<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/lib, branch v3.14.23</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>lzo: check for length overrun in variable length encoding.</title>
<updated>2014-10-30T16:38:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-27T10:31:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7f5f71a9265d9829577393d9005b165f28b1cd77'/>
<id>7f5f71a9265d9829577393d9005b165f28b1cd77</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 72cf90124e87d975d0b2114d930808c58b4c05e4 upstream.

This fix ensures that we never meet an integer overflow while adding
255 while parsing a variable length encoding. It works differently from
commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns") because instead of
ensuring that we don't overrun the input, which is tricky to guarantee
due to many assumptions in the code, it simply checks that the cumulated
number of 255 read cannot overflow by bounding this number.

The MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base
count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when
multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier
depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8
and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than
or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting
two less 255 steps.

This patch also reduces the CPU overhead and actually increases performance
by 1.1% compared to the initial code, while the previous fix costs 3.1%
(measured on x86_64).

The fix needs to be backported to all currently supported stable kernels.

Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers &lt;willem@lekkertech.net&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 72cf90124e87d975d0b2114d930808c58b4c05e4 upstream.

This fix ensures that we never meet an integer overflow while adding
255 while parsing a variable length encoding. It works differently from
commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns") because instead of
ensuring that we don't overrun the input, which is tricky to guarantee
due to many assumptions in the code, it simply checks that the cumulated
number of 255 read cannot overflow by bounding this number.

The MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base
count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when
multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier
depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8
and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than
or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting
two less 255 steps.

This patch also reduces the CPU overhead and actually increases performance
by 1.1% compared to the initial code, while the previous fix costs 3.1%
(measured on x86_64).

The fix needs to be backported to all currently supported stable kernels.

Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers &lt;willem@lekkertech.net&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "lzo: properly check for overruns"</title>
<updated>2014-10-30T16:38:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-27T10:31:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=be73cb4d097fd2bb49a5277f80da44a72466a161'/>
<id>be73cb4d097fd2bb49a5277f80da44a72466a161</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af958a38a60c7ca3d8a39c918c1baa2ff7b6b233 upstream.

This reverts commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns").

As analysed by Willem Pinckaers, this fix is still incomplete on
certain rare corner cases, and it is easier to restart from the
original code.

Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers &lt;willem@lekkertech.net&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit af958a38a60c7ca3d8a39c918c1baa2ff7b6b233 upstream.

This reverts commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns").

As analysed by Willem Pinckaers, this fix is still incomplete on
certain rare corner cases, and it is easier to restart from the
original code.

Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers &lt;willem@lekkertech.net&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/plist: add plist_requeue</title>
<updated>2014-10-09T19:21:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Streetman</name>
<email>ddstreet@ieee.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-04T23:09:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ae604916e258d7197cf4ca0249298897f29f0d20'/>
<id>ae604916e258d7197cf4ca0249298897f29f0d20</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a75f232ce0fe38bd01301899ecd97ffd0254316a upstream.

Add plist_requeue(), which moves the specified plist_node after all other
same-priority plist_nodes in the list.  This is essentially an optimized
plist_del() followed by plist_add().

This is needed by swap, which (with the next patch in this set) uses a
plist of available swap devices.  When a swap device (either a swap
partition or swap file) are added to the system with swapon(), the device
is added to a plist, ordered by the swap device's priority.  When swap
needs to allocate a page from one of the swap devices, it takes the page
from the first swap device on the plist, which is the highest priority
swap device.  The swap device is left in the plist until all its pages are
used, and then removed from the plist when it becomes full.

However, as described in man 2 swapon, swap must allocate pages from swap
devices with the same priority in round-robin order; to do this, on each
swap page allocation, swap uses a page from the first swap device in the
plist, and then calls plist_requeue() to move that swap device entry to
after any other same-priority swap devices.  The next swap page allocation
will again use a page from the first swap device in the plist and requeue
it, and so on, resulting in round-robin usage of equal-priority swap
devices.

Also add plist_test_requeue() test function, for use by plist_test() to
test plist_requeue() function.

Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fusionio.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Christian Ehrhardt &lt;ehrhardt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Weijie Yang &lt;weijieut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Bob Liu &lt;bob.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a75f232ce0fe38bd01301899ecd97ffd0254316a upstream.

Add plist_requeue(), which moves the specified plist_node after all other
same-priority plist_nodes in the list.  This is essentially an optimized
plist_del() followed by plist_add().

This is needed by swap, which (with the next patch in this set) uses a
plist of available swap devices.  When a swap device (either a swap
partition or swap file) are added to the system with swapon(), the device
is added to a plist, ordered by the swap device's priority.  When swap
needs to allocate a page from one of the swap devices, it takes the page
from the first swap device on the plist, which is the highest priority
swap device.  The swap device is left in the plist until all its pages are
used, and then removed from the plist when it becomes full.

However, as described in man 2 swapon, swap must allocate pages from swap
devices with the same priority in round-robin order; to do this, on each
swap page allocation, swap uses a page from the first swap device in the
plist, and then calls plist_requeue() to move that swap device entry to
after any other same-priority swap devices.  The next swap page allocation
will again use a page from the first swap device in the plist and requeue
it, and so on, resulting in round-robin usage of equal-priority swap
devices.

Also add plist_test_requeue() test function, for use by plist_test() to
test plist_requeue() function.

Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Shaohua Li &lt;shli@fusionio.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Christian Ehrhardt &lt;ehrhardt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Weijie Yang &lt;weijieut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Bob Liu &lt;bob.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix termination condition in assoc array garbage collection</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-10T21:22:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1143261f66aec99fdfbc98903b55d51bb55572a1'/>
<id>1143261f66aec99fdfbc98903b55d51bb55572a1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95389b08d93d5c06ec63ab49bd732b0069b7c35e upstream.

This fixes CVE-2014-3631.

It is possible for an associative array to end up with a shortcut node at the
root of the tree if there are more than fan-out leaves in the tree, but they
all crowd into the same slot in the lowest level (ie. they all have the same
first nibble of their index keys).

When assoc_array_gc() returns back up the tree after scanning some leaves, it
can fall off of the root and crash because it assumes that the back pointer
from a shortcut (after label ascend_old_tree) must point to a normal node -
which isn't true of a shortcut node at the root.

Should we find we're ascending rootwards over a shortcut, we should check to
see if the backpointer is zero - and if it is, we have completed the scan.

This particular bug cannot occur if the root node is not a shortcut - ie. if
you have fewer than 17 keys in a keyring or if you have at least two keys that
sit into separate slots (eg. a keyring and a non keyring).

This can be reproduced by:

	ring=`keyctl newring bar @s`
	for ((i=1; i&lt;=18; i++)); do last_key=`keyctl newring foo$i $ring`; done
	keyctl timeout $last_key 2

Doing this:

	echo 3 &gt;/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay

first will speed things up.

If we do fall off of the top of the tree, we get the following oops:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
PGD dae15067 PUD cfc24067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_mark nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_ni
CPU: 0 PID: 26011 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.14.9-200.fc20.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
task: ffff8800918bd580 ti: ffff8800aac14000 task.ti: ffff8800aac14000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] [&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP: 0018:ffff8800aac15d40  EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8800aaecacc0
RDX: ffff8800daecf440 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800aadc2bc0
RBP: ffff8800aac15da8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffffffff8136ccc7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000070 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000000db10d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
 ffff8800aac15d50 0000000000000011 ffff8800aac15db8 ffffffff812e2a70
 ffff880091a00600 0000000000000000 ffff8800aadc2bc3 00000000cd42c987
 ffff88003702df20 ffff88003702dfa0 0000000053b65c09 ffff8800aac15fd8
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff812e2a70&gt;] ? keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0x30/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff812e3e75&gt;] keyring_gc+0x75/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffff812e1424&gt;] key_garbage_collector+0x154/0x3c0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a67b6&gt;] process_one_work+0x176/0x430
 [&lt;ffffffff810a744b&gt;] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a7330&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
 [&lt;ffffffff810ae1a8&gt;] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff810ae0d0&gt;] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff816ffb7c&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
 [&lt;ffffffff810ae0d0&gt;] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
Code: 08 4c 8b 22 0f 84 bf 00 00 00 41 83 c7 01 49 83 e4 fc 41 83 ff 0f 4c 89 65 c0 0f 8f 5a fe ff ff 48 8b 45 c0 4d 63 cf 49 83 c1 02 &lt;4e&gt; 8b 34 c8 4d 85 f6 0f 84 be 00 00 00 41 f6 c6 01 0f 84 92
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
 RSP &lt;ffff8800aac15d40&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000018
---[ end trace 1129028a088c0cbd ]---

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 95389b08d93d5c06ec63ab49bd732b0069b7c35e upstream.

This fixes CVE-2014-3631.

It is possible for an associative array to end up with a shortcut node at the
root of the tree if there are more than fan-out leaves in the tree, but they
all crowd into the same slot in the lowest level (ie. they all have the same
first nibble of their index keys).

When assoc_array_gc() returns back up the tree after scanning some leaves, it
can fall off of the root and crash because it assumes that the back pointer
from a shortcut (after label ascend_old_tree) must point to a normal node -
which isn't true of a shortcut node at the root.

Should we find we're ascending rootwards over a shortcut, we should check to
see if the backpointer is zero - and if it is, we have completed the scan.

This particular bug cannot occur if the root node is not a shortcut - ie. if
you have fewer than 17 keys in a keyring or if you have at least two keys that
sit into separate slots (eg. a keyring and a non keyring).

This can be reproduced by:

	ring=`keyctl newring bar @s`
	for ((i=1; i&lt;=18; i++)); do last_key=`keyctl newring foo$i $ring`; done
	keyctl timeout $last_key 2

Doing this:

	echo 3 &gt;/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay

first will speed things up.

If we do fall off of the top of the tree, we get the following oops:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
PGD dae15067 PUD cfc24067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_mark nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_ni
CPU: 0 PID: 26011 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.14.9-200.fc20.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
task: ffff8800918bd580 ti: ffff8800aac14000 task.ti: ffff8800aac14000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] [&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP: 0018:ffff8800aac15d40  EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8800aaecacc0
RDX: ffff8800daecf440 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800aadc2bc0
RBP: ffff8800aac15da8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffffffff8136ccc7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000070 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000000db10d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
 ffff8800aac15d50 0000000000000011 ffff8800aac15db8 ffffffff812e2a70
 ffff880091a00600 0000000000000000 ffff8800aadc2bc3 00000000cd42c987
 ffff88003702df20 ffff88003702dfa0 0000000053b65c09 ffff8800aac15fd8
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff812e2a70&gt;] ? keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0x30/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff812e3e75&gt;] keyring_gc+0x75/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffff812e1424&gt;] key_garbage_collector+0x154/0x3c0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a67b6&gt;] process_one_work+0x176/0x430
 [&lt;ffffffff810a744b&gt;] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0
 [&lt;ffffffff810a7330&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
 [&lt;ffffffff810ae1a8&gt;] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
 [&lt;ffffffff810ae0d0&gt;] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff816ffb7c&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
 [&lt;ffffffff810ae0d0&gt;] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
Code: 08 4c 8b 22 0f 84 bf 00 00 00 41 83 c7 01 49 83 e4 fc 41 83 ff 0f 4c 89 65 c0 0f 8f 5a fe ff ff 48 8b 45 c0 4d 63 cf 49 83 c1 02 &lt;4e&gt; 8b 34 c8 4d 85 f6 0f 84 be 00 00 00 41 f6 c6 01 0f 84 92
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8136cea7&gt;] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
 RSP &lt;ffff8800aac15d40&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000018
---[ end trace 1129028a088c0cbd ]---

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix use-after-free in assoc_array_gc()</title>
<updated>2014-09-17T16:19:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-02T12:52:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ed35863a772342685da9433eb930400bb4963c60'/>
<id>ed35863a772342685da9433eb930400bb4963c60</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 27419604f51a97d497853f14142c1059d46eb597 upstream.

An edit script should be considered inaccessible by a function once it has
called assoc_array_apply_edit() or assoc_array_cancel_edit().

However, assoc_array_gc() is accessing the edit script just after the
gc_complete: label.

Reported-by: Andreea-Cristina Bernat &lt;bernat.ada@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreea-Cristina Bernat &lt;bernat.ada@gmail.com&gt;
cc: shemming@brocade.com
cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 27419604f51a97d497853f14142c1059d46eb597 upstream.

An edit script should be considered inaccessible by a function once it has
called assoc_array_apply_edit() or assoc_array_cancel_edit().

However, assoc_array_gc() is accessing the edit script just after the
gc_complete: label.

Reported-by: Andreea-Cristina Bernat &lt;bernat.ada@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andreea-Cristina Bernat &lt;bernat.ada@gmail.com&gt;
cc: shemming@brocade.com
cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/btree.c: fix leak of whole btree nodes</title>
<updated>2014-08-07T21:52:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Minfei Huang</name>
<email>huangminfei@ucloud.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-04T23:11:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0880be9a586451f4146eb2057155bd785973297c'/>
<id>0880be9a586451f4146eb2057155bd785973297c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c75b53af2f0043aff500af0a6f878497bef41bca upstream.

I use btree from 3.14-rc2 in my own module.  When the btree module is
removed, a warning arises:

 kmem_cache_destroy btree_node: Slab cache still has objects
 CPU: 13 PID: 9150 Comm: rmmod Tainted: GF          O 3.14.0-rc2 #1
 Hardware name: Inspur NF5270M3/NF5270M3, BIOS CHEETAH_2.1.3 09/10/2013
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x49/0x5d
   kmem_cache_destroy+0xcf/0xe0
   btree_module_exit+0x10/0x12 [btree]
   SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0
   system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

The cause is that it doesn't release the last btree node, when height = 1
and fill = 1.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded test of NULL]
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang &lt;huangminfei@ucloud.cn&gt;
Cc: Joern Engel &lt;joern@logfs.org&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c75b53af2f0043aff500af0a6f878497bef41bca upstream.

I use btree from 3.14-rc2 in my own module.  When the btree module is
removed, a warning arises:

 kmem_cache_destroy btree_node: Slab cache still has objects
 CPU: 13 PID: 9150 Comm: rmmod Tainted: GF          O 3.14.0-rc2 #1
 Hardware name: Inspur NF5270M3/NF5270M3, BIOS CHEETAH_2.1.3 09/10/2013
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x49/0x5d
   kmem_cache_destroy+0xcf/0xe0
   btree_module_exit+0x10/0x12 [btree]
   SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0
   system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

The cause is that it doesn't release the last btree node, when height = 1
and fill = 1.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded test of NULL]
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang &lt;huangminfei@ucloud.cn&gt;
Cc: Joern Engel &lt;joern@logfs.org&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lz4: add overrun checks to lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize()</title>
<updated>2014-07-07T01:57:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-03T23:06:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=780f1005c8e5513098f8f677bebc735107824920'/>
<id>780f1005c8e5513098f8f677bebc735107824920</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4a3a99045177369700c60d074c0e525e8093b0fc upstream.

Jan points out that I forgot to make the needed fixes to the
lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize() function to mirror the changes done
in lz4_decompress() with regards to potential pointer overflows.

The only in-kernel user of this function is the zram code, which only
takes data from a valid compressed buffer that it made itself, so it's
not a big issue.  But due to external kernel modules using this
function, it's better to be safe here.

Reported-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4a3a99045177369700c60d074c0e525e8093b0fc upstream.

Jan points out that I forgot to make the needed fixes to the
lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize() function to mirror the changes done
in lz4_decompress() with regards to potential pointer overflows.

The only in-kernel user of this function is the zram code, which only
takes data from a valid compressed buffer that it made itself, so it's
not a big issue.  But due to external kernel modules using this
function, it's better to be safe here.

Reported-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@suse.com&gt;
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lz4: fix another possible overrun</title>
<updated>2014-07-01T03:12:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-24T20:59:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=08a2da50340b0f829c27800c67782566093b5543'/>
<id>08a2da50340b0f829c27800c67782566093b5543</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4148c1f67abf823099b2d7db6851e4aea407f5ee upstream.

There is one other possible overrun in the lz4 code as implemented by
Linux at this point in time (which differs from the upstream lz4
codebase, but will get synced at in a future kernel release.)  As
pointed out by Don, we also need to check the overflow in the data
itself.

While we are at it, replace the odd error return value with just a
"simple" -1 value as the return value is never used for anything other
than a basic "did this work or not" check.

Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4148c1f67abf823099b2d7db6851e4aea407f5ee upstream.

There is one other possible overrun in the lz4 code as implemented by
Linux at this point in time (which differs from the upstream lz4
codebase, but will get synced at in a future kernel release.)  As
pointed out by Don, we also need to check the overflow in the data
itself.

While we are at it, replace the odd error return value with just a
"simple" -1 value as the return value is never used for anything other
than a basic "did this work or not" check.

Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>idr: fix overflow bug during maximum ID calculation at maximum height</title>
<updated>2014-07-01T03:11:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lai Jiangshan</name>
<email>laijs@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-06T21:37:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7c50a27b68f395fee0c45cb769b4c8546dcac7a4'/>
<id>7c50a27b68f395fee0c45cb769b4c8546dcac7a4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3afb69cb5572b3c8c898c00880803cf1a49852c4 upstream.

idr_replace() open-codes the logic to calculate the maximum valid ID
given the height of the idr tree; unfortunately, the open-coded logic
doesn't account for the fact that the top layer may have unused slots
and over-shifts the limit to zero when the tree is at its maximum
height.

The following test code shows it fails to replace the value for
id=((1&lt;&lt;27)+42):

  static void test5(void)
  {
        int id;
        DEFINE_IDR(test_idr);
  #define TEST5_START ((1&lt;&lt;27)+42) /* use the highest layer */

        printk(KERN_INFO "Start test5\n");
        id = idr_alloc(&amp;test_idr, (void *)1, TEST5_START, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
        BUG_ON(id != TEST5_START);
        TEST_BUG_ON(idr_replace(&amp;test_idr, (void *)2, TEST5_START) != (void *)1);
        idr_destroy(&amp;test_idr);
        printk(KERN_INFO "End of test5\n");
  }

Fix the bug by using idr_max() which correctly takes into account the
maximum allowed shift.

sub_alloc() shares the same problem and may incorrectly fail with
-EAGAIN; however, this bug doesn't affect correct operation because
idr_get_empty_slot(), which already uses idr_max(), retries with the
increased @id in such cases.

[tj@kernel.org: Updated patch description.]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3afb69cb5572b3c8c898c00880803cf1a49852c4 upstream.

idr_replace() open-codes the logic to calculate the maximum valid ID
given the height of the idr tree; unfortunately, the open-coded logic
doesn't account for the fact that the top layer may have unused slots
and over-shifts the limit to zero when the tree is at its maximum
height.

The following test code shows it fails to replace the value for
id=((1&lt;&lt;27)+42):

  static void test5(void)
  {
        int id;
        DEFINE_IDR(test_idr);
  #define TEST5_START ((1&lt;&lt;27)+42) /* use the highest layer */

        printk(KERN_INFO "Start test5\n");
        id = idr_alloc(&amp;test_idr, (void *)1, TEST5_START, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
        BUG_ON(id != TEST5_START);
        TEST_BUG_ON(idr_replace(&amp;test_idr, (void *)2, TEST5_START) != (void *)1);
        idr_destroy(&amp;test_idr);
        printk(KERN_INFO "End of test5\n");
  }

Fix the bug by using idr_max() which correctly takes into account the
maximum allowed shift.

sub_alloc() shares the same problem and may incorrectly fail with
-EAGAIN; however, this bug doesn't affect correct operation because
idr_get_empty_slot(), which already uses idr_max(), retries with the
increased @id in such cases.

[tj@kernel.org: Updated patch description.]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lz4: ensure length does not wrap</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T19:15:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-21T05:01:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5f32449c2863adf190b83402e9a4069cee054f9d'/>
<id>5f32449c2863adf190b83402e9a4069cee054f9d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 206204a1162b995e2185275167b22468c00d6b36 upstream.

Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen.  Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.

Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 206204a1162b995e2185275167b22468c00d6b36 upstream.

Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen.  Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.

Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" &lt;donb@securitymouse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
