<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v2.6.16.27</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fix prctl privilege escalation and suid_dumpable (CVE-2006-2451)</title>
<updated>2006-07-06T20:05:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-06T20:05:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9e4e45f19bdd41b4091e5fe556f816f4046c7598'/>
<id>9e4e45f19bdd41b4091e5fe556f816f4046c7598</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on a patch from Ernie Petrides

During security research, Red Hat discovered a behavioral flaw in core
dump handling. A local user could create a program that would cause a
core file to be dumped into a directory they would not normally have
permissions to write to. This could lead to a denial of service (disk
consumption), or allow the local user to gain root privileges.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Based on a patch from Ernie Petrides

During security research, Red Hat discovered a behavioral flaw in core
dump handling. A local user could create a program that would cause a
core file to be dumped into a directory they would not normally have
permissions to write to. This could lead to a denial of service (disk
consumption), or allow the local user to gain root privileges.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] run_posix_cpu_timers: remove a bogus BUG_ON() (CVE-2006-2445)</title>
<updated>2006-06-20T08:54:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@tv-sign.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-15T16:11:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0ba239cc0ef0ebf9d38cd733754fcf657ae79b2b'/>
<id>0ba239cc0ef0ebf9d38cd733754fcf657ae79b2b</id>
<content type='text'>
do_exit() clears -&gt;it_##clock##_expires, but nothing prevents
another cpu to attach the timer to exiting process after that.
arm_timer() tries to protect against this race, but the check
is racy.

After exit_notify() does 'write_unlock_irq(&amp;tasklist_lock)' and
before do_exit() calls 'schedule() local timer interrupt can find
tsk-&gt;exit_state != 0. If that state was EXIT_DEAD (or another cpu
does sys_wait4) interrupted task has -&gt;signal == NULL.

At this moment exiting task has no pending cpu timers, they were
cleanuped in __exit_signal()-&gt;posix_cpu_timers_exit{,_group}(),
so we can just return from irq.

John Stultz recently confirmed this bug, see

	http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=115015841413687

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
do_exit() clears -&gt;it_##clock##_expires, but nothing prevents
another cpu to attach the timer to exiting process after that.
arm_timer() tries to protect against this race, but the check
is racy.

After exit_notify() does 'write_unlock_irq(&amp;tasklist_lock)' and
before do_exit() calls 'schedule() local timer interrupt can find
tsk-&gt;exit_state != 0. If that state was EXIT_DEAD (or another cpu
does sys_wait4) interrupted task has -&gt;signal == NULL.

At this moment exiting task has no pending cpu timers, they were
cleanuped in __exit_signal()-&gt;posix_cpu_timers_exit{,_group}(),
so we can just return from irq.

John Stultz recently confirmed this bug, see

	http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=115015841413687

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] check_process_timers: fix possible lockup</title>
<updated>2006-06-20T08:54:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@tv-sign.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-15T16:11:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5705264e83bd9f8918895d8f5ddddbdeb062c719'/>
<id>5705264e83bd9f8918895d8f5ddddbdeb062c719</id>
<content type='text'>
If the local timer interrupt happens just after do_exit() sets PF_EXITING
(and before it clears -&gt;it_xxx_expires) run_posix_cpu_timers() will call
check_process_timers() with tasklist_lock + -&gt;siglock held and

	check_process_timers:

		t = tsk;
		do {
			....

			do {
				t = next_thread(t);
			} while (unlikely(t-&gt;flags &amp; PF_EXITING));
		} while (t != tsk);

the outer loop will never stop.

Actually, the window is bigger.  Another process can attach the timer
after -&gt;it_xxx_expires was cleared (see the next commit) and the 'if
(PF_EXITING)' check in arm_timer() is racy (see the one after that).

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If the local timer interrupt happens just after do_exit() sets PF_EXITING
(and before it clears -&gt;it_xxx_expires) run_posix_cpu_timers() will call
check_process_timers() with tasklist_lock + -&gt;siglock held and

	check_process_timers:

		t = tsk;
		do {
			....

			do {
				t = next_thread(t);
			} while (unlikely(t-&gt;flags &amp; PF_EXITING));
		} while (t != tsk);

the outer loop will never stop.

Actually, the window is bigger.  Another process can attach the timer
after -&gt;it_xxx_expires was cleared (see the next commit) and the 'if
(PF_EXITING)' check in arm_timer() is racy (see the one after that).

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] ptrace_attach: fix possible deadlock schenario with irqs</title>
<updated>2006-05-20T22:00:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@g5.osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-11T18:08:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f91962f90eb89684ecbfb3f6b8578b3ebd6937df'/>
<id>f91962f90eb89684ecbfb3f6b8578b3ebd6937df</id>
<content type='text'>
Eric Biederman points out that we can't take the task_lock while holding
tasklist_lock for writing, because another CPU that holds the task lock
might take an interrupt that then tries to take tasklist_lock for writing.

Which would be a nasty deadlock, with one CPU spinning forever in an
interrupt handler (although admittedly you need to really work at
triggering it ;)

Since the ptrace_attach() code is special and very unusual, just make it
be extra careful, and use trylock+repeat to avoid the possible deadlock.

Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Eric Biederman points out that we can't take the task_lock while holding
tasklist_lock for writing, because another CPU that holds the task lock
might take an interrupt that then tries to take tasklist_lock for writing.

Which would be a nasty deadlock, with one CPU spinning forever in an
interrupt handler (although admittedly you need to really work at
triggering it ;)

Since the ptrace_attach() code is special and very unusual, just make it
be extra careful, and use trylock+repeat to avoid the possible deadlock.

Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix ptrace_attach()/ptrace_traceme()/de_thread() race</title>
<updated>2006-05-20T22:00:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@g5.osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-07T17:49:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=65b01b76265047aa59d6eb741ec61468c8867256'/>
<id>65b01b76265047aa59d6eb741ec61468c8867256</id>
<content type='text'>
This holds the task lock (and, for ptrace_attach, the tasklist_lock)
over the actual attach event, which closes a race between attacking to a
thread that is either doing a PTRACE_TRACEME or getting de-threaded.

Thanks to Oleg Nesterov for reminding me about this, and Chris Wright
for noticing a lost return value in my first version.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This holds the task lock (and, for ptrace_attach, the tasklist_lock)
over the actual attach event, which closes a race between attacking to a
thread that is either doing a PTRACE_TRACEME or getting de-threaded.

Thanks to Oleg Nesterov for reminding me about this, and Chris Wright
for noticing a lost return value in my first version.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] make vm86 call audit_syscall_exit</title>
<updated>2006-05-01T19:03:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Baron</name>
<email>jbaron@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-31T21:56:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f38f300d4a0698791bb11294903702ddb1c4e9d8'/>
<id>f38f300d4a0698791bb11294903702ddb1c4e9d8</id>
<content type='text'>
hi,

The motivation behind the patch below was to address messages in
/var/log/messages such as:

Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=252 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (1)
Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=113 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (2)

I can reproduce by running 'get-edid' from:
http://john.fremlin.de/programs/linux/read-edid/.

These messages come about in the log b/c the vm86 calls do not exit via
the normal system call exit paths and thus do not call
'audit_syscall_exit'. The next system call will then free the context for
itself and for the vm86 context, thus generating the above messages. This
patch addresses the issue by simply adding a call to 'audit_syscall_exit'
from the vm86 code.

Besides fixing the above error messages the patch also now allows vm86
system calls to become auditable. This is useful since strace does not
appear to properly record the return values from sys_vm86.

I think this patch is also a step in the right direction in terms of
cleaning up some core auditing code. If we can correct any other paths
that do not properly call the audit exit and entries points, then we can
also eliminate the notion of context chaining.

I've tested this patch by verifying that the log messages no longer
appear, and that the audit records for sys_vm86 appear to be correct.
Also, 'read_edid' produces itentical output.

thanks,

-Jason

Signed-off-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
hi,

The motivation behind the patch below was to address messages in
/var/log/messages such as:

Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=252 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (1)
Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=113 name_count=0: freeing
multiple contexts (2)

I can reproduce by running 'get-edid' from:
http://john.fremlin.de/programs/linux/read-edid/.

These messages come about in the log b/c the vm86 calls do not exit via
the normal system call exit paths and thus do not call
'audit_syscall_exit'. The next system call will then free the context for
itself and for the vm86 context, thus generating the above messages. This
patch addresses the issue by simply adding a call to 'audit_syscall_exit'
from the vm86 code.

Besides fixing the above error messages the patch also now allows vm86
system calls to become auditable. This is useful since strace does not
appear to properly record the return values from sys_vm86.

I think this patch is also a step in the right direction in terms of
cleaning up some core auditing code. If we can correct any other paths
that do not properly call the audit exit and entries points, then we can
also eliminate the notion of context chaining.

I've tested this patch by verifying that the log messages no longer
appear, and that the audit records for sys_vm86 appear to be correct.
Also, 'read_edid' produces itentical output.

thanks,

-Jason

Signed-off-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Add more prevent_tail_call()</title>
<updated>2006-04-24T16:56:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>OGAWA Hirofumi</name>
<email>hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-19T23:59:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7517f43bef6016c58c007446f882ecf98a5e287b'/>
<id>7517f43bef6016c58c007446f882ecf98a5e287b</id>
<content type='text'>
Those also break userland regs like following.

   00000000 &lt;sys_chown16&gt;:
      0:	0f b7 44 24 0c       	movzwl 0xc(%esp),%eax
      5:	83 ca ff             	or     $0xffffffff,%edx
      8:	0f b7 4c 24 08       	movzwl 0x8(%esp),%ecx
      d:	66 83 f8 ff          	cmp    $0xffffffff,%ax
     11:	0f 44 c2             	cmove  %edx,%eax
     14:	66 83 f9 ff          	cmp    $0xffffffff,%cx
     18:	0f 45 d1             	cmovne %ecx,%edx
     1b:	89 44 24 0c          	mov    %eax,0xc(%esp)
     1f:	89 54 24 08          	mov    %edx,0x8(%esp)
     23:	e9 fc ff ff ff       	jmp    24 &lt;sys_chown16+0x24&gt;

where the tailcall at the end overwrites the incoming stack-frame.

Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi &lt;hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Those also break userland regs like following.

   00000000 &lt;sys_chown16&gt;:
      0:	0f b7 44 24 0c       	movzwl 0xc(%esp),%eax
      5:	83 ca ff             	or     $0xffffffff,%edx
      8:	0f b7 4c 24 08       	movzwl 0x8(%esp),%ecx
      d:	66 83 f8 ff          	cmp    $0xffffffff,%ax
     11:	0f 44 c2             	cmove  %edx,%eax
     14:	66 83 f9 ff          	cmp    $0xffffffff,%cx
     18:	0f 45 d1             	cmovne %ecx,%edx
     1b:	89 44 24 0c          	mov    %eax,0xc(%esp)
     1f:	89 54 24 08          	mov    %edx,0x8(%esp)
     23:	e9 fc ff ff ff       	jmp    24 &lt;sys_chown16+0x24&gt;

where the tailcall at the end overwrites the incoming stack-frame.

Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi &lt;hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] fix non-leader exec under ptrace</title>
<updated>2006-04-17T20:16:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roland McGrath</name>
<email>roland@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-12T23:30:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=18b1e8193eef97f3ac854276a7c4bacbb1bdfbd1'/>
<id>18b1e8193eef97f3ac854276a7c4bacbb1bdfbd1</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts most of commit 30e0fca6c1d7d26f3f2daa4dd2b12c51dadc778a.
It broke the case of non-leader MT exec when ptraced.
I think the bug it was intended to fix was already addressed by commit
788e05a67c343fa22f2ae1d3ca264e7f15c25eaf.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts most of commit 30e0fca6c1d7d26f3f2daa4dd2b12c51dadc778a.
It broke the case of non-leader MT exec when ptraced.
I think the bug it was intended to fix was already addressed by commit
788e05a67c343fa22f2ae1d3ca264e7f15c25eaf.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix suspend with traced tasks</title>
<updated>2006-04-17T20:16:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Machek</name>
<email>pavel@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2006-03-31T10:30:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6b2467e45179a336f1e5b70d2b2ae1fe89a00133'/>
<id>6b2467e45179a336f1e5b70d2b2ae1fe89a00133</id>
<content type='text'>
strace /bin/bash misbehaves after resume; this fixes it.

(akpm: it's scary calling refrigerator() in state TASK_TRACED, but it seems to
do the right thing).

Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
strace /bin/bash misbehaves after resume; this fixes it.

(akpm: it's scary calling refrigerator() in state TASK_TRACED, but it seems to
do the right thing).

Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] RLIMIT_CPU: fix handling of a zero limit</title>
<updated>2006-04-17T20:16:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Morton</name>
<email>akpm@osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-03-24T11:18:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=284a7c99c01846ee44040268529c99fc92dcc531'/>
<id>284a7c99c01846ee44040268529c99fc92dcc531</id>
<content type='text'>
At present the kernel doesn't honour an attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU to zero
seconds.  But the spec says it should, and that's what 2.4.x does.

Fixing this for real would involve some complexity (such as adding a new
it-has-been-set flag to the task_struct, and testing that everwhere, instead
of overloading the value of it_prof_expires).

Given that a 2.4 kernel won't actually send the signal until one second has
expired anyway, let's just handle this case by treating the caller's
zero-seconds as one second.

Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ulrich Weigand &lt;uweigand@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Cliff Wickman &lt;cpw@sgi.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
At present the kernel doesn't honour an attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU to zero
seconds.  But the spec says it should, and that's what 2.4.x does.

Fixing this for real would involve some complexity (such as adding a new
it-has-been-set flag to the task_struct, and testing that everwhere, instead
of overloading the value of it_prof_expires).

Given that a 2.4 kernel won't actually send the signal until one second has
expired anyway, let's just handle this case by treating the caller's
zero-seconds as one second.

Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ulrich Weigand &lt;uweigand@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Cliff Wickman &lt;cpw@sgi.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
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