<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v4.20-rc6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net</title>
<updated>2018-12-09T23:12:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-09T23:12:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d48f782e4fb20dc7ec935ca0ca41ae31e4a69362'/>
<id>d48f782e4fb20dc7ec935ca0ca41ae31e4a69362</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
 "A decent batch of fixes here. I'd say about half are for problems that
  have existed for a while, and half are for new regressions added in
  the 4.20 merge window.

   1) Fix 10G SFP phy module detection in mvpp2, from Baruch Siach.

   2) Revert bogus emac driver change, from Benjamin Herrenschmidt.

   3) Handle BPF exported data structure with pointers when building
      32-bit userland, from Daniel Borkmann.

   4) Memory leak fix in act_police, from Davide Caratti.

   5) Check RX checksum offload in RX descriptors properly in aquantia
      driver, from Dmitry Bogdanov.

   6) SKB unlink fix in various spots, from Edward Cree.

   7) ndo_dflt_fdb_dump() only works with ethernet, enforce this, from
      Eric Dumazet.

   8) Fix FID leak in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel.

   9) IOTLB locking fix in vhost, from Jean-Philippe Brucker.

  10) Fix SKB truesize accounting in ipv4/ipv6/netfilter frag memory
      limits otherwise namespace exit can hang. From Jiri Wiesner.

  11) Address block parsing length fixes in x25 from Martin Schiller.

  12) IRQ and ring accounting fixes in bnxt_en, from Michael Chan.

  13) For tun interfaces, only iface delete works with rtnl ops, enforce
      this by disallowing add. From Nicolas Dichtel.

  14) Use after free in liquidio, from Pan Bian.

  15) Fix SKB use after passing to netif_receive_skb(), from Prashant
      Bhole.

  16) Static key accounting and other fixes in XPS from Sabrina Dubroca.

  17) Partially initialized flow key passed to ip6_route_output(), from
      Shmulik Ladkani.

  18) Fix RTNL deadlock during reset in ibmvnic driver, from Thomas
      Falcon.

  19) Several small TCP fixes (off-by-one on window probe abort, NULL
      deref in tail loss probe, SNMP mis-estimations) from Yuchung
      Cheng"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (93 commits)
  net/sched: cls_flower: Reject duplicated rules also under skip_sw
  bnxt_en: Fix _bnxt_get_max_rings() for 57500 chips.
  bnxt_en: Fix NQ/CP rings accounting on the new 57500 chips.
  bnxt_en: Keep track of reserved IRQs.
  bnxt_en: Fix CNP CoS queue regression.
  net/mlx4_core: Correctly set PFC param if global pause is turned off.
  Revert "net/ibm/emac: wrong bit is used for STA control"
  neighbour: Avoid writing before skb-&gt;head in neigh_hh_output()
  ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options
  tcp: lack of available data can also cause TSO defer
  ipv6: sr: properly initialize flowi6 prior passing to ip6_route_output
  mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Fix VLAN device deletion via ioctl
  mlxsw: spectrum_router: Relax GRE decap matching check
  mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Avoid leaking FID's reference count
  mlxsw: spectrum_nve: Remove easily triggerable warnings
  ipv4: ipv6: netfilter: Adjust the frag mem limit when truesize changes
  sctp: frag_point sanity check
  tcp: fix NULL ref in tail loss probe
  tcp: Do not underestimate rwnd_limited
  net: use skb_list_del_init() to remove from RX sublists
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
 "A decent batch of fixes here. I'd say about half are for problems that
  have existed for a while, and half are for new regressions added in
  the 4.20 merge window.

   1) Fix 10G SFP phy module detection in mvpp2, from Baruch Siach.

   2) Revert bogus emac driver change, from Benjamin Herrenschmidt.

   3) Handle BPF exported data structure with pointers when building
      32-bit userland, from Daniel Borkmann.

   4) Memory leak fix in act_police, from Davide Caratti.

   5) Check RX checksum offload in RX descriptors properly in aquantia
      driver, from Dmitry Bogdanov.

   6) SKB unlink fix in various spots, from Edward Cree.

   7) ndo_dflt_fdb_dump() only works with ethernet, enforce this, from
      Eric Dumazet.

   8) Fix FID leak in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel.

   9) IOTLB locking fix in vhost, from Jean-Philippe Brucker.

  10) Fix SKB truesize accounting in ipv4/ipv6/netfilter frag memory
      limits otherwise namespace exit can hang. From Jiri Wiesner.

  11) Address block parsing length fixes in x25 from Martin Schiller.

  12) IRQ and ring accounting fixes in bnxt_en, from Michael Chan.

  13) For tun interfaces, only iface delete works with rtnl ops, enforce
      this by disallowing add. From Nicolas Dichtel.

  14) Use after free in liquidio, from Pan Bian.

  15) Fix SKB use after passing to netif_receive_skb(), from Prashant
      Bhole.

  16) Static key accounting and other fixes in XPS from Sabrina Dubroca.

  17) Partially initialized flow key passed to ip6_route_output(), from
      Shmulik Ladkani.

  18) Fix RTNL deadlock during reset in ibmvnic driver, from Thomas
      Falcon.

  19) Several small TCP fixes (off-by-one on window probe abort, NULL
      deref in tail loss probe, SNMP mis-estimations) from Yuchung
      Cheng"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (93 commits)
  net/sched: cls_flower: Reject duplicated rules also under skip_sw
  bnxt_en: Fix _bnxt_get_max_rings() for 57500 chips.
  bnxt_en: Fix NQ/CP rings accounting on the new 57500 chips.
  bnxt_en: Keep track of reserved IRQs.
  bnxt_en: Fix CNP CoS queue regression.
  net/mlx4_core: Correctly set PFC param if global pause is turned off.
  Revert "net/ibm/emac: wrong bit is used for STA control"
  neighbour: Avoid writing before skb-&gt;head in neigh_hh_output()
  ipv6: Check available headroom in ip6_xmit() even without options
  tcp: lack of available data can also cause TSO defer
  ipv6: sr: properly initialize flowi6 prior passing to ip6_route_output
  mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Fix VLAN device deletion via ioctl
  mlxsw: spectrum_router: Relax GRE decap matching check
  mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Avoid leaking FID's reference count
  mlxsw: spectrum_nve: Remove easily triggerable warnings
  ipv4: ipv6: netfilter: Adjust the frag mem limit when truesize changes
  sctp: frag_point sanity check
  tcp: fix NULL ref in tail loss probe
  tcp: Do not underestimate rwnd_limited
  net: use skb_list_del_init() to remove from RX sublists
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.20-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2018-12-07T21:13:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-07T21:13:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1cdc3624a1df5b10519481763ec7a2b2481495ca'/>
<id>1cdc3624a1df5b10519481763ec7a2b2481495ca</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull gcc stackleak plugin fixes from Kees Cook:

 - Remove tracing for inserted stack depth marking function (Anders
   Roxell)

 - Move gcc-plugin pass location to avoid objtool warnings (Alexander
   Popov)

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.20-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  stackleak: Register the 'stackleak_cleanup' pass before the '*free_cfg' pass
  stackleak: Mark stackleak_track_stack() as notrace
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull gcc stackleak plugin fixes from Kees Cook:

 - Remove tracing for inserted stack depth marking function (Anders
   Roxell)

 - Move gcc-plugin pass location to avoid objtool warnings (Alexander
   Popov)

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.20-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  stackleak: Register the 'stackleak_cleanup' pass before the '*free_cfg' pass
  stackleak: Mark stackleak_track_stack() as notrace
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'trace-v4.20-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace</title>
<updated>2018-12-06T18:35:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-06T18:35:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=abb8d6ecbd8f7801c048f6543f79d22d24cead7b'/>
<id>abb8d6ecbd8f7801c048f6543f79d22d24cead7b</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tracing fix from Steven Rostedt:
 "This is a single commit that fixes a bug in uprobes SDT code due to a
  missing mutex protection"

* tag 'trace-v4.20-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
  Uprobes: Fix kernel oops with delayed_uprobe_remove()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull tracing fix from Steven Rostedt:
 "This is a single commit that fixes a bug in uprobes SDT code due to a
  missing mutex protection"

* tag 'trace-v4.20-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
  Uprobes: Fix kernel oops with delayed_uprobe_remove()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Uprobes: Fix kernel oops with delayed_uprobe_remove()</title>
<updated>2018-12-06T04:05:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ravi Bangoria</name>
<email>ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-05T03:34:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1aed58e67a6ec1e7a18bfabe8ba6ec2d27c15636'/>
<id>1aed58e67a6ec1e7a18bfabe8ba6ec2d27c15636</id>
<content type='text'>
There could be a race between task exit and probe unregister:

  exit_mm()
  mmput()
  __mmput()                     uprobe_unregister()
  uprobe_clear_state()          put_uprobe()
  delayed_uprobe_remove()       delayed_uprobe_remove()

put_uprobe() is calling delayed_uprobe_remove() without taking
delayed_uprobe_lock and thus the race sometimes results in a
kernel crash. Fix this by taking delayed_uprobe_lock before
calling delayed_uprobe_remove() from put_uprobe().

Detailed crash log can be found at:
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000140c370577db5ece@google.com

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181205033423.26242-1-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com

Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju &lt;srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+cb1fb754b771caca0a88@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1cc33161a83d ("uprobes: Support SDT markers having reference count (semaphore)")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There could be a race between task exit and probe unregister:

  exit_mm()
  mmput()
  __mmput()                     uprobe_unregister()
  uprobe_clear_state()          put_uprobe()
  delayed_uprobe_remove()       delayed_uprobe_remove()

put_uprobe() is calling delayed_uprobe_remove() without taking
delayed_uprobe_lock and thus the race sometimes results in a
kernel crash. Fix this by taking delayed_uprobe_lock before
calling delayed_uprobe_remove() from put_uprobe().

Detailed crash log can be found at:
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000140c370577db5ece@google.com

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181205033423.26242-1-ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com

Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju &lt;srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+cb1fb754b771caca0a88@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1cc33161a83d ("uprobes: Support SDT markers having reference count (semaphore)")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>stackleak: Mark stackleak_track_stack() as notrace</title>
<updated>2018-12-06T03:31:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anders Roxell</name>
<email>anders.roxell@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-30T15:08:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e9c7d656610e3fff7c96b199d418add2528aea6e'/>
<id>e9c7d656610e3fff7c96b199d418add2528aea6e</id>
<content type='text'>
Function graph tracing recurses into itself when stackleak is enabled,
causing the ftrace graph selftest to run for up to 90 seconds and
trigger the softlockup watchdog.

Breakpoint 2, ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:200
200             mcount_get_lr_addr        x0    //     pointer to function's saved lr
(gdb) bt
\#0  ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:200
\#1  0xffffff80081d5280 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:153
\#2  0xffffff8008555484 in stackleak_track_stack () at ../kernel/stackleak.c:106
\#3  0xffffff8008421ff8 in ftrace_ops_test (ops=0xffffff8009eaa840 &lt;graph_ops&gt;, ip=18446743524091297036, regs=&lt;optimized out&gt;) at ../kernel/trace/ftrace.c:1507
\#4  0xffffff8008428770 in __ftrace_ops_list_func (regs=&lt;optimized out&gt;, ignored=&lt;optimized out&gt;, parent_ip=&lt;optimized out&gt;, ip=&lt;optimized out&gt;) at ../kernel/trace/ftrace.c:6286
\#5  ftrace_ops_no_ops (ip=18446743524091297036, parent_ip=18446743524091242824) at ../kernel/trace/ftrace.c:6321
\#6  0xffffff80081d5280 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:153
\#7  0xffffff800832fd10 in irq_find_mapping (domain=0xffffffc03fc4bc80, hwirq=27) at ../kernel/irq/irqdomain.c:876
\#8  0xffffff800832294c in __handle_domain_irq (domain=0xffffffc03fc4bc80, hwirq=27, lookup=true, regs=0xffffff800814b840) at ../kernel/irq/irqdesc.c:650
\#9  0xffffff80081d52b4 in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:205

Rework so we mark stackleak_track_stack as notrace

Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell &lt;anders.roxell@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Function graph tracing recurses into itself when stackleak is enabled,
causing the ftrace graph selftest to run for up to 90 seconds and
trigger the softlockup watchdog.

Breakpoint 2, ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:200
200             mcount_get_lr_addr        x0    //     pointer to function's saved lr
(gdb) bt
\#0  ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:200
\#1  0xffffff80081d5280 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:153
\#2  0xffffff8008555484 in stackleak_track_stack () at ../kernel/stackleak.c:106
\#3  0xffffff8008421ff8 in ftrace_ops_test (ops=0xffffff8009eaa840 &lt;graph_ops&gt;, ip=18446743524091297036, regs=&lt;optimized out&gt;) at ../kernel/trace/ftrace.c:1507
\#4  0xffffff8008428770 in __ftrace_ops_list_func (regs=&lt;optimized out&gt;, ignored=&lt;optimized out&gt;, parent_ip=&lt;optimized out&gt;, ip=&lt;optimized out&gt;) at ../kernel/trace/ftrace.c:6286
\#5  ftrace_ops_no_ops (ip=18446743524091297036, parent_ip=18446743524091242824) at ../kernel/trace/ftrace.c:6321
\#6  0xffffff80081d5280 in ftrace_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:153
\#7  0xffffff800832fd10 in irq_find_mapping (domain=0xffffffc03fc4bc80, hwirq=27) at ../kernel/irq/irqdomain.c:876
\#8  0xffffff800832294c in __handle_domain_irq (domain=0xffffffc03fc4bc80, hwirq=27, lookup=true, regs=0xffffff800814b840) at ../kernel/irq/irqdesc.c:650
\#9  0xffffff80081d52b4 in ftrace_graph_caller () at ../arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S:205

Rework so we mark stackleak_track_stack as notrace

Co-developed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell &lt;anders.roxell@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf</title>
<updated>2018-12-06T00:30:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-06T00:30:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e37d05a538a6656e108f7704ad66e1ccc13d6f68'/>
<id>e37d05a538a6656e108f7704ad66e1ccc13d6f68</id>
<content type='text'>
Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2018-12-05

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

The main changes are:

1) fix bpf uapi pointers for 32-bit architectures, from Daniel.

2) improve verifer ability to handle progs with a lot of branches, from Alexei.

3) strict btf checks, from Yonghong.

4) bpf_sk_lookup api cleanup, from Joe.

5) other misc fixes
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2018-12-05

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

The main changes are:

1) fix bpf uapi pointers for 32-bit architectures, from Daniel.

2) improve verifer ability to handle progs with a lot of branches, from Alexei.

3) strict btf checks, from Yonghong.

4) bpf_sk_lookup api cleanup, from Joe.

5) other misc fixes
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: add per-insn complexity limit</title>
<updated>2018-12-04T16:22:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-04T06:46:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ceefbc96fa5c5b975d87bf8e89ba8416f6b764d9'/>
<id>ceefbc96fa5c5b975d87bf8e89ba8416f6b764d9</id>
<content type='text'>
malicious bpf program may try to force the verifier to remember
a lot of distinct verifier states.
Put a limit to number of per-insn 'struct bpf_verifier_state'.
Note that hitting the limit doesn't reject the program.
It potentially makes the verifier do more steps to analyze the program.
It means that malicious programs will hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS sooner
instead of spending cpu time walking long link list.

The limit of BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES==64 affects cilium progs
with slight increase in number of "steps" it takes to successfully verify
the programs:
                       before    after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o         1940      1940
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o         3089      3089
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o       1065      1065
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o     28052  |  28162
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o      35487  |  35541
bpf_netdev.o            10864     10864
bpf_overlay.o           6643      6643
bpf_lcx_jit.o           38437     38437

But it also makes malicious program to be rejected in 0.4 seconds vs 6.5
Hence apply this limit to unprivileged programs only.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
malicious bpf program may try to force the verifier to remember
a lot of distinct verifier states.
Put a limit to number of per-insn 'struct bpf_verifier_state'.
Note that hitting the limit doesn't reject the program.
It potentially makes the verifier do more steps to analyze the program.
It means that malicious programs will hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS sooner
instead of spending cpu time walking long link list.

The limit of BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES==64 affects cilium progs
with slight increase in number of "steps" it takes to successfully verify
the programs:
                       before    after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o         1940      1940
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o         3089      3089
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o       1065      1065
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o     28052  |  28162
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o      35487  |  35541
bpf_netdev.o            10864     10864
bpf_overlay.o           6643      6643
bpf_lcx_jit.o           38437     38437

But it also makes malicious program to be rejected in 0.4 seconds vs 6.5
Hence apply this limit to unprivileged programs only.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: improve verifier branch analysis</title>
<updated>2018-12-04T16:22:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-04T06:46:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4f7b3e82589e0de723780198ec7983e427144c0a'/>
<id>4f7b3e82589e0de723780198ec7983e427144c0a</id>
<content type='text'>
pathological bpf programs may try to force verifier to explode in
the number of branch states:
  20: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0x24000028 goto pc+0
  21: (b5) if r0 &lt;= 0xe1fa20 goto pc+2
  22: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0x7e goto pc+0
  23: (b5) if r0 &lt;= 0xe880e000 goto pc+0
  24: (c5) if r0 s&lt; 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0
  25: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0xe880e000 goto pc+1
  26: (c5) if r0 s&lt; 0xf4041810 goto pc+0
  27: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0x1e007e goto pc+0
  28: (b5) if r0 &lt;= 0xe86be000 goto pc+0
  29: (07) r0 += 16614
  30: (c5) if r0 s&lt; 0x6d0020da goto pc+0
  31: (35) if r0 &gt;= 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0

Teach verifier to recognize always taken and always not taken branches.
This analysis is already done for == and != comparison.
Expand it to all other branches.

It also helps real bpf programs to be verified faster:
                       before  after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o         2003    1940
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o         3173    3089
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o       1080    1065
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o     29584   28052
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o      36916   35487
bpf_netdev.o            11188   10864
bpf_overlay.o           6679    6643
bpf_lcx_jit.o           39555   38437

Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko &lt;anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
pathological bpf programs may try to force verifier to explode in
the number of branch states:
  20: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0x24000028 goto pc+0
  21: (b5) if r0 &lt;= 0xe1fa20 goto pc+2
  22: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0x7e goto pc+0
  23: (b5) if r0 &lt;= 0xe880e000 goto pc+0
  24: (c5) if r0 s&lt; 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0
  25: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0xe880e000 goto pc+1
  26: (c5) if r0 s&lt; 0xf4041810 goto pc+0
  27: (d5) if r1 s&lt;= 0x1e007e goto pc+0
  28: (b5) if r0 &lt;= 0xe86be000 goto pc+0
  29: (07) r0 += 16614
  30: (c5) if r0 s&lt; 0x6d0020da goto pc+0
  31: (35) if r0 &gt;= 0x2100ecf4 goto pc+0

Teach verifier to recognize always taken and always not taken branches.
This analysis is already done for == and != comparison.
Expand it to all other branches.

It also helps real bpf programs to be verified faster:
                       before  after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o         2003    1940
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o         3173    3089
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o       1080    1065
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o     29584   28052
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o      36916   35487
bpf_netdev.o            11188   10864
bpf_overlay.o           6679    6643
bpf_lcx_jit.o           39555   38437

Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko &lt;anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: check pending signals while verifying programs</title>
<updated>2018-12-04T16:22:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-04T06:46:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c3494801cd1785e2c25f1a5735fa19ddcf9665da'/>
<id>c3494801cd1785e2c25f1a5735fa19ddcf9665da</id>
<content type='text'>
Malicious user space may try to force the verifier to use as much cpu
time and memory as possible. Hence check for pending signals
while verifying the program.
Note that suspend of sys_bpf(PROG_LOAD) syscall will lead to EAGAIN,
since the kernel has to release the resources used for program verification.

Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko &lt;anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Malicious user space may try to force the verifier to use as much cpu
time and memory as possible. Hence check for pending signals
while verifying the program.
Note that suspend of sys_bpf(PROG_LOAD) syscall will lead to EAGAIN,
since the kernel has to release the resources used for program verification.

Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko &lt;anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Edward Cree &lt;ecree@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T20:35:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-01T20:35:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4b78317679c4f3782a3cff0ddb269c1fcfde7621'/>
<id>4b78317679c4f3782a3cff0ddb269c1fcfde7621</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull STIBP fallout fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The performance destruction department finally got it's act together
  and came up with a cure for the STIPB regression:

   - Provide a command line option to control the spectre v2 user space
     mitigations. Default is either seccomp or prctl (if seccomp is
     disabled in Kconfig). prctl allows mitigation opt-in, seccomp
     enables the migitation for sandboxed processes.

   - Rework the code to handle the conditional STIBP/IBPB control and
     remove the now unused ptrace_may_access_sched() optimization
     attempt

   - Disable STIBP automatically when SMT is disabled

   - Optimize the switch_to() logic to avoid MSR writes and invocations
     of __switch_to_xtra().

   - Make the asynchronous speculation TIF updates synchronous to
     prevent stale mitigation state.

  As a general cleanup this also makes retpoline directly depend on
  compiler support and removes the 'minimal retpoline' option which just
  pretended to provide some form of security while providing none"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
  x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
  x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
  x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
  x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
  x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
  x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
  ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
  x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
  x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
  x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
  x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
  x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
  x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
  x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
  x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
  x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state
  x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
  sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull STIBP fallout fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The performance destruction department finally got it's act together
  and came up with a cure for the STIPB regression:

   - Provide a command line option to control the spectre v2 user space
     mitigations. Default is either seccomp or prctl (if seccomp is
     disabled in Kconfig). prctl allows mitigation opt-in, seccomp
     enables the migitation for sandboxed processes.

   - Rework the code to handle the conditional STIBP/IBPB control and
     remove the now unused ptrace_may_access_sched() optimization
     attempt

   - Disable STIBP automatically when SMT is disabled

   - Optimize the switch_to() logic to avoid MSR writes and invocations
     of __switch_to_xtra().

   - Make the asynchronous speculation TIF updates synchronous to
     prevent stale mitigation state.

  As a general cleanup this also makes retpoline directly depend on
  compiler support and removes the 'minimal retpoline' option which just
  pretended to provide some form of security while providing none"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
  x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
  x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
  x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
  x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
  x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
  x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
  ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
  x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
  x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
  x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
  x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
  x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
  x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
  x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
  x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
  x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state
  x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
  sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
