<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel/user.c, branch v2.6.23.12</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Fix user namespace exiting OOPs</title>
<updated>2007-09-19T18:24:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Emelyanov</name>
<email>xemul@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2007-09-19T05:46:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=28f300d23674fa01ae747c66ce861d4ee6aebe8c'/>
<id>28f300d23674fa01ae747c66ce861d4ee6aebe8c</id>
<content type='text'>
It turned out, that the user namespace is released during the do_exit() in
exit_task_namespaces(), but the struct user_struct is released only during the
put_task_struct(), i.e.  MUCH later.

On debug kernels with poisoned slabs this will cause the oops in
uid_hash_remove() because the head of the chain, which resides inside the
struct user_namespace, will be already freed and poisoned.

Since the uid hash itself is required only when someone can search it, i.e.
when the namespace is alive, we can safely unhash all the user_struct-s from
it during the namespace exiting.  The subsequent free_uid() will complete the
user_struct destruction.

For example simple program

   #include &lt;sched.h&gt;

   char stack[2 * 1024 * 1024];

   int f(void *foo)
   {
   	return 0;
   }

   int main(void)
   {
   	clone(f, stack + 1 * 1024 * 1024, 0x10000000, 0);
   	return 0;
   }

run on kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS turned on will oops the
kernel immediately.

This was spotted during OpenVZ kernel testing.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It turned out, that the user namespace is released during the do_exit() in
exit_task_namespaces(), but the struct user_struct is released only during the
put_task_struct(), i.e.  MUCH later.

On debug kernels with poisoned slabs this will cause the oops in
uid_hash_remove() because the head of the chain, which resides inside the
struct user_namespace, will be already freed and poisoned.

Since the uid hash itself is required only when someone can search it, i.e.
when the namespace is alive, we can safely unhash all the user_struct-s from
it during the namespace exiting.  The subsequent free_uid() will complete the
user_struct destruction.

For example simple program

   #include &lt;sched.h&gt;

   char stack[2 * 1024 * 1024];

   int f(void *foo)
   {
   	return 0;
   }

   int main(void)
   {
   	clone(f, stack + 1 * 1024 * 1024, 0x10000000, 0);
   	return 0;
   }

run on kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS turned on will oops the
kernel immediately.

This was spotted during OpenVZ kernel testing.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Convert uid hash to hlist</title>
<updated>2007-09-19T18:24:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Emelyanov</name>
<email>xemul@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2007-09-19T05:46:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=735de2230f09741077a645a913de0a04b10208bf'/>
<id>735de2230f09741077a645a913de0a04b10208bf</id>
<content type='text'>
Surprisingly, but (spotted by Alexey Dobriyan) the uid hash still uses
list_heads, thus occupying twice as much place as it could.  Convert it to
hlist_heads.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Surprisingly, but (spotted by Alexey Dobriyan) the uid hash still uses
list_heads, thus occupying twice as much place as it could.  Convert it to
hlist_heads.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel/user.c: Use list_for_each_entry instead of list_for_each</title>
<updated>2007-09-19T18:24:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthias Kaehlcke</name>
<email>matthias.kaehlcke@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-09-19T05:46:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d8a4821dca693867a7953104c1e3cc830eb9191f'/>
<id>d8a4821dca693867a7953104c1e3cc830eb9191f</id>
<content type='text'>
kernel/user.c: Convert list_for_each to list_for_each_entry in
uid_hash_find()

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;matthias.kaehlcke@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
kernel/user.c: Convert list_for_each to list_for_each_entry in
uid_hash_find()

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;matthias.kaehlcke@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create().</title>
<updated>2007-07-20T01:11:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mundt</name>
<email>lethal@linux-sh.org</email>
</author>
<published>2007-07-20T01:11:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=20c2df83d25c6a95affe6157a4c9cac4cf5ffaac'/>
<id>20c2df83d25c6a95affe6157a4c9cac4cf5ffaac</id>
<content type='text'>
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f222d44bb7e2f0a559f2906191a0862d7 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.

This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt &lt;lethal@linux-sh.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f222d44bb7e2f0a559f2906191a0862d7 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.

This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt &lt;lethal@linux-sh.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>user namespace: add the framework</title>
<updated>2007-07-16T16:05:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cedric Le Goater</name>
<email>clg@fr.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-07-16T06:40:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=acce292c82d4d82d35553b928df2b0597c3a9c78'/>
<id>acce292c82d4d82d35553b928df2b0597c3a9c78</id>
<content type='text'>
Basically, it will allow a process to unshare its user_struct table,
resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the associated
accounting.

A new root user (uid == 0) is added to the user namespace upon creation.
Such root users have full privileges and it seems that theses privileges
should be controlled through some means (process capabilities ?)

The unshare is not included in this patch.

Changes since [try #4]:
	- Updated get_user_ns and put_user_ns to accept NULL, and
	  get_user_ns to return the namespace.

Changes since [try #3]:
	- moved struct user_namespace to files user_namespace.{c,h}

Changes since [try #2]:
	- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()

Changes since [try #1]:
	- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
	- added a root_user per user namespace

Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater &lt;clg@fr.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Poetzl &lt;herbert@13thfloor.at&gt;
Cc: Kirill Korotaev &lt;dev@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morgan &lt;agm@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Basically, it will allow a process to unshare its user_struct table,
resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the associated
accounting.

A new root user (uid == 0) is added to the user namespace upon creation.
Such root users have full privileges and it seems that theses privileges
should be controlled through some means (process capabilities ?)

The unshare is not included in this patch.

Changes since [try #4]:
	- Updated get_user_ns and put_user_ns to accept NULL, and
	  get_user_ns to return the namespace.

Changes since [try #3]:
	- moved struct user_namespace to files user_namespace.{c,h}

Changes since [try #2]:
	- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()

Changes since [try #1]:
	- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
	- added a root_user per user namespace

Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater &lt;clg@fr.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Poetzl &lt;herbert@13thfloor.at&gt;
Cc: Kirill Korotaev &lt;dev@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morgan &lt;agm@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] slab: remove kmem_cache_t</title>
<updated>2006-12-07T16:39:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Lameter</name>
<email>clameter@sgi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-12-07T04:33:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e18b890bb0881bbab6f4f1a6cd20d9c60d66b003'/>
<id>e18b890bb0881bbab6f4f1a6cd20d9c60d66b003</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.

The patch was generated using the following script:

	#!/bin/sh
	#
	# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
	#

	set -e

	for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
		quilt add $file
		sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file &gt;/tmp/$$
		mv /tmp/$$ $file
		quilt refresh
	done

The script was run like this

	sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;clameter@sgi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.

The patch was generated using the following script:

	#!/bin/sh
	#
	# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
	#

	set -e

	for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
		quilt add $file
		sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file &gt;/tmp/$$
		mv /tmp/$$ $file
		quilt refresh
	done

The script was run like this

	sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;clameter@sgi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] slab: remove SLAB_KERNEL</title>
<updated>2006-12-07T16:39:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Lameter</name>
<email>clameter@sgi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-12-07T04:33:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e94b1766097d53e6f3ccfb36c8baa562ffeda3fc'/>
<id>e94b1766097d53e6f3ccfb36c8baa562ffeda3fc</id>
<content type='text'>
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;clameter@sgi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;clameter@sgi.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix unlikely (but possible) race condition on task-&gt;user access</title>
<updated>2006-11-04T18:06:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@g5.osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-11-04T18:06:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=45c18b0bb579b5c1b89f8c99f1b6ffa4c586ba08'/>
<id>45c18b0bb579b5c1b89f8c99f1b6ffa4c586ba08</id>
<content type='text'>
There's a possible race condition when doing a "switch_uid()" from one
user to another, which could race with another thread doing a signal
allocation and looking at the old thread -&gt;user pointer as it is freed.

This explains an oops reported by Lukasz Trabinski:
	http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/462241

We fix this by delaying the (reference-counted) freeing of the user
structure until the thread signal handler lock has been released, so
that we know that the signal allocation has either seen the new value or
has properly incremented the reference count of the old one.

Race identified by Oleg Nesterov.

Cc: Lukasz Trabinski &lt;lukasz@wsisiz.edu.pl&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There's a possible race condition when doing a "switch_uid()" from one
user to another, which could race with another thread doing a signal
allocation and looking at the old thread -&gt;user pointer as it is freed.

This explains an oops reported by Lukasz Trabinski:
	http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/462241

We fix this by delaying the (reference-counted) freeing of the user
structure until the thread signal handler lock has been released, so
that we know that the signal allocation has either seen the new value or
has properly incremented the reference count of the old one.

Race identified by Oleg Nesterov.

Cc: Lukasz Trabinski &lt;lukasz@wsisiz.edu.pl&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem</title>
<updated>2006-06-22T22:05:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael LeMay</name>
<email>mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-22T21:47:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d720024e94de4e8b7f10ee83c532926f3ad5d708'/>
<id>d720024e94de4e8b7f10ee83c532926f3ad5d708</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys.  Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated.  Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.

Has passed David's testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay &lt;mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys.  Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated.  Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.

Has passed David's testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay &lt;mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] inotify (1/5): split kernel API from userspace support</title>
<updated>2006-06-20T09:25:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-01T20:10:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2d9048e201bfb67ba21f05e647b1286b8a4a5667'/>
<id>2d9048e201bfb67ba21f05e647b1286b8a4a5667</id>
<content type='text'>
The following series of patches introduces a kernel API for inotify,
making it possible for kernel modules to benefit from inotify's
mechanism for watching inodes.  With these patches, inotify will
maintain for each caller a list of watches (via an embedded struct
inotify_watch), where each inotify_watch is associated with a
corresponding struct inode.  The caller registers an event handler and
specifies for which filesystem events their event handler should be
called per inotify_watch.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Acked-by: Robert Love &lt;rml@novell.com&gt;
Acked-by: John McCutchan &lt;john@johnmccutchan.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The following series of patches introduces a kernel API for inotify,
making it possible for kernel modules to benefit from inotify's
mechanism for watching inodes.  With these patches, inotify will
maintain for each caller a list of watches (via an embedded struct
inotify_watch), where each inotify_watch is associated with a
corresponding struct inode.  The caller registers an event handler and
specifies for which filesystem events their event handler should be
called per inotify_watch.

Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;
Acked-by: Robert Love &lt;rml@novell.com&gt;
Acked-by: John McCutchan &lt;john@johnmccutchan.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
