linux-toradex.git/kernel, branch v4.4.16

tracing: Handle NULL formats in hold_module_trace_bprintk_format()

2016-07-27T16:47:32+00:00

commit 70c8217acd4383e069fe1898bbad36ea4fcdbdcc upstream.

If a task uses a non constant string for the format parameter in
trace_printk(), then the trace_printk_fmt variable is set to NULL. This
variable is then saved in the __trace_printk_fmt section.

The function hold_module_trace_bprintk_format() checks to see if duplicate
formats are used by modules, and reuses them if so (saves them to the list
if it is new). But this function calls lookup_format() that does a strcmp()
to the value (which is now NULL) and can cause a kernel oops.

This wasn't an issue till 3debb0a9ddb ("tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print
when not using bprintk()") which added "__used" to the trace_printk_fmt
variable, and before that, the kernel simply optimized it out (no NULL value
was saved).

The fix is simply to handle the NULL pointer in lookup_format() and have the
caller ignore the value if it was NULL.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464769870-18344-1-git-send-email-zhengjun.xing@intel.com

Reported-by: xingzhen 
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim 
Fixes: 3debb0a9ddb ("tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print when not using bprintk()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/fair: Fix cfs_rq avg tracking underflow

2016-07-27T16:47:31+00:00

commit 8974189222159154c55f24ddad33e3613960521a upstream.

As per commit:

  b7fa30c9cc48 ("sched/fair: Fix post_init_entity_util_avg() serialization")

> the code generated from update_cfs_rq_load_avg():
>
> 	if (atomic_long_read(&cfs_rq->removed_load_avg)) {
> 		s64 r = atomic_long_xchg(&cfs_rq->removed_load_avg, 0);
> 		sa->load_avg = max_t(long, sa->load_avg - r, 0);
> 		sa->load_sum = max_t(s64, sa->load_sum - r * LOAD_AVG_MAX, 0);
> 		removed_load = 1;
> 	}
>
> turns into:
>
> ffffffff81087064:       49 8b 85 98 00 00 00    mov    0x98(%r13),%rax
> ffffffff8108706b:       48 85 c0                test   %rax,%rax
> ffffffff8108706e:       74 40                   je     ffffffff810870b0 
> ffffffff81087070:       4c 89 f8                mov    %r15,%rax
> ffffffff81087073:       49 87 85 98 00 00 00    xchg   %rax,0x98(%r13)
> ffffffff8108707a:       49 29 45 70             sub    %rax,0x70(%r13)
> ffffffff8108707e:       4c 89 f9                mov    %r15,%rcx
> ffffffff81087081:       bb 01 00 00 00          mov    $0x1,%ebx
> ffffffff81087086:       49 83 7d 70 00          cmpq   $0x0,0x70(%r13)
> ffffffff8108708b:       49 0f 49 4d 70          cmovns 0x70(%r13),%rcx
>
> Which you'll note ends up with sa->load_avg -= r in memory at
> ffffffff8108707a.

So I _should_ have looked at other unserialized users of ->load_avg,
but alas. Luckily nikbor reported a similar /0 from task_h_load() which
instantly triggered recollection of this here problem.

Aside from the intermediate value hitting memory and causing problems,
there's another problem: the underflow detection relies on the signed
bit. This reduces the effective width of the variables, IOW its
effectively the same as having these variables be of signed type.

This patch changes to a different means of unsigned underflow
detection to not rely on the signed bit. This allows the variables to
use the 'full' unsigned range. And it does so with explicit LOAD -
STORE to ensure any intermediate value will never be visible in
memory, allowing these unserialized loads.

Note: GCC generates crap code for this, might warrant a look later.

Note2: I say 'full' above, if we end up at U*_MAX we'll still explode;
       maybe we should do clamping on add too.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Chris Wilson 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Yuyang Du 
Cc: bsegall@google.com
Cc: kernel@kyup.com
Cc: morten.rasmussen@arm.com
Cc: pjt@google.com
Cc: steve.muckle@linaro.org
Fixes: 9d89c257dfb9 ("sched/fair: Rewrite runnable load and utilization average tracking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160617091948.GJ30927@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

locking/static_key: Fix concurrent static_key_slow_inc()

2016-07-27T16:47:29+00:00

commit 4c5ea0a9cd02d6aa8adc86e100b2a4cff8d614ff upstream.

The following scenario is possible:

    CPU 1                                   CPU 2
    static_key_slow_inc()
     atomic_inc_not_zero()
      -> key.enabled == 0, no increment
     jump_label_lock()
     atomic_inc_return()
      -> key.enabled == 1 now
                                            static_key_slow_inc()
                                             atomic_inc_not_zero()
                                              -> key.enabled == 1, inc to 2
                                             return
                                            ** static key is wrong!
     jump_label_update()
     jump_label_unlock()

Testing the static key at the point marked by (**) will follow the
wrong path for jumps that have not been patched yet.  This can
actually happen when creating many KVM virtual machines with userspace
LAPIC emulation; just run several copies of the following program:

    #include 
    #include 
    #include 
    #include 

    int main(void)
    {
        for (;;) {
            int kvmfd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDONLY);
            int vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0);
            close(ioctl(vmfd, KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 1));
            close(vmfd);
            close(kvmfd);
        }
        return 0;
    }

Every KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl will attempt a static_key_slow_inc() call.
The static key's purpose is to skip NULL pointer checks and indeed one
of the processes eventually dereferences NULL.

As explained in the commit that introduced the bug:

  706249c222f6 ("locking/static_keys: Rework update logic")

jump_label_update() needs key.enabled to be true.  The solution adopted
here is to temporarily make key.enabled == -1, and use go down the
slow path when key.enabled <= 0.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Fixes: 706249c222f6 ("locking/static_keys: Rework update logic")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466527937-69798-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com
[ Small stylistic edits to the changelog and the code. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

locking/qspinlock: Fix spin_unlock_wait() some more

2016-07-27T16:47:29+00:00

commit 2c610022711675ee908b903d242f0b90e1db661f upstream.

While this prior commit:

  54cf809b9512 ("locking,qspinlock: Fix spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait()")

... fixes spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait() for the usage
in ipc/sem and netfilter, it does not in fact work right for the
usage in task_work and futex.

So while the 2 locks crossed problem:

	spin_lock(A)		spin_lock(B)
	if (!spin_is_locked(B)) spin_unlock_wait(A)
	  foo()			foo();

... works with the smp_mb() injected by both spin_is_locked() and
spin_unlock_wait(), this is not sufficient for:

	flag = 1;
	smp_mb();		spin_lock()
	spin_unlock_wait()	if (!flag)
				  // add to lockless list
	// iterate lockless list

... because in this scenario, the store from spin_lock() can be delayed
past the load of flag, uncrossing the variables and loosing the
guarantee.

This patch reworks spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait() to work in
both cases by exploiting the observation that while the lock byte
store can be delayed, the contender must have registered itself
visibly in other state contained in the word.

It also allows for architectures to override both functions, as PPC
and ARM64 have an additional issue for which we currently have no
generic solution.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Boqun Feng 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Giovanni Gherdovich 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Pan Xinhui 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Waiman Long 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Fixes: 54cf809b9512 ("locking,qspinlock: Fix spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait()")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

locking/ww_mutex: Report recursive ww_mutex locking early

2016-07-27T16:47:29+00:00

commit 0422e83d84ae24b933e4b0d4c1e0f0b4ae8a0a3b upstream.

Recursive locking for ww_mutexes was originally conceived as an
exception. However, it is heavily used by the DRM atomic modesetting
code. Currently, the recursive deadlock is checked after we have queued
up for a busy-spin and as we never release the lock, we spin until
kicked, whereupon the deadlock is discovered and reported.

A simple solution for the now common problem is to move the recursive
deadlock discovery to the first action when taking the ww_mutex.

Suggested-by: Maarten Lankhorst 
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464293297-19777-1-git-send-email-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf, perf: delay release of BPF prog after grace period

2016-07-11T16:31:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit ceb56070359b7329b5678b5d95a376fcb24767be ]

Commit dead9f29ddcc ("perf: Fix race in BPF program unregister") moved
destruction of BPF program from free_event_rcu() callback to __free_event(),
which is problematic if used with tail calls: if prog A is attached as
trace event directly, but at the same time present in a tail call map used
by another trace event program elsewhere, then we need to delay destruction
via RCU grace period since it can still be in use by the program doing the
tail call (the prog first needs to be dropped from the tail call map, then
trace event with prog A attached destroyed, so we get immediate destruction).

Fixes: dead9f29ddcc ("perf: Fix race in BPF program unregister")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched: panic on corrupted stack end

2016-06-24T17:18:20+00:00

commit 29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df upstream.

Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g.  via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).

Just panic directly.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf, inode: disallow userns mounts

2016-06-24T17:18:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit 612bacad78ba6d0a91166fc4487af114bac172a8 ]

Follow-up to commit e27f4a942a0e ("bpf: Use mount_nodev not mount_ns
to mount the bpf filesystem"), which removes the FS_USERNS_MOUNT flag.

The original idea was to have a per mountns instance instead of a
single global fs instance, but that didn't work out and we had to
switch to mount_nodev() model. The intent of that middle ground was
that we avoid users who don't play nice to create endless instances
of bpf fs which are difficult to control and discover from an admin
point of view, but at the same time it would have allowed us to be
more flexible with regard to namespaces.

Therefore, since we now did the switch to mount_nodev() as a fix
where individual instances are created, we also need to remove userns
mount flag along with it to avoid running into mentioned situation.
I don't expect any breakage at this early point in time with removing
the flag and we can revisit this later should the requirement for
this come up with future users. This and commit e27f4a942a0e have
been split to facilitate tracking should any of them run into the
unlikely case of causing a regression.

Fixes: b2197755b263 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Use mount_nodev not mount_ns to mount the bpf filesystem

2016-06-24T17:18:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit e27f4a942a0ee4b84567a3c6cfa84f273e55cbb7 ]

While reviewing the filesystems that set FS_USERNS_MOUNT I spotted the
bpf filesystem.  Looking at the code I saw a broken usage of mount_ns
with current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. As the code does not acquire a
reference to the mount namespace it can not possibly be correct to
store the mount namespace on the superblock as it does.

Replace mount_ns with mount_nodev so that each mount of the bpf
filesystem returns a distinct instance, and the code is not buggy.

In discussion with Hannes Frederic Sowa it was reported that the use
of mount_ns was an attempt to have one bpf instance per mount
namespace, in an attempt to keep resources that pin resources from
hiding.  That intent simply does not work, the vfs is not built to
allow that kind of behavior.  Which means that the bpf filesystem
really is buggy both semantically and in it's implemenation as it does
not nor can it implement the original intent.

This change is userspace visible, but my experience with similar
filesystems leads me to believe nothing will break with a model of each
mount of the bpf filesystem is distinct from all others.

Fixes: b2197755b263 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes

2016-06-08T01:14:35+00:00

commit 759c01142a5d0f364a462346168a56de28a80f52 upstream.

On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.

This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.

The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).

Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman