<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/lib/usercopy.c, branch v7.0-rc5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: decouple INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER and CONFIG_RUST</title>
<updated>2025-11-12T18:00:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yury Norov (NVIDIA)</name>
<email>yury.norov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-23T17:16:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d99dc586ca7c7729450af2ed39ca1483c0eb7b5c'/>
<id>d99dc586ca7c7729450af2ed39ca1483c0eb7b5c</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 1f9a8286bc0c ("uaccess: always export _copy_[from|to]_user with
CONFIG_RUST") exports _copy_{from,to}_user() unconditionally, if RUST is
enabled.  This pollutes exported symbols namespace, and spreads RUST
ifdefery in core files.

It's better to declare a corresponding helper under the rust/helpers,
similarly to how non-underscored copy_{from,to}_user() is handled.

[yury.norov@gmail.com: drop rust part of comment for _copy_from_user(), per Alice]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251024154754.99768-1-yury.norov@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251023171607.1171534-1-yury.norov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov (NVIDIA) &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Gaynor &lt;alex.gaynor@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andreas Hindborg &lt;a.hindborg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Björn Roy Baron &lt;bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com&gt;
Cc: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Danilo Krummrich &lt;dakr@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Gary Guo &lt;gary@garyguo.net&gt;
Cc: John Hubbard &lt;jhubbard@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Trevor Gross &lt;tmgross@umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 1f9a8286bc0c ("uaccess: always export _copy_[from|to]_user with
CONFIG_RUST") exports _copy_{from,to}_user() unconditionally, if RUST is
enabled.  This pollutes exported symbols namespace, and spreads RUST
ifdefery in core files.

It's better to declare a corresponding helper under the rust/helpers,
similarly to how non-underscored copy_{from,to}_user() is handled.

[yury.norov@gmail.com: drop rust part of comment for _copy_from_user(), per Alice]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251024154754.99768-1-yury.norov@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251023171607.1171534-1-yury.norov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov (NVIDIA) &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Gaynor &lt;alex.gaynor@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andreas Hindborg &lt;a.hindborg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Björn Roy Baron &lt;bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com&gt;
Cc: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Danilo Krummrich &lt;dakr@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Gary Guo &lt;gary@garyguo.net&gt;
Cc: John Hubbard &lt;jhubbard@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Trevor Gross &lt;tmgross@umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: always export _copy_[from|to]_user with CONFIG_RUST</title>
<updated>2024-07-08T21:44:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-28T14:58:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1f9a8286bc0c3df7d789ea625d9d9db3d7779f2d'/>
<id>1f9a8286bc0c3df7d789ea625d9d9db3d7779f2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Rust code needs to be able to access _copy_from_user and _copy_to_user
so that it can skip the check_copy_size check in cases where the length
is known at compile-time, mirroring the logic for when C code will skip
check_copy_size. To do this, we ensure that exported versions of these
methods are available when CONFIG_RUST is enabled.

Alice has verified that this patch passes the CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY test
on x86 using the Android cuttlefish emulator.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Tested-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240528-alice-mm-v7-2-78222c31b8f4@google.com
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rust code needs to be able to access _copy_from_user and _copy_to_user
so that it can skip the check_copy_size check in cases where the length
is known at compile-time, mirroring the logic for when C code will skip
check_copy_size. To do this, we ensure that exported versions of these
methods are available when CONFIG_RUST is enabled.

Alice has verified that this patch passes the CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY test
on x86 using the Android cuttlefish emulator.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Tested-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl &lt;aliceryhl@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240528-alice-mm-v7-2-78222c31b8f4@google.com
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usercopy: Don't use "proxy" headers</title>
<updated>2024-05-19T23:12:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Shevchenko</name>
<email>andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-07T20:01:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5671dca241b9a2f4ecf88d8e992041cfb580e0a5'/>
<id>5671dca241b9a2f4ecf88d8e992041cfb580e0a5</id>
<content type='text'>
Update header inclusions to follow IWYU (Include What You Use)
principle.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Update header inclusions to follow IWYU (Include What You Use)
principle.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bitops: Move aligned_byte_mask() to wordpart.h</title>
<updated>2024-05-19T23:12:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Shevchenko</name>
<email>andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-07T20:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f2c2d6ba13da08643c65b948ce5e3d616864c47'/>
<id>9f2c2d6ba13da08643c65b948ce5e3d616864c47</id>
<content type='text'>
The bitops.h is for bit related operations. The aligned_byte_mask()
is about byte (or part of the machine word) operations, for which
we have a separate header, move the mentioned macro to wordpart.h
to consolidate similar operations.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The bitops.h is for bit related operations. The aligned_byte_mask()
is about byte (or part of the machine word) operations, for which
we have a separate header, move the mentioned macro to wordpart.h
to consolidate similar operations.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov &lt;yury.norov@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()</title>
<updated>2023-02-21T22:45:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-21T20:30:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47'/>
<id>74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47</id>
<content type='text'>
The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated.  The result is that
you can end speculatively:

	if (access_ok(from, size))
		// Right here

even for bad from/size combinations.  On first glance, it would be ideal
to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results
can never be mis-speculated.

But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via
"copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends).  Those are
generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from
userspace other than the pointer.  They are also very quick and common
system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.

"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and
is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches.  Take
something like this:

	if (!copy_from_user(&amp;kernelvar, uptr, size))
		do_something_with(kernelvar);

If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel
addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other)
side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.

Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent
mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.

Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec().
This makes the macro usable in generic code.

Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the
BPF code can also go away.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer &lt;jordyzomer@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;   # BPF bits
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated.  The result is that
you can end speculatively:

	if (access_ok(from, size))
		// Right here

even for bad from/size combinations.  On first glance, it would be ideal
to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results
can never be mis-speculated.

But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via
"copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends).  Those are
generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from
userspace other than the pointer.  They are also very quick and common
system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.

"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and
is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches.  Take
something like this:

	if (!copy_from_user(&amp;kernelvar, uptr, size))
		do_something_with(kernelvar);

If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel
addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other)
side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.

Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent
mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.

Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec().
This makes the macro usable in generic code.

Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the
BPF code can also go away.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer &lt;jordyzomer@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;   # BPF bits
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>instrumented.h: allow instrumenting both sides of copy_from_user()</title>
<updated>2022-10-03T21:03:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-15T15:03:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=33b75c1d884e81ec97525e0a6fdcb187adf273f4'/>
<id>33b75c1d884e81ec97525e0a6fdcb187adf273f4</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce instrument_copy_from_user_before() and
instrument_copy_from_user_after() hooks to be invoked before and after the
call to copy_from_user().

KASAN and KCSAN will be only using instrument_copy_from_user_before(), but
for KMSAN we'll need to insert code after copy_from_user().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-4-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce instrument_copy_from_user_before() and
instrument_copy_from_user_after() hooks to be invoked before and after the
call to copy_from_user().

KASAN and KCSAN will be only using instrument_copy_from_user_before(), but
for KMSAN we'll need to insert code after copy_from_user().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-4-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib, uaccess: add failure injection to usercopy functions</title>
<updated>2020-10-16T18:11:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Albert van der Linde</name>
<email>alinde@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-16T03:13:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4d0e9df5e43dba52d38b251e3b909df8fa1110be'/>
<id>4d0e9df5e43dba52d38b251e3b909df8fa1110be</id>
<content type='text'>
To test fault-tolerance of user memory access functions, introduce fault
injection to usercopy functions.

If a failure is expected return either -EFAULT or the total amount of
bytes that were not copied.

Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde &lt;alinde@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita &lt;akinobu.mita@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-3-alinde@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
To test fault-tolerance of user memory access functions, introduce fault
injection to usercopy functions.

If a failure is expected return either -EFAULT or the total amount of
bytes that were not copied.

Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde &lt;alinde@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita &lt;akinobu.mita@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-3-alinde@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Rebase locking/kcsan to locking/urgent</title>
<updated>2020-06-11T18:02:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-11T18:02:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=37d1a04b13a6d2fec91a6813fc034947a27db034'/>
<id>37d1a04b13a6d2fec91a6813fc034947a27db034</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge the state of the locking kcsan branch before the read/write_once()
and the atomics modifications got merged.

Squash the fallout of the rebase on top of the read/write once and atomic
fallback work into the merge. The history of the original branch is
preserved in tag locking-kcsan-2020-06-02.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Merge the state of the locking kcsan branch before the read/write_once()
and the atomics modifications got merged.

Squash the fallout of the rebase on top of the read/write once and atomic
fallback work into the merge. The history of the original branch is
preserved in tag locking-kcsan-2020-06-02.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: Selectively open read or write user access</title>
<updated>2020-05-01T02:35:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@c-s.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-03T07:20:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=41cd780524674082b037e7c8461f90c5e42103f0'/>
<id>41cd780524674082b037e7c8461f90c5e42103f0</id>
<content type='text'>
When opening user access to only perform reads, only open read access.
When opening user access to only perform writes, only open write
access.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2e73bc57125c2c6ab12a587586a4eed3a47105fc.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When opening user access to only perform reads, only open read access.
When opening user access to only perform writes, only open write
access.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@c-s.fr&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2e73bc57125c2c6ab12a587586a4eed3a47105fc.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>copy_to_user, copy_from_user: Use generic instrumented.h</title>
<updated>2020-03-21T08:41:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marco Elver</name>
<email>elver@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-21T16:05:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=76d6f06c36a3b5cc402eeeb709613cb211fdaa8f'/>
<id>76d6f06c36a3b5cc402eeeb709613cb211fdaa8f</id>
<content type='text'>
This replaces the KASAN instrumentation with generic instrumentation,
implicitly adding KCSAN instrumentation support.

For KASAN no functional change is intended.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This replaces the KASAN instrumentation with generic instrumentation,
implicitly adding KCSAN instrumentation support.

For KASAN no functional change is intended.

Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
