linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v3.0.56

Revert "sched, autogroup: Stop going ahead if autogroup is disabled"

2012-12-10T18:45:08+00:00

commit fd8ef11730f1d03d5d6555aa53126e9e34f52f12 upstream.

This reverts commit 800d4d30c8f20bd728e5741a3b77c4859a613f7c.

Between commits 8323f26ce342 ("sched: Fix race in task_group()") and
800d4d30c8f2 ("sched, autogroup: Stop going ahead if autogroup is
disabled"), autogroup is a wreck.

With both applied, all you have to do to crash a box is disable
autogroup during boot up, then reboot..  boom, NULL pointer dereference
due to commit 800d4d30c8f2 not allowing autogroup to move things, and
commit 8323f26ce342 making that the only way to switch runqueues:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
  IP: [] effective_load.isra.43+0x50/0x90
  Pid: 7047, comm: systemd-user-se Not tainted 3.6.8-smp #7 MEDIONPC MS-7502/MS-7502
  RIP: effective_load.isra.43+0x50/0x90
  Process systemd-user-se (pid: 7047, threadinfo ffff880221dde000, task ffff88022618b3a0)
  Call Trace:
    select_task_rq_fair+0x255/0x780
    try_to_wake_up+0x156/0x2c0
    wake_up_state+0xb/0x10
    signal_wake_up+0x28/0x40
    complete_signal+0x1d6/0x250
    __send_signal+0x170/0x310
    send_signal+0x40/0x80
    do_send_sig_info+0x47/0x90
    group_send_sig_info+0x4a/0x70
    kill_pid_info+0x3a/0x60
    sys_kill+0x97/0x1a0
    ? vfs_read+0x120/0x160
    ? sys_read+0x45/0x90
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 49 0f af 41 50 31 d2 49 f7 f0 48 83 f8 01 48 0f 46 c6 48 2b 07 48 8b bf 40 01 00 00 48 85 ff 74 3a 45 31 c0 48 8b 8f 50 01 00 00 <48> 8b 11 4c 8b 89 80 00 00 00 49 89 d2 48 01 d0 45 8b 59 58 4c
  RIP  [] effective_load.isra.43+0x50/0x90
   RSP 
  CR2: 0000000000000000

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith 
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Yong Zhang 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

workqueue: exit rescuer_thread() as TASK_RUNNING

2012-12-10T18:45:07+00:00

commit 412d32e6c98527078779e5b515823b2810e40324 upstream.

A rescue thread exiting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE can lead to a task scheduling
off, never to be seen again.  In the case where this occurred, an exiting
thread hit reiserfs homebrew conditional resched while holding a mutex,
bringing the box to its knees.

PID: 18105  TASK: ffff8807fd412180  CPU: 5   COMMAND: "kdmflush"
 #0 [ffff8808157e7670] schedule at ffffffff8143f489
 #1 [ffff8808157e77b8] reiserfs_get_block at ffffffffa038ab2d [reiserfs]
 #2 [ffff8808157e79a8] __block_write_begin at ffffffff8117fb14
 #3 [ffff8808157e7a98] reiserfs_write_begin at ffffffffa0388695 [reiserfs]
 #4 [ffff8808157e7ad8] generic_perform_write at ffffffff810ee9e2
 #5 [ffff8808157e7b58] generic_file_buffered_write at ffffffff810eeb41
 #6 [ffff8808157e7ba8] __generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1a3a
 #7 [ffff8808157e7c58] generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1c88
 #8 [ffff8808157e7cc8] do_sync_write at ffffffff8114f850
 #9 [ffff8808157e7dd8] do_acct_process at ffffffff810a268f
    [exception RIP: kernel_thread_helper]
    RIP: ffffffff8144a5c0  RSP: ffff8808157e7f58  RFLAGS: 00000202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000000  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffffffff8107af60  RDI: ffff8803ee491d18
    RBP: 0000000000000000   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

watchdog: using u64 in get_sample_period()

2012-12-03T20:59:15+00:00

commit 8ffeb9b0e6369135bf03a073514f571ef10606b9 upstream.

In get_sample_period(), unsigned long is not enough:

  watchdog_thresh * 2 * (NSEC_PER_SEC / 5)

case1:
  watchdog_thresh is 10 by default, the sample value will be: 0xEE6B2800

case2:
 set watchdog_thresh is 20, the sample value will be: 0x1 DCD6 5000

In case2, we need use u64 to express the sample period.  Otherwise,
changing the threshold thru proc often can not be successful.

Signed-off-by: liu chuansheng 
Acked-by: Don Zickus 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: avoid wake_futex() for a PI futex_q

2012-12-03T20:59:14+00:00

commit aa10990e028cac3d5e255711fb9fb47e00700e35 upstream.

Dave Jones reported a bug with futex_lock_pi() that his trinity test
exposed.  Sometime between queue_me() and taking the q.lock_ptr, the
lock_ptr became NULL, resulting in a crash.

While futex_wake() is careful to not call wake_futex() on futex_q's with
a pi_state or an rt_waiter (which are either waiting for a
futex_unlock_pi() or a PI futex_requeue()), futex_wake_op() and
futex_requeue() do not perform the same test.

Update futex_wake_op() and futex_requeue() to test for q.pi_state and
q.rt_waiter and abort with -EINVAL if detected.  To ensure any future
breakage is caught, add a WARN() to wake_futex() if the same condition
is true.

This fix has seen 3 hours of testing with "trinity -c futex" on an
x86_64 VM with 4 CPUS.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy up the WARN()]
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart 
Reported-by: Dave Jones 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: John Kacur 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Resource: fix wrong resource window calculation

2012-11-26T19:34:58+00:00

commit 47ea91b4052d9e94b9dca5d7a3d947fbebd07ba9 upstream.

__find_resource() incorrectly returns a resource window which overlaps
an existing allocated window.  This happens when the parent's
resource-window spans 0x00000000 to 0xffffffff and is entirely allocated
to all its children resource-windows.

__find_resource() looks for gaps in resource allocation among the
children resource windows.  When it encounters the last child window it
blindly tries the range next to one allocated to the last child.  Since
the last child's window ends at 0xffffffff the calculation overflows,
leading the algorithm to believe that any window in the range 0x0000000
to 0xfffffff is available for allocation.  This leads to a conflicting
window allocation.

Michal Ludvig reported this issue seen on his platform.  The following
patch fixes the problem and has been verified by Michal.  I believe this
bug has been there for ages.  It got exposed by git commit 2bbc6942273b
("PCI : ability to relocate assigned pci-resources")

Signed-off-by: Ram Pai 
Tested-by: Michal Ludvig 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Handle futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly

2012-11-17T21:14:25+00:00

commit 59fa6245192159ab5e1e17b8e31f15afa9cff4bf upstream.

Siddhesh analyzed a failure in the take over of pi futexes in case the
owner died and provided a workaround.
See: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14076

The detailed problem analysis shows:

Futex F is initialized with PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT and
PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST_NP attributes.

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Succeeds due to the check for F's userspace TID field == 0
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes T2 via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains real ownership of the
       pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T3 --> observes inconsistent state

This problem is independent of UP/SMP, preemptible/non preemptible
kernels, or process shared vs. private. The only difference is that
certain configurations are more likely to expose it.

So as Siddhesh correctly analyzed the following check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic() is the culprit:

	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {

We check the userspace value for a TID value of 0 and take over the
futex unconditionally if that's true.

AFAICT this check is there as it is correct for a different corner
case of futexes: the WAITERS bit became stale.

Now the proposed change

-	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {
+       if (unlikely(ownerdied ||
+                       !(curval & (FUTEX_TID_MASK | FUTEX_WAITERS)))) {

solves the problem, but it's not obvious why and it wreckages the
"stale WAITERS bit" case.

What happens is, that due to the WAITERS bit being set (T2 is blocked
on that futex) it enforces T3 to go through lookup_pi_state(), which
in the above case returns an existing pi_state and therefor forces T3
to legitimately fight with T2 over the ownership of the pi_state (via
pi_state->mutex). Probelm solved!

Though that does not work for the "WAITERS bit is stale" problem
because if lookup_pi_state() does not find existing pi_state it
returns -ERSCH (due to TID == 0) which causes futex_lock_pi() to
return -ESRCH to user space because the OWNER_DIED bit is not set.

Now there is a different solution to that problem. Do not look at the
user space value at all and enforce a lookup of possibly available
pi_state. If pi_state can be found, then the new incoming locker T3
blocks on that pi_state and legitimately races with T2 to acquire the
rt_mutex and the pi_state and therefor the proper ownership of the
user space futex.

lookup_pi_state() has the correct order of checks. It first tries to
find a pi_state associated with the user space futex and only if that
fails it checks for futex TID value = 0. If no pi_state is available
nothing can create new state at that point because this happens with
the hash bucket lock held.

So the above scenario changes to:

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Finds pi_state and blocks on pi_state->rt_mutex

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes it via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains ownership of the pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

This covers all gazillion points on which T3 might come in between
T1's exit_robust_list() clearing the TID field and T2 fixing it up. It
also solves the "WAITERS bit stale" problem by forcing the take over.

Another benefit of changing the code this way is that it makes it less
dependent on untrusted user space values and therefor minimizes the
possible wreckage which might be inflicted.

As usual after staring for too long at the futex code my brain hurts
so much that I really want to ditch that whole optimization of
avoiding the syscall for the non contended case for PI futexes and rip
out the maze of corner case handling code. Unfortunately we can't as
user space relies on that existing behaviour, but at least thinking
about it helps me to preserve my mental sanity. Maybe we should
nevertheless :)

Reported-and-tested-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1210232138540.2756@ionos
Acked-by: Darren Hart 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cgroup: notify_on_release may not be triggered in some cases

2012-10-28T17:02:12+00:00

commit 1f5320d5972aa50d3e8d2b227b636b370e608359 upstream.

notify_on_release must be triggered when the last process in a cgroup is
move to another. But if the first(and only) process in a cgroup is moved to
another, notify_on_release is not triggered.

	# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/SRC
	# mkdir /cgroup/cpu/DST
	#
	# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/notify_on_release
	# echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/notify_on_release
	#
	# sleep 300 &
	[1] 8629
	#
	# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/tasks
	# echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/tasks
	-> notify_on_release for /SRC must be triggered at this point,
	   but it isn't.

This is because put_css_set() is called before setting CGRP_RELEASABLE
in cgroup_task_migrate(), and is a regression introduce by the
commit:74a1166d(cgroups: make procs file writable), which was merged
into v3.0.

Acked-by: Li Zefan 
Cc: Ben Blum 
Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

use clamp_t in UNAME26 fix

2012-10-28T17:02:11+00:00

commit 31fd84b95eb211d5db460a1dda85e004800a7b52 upstream.

The min/max call needed to have explicit types on some architectures
(e.g. mn10300). Use clamp_t instead to avoid the warning:

  kernel/sys.c: In function 'override_release':
  kernel/sys.c:1287:10: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [enabled by default]

Reported-by: Fengguang Wu 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26

2012-10-28T17:02:11+00:00

commit 2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e upstream.

Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents.  This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).

CVE-2012-0957

Reported-by: PaX Team 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: PaX Team 
Cc: Brad Spengler 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

timers: Fix endless looping between cascade() and internal_add_timer()

2012-10-21T16:17:10+00:00

commit 26cff4e2aa4d666dc6a120ea34336b5057e3e187 upstream.

Adding two (or more) timers with large values for "expires" (they have
to reside within tv5 in the same list) leads to endless looping
between cascade() and internal_add_timer() in case CONFIG_BASE_SMALL
is one and jiffies are crossing the value 1 << 18. The bug was
introduced between 2.6.11 and 2.6.12 (and survived for quite some
time).

This patch ensures that when cascade() is called timers within tv5 are
not added endlessly to their own list again, instead they are added to
the next lower tv level tv4 (as expected).

Signed-off-by: Christian Hildner 
Reviewed-by: Jan Kiszka 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/98673C87CB31274881CFFE0B65ECC87B0F5FC1963E@DEFTHW99EA4MSX.ww902.siemens.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman