linux-toradex.git/lib/random32.c, branch v4.13-rc5

Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

2016-10-15T17:03:15+00:00

Pull gcc plugins update from Kees Cook:
 "This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
  extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot
  time as possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in
  CPU operation (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences,
  SMP ordering, thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).

  At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example
  for how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  latent_entropy: Mark functions with __latent_entropy
  gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin

latent_entropy: Mark functions with __latent_entropy

2016-10-10T21:51:45+00:00

The __latent_entropy gcc attribute can be used only on functions and
variables.  If it is on a function then the plugin will instrument it for
gathering control-flow entropy. If the attribute is on a variable then
the plugin will initialize it with random contents.  The variable must
be an integer, an integer array type or a structure with integer fields.

These specific functions have been selected because they are init
functions (to help gather boot-time entropy), are called at unpredictable
times, or they have variable loops, each of which provide some level of
latent entropy.

Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy 
[kees: expanded commit message]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

lib: clean up put_cpu_var usage

2016-09-28T02:09:17+00:00

put_cpu_var takes the percpu data, not the data returned from
get_cpu_var.

This doesn't change the behavior.

Cc: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li 
Acked-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

timers: Remove set_timer_slack() leftovers

2016-07-07T08:35:09+00:00

We now have implicit batching in the timer wheel. The slack API is no longer
used, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Alan Stern 
Cc: Andrew F. Davis 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Cc: Chris Mason 
Cc: David S. Miller 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov 
Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: George Spelvin 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Jaehoon Chung 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: John Stultz 
Cc: Josh Triplett 
Cc: Len Brown 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mathias Nyman 
Cc: Pali Rohár 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Sebastian Reichel 
Cc: Ulf Hansson 
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rt@linutronix.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160704094342.189813118@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

netfilter: meta: add PRANDOM support

2016-02-29T12:55:59+00:00

Can be used to randomly match packets e.g. for statistic traffic sampling.

See commit 3ad0040573b0c00f8848
("bpf: split state from prandom_u32() and consolidate {c, e}BPF prngs")
for more info why this doesn't use prandom_u32 directly.

Unlike bpf nft_meta can be built as a module, so add an EXPORT_SYMBOL
for prandom_seed_full_state too.

Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso

random32: add prandom_init_once helper for own rngs

2015-10-08T12:26:38+00:00

Add a prandom_init_once() facility that works on the rnd_state, so that
users that are keeping their own state independent from prandom_u32() can
initialize their taus113 per cpu states.

The motivation here is similar to net_get_random_once(): initialize the
state as late as possible in the hope that enough entropy has been
collected for the seeding. prandom_init_once() makes use of the recently
introduced prandom_seed_full_state() helper and is generic enough so that
it could also be used on fast-paths due to the DO_ONCE().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

random32: add prandom_seed_full_state helper

2015-10-08T12:26:37+00:00

Factor out the full reseed handling code that populates the state
through get_random_bytes() and runs prandom_warmup(). The resulting
prandom_seed_full_state() will be used later on in more than the
current __prandom_reseed() user. Fix also two minor whitespace
issues along the way.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

random32: improvements to prandom_bytes

2014-08-25T01:36:01+00:00

This patch addresses a couple of minor items, mostly addesssing
prandom_bytes(): 1) prandom_bytes{,_state}() should use size_t
for length arguments, 2) We can use put_unaligned() when filling
the array instead of open coding it [ perhaps some archs will
further benefit from their own arch specific implementation when
GCC cannot make up for it ], 3) Fix a typo, 4) Better use unsigned
int as type for getting the arch seed, 5) Make use of
prandom_u32_max() for timer slack.

Regarding the change to put_unaligned(), callers of prandom_bytes()
which internally invoke prandom_bytes_state(), don't bother as
they expect the array to be filled randomly and don't have any
control of the internal state what-so-ever (that's also why we
have periodic reseeding there, etc), so they really don't care.

Now for the direct callers of prandom_bytes_state(), which
are solely located in test cases for MTD devices, that is,
drivers/mtd/tests/{oobtest.c,pagetest.c,subpagetest.c}:

These tests basically fill a test write-vector through
prandom_bytes_state() with an a-priori defined seed each time
and write that to a MTD device. Later on, they set up a read-vector
and read back that blocks from the device. So in the verification
phase, the write-vector is being re-setup [ so same seed and
prandom_bytes_state() called ], and then memcmp()'ed against the
read-vector to check if the data is the same.

Akinobu, Lothar and I also tested this patch and it runs through
the 3 relevant MTD test cases w/o any errors on the nandsim device
(simulator for MTD devs) for x86_64, ppc64, ARM (i.MX28, i.MX53
and i.MX6):

  # modprobe nandsim first_id_byte=0x20 second_id_byte=0xac \
                     third_id_byte=0x00 fourth_id_byte=0x15
  # modprobe mtd_oobtest dev=0
  # modprobe mtd_pagetest dev=0
  # modprobe mtd_subpagetest dev=0

We also don't have any users depending directly on a particular
result of the PRNG (except the PRNG self-test itself), and that's
just fine as it e.g. allowed us easily to do things like upgrading
from taus88 to taus113.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Tested-by: Akinobu Mita 
Tested-by: Lothar Waßmann 
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

random32: mix in entropy from core to late initcall

2014-07-30T20:55:27+00:00

Currently, we have a 3-stage seeding process in prandom():

Phase 1 is from the early actual initialization of prandom()
subsystem which happens during core_initcall() and remains
most likely until the beginning of late_initcall() phase.
Here, the system might not have enough entropy available
for seeding with strong randomness from the random driver.
That means, we currently have a 32bit weak LCG() seeding
the PRNG status register 1 and mixing that successively
into the other 3 registers just to get it up and running.

Phase 2 starts with late_initcall() phase resp. when the
random driver has initialized its non-blocking pool with
enough entropy. At that time, we throw away *all* inner
state from its 4 registers and do a full reseed with strong
randomness.

Phase 3 starts right after that and does a periodic reseed
with random slack of status register 1 by a strong random
source again.

A problem in phase 1 is that during bootup data structures
can be initialized, e.g. on module load time, and thus access
a weakly seeded prandom and are never changed for the rest
of their live-time, thus carrying along the results from a
week seed. Lets make sure that current but also future users
access a possibly better early seeded prandom.

This patch therefore improves phase 1 by trying to make it
more 'unpredictable' through mixing in seed from a possible
hardware source. Now, the mix-in xors inner state with the
outcome of either of the two functions arch_get_random_{,seed}_int(),
preferably arch_get_random_seed_int() as it likely represents
a non-deterministic random bit generator in hw rather than
a cryptographically secure PRNG in hw. However, not all might
have the first one, so we use the PRNG as a fallback if
available. As we xor the seed into the current state, the
worst case would be that a hardware source could be unverifiable
compromised or backdoored. In that case nevertheless it
would be as good as our original early seeding function
prandom_seed_very_weak() since we mix through xor which is
entropy preserving.

Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

lib/random32.c: minor cleanups and kdoc fix

2014-04-03T23:21:11+00:00

These are just some very minor and misc cleanups in the PRNG.  In
prandom_u32() we store the result in an unsigned long which is
unnecessary as it should be u32 instead that we get from
prandom_u32_state().  prandom_bytes_state()'s comment is in kdoc format,
so change it into such as it's done everywhere else.  Also, use the
normal comment style for the header comment.  Last but not least for
readability, add some newlines.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Cc: Joe Perches 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds