<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v3.0.34</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>workqueue: skip nr_running sanity check in worker_enter_idle() if trustee is active</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T07:12:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-14T22:04:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=935055856458a05c43f518bf9ed406f67c090f0a'/>
<id>935055856458a05c43f518bf9ed406f67c090f0a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 544ecf310f0e7f51fa057ac2a295fc1b3b35a9d3 upstream.

worker_enter_idle() has WARN_ON_ONCE() which triggers if nr_running
isn't zero when every worker is idle.  This can trigger spuriously
while a cpu is going down due to the way trustee sets %WORKER_ROGUE
and zaps nr_running.

It first sets %WORKER_ROGUE on all workers without updating
nr_running, releases gcwq-&gt;lock, schedules, regrabs gcwq-&gt;lock and
then zaps nr_running.  If the last running worker enters idle
inbetween, it would see stale nr_running which hasn't been zapped yet
and trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE().

Fix it by performing the sanity check iff the trustee is idle.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 544ecf310f0e7f51fa057ac2a295fc1b3b35a9d3 upstream.

worker_enter_idle() has WARN_ON_ONCE() which triggers if nr_running
isn't zero when every worker is idle.  This can trigger spuriously
while a cpu is going down due to the way trustee sets %WORKER_ROGUE
and zaps nr_running.

It first sets %WORKER_ROGUE on all workers without updating
nr_running, releases gcwq-&gt;lock, schedules, regrabs gcwq-&gt;lock and
then zaps nr_running.  If the last running worker enters idle
inbetween, it would see stale nr_running which hasn't been zapped yet
and trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE().

Fix it by performing the sanity check iff the trustee is idle.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>compat: Fix RT signal mask corruption via sigprocmask</title>
<updated>2012-05-21T16:40:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kiszka</name>
<email>jan.kiszka@siemens.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-10T13:04:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5c17daa89308cc028fe336af58cf9d4e4d83298d'/>
<id>5c17daa89308cc028fe336af58cf9d4e4d83298d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7dafa0ef3145c31d7753be0a08b3cbda51f0209 upstream.

compat_sys_sigprocmask reads a smaller signal mask from userspace than
sigprogmask accepts for setting.  So the high word of blocked.sig[0]
will be cleared, releasing any potentially blocked RT signal.

This was discovered via userspace code that relies on get/setcontext.
glibc's i386 versions of those functions use sigprogmask instead of
rt_sigprogmask to save/restore signal mask and caused RT signal
unblocking this way.

As suggested by Linus, this replaces the sys_sigprocmask based compat
version with one that open-codes the required logic, including the merge
of the existing blocked set with the new one provided on SIG_SETMASK.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b7dafa0ef3145c31d7753be0a08b3cbda51f0209 upstream.

compat_sys_sigprocmask reads a smaller signal mask from userspace than
sigprogmask accepts for setting.  So the high word of blocked.sig[0]
will be cleared, releasing any potentially blocked RT signal.

This was discovered via userspace code that relies on get/setcontext.
glibc's i386 versions of those functions use sigprogmask instead of
rt_sigprogmask to save/restore signal mask and caused RT signal
unblocking this way.

As suggested by Linus, this replaces the sys_sigprocmask based compat
version with one that open-codes the required logic, including the merge
of the existing blocked set with the new one provided on SIG_SETMASK.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka &lt;jan.kiszka@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>namespaces, pid_ns: fix leakage on fork() failure</title>
<updated>2012-05-21T16:40:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Galbraith</name>
<email>efault@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-10T20:01:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6f6f21eceec3a60d2066bb3b5e31dc14f9168fa7'/>
<id>6f6f21eceec3a60d2066bb3b5e31dc14f9168fa7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5e2bf0142231194d36fdc9596b36a261ed2b9fe7 upstream.

Fork() failure post namespace creation for a child cloned with
CLONE_NEWPID leaks pid_namespace/mnt_cache due to proc being mounted
during creation, but not unmounted during cleanup.  Call
pid_ns_release_proc() during cleanup.

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Louis Rilling &lt;louis.rilling@kerlabs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5e2bf0142231194d36fdc9596b36a261ed2b9fe7 upstream.

Fork() failure post namespace creation for a child cloned with
CLONE_NEWPID leaks pid_namespace/mnt_cache due to proc being mounted
during creation, but not unmounted during cleanup.  Call
pid_ns_release_proc() during cleanup.

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Louis Rilling &lt;louis.rilling@kerlabs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix nohz load accounting -- again!</title>
<updated>2012-05-07T15:56:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-01T14:04:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7bfac470b517b18d496e96acc90be58353df2159'/>
<id>7bfac470b517b18d496e96acc90be58353df2159</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c308b56b5398779cd3da0f62ab26b0453494c3d4 upstream.
[ backported to 3.0 by Kerin Millar &lt;kerframil@gmail.com&gt;]

Various people reported nohz load tracking still being wrecked, but Doug
spotted the actual problem. We fold the nohz remainder in too soon,
causing us to loose samples and under-account.

So instead of playing catch-up up-front, always do a single load-fold
with whatever state we encounter and only then fold the nohz remainder
and play catch-up.

Reported-by: Doug Smythies &lt;dsmythies@telus.net&gt;
Reported-by: LesÅ=82aw Kope=C4=87 &lt;leslaw.kopec@nasza-klasa.pl&gt;
Reported-by: Aman Gupta &lt;aman@tmm1.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-4v31etnhgg9kwd6ocgx3rxl8@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Kerin Millar &lt;kerframil@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c308b56b5398779cd3da0f62ab26b0453494c3d4 upstream.
[ backported to 3.0 by Kerin Millar &lt;kerframil@gmail.com&gt;]

Various people reported nohz load tracking still being wrecked, but Doug
spotted the actual problem. We fold the nohz remainder in too soon,
causing us to loose samples and under-account.

So instead of playing catch-up up-front, always do a single load-fold
with whatever state we encounter and only then fold the nohz remainder
and play catch-up.

Reported-by: Doug Smythies &lt;dsmythies@telus.net&gt;
Reported-by: LesÅ=82aw Kope=C4=87 &lt;leslaw.kopec@nasza-klasa.pl&gt;
Reported-by: Aman Gupta &lt;aman@tmm1.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-4v31etnhgg9kwd6ocgx3rxl8@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Kerin Millar &lt;kerframil@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process</title>
<updated>2012-04-22T23:21:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-19T23:12:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=631792ffa5b781301812b8514b8c0a10eb8ce5d7'/>
<id>631792ffa5b781301812b8514b8c0a10eb8ce5d7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8 upstream.

It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
info that comes out of /proc.

Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
  cred-&gt;euid != pcred-&gt;euid
  cred-&gt;euid == pcred-&gt;uid
so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.

(This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8 upstream.

It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
info that comes out of /proc.

Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
  cred-&gt;euid != pcred-&gt;euid
  cred-&gt;euid == pcred-&gt;uid
so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.

(This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nohz: Fix stale jiffies update in tick_nohz_restart()</title>
<updated>2012-04-22T23:21:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-27T19:09:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2ca8877b566438c293e4e54d39c959a9a847a77b'/>
<id>2ca8877b566438c293e4e54d39c959a9a847a77b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6f103929f8979d2638e58d7f7fda0beefcb8ee7e upstream.

Fix tick_nohz_restart() to not use a stale ktime_t "now" value when
calling tick_do_update_jiffies64(now).

If we reach this point in the loop it means that we crossed a tick
boundary since we grabbed the "now" timestamp, so at this point "now"
refers to a time in the old jiffy, so using the old value for "now" is
incorrect, and is likely to give us a stale jiffies value.

In particular, the first time through the loop the
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) call is always a no-op, since the
caller, tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(), will have already called
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) with that "now" value.

Note that tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() already uses the correct
approach: when we notice we cross a jiffy boundary, grab a new
timestamp with ktime_get(), and *then* update jiffies.

Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1332875377-23014-1-git-send-email-ncardwell@google.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6f103929f8979d2638e58d7f7fda0beefcb8ee7e upstream.

Fix tick_nohz_restart() to not use a stale ktime_t "now" value when
calling tick_do_update_jiffies64(now).

If we reach this point in the loop it means that we crossed a tick
boundary since we grabbed the "now" timestamp, so at this point "now"
refers to a time in the old jiffy, so using the old value for "now" is
incorrect, and is likely to give us a stale jiffies value.

In particular, the first time through the loop the
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) call is always a no-op, since the
caller, tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(), will have already called
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) with that "now" value.

Note that tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() already uses the correct
approach: when we notice we cross a jiffy boundary, grab a new
timestamp with ktime_get(), and *then* update jiffies.

Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1332875377-23014-1-git-send-email-ncardwell@google.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: copy_process() should clear child-&gt;replacement_session_keyring</title>
<updated>2012-04-13T15:14:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-09T19:03:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a27f3e06be07cd3719f8c42092de3ebfc9202923'/>
<id>a27f3e06be07cd3719f8c42092de3ebfc9202923</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33 upstream.

keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets -&gt;replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().

However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus -&gt;replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).

change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong -&gt;replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33 upstream.

keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets -&gt;replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().

However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus -&gt;replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).

change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong -&gt;replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sysctl: fix write access to dmesg_restrict/kptr_restrict</title>
<updated>2012-04-13T15:14:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T18:40:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=41ae97bd8c2166184bf0552b7c41868b74344039'/>
<id>41ae97bd8c2166184bf0552b7c41868b74344039</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 620f6e8e855d6d447688a5f67a4e176944a084e8 upstream.

Commit bfdc0b4 adds code to restrict access to dmesg_restrict,
however, it incorrectly alters kptr_restrict rather than
dmesg_restrict.

The original patch from Richard Weinberger
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/3/14/362) alters dmesg_restrict as
expected, and so the patch seems to have been misapplied.

This adds the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check to both dmesg_restrict and
kptr_restrict, since both are sensitive.

Reported-by: Phillip Lougher &lt;plougher@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 620f6e8e855d6d447688a5f67a4e176944a084e8 upstream.

Commit bfdc0b4 adds code to restrict access to dmesg_restrict,
however, it incorrectly alters kptr_restrict rather than
dmesg_restrict.

The original patch from Richard Weinberger
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/3/14/362) alters dmesg_restrict as
expected, and so the patch seems to have been misapplied.

This adds the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check to both dmesg_restrict and
kptr_restrict, since both are sensitive.

Reported-by: Phillip Lougher &lt;plougher@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kgdb,debug_core: pass the breakpoint struct instead of address and memory</title>
<updated>2012-04-13T15:14:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Wessel</name>
<email>jason.wessel@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-21T15:17:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1374668fa85ed172c982be6eda7fab795bc4fcb5'/>
<id>1374668fa85ed172c982be6eda7fab795bc4fcb5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 98b54aa1a2241b59372468bd1e9c2d207bdba54b upstream.

There is extra state information that needs to be exposed in the
kgdb_bpt structure for tracking how a breakpoint was installed.  The
debug_core only uses the the probe_kernel_write() to install
breakpoints, but this is not enough for all the archs.  Some arch such
as x86 need to use text_poke() in order to install a breakpoint into a
read only page.

Passing the kgdb_bpt structure to kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint() and
kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint() allows other archs to set the type
variable which indicates how the breakpoint was installed.

Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel &lt;jason.wessel@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 98b54aa1a2241b59372468bd1e9c2d207bdba54b upstream.

There is extra state information that needs to be exposed in the
kgdb_bpt structure for tracking how a breakpoint was installed.  The
debug_core only uses the the probe_kernel_write() to install
breakpoints, but this is not enough for all the archs.  Some arch such
as x86 need to use text_poke() in order to install a breakpoint into a
read only page.

Passing the kgdb_bpt structure to kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint() and
kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint() allows other archs to set the type
variable which indicates how the breakpoint was installed.

Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel &lt;jason.wessel@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix ftrace stack trace entries</title>
<updated>2012-04-13T15:14:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wolfgang Mauerer</name>
<email>wolfgang.mauerer@siemens.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-22T10:18:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c9f514e30019562ad19044e992248ad7865b37cd'/>
<id>c9f514e30019562ad19044e992248ad7865b37cd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 01de982abf8c9e10fc3089e10585cd2cc914bdab upstream.

8 hex characters tell only half the tale for 64 bit CPUs,
so use the appropriate length.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1332411501-8059-2-git-send-email-wolfgang.mauerer@siemens.com

Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Mauerer &lt;wolfgang.mauerer@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 01de982abf8c9e10fc3089e10585cd2cc914bdab upstream.

8 hex characters tell only half the tale for 64 bit CPUs,
so use the appropriate length.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1332411501-8059-2-git-send-email-wolfgang.mauerer@siemens.com

Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Mauerer &lt;wolfgang.mauerer@siemens.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
