>
<id>fe6c59dc17908effd4e2caa666795b9ad984005b</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: swap hard-coded zeros to defined name</title>
<updated>2015-07-15T18:52:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-15T22:29:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=221272f97ca528048a577a3ff23d7774286ca5fd'/>
<id>221272f97ca528048a577a3ff23d7774286ca5fd</id>
<content type='text'>
For clarity, if CONFIG_SECCOMP isn't defined, seccomp_mode() is returning
"disabled". This makes that more clear, along with another 0-use, and
results in no operational change.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For clarity, if CONFIG_SECCOMP isn't defined, seccomp_mode() is returning
"disabled". This makes that more clear, along with another 0-use, and
results in no operational change.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume</title>
<updated>2015-07-15T18:52:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tycho Andersen</name>
<email>tycho.andersen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-13T15:02:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=13c4a90119d28cfcb6b5bdd820c233b86c2b0237'/>
<id>13c4a90119d28cfcb6b5bdd820c233b86c2b0237</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
with seccomp enabled.

One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.

This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.

Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
filters resumed as well.

v2 changes:

* require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
* drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
* change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
  as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
  detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
  disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.

v3 changes:

* get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
* report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
  used

v4 changes:

* get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
  directly

v5 changes:

* check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
CC: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
CC: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@hack.frob.com&gt;
CC: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
CC: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
[kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
with seccomp enabled.

One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.

This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.

Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
filters resumed as well.

v2 changes:

* require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
* drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
* change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
  as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
  detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
  disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.

v3 changes:

* get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
* report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
  used

v4 changes:

* get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
  directly

v5 changes:

* check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen &lt;tycho.andersen@canonical.com&gt;
CC: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
CC: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@hack.frob.com&gt;
CC: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
CC: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
[kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: Replace smp_read_barrier_depends() with lockless_dereference()</title>
<updated>2015-07-15T18:52:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pranith Kumar</name>
<email>bobby.prani@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-21T15:06:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8225d3853f34f6cf9caff15d8c385a528e0d7cb1'/>
<id>8225d3853f34f6cf9caff15d8c385a528e0d7cb1</id>
<content type='text'>
Recently lockless_dereference() was added which can be used in place of
hard-coding smp_read_barrier_depends(). The following PATCH makes the change.

Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar &lt;bobby.prani@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Recently lockless_dereference() was added which can be used in place of
hard-coding smp_read_barrier_depends(). The following PATCH makes the change.

Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar &lt;bobby.prani@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp, filter: add and use bpf_prog_create_from_user from seccomp</title>
<updated>2015-05-09T21:35:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-06T14:12:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ac67eb2c5347bd9976308c0e0cf1d9e7ca690342'/>
<id>ac67eb2c5347bd9976308c0e0cf1d9e7ca690342</id>
<content type='text'>
Seccomp has always been a special candidate when it comes to preparation
of its filters in seccomp_prepare_filter(). Due to the extra checks and
filter rewrite it partially duplicates code and has BPF internals exposed.

This patch adds a generic API inside the BPF code code that seccomp can use
and thus keep it's filter preparation code minimal and better maintainable.
The other side-effect is that now classic JITs can add seccomp support as
well by only providing a BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS translation.

Tested with seccomp and BPF test suites.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Nicolas Schichan &lt;nschichan@freebox.fr&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Seccomp has always been a special candidate when it comes to preparation
of its filters in seccomp_prepare_filter(). Due to the extra checks and
filter rewrite it partially duplicates code and has BPF internals exposed.

This patch adds a generic API inside the BPF code code that seccomp can use
and thus keep it's filter preparation code minimal and better maintainable.
The other side-effect is that now classic JITs can add seccomp support as
well by only providing a BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS translation.

Tested with seccomp and BPF test suites.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Nicolas Schichan &lt;nschichan@freebox.fr&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: simplify seccomp_prepare_filter and reuse bpf_prepare_filter</title>
<updated>2015-05-09T21:35:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Schichan</name>
<email>nschichan@freebox.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-06T14:12:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d9e12f42e58da475379b9080708b94f2095904af'/>
<id>d9e12f42e58da475379b9080708b94f2095904af</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove the calls to bpf_check_classic(), bpf_convert_filter() and
bpf_migrate_runtime() and let bpf_prepare_filter() take care of that
instead.

seccomp_check_filter() is passed to bpf_prepare_filter() so that it
gets called from there, after bpf_check_classic().

We can now remove exposure of two internal classic BPF functions
previously used by seccomp. The export of bpf_check_classic() symbol,
previously known as sk_chk_filter(), was there since pre git times,
and no in-tree module was using it, therefore remove it.

Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Schichan &lt;nschichan@freebox.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Remove the calls to bpf_check_classic(), bpf_convert_filter() and
bpf_migrate_runtime() and let bpf_prepare_filter() take care of that
instead.

seccomp_check_filter() is passed to bpf_prepare_filter() so that it
gets called from there, after bpf_check_classic().

We can now remove exposure of two internal classic BPF functions
previously used by seccomp. The export of bpf_check_classic() symbol,
previously known as sk_chk_filter(), was there since pre git times,
and no in-tree module was using it, therefore remove it.

Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Schichan &lt;nschichan@freebox.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
