linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v3.14.57

module: Fix locking in symbol_put_addr()

2015-11-09T20:50:25+00:00

commit 275d7d44d802ef271a42dc87ac091a495ba72fc5 upstream.

Poma (on the way to another bug) reported an assertion triggering:

  [] module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x49/0x90
  [] __module_address+0x32/0x150
  [] __module_text_address+0x16/0x70
  [] symbol_put_addr+0x29/0x40
  [] dvb_frontend_detach+0x7d/0x90 [dvb_core]

Laura Abbott  produced a patch which lead us to
inspect symbol_put_addr(). This function has a comment claiming it
doesn't need to disable preemption around the module lookup
because it holds a reference to the module it wants to find, which
therefore cannot go away.

This is wrong (and a false optimization too, preempt_disable() is really
rather cheap, and I doubt any of this is on uber critical paths,
otherwise it would've retained a pointer to the actual module anyway and
avoided the second lookup).

While its true that the module cannot go away while we hold a reference
on it, the data structure we do the lookup in very much _CAN_ change
while we do the lookup. Therefore fix the comment and add the
required preempt_disable().

Reported-by: poma 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell 
Fixes: a6e6abd575fc ("module: remove module_text_address()")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/preempt: Fix cond_resched_lock() and cond_resched_softirq()

2015-10-27T00:45:59+00:00

commit fe32d3cd5e8eb0f82e459763374aa80797023403 upstream.

These functions check should_resched() before unlocking spinlock/bh-enable:
preempt_count always non-zero => should_resched() always returns false.
cond_resched_lock() worked iff spin_needbreak is set.

This patch adds argument "preempt_offset" to should_resched().

preempt_count offset constants for that:

  PREEMPT_DISABLE_OFFSET  - offset after preempt_disable()
  PREEMPT_LOCK_OFFSET     - offset after spin_lock()
  SOFTIRQ_DISABLE_OFFSET  - offset after local_bh_distable()
  SOFTIRQ_LOCK_OFFSET     - offset after spin_lock_bh()

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Graf 
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky 
Cc: David Vrabel 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Fixes: bdb438065890 ("sched: Extract the basic add/sub preempt_count modifiers")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150715095204.12246.98268.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

workqueue: make sure delayed work run in local cpu

2015-10-27T00:45:58+00:00

commit 874bbfe600a660cba9c776b3957b1ce393151b76 upstream.

My system keeps crashing with below message. vmstat_update() schedules a delayed
work in current cpu and expects the work runs in the cpu.
schedule_delayed_work() is expected to make delayed work run in local cpu. The
problem is timer can be migrated with NO_HZ. __queue_work() queues work in
timer handler, which could run in a different cpu other than where the delayed
work is scheduled. The end result is the delayed work runs in different cpu.
The patch makes __queue_delayed_work records local cpu earlier. Where the timer
runs doesn't change where the work runs with the change.

[   28.010131] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   28.010609] kernel BUG at ../mm/vmstat.c:1392!
[   28.011099] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
[   28.011860] Modules linked in:
[   28.012245] CPU: 0 PID: 289 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G        W4.3.0-rc3+ #634
[   28.013065] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140709_153802- 04/01/2014
[   28.014160] Workqueue: events vmstat_update
[   28.014571] task: ffff880117682580 ti: ffff8800ba428000 task.ti: ffff8800ba428000
[   28.015445] RIP: 0010:[]  []vmstat_update+0x31/0x80
[   28.016282] RSP: 0018:ffff8800ba42fd80  EFLAGS: 00010297
[   28.016812] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88011a858dc0 RCX:0000000000000000
[   28.017585] RDX: ffff880117682580 RSI: ffffffff81f14d8c RDI:ffffffff81f4df8d
[   28.018366] RBP: ffff8800ba42fd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:0000000000000000
[   28.019169] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000121 R12:ffff8800baa9f640
[   28.019947] R13: ffff88011a81e340 R14: ffff88011a823700 R15:0000000000000000
[   28.020071] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011a800000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000
[   28.020071] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[   28.020071] CR2: 00007ff6144b01d0 CR3: 00000000b8e93000 CR4:00000000000006f0
[   28.020071] Stack:
[   28.020071]  ffff88011a858dc0 ffff8800baa9f640 ffff8800ba42fe00ffffffff8106bd88
[   28.020071]  ffffffff8106bd0b 0000000000000096 0000000000000000ffffffff82f9b1e8
[   28.020071]  ffffffff829f0b10 0000000000000000 ffffffff81f18460ffff88011a81e340
[   28.020071] Call Trace:
[   28.020071]  [] process_one_work+0x1c8/0x540
[   28.020071]  [] ? process_one_work+0x14b/0x540
[   28.020071]  [] worker_thread+0x114/0x460
[   28.020071]  [] ? process_one_work+0x540/0x540
[   28.020071]  [] kthread+0xf8/0x110
[   28.020071]  [] ?kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200
[   28.020071]  [] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[   28.020071]  [] ?kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200

Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

genirq: Fix race in register_irq_proc()

2015-10-22T21:39:22+00:00

commit 95c2b17534654829db428f11bcf4297c059a2a7e upstream.

Per-IRQ directories in procfs are created only when a handler is first
added to the irqdesc, not when the irqdesc is created.  In the case of
a shared IRQ, multiple tasks can race to create a directory.  This
race condition seems to have been present forever, but is easier to
hit with async probing.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443266636.2004.2.camel@decadent.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/core: Fix TASK_DEAD race in finish_task_switch()

2015-10-22T21:39:18+00:00

commit 95913d97914f44db2b81271c2e2ebd4d2ac2df83 upstream.

So the problem this patch is trying to address is as follows:

        CPU0                            CPU1

        context_switch(A, B)
                                        ttwu(A)
                                          LOCK A->pi_lock
                                          A->on_cpu == 0
        finish_task_switch(A)
          prev_state = A->state  <-.
          WMB                      |
          A->on_cpu = 0;           |
          UNLOCK rq0->lock         |
                                   |    context_switch(C, A)
                                   `--  A->state = TASK_DEAD
          prev_state == TASK_DEAD
            put_task_struct(A)
                                        context_switch(A, C)
                                        finish_task_switch(A)
                                          A->state == TASK_DEAD
                                            put_task_struct(A)

The argument being that the WMB will allow the load of A->state on CPU0
to cross over and observe CPU1's store of A->state, which will then
result in a double-drop and use-after-free.

Now the comment states (and this was true once upon a long time ago)
that we need to observe A->state while holding rq->lock because that
will order us against the wakeup; however the wakeup will not in fact
acquire (that) rq->lock; it takes A->pi_lock these days.

We can obviously fix this by upgrading the WMB to an MB, but that is
expensive, so we'd rather avoid that.

The alternative this patch takes is: smp_store_release(&A->on_cpu, 0),
which avoids the MB on some archs, but not important ones like ARM.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: manfred@colorfullife.com
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Fixes: e4a52bcb9a18 ("sched: Remove rq->lock from the first half of ttwu()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150929124509.GG3816@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm

2015-10-01T09:36:09+00:00

commit 12c641ab8270f787dfcce08b5f20ce8b65008096 upstream.

In the logic in the initial commit of unshare made creating a new
thread group for a process, contingent upon creating a new memory
address space for that process. That is wrong. Two separate
processes in different thread groups can share a memory address space
and clone allows creation of such proceses.

This is significant because it was observed that mm_users > 1 does not
mean that a process is multi-threaded, as reading /proc/PID/maps
temporarily increments mm_users, which allows other processes to
(accidentally) interfere with unshare() calls.

Correct the check in check_unshare_flags() to test for
!thread_group_empty() for CLONE_THREAD, CLONE_SIGHAND, and CLONE_VM.
For sighand->count > 1 for CLONE_SIGHAND and CLONE_VM.
For !current_is_single_threaded instead of mm_users > 1 for CLONE_VM.

By using the correct checks in unshare this removes the possibility of
an accidental denial of service attack.

Additionally using the correct checks in unshare ensures that only an
explicit unshare(CLONE_VM) can possibly trigger the slow path of
current_is_single_threaded(). As an explict unshare(CLONE_VM) is
pointless it is not expected there are many applications that make
that call.

Fixes: b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704 userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
Reported-by: Ricky Zhou
Reported-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Fix PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD migration race

2015-09-13T16:10:48+00:00

commit c7999c6f3fed9e383d3131474588f282ae6d56b9 upstream.

I ran the perf fuzzer, which triggered some WARN()s which are due to
trying to stop/restart an event on the wrong CPU.

Use the normal IPI pattern to ensure we run the code on the correct CPU.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Fixes: bad7192b842c ("perf: Fix PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD to force-reset the period")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Fix fasync handling on inherited events

2015-09-13T16:10:48+00:00

commit fed66e2cdd4f127a43fd11b8d92a99bdd429528c upstream.

Vince reported that the fasync signal stuff doesn't work proper for
inherited events. So fix that.

Installing fasync allocates memory and sets filp->f_flags |= FASYNC,
which upon the demise of the file descriptor ensures the allocation is
freed and state is updated.

Now for perf, we can have the events stick around for a while after the
original FD is dead because of references from child events. So we
cannot copy the fasync pointer around. We can however consistently use
the parent's fasync, as that will be updated.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho deMelo 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: eranian@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1434011521.1495.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_from_user32

2015-08-17T03:51:52+00:00

commit 3c00cb5e68dc719f2fc73a33b1b230aadfcb1309 upstream.

This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a
positive si_code value.  The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields
in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently
between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and
copy_siginfo_to_user.

copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits
of si_code.

This fixes the following information leaks:
x86:   8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32.
       (si_code = __SI_CHLD)
x86:   100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1)
sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a
       64-bit process. (si_code = any)

parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because
rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code
to a different process.  These bugs are also fixed for consistency.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Chris Metcalf 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Michael Ellerman 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_to_user

2015-08-17T03:51:51+00:00

commit 26135022f85105ad725cda103fa069e29e83bd16 upstream.

This function may copy the si_addr_lsb, si_lower and si_upper fields to
user mode when they haven't been initialized, which can leak kernel
stack data to user mode.

Just checking the value of si_code is insufficient because the same
si_code value is shared between multiple signals.  This is solved by
checking the value of si_signo in addition to si_code.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman