<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v3.2.29</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>audit: fix refcounting in audit-tree</title>
<updated>2012-09-12T02:37:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-15T10:55:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c2cc94c67ca8e3c496a790d631fd1ac38d31d522'/>
<id>c2cc94c67ca8e3c496a790d631fd1ac38d31d522</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a2140fc0cb0325bb6384e788edd27b9a568714e2 upstream.

Refcounting of fsnotify_mark in audit tree is broken.  E.g:

                              refcount
create_chunk
  alloc_chunk                 1
  fsnotify_add_mark           2

untag_chunk
  fsnotify_get_mark           3
  fsnotify_destroy_mark
    audit_tree_freeing_mark   2
  fsnotify_put_mark           1
  fsnotify_put_mark           0
  via destroy_list
    fsnotify_mark_destroy    -1

This was reported by various people as triggering Oops when stopping auditd.

We could just remove the put_mark from audit_tree_freeing_mark() but that would
break freeing via inode destruction.  So this patch simply omits a put_mark
after calling destroy_mark or adds a get_mark before.

The additional get_mark is necessary where there's no other put_mark after
fsnotify_destroy_mark() since it assumes that the caller is holding a reference
(or the inode is keeping the mark pinned, not the case here AFAICS).

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Valentin Avram &lt;aval13@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Peter Moody &lt;pmoody@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a2140fc0cb0325bb6384e788edd27b9a568714e2 upstream.

Refcounting of fsnotify_mark in audit tree is broken.  E.g:

                              refcount
create_chunk
  alloc_chunk                 1
  fsnotify_add_mark           2

untag_chunk
  fsnotify_get_mark           3
  fsnotify_destroy_mark
    audit_tree_freeing_mark   2
  fsnotify_put_mark           1
  fsnotify_put_mark           0
  via destroy_list
    fsnotify_mark_destroy    -1

This was reported by various people as triggering Oops when stopping auditd.

We could just remove the put_mark from audit_tree_freeing_mark() but that would
break freeing via inode destruction.  So this patch simply omits a put_mark
after calling destroy_mark or adds a get_mark before.

The additional get_mark is necessary where there's no other put_mark after
fsnotify_destroy_mark() since it assumes that the caller is holding a reference
(or the inode is keeping the mark pinned, not the case here AFAICS).

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: Valentin Avram &lt;aval13@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Peter Moody &lt;pmoody@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: don't free_chunk() after fsnotify_add_mark()</title>
<updated>2012-09-12T02:37:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-15T10:55:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7d78916c93c07eedb9cf37f5b09e62fbd65968cc'/>
<id>7d78916c93c07eedb9cf37f5b09e62fbd65968cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0fe33aae0e94b4097dd433c9399e16e17d638cd8 upstream.

Don't do free_chunk() after fsnotify_add_mark().  That one does a delayed unref
via the destroy list and this results in use-after-free.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0fe33aae0e94b4097dd433c9399e16e17d638cd8 upstream.

Don't do free_chunk() after fsnotify_add_mark().  That one does a delayed unref
via the destroy list and this results in use-after-free.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: fix divide by zero at {thread_group,task}_times</title>
<updated>2012-09-12T02:36:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stanislaw Gruszka</name>
<email>sgruszka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-08-08T09:27:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=097e2f40cbca70422ade38ea61d72c3b8566f14d'/>
<id>097e2f40cbca70422ade38ea61d72c3b8566f14d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bea6832cc8c4a0a9a65dd17da6aaa657fe27bc3e upstream.

On architectures where cputime_t is 64 bit type, is possible to trigger
divide by zero on do_div(temp, (__force u32) total) line, if total is a
non zero number but has lower 32 bit's zeroed. Removing casting is not
a good solution since some do_div() implementations do cast to u32
internally.

This problem can be triggered in practice on very long lived processes:

  PID: 2331   TASK: ffff880472814b00  CPU: 2   COMMAND: "oraagent.bin"
   #0 [ffff880472a51b70] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103214b
   #1 [ffff880472a51bd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b91c2
   #2 [ffff880472a51ca0] oops_end at ffffffff814f0b00
   #3 [ffff880472a51cd0] die at ffffffff8100f26b
   #4 [ffff880472a51d00] do_trap at ffffffff814f03f4
   #5 [ffff880472a51d60] do_divide_error at ffffffff8100cfff
   #6 [ffff880472a51e00] divide_error at ffffffff8100be7b
      [exception RIP: thread_group_times+0x56]
      RIP: ffffffff81056a16  RSP: ffff880472a51eb8  RFLAGS: 00010046
      RAX: bc3572c9fe12d194  RBX: ffff880874150800  RCX: 0000000110266fad
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff880472a51eb8  RDI: 001038ae7d9633dc
      RBP: ffff880472a51ef8   R8: 00000000b10a3a64   R9: ffff880874150800
      R10: 00007fcba27ab680  R11: 0000000000000202  R12: ffff880472a51f08
      R13: ffff880472a51f10  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000007
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffff880472a51f00] do_sys_times at ffffffff8108845d
   #8 [ffff880472a51f40] sys_times at ffffffff81088524
   #9 [ffff880472a51f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8100b0f2
      RIP: 0000003808caac3a  RSP: 00007fcba27ab6d8  RFLAGS: 00000202
      RAX: 0000000000000064  RBX: ffffffff8100b0f2  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 00007fcba27ab6e0  RSI: 000000000076d58e  RDI: 00007fcba27ab6e0
      RBP: 00007fcba27ab700   R8: 0000000000000020   R9: 000000000000091b
      R10: 00007fcba27ab680  R11: 0000000000000202  R12: 00007fff9ca41940
      R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 00007fcba27ac9c0  R15: 00007fff9ca41940
      ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000064  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka &lt;sgruszka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120808092714.GA3580@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust filename
 - Most conversions in the original code are implicit]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bea6832cc8c4a0a9a65dd17da6aaa657fe27bc3e upstream.

On architectures where cputime_t is 64 bit type, is possible to trigger
divide by zero on do_div(temp, (__force u32) total) line, if total is a
non zero number but has lower 32 bit's zeroed. Removing casting is not
a good solution since some do_div() implementations do cast to u32
internally.

This problem can be triggered in practice on very long lived processes:

  PID: 2331   TASK: ffff880472814b00  CPU: 2   COMMAND: "oraagent.bin"
   #0 [ffff880472a51b70] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103214b
   #1 [ffff880472a51bd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b91c2
   #2 [ffff880472a51ca0] oops_end at ffffffff814f0b00
   #3 [ffff880472a51cd0] die at ffffffff8100f26b
   #4 [ffff880472a51d00] do_trap at ffffffff814f03f4
   #5 [ffff880472a51d60] do_divide_error at ffffffff8100cfff
   #6 [ffff880472a51e00] divide_error at ffffffff8100be7b
      [exception RIP: thread_group_times+0x56]
      RIP: ffffffff81056a16  RSP: ffff880472a51eb8  RFLAGS: 00010046
      RAX: bc3572c9fe12d194  RBX: ffff880874150800  RCX: 0000000110266fad
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff880472a51eb8  RDI: 001038ae7d9633dc
      RBP: ffff880472a51ef8   R8: 00000000b10a3a64   R9: ffff880874150800
      R10: 00007fcba27ab680  R11: 0000000000000202  R12: ffff880472a51f08
      R13: ffff880472a51f10  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000007
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffff880472a51f00] do_sys_times at ffffffff8108845d
   #8 [ffff880472a51f40] sys_times at ffffffff81088524
   #9 [ffff880472a51f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8100b0f2
      RIP: 0000003808caac3a  RSP: 00007fcba27ab6d8  RFLAGS: 00000202
      RAX: 0000000000000064  RBX: ffffffff8100b0f2  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 00007fcba27ab6e0  RSI: 000000000076d58e  RDI: 00007fcba27ab6e0
      RBP: 00007fcba27ab700   R8: 0000000000000020   R9: 000000000000091b
      R10: 00007fcba27ab680  R11: 0000000000000202  R12: 00007fff9ca41940
      R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 00007fcba27ac9c0  R15: 00007fff9ca41940
      ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000064  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka &lt;sgruszka@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120808092714.GA3580@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust filename
 - Most conversions in the original code are implicit]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()</title>
<updated>2012-08-09T23:24:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darren Hart</name>
<email>dvhart@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-20T18:53:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4344b8578fb31bb06abd397219ac0376f116f6f2'/>
<id>4344b8578fb31bb06abd397219ac0376f116f6f2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef upstream.

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef upstream.

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Fix bug in WARN_ON for NULL q.pi_state</title>
<updated>2012-08-09T23:24:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darren Hart</name>
<email>dvhart@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-20T18:53:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4ccf9739188a122c229a7839ee0af89c91f26029'/>
<id>4ccf9739188a122c229a7839ee0af89c91f26029</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f27071cb7fe3e1d37a9dbe6c0dfc5395cd40fa43 upstream.

The WARN_ON in futex_wait_requeue_pi() for a NULL q.pi_state was testing
the address (&amp;q.pi_state) of the pointer instead of the value
(q.pi_state) of the pointer. Correct it accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c85d97f6e5f79ec389a4ead3e367363c74bd09a.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f27071cb7fe3e1d37a9dbe6c0dfc5395cd40fa43 upstream.

The WARN_ON in futex_wait_requeue_pi() for a NULL q.pi_state was testing
the address (&amp;q.pi_state) of the pointer instead of the value
(q.pi_state) of the pointer. Correct it accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c85d97f6e5f79ec389a4ead3e367363c74bd09a.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Test for pi_mutex on fault in futex_wait_requeue_pi()</title>
<updated>2012-08-09T23:24:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darren Hart</name>
<email>dvhart@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-20T18:53:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c2da76144f8b38d0a958ff1cd669d5b78e5c3018'/>
<id>c2da76144f8b38d0a958ff1cd669d5b78e5c3018</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b6070a8d9853eda010a549fa9a09eb8d7269b929 upstream.

If fixup_pi_state_owner() faults, pi_mutex may be NULL. Test
for pi_mutex != NULL before testing the owner against current
and possibly unlocking it.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dc59890338fc413606f04e5c5b131530734dae3d.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b6070a8d9853eda010a549fa9a09eb8d7269b929 upstream.

If fixup_pi_state_owner() faults, pi_mutex may be NULL. Test
for pi_mutex != NULL before testing the owner against current
and possibly unlocking it.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dc59890338fc413606f04e5c5b131530734dae3d.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane</title>
<updated>2012-08-09T23:24:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-02T11:52:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7069678424c5a5ab11938a274e2c03b1dd0b3302'/>
<id>7069678424c5a5ab11938a274e2c03b1dd0b3302</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow &lt;ewust@umich.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow &lt;ewust@umich.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger &lt;nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric &lt;zakir@umich.edu&gt;
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman &lt;jhalderm@umich.edu&gt;.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow &lt;ewust@umich.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow &lt;ewust@umich.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger &lt;nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric &lt;zakir@umich.edu&gt;
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman &lt;jhalderm@umich.edu&gt;.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix race in task_group()</title>
<updated>2012-08-09T23:11:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-22T11:36:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b75bfc42974aaf089ae7eae5d3c6bf362f57ee93'/>
<id>b75bfc42974aaf089ae7eae5d3c6bf362f57ee93</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8323f26ce3425460769605a6aece7a174edaa7d1 upstream

Stefan reported a crash on a kernel before a3e5d1091c1 ("sched:
Don't call task_group() too many times in set_task_rq()"), he
found the reason to be that the multiple task_group()
invocations in set_task_rq() returned different values.

Looking at all that I found a lack of serialization and plain
wrong comments.

The below tries to fix it using an extra pointer which is
updated under the appropriate scheduler locks. Its not pretty,
but I can't really see another way given how all the cgroup
stuff works.

Reported-and-tested-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1340364965.18025.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;

(backported to previous file names and layout)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8323f26ce3425460769605a6aece7a174edaa7d1 upstream

Stefan reported a crash on a kernel before a3e5d1091c1 ("sched:
Don't call task_group() too many times in set_task_rq()"), he
found the reason to be that the multiple task_group()
invocations in set_task_rq() returned different values.

Looking at all that I found a lack of serialization and plain
wrong comments.

The below tries to fix it using an extra pointer which is
updated under the appropriate scheduler locks. Its not pretty,
but I can't really see another way given how all the cgroup
stuff works.

Reported-and-tested-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1340364965.18025.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;

(backported to previous file names and layout)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>workqueue: perform cpu down operations from low priority cpu_notifier()</title>
<updated>2012-08-02T13:37:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-17T19:39:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c4f1f3253303865d0fda62c27057009096eeb6ef'/>
<id>c4f1f3253303865d0fda62c27057009096eeb6ef</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6575820221f7a4dd6eadecf7bf83cdd154335eda upstream.

Currently, all workqueue cpu hotplug operations run off
CPU_PRI_WORKQUEUE which is higher than normal notifiers.  This is to
ensure that workqueue is up and running while bringing up a CPU before
other notifiers try to use workqueue on the CPU.

Per-cpu workqueues are supposed to remain working and bound to the CPU
for normal CPU_DOWN_PREPARE notifiers.  This holds mostly true even
with workqueue offlining running with higher priority because
workqueue CPU_DOWN_PREPARE only creates a bound trustee thread which
runs the per-cpu workqueue without concurrency management without
explicitly detaching the existing workers.

However, if the trustee needs to create new workers, it creates
unbound workers which may wander off to other CPUs while
CPU_DOWN_PREPARE notifiers are in progress.  Furthermore, if the CPU
down is cancelled, the per-CPU workqueue may end up with workers which
aren't bound to the CPU.

While reliably reproducible with a convoluted artificial test-case
involving scheduling and flushing CPU burning work items from CPU down
notifiers, this isn't very likely to happen in the wild, and, even
when it happens, the effects are likely to be hidden by the following
successful CPU down.

Fix it by using different priorities for up and down notifiers - high
priority for up operations and low priority for down operations.

Workqueue cpu hotplug operations will soon go through further cleanup.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@sisk.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6575820221f7a4dd6eadecf7bf83cdd154335eda upstream.

Currently, all workqueue cpu hotplug operations run off
CPU_PRI_WORKQUEUE which is higher than normal notifiers.  This is to
ensure that workqueue is up and running while bringing up a CPU before
other notifiers try to use workqueue on the CPU.

Per-cpu workqueues are supposed to remain working and bound to the CPU
for normal CPU_DOWN_PREPARE notifiers.  This holds mostly true even
with workqueue offlining running with higher priority because
workqueue CPU_DOWN_PREPARE only creates a bound trustee thread which
runs the per-cpu workqueue without concurrency management without
explicitly detaching the existing workers.

However, if the trustee needs to create new workers, it creates
unbound workers which may wander off to other CPUs while
CPU_DOWN_PREPARE notifiers are in progress.  Furthermore, if the CPU
down is cancelled, the per-CPU workqueue may end up with workers which
aren't bound to the CPU.

While reliably reproducible with a convoluted artificial test-case
involving scheduling and flushing CPU burning work items from CPU down
notifiers, this isn't very likely to happen in the wild, and, even
when it happens, the effects are likely to be hidden by the following
successful CPU down.

Fix it by using different priorities for up and down notifiers - high
priority for up operations and low priority for down operations.

Workqueue cpu hotplug operations will soon go through further cleanup.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" &lt;rjw@sisk.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Disable function tracing during suspend/resume and hibernation, again</title>
<updated>2012-08-02T13:37:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Srivatsa S. Bhat</name>
<email>srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-16T13:30:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=701aa1144e7576cc3a6a9858d2f6ce7ba92bdec4'/>
<id>701aa1144e7576cc3a6a9858d2f6ce7ba92bdec4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 443772d408a25af62498793f6f805ce3c559309a upstream.

If function tracing is enabled for some of the low-level suspend/resume
functions, it leads to triple fault during resume from suspend, ultimately
ending up in a reboot instead of a resume (or a total refusal to come out
of suspended state, on some machines).

This issue was explained in more detail in commit f42ac38c59e0a03d (ftrace:
disable tracing for suspend to ram). However, the changes made by that commit
got reverted by commit cbe2f5a6e84eebb (tracing: allow tracing of
suspend/resume &amp; hibernation code again). So, unfortunately since things are
not yet robust enough to allow tracing of low-level suspend/resume functions,
suspend/resume is still broken when ftrace is enabled.

So fix this by disabling function tracing during suspend/resume &amp; hibernation.

Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rjw@sisk.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 443772d408a25af62498793f6f805ce3c559309a upstream.

If function tracing is enabled for some of the low-level suspend/resume
functions, it leads to triple fault during resume from suspend, ultimately
ending up in a reboot instead of a resume (or a total refusal to come out
of suspended state, on some machines).

This issue was explained in more detail in commit f42ac38c59e0a03d (ftrace:
disable tracing for suspend to ram). However, the changes made by that commit
got reverted by commit cbe2f5a6e84eebb (tracing: allow tracing of
suspend/resume &amp; hibernation code again). So, unfortunately since things are
not yet robust enough to allow tracing of low-level suspend/resume functions,
suspend/resume is still broken when ftrace is enabled.

So fix this by disabling function tracing during suspend/resume &amp; hibernation.

Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rjw@sisk.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
