linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v3.14.10 Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules genirq: Sanitize spurious interrupt detection of threaded irqs 2014-07-01T03:12:00+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2013-03-07T13:53:45+00:00 cc40a2916d3f2c7495410385bae08cfd58192071 commit 1e77d0a1ed7417d2a5a52a7b8d32aea1833faa6c upstream. Till reported that the spurious interrupt detection of threaded interrupts is broken in two ways: - note_interrupt() is called for each action thread of a shared interrupt line. That's wrong as we are only interested whether none of the device drivers felt responsible for the interrupt, but by calling multiple times for a single interrupt line we account IRQ_NONE even if one of the drivers felt responsible. - note_interrupt() when called from the thread handler is not serialized. That leaves the members of irq_desc which are used for the spurious detection unprotected. To solve this we need to defer the spurious detection of a threaded interrupt to the next hardware interrupt context where we have implicit serialization. If note_interrupt is called with action_ret == IRQ_WAKE_THREAD, we check whether the previous interrupt requested a deferred check. If not, we request a deferred check for the next hardware interrupt and return. If set, we check whether one of the interrupt threads signaled success. Depending on this information we feed the result into the spurious detector. If one primary handler of a shared interrupt returns IRQ_HANDLED we disable the deferred check of irq threads on the same line, as we have found at least one device driver who cared. Reported-by: Till Straumann <strauman@slac.stanford.edu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Austin Schuh <austin@peloton-tech.com> Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com> Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz> Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1303071450130.22263@ionos Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 1e77d0a1ed7417d2a5a52a7b8d32aea1833faa6c upstream.

Till reported that the spurious interrupt detection of threaded
interrupts is broken in two ways:

- note_interrupt() is called for each action thread of a shared
  interrupt line. That's wrong as we are only interested whether none
  of the device drivers felt responsible for the interrupt, but by
  calling multiple times for a single interrupt line we account
  IRQ_NONE even if one of the drivers felt responsible.

- note_interrupt() when called from the thread handler is not
  serialized. That leaves the members of irq_desc which are used for
  the spurious detection unprotected.

To solve this we need to defer the spurious detection of a threaded
interrupt to the next hardware interrupt context where we have
implicit serialization.

If note_interrupt is called with action_ret == IRQ_WAKE_THREAD, we
check whether the previous interrupt requested a deferred check. If
not, we request a deferred check for the next hardware interrupt and
return.

If set, we check whether one of the interrupt threads signaled
success. Depending on this information we feed the result into the
spurious detector.

If one primary handler of a shared interrupt returns IRQ_HANDLED we
disable the deferred check of irq threads on the same line, as we have
found at least one device driver who cared.

Reported-by: Till Straumann <strauman@slac.stanford.edu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Austin Schuh <austin@peloton-tech.com>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1303071450130.22263@ionos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rtmutex: Plug slow unlock race 2014-07-01T03:11:58+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2014-06-11T18:44:04+00:00 01b8eab1cc72c9339974fcee698515042d05f9b3 commit 27e35715df54cbc4f2d044f681802ae30479e7fb upstream. When the rtmutex fast path is enabled the slow unlock function can create the following situation: spin_lock(foo->m->wait_lock); foo->m->owner = NULL; rt_mutex_lock(foo->m); <-- fast path free = atomic_dec_and_test(foo->refcnt); rt_mutex_unlock(foo->m); <-- fast path if (free) kfree(foo); spin_unlock(foo->m->wait_lock); <--- Use after free. Plug the race by changing the slow unlock to the following scheme: while (!rt_mutex_has_waiters(m)) { /* Clear the waiters bit in m->owner */ clear_rt_mutex_waiters(m); owner = rt_mutex_owner(m); spin_unlock(m->wait_lock); if (cmpxchg(m->owner, owner, 0) == owner) return; spin_lock(m->wait_lock); } So in case of a new waiter incoming while the owner tries the slow path unlock we have two situations: unlock(wait_lock); lock(wait_lock); cmpxchg(p, owner, 0) == owner mark_rt_mutex_waiters(lock); acquire(lock); Or: unlock(wait_lock); lock(wait_lock); mark_rt_mutex_waiters(lock); cmpxchg(p, owner, 0) != owner enqueue_waiter(); unlock(wait_lock); lock(wait_lock); wakeup_next waiter(); unlock(wait_lock); lock(wait_lock); acquire(lock); If the fast path is disabled, then the simple m->owner = NULL; unlock(m->wait_lock); is sufficient as all access to m->owner is serialized via m->wait_lock; Also document and clarify the wakeup_next_waiter function as suggested by Oleg Nesterov. Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140611183852.937945560@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 27e35715df54cbc4f2d044f681802ae30479e7fb upstream.

When the rtmutex fast path is enabled the slow unlock function can
create the following situation:

spin_lock(foo->m->wait_lock);
foo->m->owner = NULL;
	    			rt_mutex_lock(foo->m); <-- fast path
				free = atomic_dec_and_test(foo->refcnt);
				rt_mutex_unlock(foo->m); <-- fast path
				if (free)
				   kfree(foo);

spin_unlock(foo->m->wait_lock); <--- Use after free.

Plug the race by changing the slow unlock to the following scheme:

     while (!rt_mutex_has_waiters(m)) {
     	    /* Clear the waiters bit in m->owner */
	    clear_rt_mutex_waiters(m);
      	    owner = rt_mutex_owner(m);
      	    spin_unlock(m->wait_lock);
      	    if (cmpxchg(m->owner, owner, 0) == owner)
      	       return;
      	    spin_lock(m->wait_lock);
     }

So in case of a new waiter incoming while the owner tries the slow
path unlock we have two situations:

 unlock(wait_lock);
					lock(wait_lock);
 cmpxchg(p, owner, 0) == owner
 	    	   			mark_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
	 				acquire(lock);

Or:

 unlock(wait_lock);
					lock(wait_lock);
	 				mark_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
 cmpxchg(p, owner, 0) != owner
					enqueue_waiter();
					unlock(wait_lock);
 lock(wait_lock);
 wakeup_next waiter();
 unlock(wait_lock);
					lock(wait_lock);
					acquire(lock);

If the fast path is disabled, then the simple

   m->owner = NULL;
   unlock(m->wait_lock);

is sufficient as all access to m->owner is serialized via
m->wait_lock;

Also document and clarify the wakeup_next_waiter function as suggested
by Oleg Nesterov.

Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140611183852.937945560@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rtmutex: Handle deadlock detection smarter 2014-07-01T03:11:58+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2014-06-05T10:34:23+00:00 fb52f40e085ef4074f1335672cd62c1f832af13b commit 3d5c9340d1949733eb37616abd15db36aef9a57c upstream. Even in the case when deadlock detection is not requested by the caller, we can detect deadlocks. Right now the code stops the lock chain walk and keeps the waiter enqueued, even on itself. Silly not to yell when such a scenario is detected and to keep the waiter enqueued. Return -EDEADLK unconditionally and handle it at the call sites. The futex calls return -EDEADLK. The non futex ones dequeue the waiter, throw a warning and put the task into a schedule loop. Tagged for stable as it makes the code more robust. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Brad Mouring <bmouring@ni.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140605152801.836501969@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 3d5c9340d1949733eb37616abd15db36aef9a57c upstream.

Even in the case when deadlock detection is not requested by the
caller, we can detect deadlocks. Right now the code stops the lock
chain walk and keeps the waiter enqueued, even on itself. Silly not to
yell when such a scenario is detected and to keep the waiter enqueued.

Return -EDEADLK unconditionally and handle it at the call sites.

The futex calls return -EDEADLK. The non futex ones dequeue the
waiter, throw a warning and put the task into a schedule loop.

Tagged for stable as it makes the code more robust.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brad Mouring <bmouring@ni.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140605152801.836501969@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rtmutex: Detect changes in the pi lock chain 2014-07-01T03:11:58+00:00 Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de 2014-06-05T09:16:12+00:00 2fff347cce2d1538556ab3127f7224f6b522575e commit 82084984383babe728e6e3c9a8e5c46278091315 upstream. When we walk the lock chain, we drop all locks after each step. So the lock chain can change under us before we reacquire the locks. That's harmless in principle as we just follow the wrong lock path. But it can lead to a false positive in the dead lock detection logic: T0 holds L0 T0 blocks on L1 held by T1 T1 blocks on L2 held by T2 T2 blocks on L3 held by T3 T4 blocks on L4 held by T4 Now we walk the chain lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> lock T2 -> adjust T2 -> drop locks T2 times out and blocks on L0 Now we continue: lock T2 -> lock L0 -> deadlock detected, but it's not a deadlock at all. Brad tried to work around that in the deadlock detection logic itself, but the more I looked at it the less I liked it, because it's crystal ball magic after the fact. We actually can detect a chain change very simple: lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> lock T2 -> adjust T2 -> next_lock = T2->pi_blocked_on->lock; drop locks T2 times out and blocks on L0 Now we continue: lock T2 -> if (next_lock != T2->pi_blocked_on->lock) return; So if we detect that T2 is now blocked on a different lock we stop the chain walk. That's also correct in the following scenario: lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> lock T2 -> adjust T2 -> next_lock = T2->pi_blocked_on->lock; drop locks T3 times out and drops L3 T2 acquires L3 and blocks on L4 now Now we continue: lock T2 -> if (next_lock != T2->pi_blocked_on->lock) return; We don't have to follow up the chain at that point, because T2 propagated our priority up to T4 already. [ Folded a cleanup patch from peterz ] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reported-by: Brad Mouring <bmouring@ni.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140605152801.930031935@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 82084984383babe728e6e3c9a8e5c46278091315 upstream.

When we walk the lock chain, we drop all locks after each step. So the
lock chain can change under us before we reacquire the locks. That's
harmless in principle as we just follow the wrong lock path. But it
can lead to a false positive in the dead lock detection logic:

T0 holds L0
T0 blocks on L1 held by T1
T1 blocks on L2 held by T2
T2 blocks on L3 held by T3
T4 blocks on L4 held by T4

Now we walk the chain

lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 ->
     lock T2 ->  adjust T2 ->  drop locks

T2 times out and blocks on L0

Now we continue:

lock T2 -> lock L0 -> deadlock detected, but it's not a deadlock at all.

Brad tried to work around that in the deadlock detection logic itself,
but the more I looked at it the less I liked it, because it's crystal
ball magic after the fact.

We actually can detect a chain change very simple:

lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> lock T2 -> adjust T2 ->

     next_lock = T2->pi_blocked_on->lock;

drop locks

T2 times out and blocks on L0

Now we continue:

lock T2 ->

     if (next_lock != T2->pi_blocked_on->lock)
     	   return;

So if we detect that T2 is now blocked on a different lock we stop the
chain walk. That's also correct in the following scenario:

lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> lock T2 -> adjust T2 ->

     next_lock = T2->pi_blocked_on->lock;

drop locks

T3 times out and drops L3
T2 acquires L3 and blocks on L4 now

Now we continue:

lock T2 ->

     if (next_lock != T2->pi_blocked_on->lock)
     	   return;

We don't have to follow up the chain at that point, because T2
propagated our priority up to T4 already.

[ Folded a cleanup patch from peterz ]

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: Brad Mouring <bmouring@ni.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140605152801.930031935@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptrace: fix fork event messages across pid namespaces 2014-07-01T03:11:54+00:00 Matthew Dempsky mdempsky@chromium.org 2014-06-06T21:36:42+00:00 c7d489fa670f9d54dd05b46d81397ec6df208e60 commit 4e52365f279564cef0ddd41db5237f0471381093 upstream. When tracing a process in another pid namespace, it's important for fork event messages to contain the child's pid as seen from the tracer's pid namespace, not the parent's. Otherwise, the tracer won't be able to correlate the fork event with later SIGTRAP signals it receives from the child. We still risk a race condition if a ptracer from a different pid namespace attaches after we compute the pid_t value. However, sending a bogus fork event message in this unlikely scenario is still a vast improvement over the status quo where we always send bogus fork event messages to debuggers in a different pid namespace than the forking process. Signed-off-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@chromium.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 4e52365f279564cef0ddd41db5237f0471381093 upstream.

When tracing a process in another pid namespace, it's important for fork
event messages to contain the child's pid as seen from the tracer's pid
namespace, not the parent's.  Otherwise, the tracer won't be able to
correlate the fork event with later SIGTRAP signals it receives from the
child.

We still risk a race condition if a ptracer from a different pid
namespace attaches after we compute the pid_t value.  However, sending a
bogus fork event message in this unlikely scenario is still a vast
improvement over the status quo where we always send bogus fork event
messages to debuggers in a different pid namespace than the forking
process.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kthread: fix return value of kthread_create() upon SIGKILL. 2014-07-01T03:11:53+00:00 Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp 2014-06-04T23:05:36+00:00 19801fb4a801cec39a70ff9c0a9c9023bd42a1a1 commit 8fe6929cfd43c44834858a53e129ffdc7c166298 upstream. Commit 786235eeba0e ("kthread: make kthread_create() killable") meant for allowing kthread_create() to abort as soon as killed by the OOM-killer. But returning -ENOMEM is wrong if killed by SIGKILL from userspace. Change kthread_create() to return -EINTR upon SIGKILL. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 8fe6929cfd43c44834858a53e129ffdc7c166298 upstream.

Commit 786235eeba0e ("kthread: make kthread_create() killable") meant
for allowing kthread_create() to abort as soon as killed by the
OOM-killer.  But returning -ENOMEM is wrong if killed by SIGKILL from
userspace.  Change kthread_create() to return -EINTR upon SIGKILL.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages 2014-06-26T19:15:38+00:00 Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com 2014-04-23T21:29:27+00:00 be0ef855baab7248d0fc71cdf78a47fcfd3708f1 [ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking 2014-06-16T20:40:33+00:00 Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net 2014-05-29T03:09:58+00:00 732eafc78bba8e18a51c169f3dc7f33cddcdc401 commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream. Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure. This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing. eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow... Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.

Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.

This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.

eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid 2014-06-16T20:40:32+00:00 Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net 2014-06-10T19:45:42+00:00 5bacea89dc8dfd3f7d7dfbed798f3b41d4f53c78 commit 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 upstream. The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode, CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense. This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more obvious what it does. Fixes CVE-2014-4014. Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 upstream.

The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces.  For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.

This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.

Fixes CVE-2014-4014.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sched: Fix sched_policy < 0 comparison 2014-06-11T18:54:11+00:00 Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at 2014-06-02T20:38:34+00:00 ccada0157f0909010e6684fe8fedb81d3a4351ee commit b14ed2c273f8ab872ae4e6735fe5ab09cb14b8c3 upstream. attr.sched_policy is u32, therefore a comparison against < 0 is never true. Fix this by casting sched_policy to int. This issue was reported by coverity CID 1219934. Fixes: dbdb22754fde ("sched: Disallow sched_attr::sched_policy < 0") Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1401741514-7045-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit b14ed2c273f8ab872ae4e6735fe5ab09cb14b8c3 upstream.

attr.sched_policy is u32, therefore a comparison against < 0 is never true.
Fix this by casting sched_policy to int.

This issue was reported by coverity CID 1219934.

Fixes: dbdb22754fde ("sched: Disallow sched_attr::sched_policy < 0")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1401741514-7045-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>