<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v3.3.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>exit_signal: fix the "parent has changed security domain" logic</title>
<updated>2012-05-07T15:53:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-19T16:03:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=59a49b056b6f7a0207cbde94c7163ed365be82e1'/>
<id>59a49b056b6f7a0207cbde94c7163ed365be82e1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b6e238dceed36891cc633167afe7151f1f3d83c5 upstream.

exit_notify() changes -&gt;exit_signal if the parent already did exec.
This doesn't really work, we are not going to send the signal now
if there is another live thread or the exiting task is traced. The
parent can exec before the last dies or the tracer detaches.

Move this check into do_notify_parent() which actually sends the
signal.

The user-visible change is that we do not change -&gt;exit_signal,
and thus the exiting task is still "clone children" for
do_wait()-&gt;eligible_child(__WCLONE). Hopefully this is fine, the
current logic is racy anyway.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b6e238dceed36891cc633167afe7151f1f3d83c5 upstream.

exit_notify() changes -&gt;exit_signal if the parent already did exec.
This doesn't really work, we are not going to send the signal now
if there is another live thread or the exiting task is traced. The
parent can exec before the last dies or the tracer detaches.

Move this check into do_notify_parent() which actually sends the
signal.

The user-visible change is that we do not change -&gt;exit_signal,
and thus the exiting task is still "clone children" for
do_wait()-&gt;eligible_child(__WCLONE). Hopefully this is fine, the
current logic is racy anyway.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exit_signal: simplify the "we have changed execution domain" logic</title>
<updated>2012-05-07T15:53:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-19T16:03:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f799aa1565fc056504ba7473a09e8f0dee3a20b7'/>
<id>f799aa1565fc056504ba7473a09e8f0dee3a20b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e636825346b36a07ccfc8e30946d52855e21f681 upstream.

exit_notify() checks "tsk-&gt;self_exec_id != tsk-&gt;parent_exec_id"
to handle the "we have changed execution domain" case.

We can change do_thread() to always set -&gt;exit_signal = SIGCHLD
and remove this check to simplify the code.

We could change setup_new_exec() instead, this looks more logical
because it increments -&gt;self_exec_id. But note that de_thread()
already resets -&gt;exit_signal if it changes the leader, let's keep
both changes close to each other.

Note that we change -&gt;exit_signal lockless, this changes the rules.
Thereafter -&gt;exit_signal is not stable under tasklist but this is
fine, the only possible change is OLDSIG -&gt; SIGCHLD. This can race
with eligible_child() but the race is harmless. We can race with
reparent_leader() which changes our -&gt;exit_signal in parallel, but
it does the same change to SIGCHLD.

The noticeable user-visible change is that the execing task is not
"visible" to do_wait()-&gt;eligible_child(__WCLONE) right after exec.
To me this looks more logical, and this is consistent with mt case.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e636825346b36a07ccfc8e30946d52855e21f681 upstream.

exit_notify() checks "tsk-&gt;self_exec_id != tsk-&gt;parent_exec_id"
to handle the "we have changed execution domain" case.

We can change do_thread() to always set -&gt;exit_signal = SIGCHLD
and remove this check to simplify the code.

We could change setup_new_exec() instead, this looks more logical
because it increments -&gt;self_exec_id. But note that de_thread()
already resets -&gt;exit_signal if it changes the leader, let's keep
both changes close to each other.

Note that we change -&gt;exit_signal lockless, this changes the rules.
Thereafter -&gt;exit_signal is not stable under tasklist but this is
fine, the only possible change is OLDSIG -&gt; SIGCHLD. This can race
with eligible_child() but the race is harmless. We can race with
reparent_leader() which changes our -&gt;exit_signal in parallel, but
it does the same change to SIGCHLD.

The noticeable user-visible change is that the execing task is not
"visible" to do_wait()-&gt;eligible_child(__WCLONE) right after exec.
To me this looks more logical, and this is consistent with mt case.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix nohz load accounting -- again!</title>
<updated>2012-05-07T15:53:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-01T14:04:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6b7b95e774e2e2b32631511ad7d4c2256f1b3162'/>
<id>6b7b95e774e2e2b32631511ad7d4c2256f1b3162</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c308b56b5398779cd3da0f62ab26b0453494c3d4 upstream.

Various people reported nohz load tracking still being wrecked, but Doug
spotted the actual problem. We fold the nohz remainder in too soon,
causing us to loose samples and under-account.

So instead of playing catch-up up-front, always do a single load-fold
with whatever state we encounter and only then fold the nohz remainder
and play catch-up.

Reported-by: Doug Smythies &lt;dsmythies@telus.net&gt;
Reported-by: LesÅ=82aw Kope=C4=87 &lt;leslaw.kopec@nasza-klasa.pl&gt;
Reported-by: Aman Gupta &lt;aman@tmm1.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-4v31etnhgg9kwd6ocgx3rxl8@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Kerin Millar &lt;kerframil@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c308b56b5398779cd3da0f62ab26b0453494c3d4 upstream.

Various people reported nohz load tracking still being wrecked, but Doug
spotted the actual problem. We fold the nohz remainder in too soon,
causing us to loose samples and under-account.

So instead of playing catch-up up-front, always do a single load-fold
with whatever state we encounter and only then fold the nohz remainder
and play catch-up.

Reported-by: Doug Smythies &lt;dsmythies@telus.net&gt;
Reported-by: LesÅ=82aw Kope=C4=87 &lt;leslaw.kopec@nasza-klasa.pl&gt;
Reported-by: Aman Gupta &lt;aman@tmm1.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-4v31etnhgg9kwd6ocgx3rxl8@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Kerin Millar &lt;kerframil@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PM / Hibernate: fix the number of pages used for hibernate/thaw buffering</title>
<updated>2012-05-07T15:53:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bojan Smojver</name>
<email>bojan@rexursive.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-24T21:53:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4da7d6143870a2f81ceaeabdc64e0f74121e35b3'/>
<id>4da7d6143870a2f81ceaeabdc64e0f74121e35b3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8262d476823a7ea1eb497ff9676d1eab2393c75 upstream.

Hibernation regression fix, since 3.2.

Calculate the number of required free pages based on non-high memory
pages only, because that is where the buffers will come from.

Commit 081a9d043c983f161b78fdc4671324d1342b86bc introduced a new buffer
page allocation logic during hibernation, in order to improve the
performance. The amount of pages allocated was calculated based on total
amount of pages available, although only non-high memory pages are
usable for this purpose. This caused hibernation code to attempt to over
allocate pages on platforms that have high memory, which led to hangs.

Signed-off-by: Bojan Smojver &lt;bojan@rexursive.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rjw@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f8262d476823a7ea1eb497ff9676d1eab2393c75 upstream.

Hibernation regression fix, since 3.2.

Calculate the number of required free pages based on non-high memory
pages only, because that is where the buffers will come from.

Commit 081a9d043c983f161b78fdc4671324d1342b86bc introduced a new buffer
page allocation logic during hibernation, in order to improve the
performance. The amount of pages allocated was calculated based on total
amount of pages available, although only non-high memory pages are
usable for this purpose. This caused hibernation code to attempt to over
allocate pages on platforms that have high memory, which led to hangs.

Signed-off-by: Bojan Smojver &lt;bojan@rexursive.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rjw@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix stacktrace of latency tracers (irqsoff and friends)</title>
<updated>2012-05-07T15:53:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>srostedt@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-19T14:31:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=acfaccd16f9a9e81b7f4dac87617188387220227'/>
<id>acfaccd16f9a9e81b7f4dac87617188387220227</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db4c75cbebd7e5910cd3bcb6790272fcc3042857 upstream.

While debugging a latency with someone on IRC (mirage335) on #linux-rt (OFTC),
we discovered that the stacktrace output of the latency tracers
(preemptirqsoff) was empty.

This bug was caused by the creation of the dynamic length stack trace
again (like commit 12b5da3 "tracing: Fix ent_size in trace output" was).

This bug is caused by the latency tracers requiring the next event
to determine the time between the current event and the next. But by
grabbing the next event, the iter-&gt;ent_size is set to the next event
instead of the current one. As the stacktrace event is the last event,
this makes the ent_size zero and causes nothing to be printed for
the stack trace. The dynamic stacktrace uses the ent_size to determine
how much of the stack can be printed. The ent_size of zero means
no stack.

The simple fix is to save the iter-&gt;ent_size before finding the next event.

Note, mirage335 asked to remain anonymous from LKML and git, so I will
not add the Reported-by and Tested-by tags, even though he did report
the issue and tested the fix.

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit db4c75cbebd7e5910cd3bcb6790272fcc3042857 upstream.

While debugging a latency with someone on IRC (mirage335) on #linux-rt (OFTC),
we discovered that the stacktrace output of the latency tracers
(preemptirqsoff) was empty.

This bug was caused by the creation of the dynamic length stack trace
again (like commit 12b5da3 "tracing: Fix ent_size in trace output" was).

This bug is caused by the latency tracers requiring the next event
to determine the time between the current event and the next. But by
grabbing the next event, the iter-&gt;ent_size is set to the next event
instead of the current one. As the stacktrace event is the last event,
this makes the ent_size zero and causes nothing to be printed for
the stack trace. The dynamic stacktrace uses the ent_size to determine
how much of the stack can be printed. The ent_size of zero means
no stack.

The simple fix is to save the iter-&gt;ent_size before finding the next event.

Note, mirage335 asked to remain anonymous from LKML and git, so I will
not add the Reported-by and Tested-by tags, even though he did report
the issue and tested the fix.

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix OOPS when build_sched_domains() percpu allocation fails</title>
<updated>2012-05-07T15:53:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>he, bo</name>
<email>bo.he@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-25T11:59:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fbd271acf9cccc23a5167ca2b7861c5b9574a6a0'/>
<id>fbd271acf9cccc23a5167ca2b7861c5b9574a6a0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fb2cf2c660971bea0ad86a9a5c19ad39eab61344 upstream.

Under extreme memory used up situations, percpu allocation
might fail. We hit it when system goes to suspend-to-ram,
causing a kworker panic:

 EIP: [&lt;c124411a&gt;] build_sched_domains+0x23a/0xad0
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
 Pid: 3026, comm: kworker/u:3
 3.0.8-137473-gf42fbef #1

 Call Trace:
  [&lt;c18cc4f2&gt;] panic+0x66/0x16c
  [...]
  [&lt;c1244c37&gt;] partition_sched_domains+0x287/0x4b0
  [&lt;c12a77be&gt;] cpuset_update_active_cpus+0x1fe/0x210
  [&lt;c123712d&gt;] cpuset_cpu_inactive+0x1d/0x30
  [...]

With this fix applied build_sched_domains() will return -ENOMEM and
the suspend attempt fails.

Signed-off-by: he, bo &lt;bo.he@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zhang, Yanmin &lt;yanmin.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1335355161.5892.17.camel@hebo
[ So, we fail to deallocate a CPU because we cannot allocate RAM :-/
  I don't like that kind of sad behavior but nevertheless it should
  not crash under high memory load. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fb2cf2c660971bea0ad86a9a5c19ad39eab61344 upstream.

Under extreme memory used up situations, percpu allocation
might fail. We hit it when system goes to suspend-to-ram,
causing a kworker panic:

 EIP: [&lt;c124411a&gt;] build_sched_domains+0x23a/0xad0
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
 Pid: 3026, comm: kworker/u:3
 3.0.8-137473-gf42fbef #1

 Call Trace:
  [&lt;c18cc4f2&gt;] panic+0x66/0x16c
  [...]
  [&lt;c1244c37&gt;] partition_sched_domains+0x287/0x4b0
  [&lt;c12a77be&gt;] cpuset_update_active_cpus+0x1fe/0x210
  [&lt;c123712d&gt;] cpuset_cpu_inactive+0x1d/0x30
  [...]

With this fix applied build_sched_domains() will return -ENOMEM and
the suspend attempt fails.

Signed-off-by: he, bo &lt;bo.he@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Zhang, Yanmin &lt;yanmin.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1335355161.5892.17.camel@hebo
[ So, we fail to deallocate a CPU because we cannot allocate RAM :-/
  I don't like that kind of sad behavior but nevertheless it should
  not crash under high memory load. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process</title>
<updated>2012-04-22T22:39:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-19T23:12:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c01a9ac74a8b0e704f2d88c277c2a379849b818d'/>
<id>c01a9ac74a8b0e704f2d88c277c2a379849b818d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8 upstream.

It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
info that comes out of /proc.

Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
  cred-&gt;euid != pcred-&gt;euid
  cred-&gt;euid == pcred-&gt;uid
so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.

(This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8 upstream.

It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
info that comes out of /proc.

Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
  cred-&gt;euid != pcred-&gt;euid
  cred-&gt;euid == pcred-&gt;uid
so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.

(This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: spender@grsecurity.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nohz: Fix stale jiffies update in tick_nohz_restart()</title>
<updated>2012-04-22T22:38:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neal Cardwell</name>
<email>ncardwell@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-27T19:09:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=177b07ddae959f9454f4f4f1d14ab3365be58d84'/>
<id>177b07ddae959f9454f4f4f1d14ab3365be58d84</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6f103929f8979d2638e58d7f7fda0beefcb8ee7e upstream.

Fix tick_nohz_restart() to not use a stale ktime_t "now" value when
calling tick_do_update_jiffies64(now).

If we reach this point in the loop it means that we crossed a tick
boundary since we grabbed the "now" timestamp, so at this point "now"
refers to a time in the old jiffy, so using the old value for "now" is
incorrect, and is likely to give us a stale jiffies value.

In particular, the first time through the loop the
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) call is always a no-op, since the
caller, tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(), will have already called
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) with that "now" value.

Note that tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() already uses the correct
approach: when we notice we cross a jiffy boundary, grab a new
timestamp with ktime_get(), and *then* update jiffies.

Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1332875377-23014-1-git-send-email-ncardwell@google.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6f103929f8979d2638e58d7f7fda0beefcb8ee7e upstream.

Fix tick_nohz_restart() to not use a stale ktime_t "now" value when
calling tick_do_update_jiffies64(now).

If we reach this point in the loop it means that we crossed a tick
boundary since we grabbed the "now" timestamp, so at this point "now"
refers to a time in the old jiffy, so using the old value for "now" is
incorrect, and is likely to give us a stale jiffies value.

In particular, the first time through the loop the
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) call is always a no-op, since the
caller, tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(), will have already called
tick_do_update_jiffies64(now) with that "now" value.

Note that tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() already uses the correct
approach: when we notice we cross a jiffy boundary, grab a new
timestamp with ktime_get(), and *then* update jiffies.

Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1332875377-23014-1-git-send-email-ncardwell@google.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>panic: fix stack dump print on direct call to panic()</title>
<updated>2012-04-22T22:38:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Wessel</name>
<email>jason.wessel@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-12T19:49:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e8514a06812f2fb3409d52fa604a2a340b0a1720'/>
<id>e8514a06812f2fb3409d52fa604a2a340b0a1720</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 026ee1f66aaa7f01b617a0ba89ac4b531f9603f1 upstream.

Commit 6e6f0a1f0fa6 ("panic: don't print redundant backtraces on oops")
causes a regression where no stack trace will be printed at all for the
case where kernel code calls panic() directly while not processing an
oops, and of course there are 100's of instances of this type of call.

The original commit executed the check (!oops_in_progress), but this will
always be false because just before the dump_stack() there is a call to
bust_spinlocks(1), which does the following:

  void __attribute__((weak)) bust_spinlocks(int yes)
  {
	if (yes) {
		++oops_in_progress;

The proper way to resolve the problem that original commit tried to
solve is to avoid printing a stack dump from panic() when the either of
the following conditions is true:

  1) TAINT_DIE has been set (this is done by oops_end())
     This indicates and oops has already been printed.
  2) oops_in_progress &gt; 1
     This guards against the rare case where panic() is invoked
     a second time, or in between oops_begin() and oops_end()

Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel &lt;jason.wessel@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 026ee1f66aaa7f01b617a0ba89ac4b531f9603f1 upstream.

Commit 6e6f0a1f0fa6 ("panic: don't print redundant backtraces on oops")
causes a regression where no stack trace will be printed at all for the
case where kernel code calls panic() directly while not processing an
oops, and of course there are 100's of instances of this type of call.

The original commit executed the check (!oops_in_progress), but this will
always be false because just before the dump_stack() there is a call to
bust_spinlocks(1), which does the following:

  void __attribute__((weak)) bust_spinlocks(int yes)
  {
	if (yes) {
		++oops_in_progress;

The proper way to resolve the problem that original commit tried to
solve is to avoid printing a stack dump from panic() when the either of
the following conditions is true:

  1) TAINT_DIE has been set (this is done by oops_end())
     This indicates and oops has already been printed.
  2) oops_in_progress &gt; 1
     This guards against the rare case where panic() is invoked
     a second time, or in between oops_begin() and oops_end()

Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel &lt;jason.wessel@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cred: copy_process() should clear child-&gt;replacement_session_keyring</title>
<updated>2012-04-13T16:13:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-09T19:03:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b502007fc61b7799148ccd1bc4a502acd1a0b8fa'/>
<id>b502007fc61b7799148ccd1bc4a502acd1a0b8fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33 upstream.

keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets -&gt;replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().

However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus -&gt;replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).

change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong -&gt;replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33 upstream.

keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets -&gt;replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().

However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus -&gt;replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).

change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong -&gt;replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
