linux-toradex.git/mm/Makefile, branch v4.2.7

mm: move memtest under mm

2015-04-14T23:49:06+00:00

Memtest is a simple feature which fills the memory with a given set of
patterns and validates memory contents, if bad memory regions is detected
it reserves them via memblock API.  Since memblock API is widely used by
other architectures this feature can be enabled outside of x86 world.

This patch set promotes memtest to live under generic mm umbrella and
enables memtest feature for arm/arm64.

It was reported that this patch set was useful for tracking down an issue
with some errant DMA on an arm64 platform.

This patch (of 6):

There is nothing platform dependent in the core memtest code, so other
platforms might benefit from this feature too.

[linux@roeck-us.net: MEMTEST depends on MEMBLOCK]
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin 
Acked-by: Will Deacon 
Tested-by: Mark Rutland 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Paul Bolle 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: cma: debugfs interface

2015-04-14T23:49:00+00:00

I've noticed that there is no interfaces exposed by CMA which would let me
fuzz what's going on in there.

This small patchset exposes some information out to userspace, plus adds
the ability to trigger allocation and freeing from userspace.

This patch (of 3):

Implement a simple debugfs interface to expose information about CMA areas
in the system.

Useful for testing/sanity checks for CMA since it was impossible to
previously retrieve this information in userspace.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: Marek Szyprowski 
Cc: Laura Abbott 
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

move iov_iter.c from mm/ to lib/

2015-02-18T03:22:17+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

vfs: remove get_xip_mem

2015-02-17T01:56:03+00:00

All callers of get_xip_mem() are now gone.  Remove checks for it,
initialisers of it, documentation of it and the only implementation of it.
 Also remove mm/filemap_xip.c as it is now empty.  Also remove
documentation of the long-gone get_xip_page().

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: Andreas Dilger 
Cc: Boaz Harrosh 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Dave Chinner 
Cc: Jan Kara 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Cc: Randy Dunlap 
Cc: Ross Zwisler 
Cc: Theodore Ts'o 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocator

2015-02-14T05:21:41+00:00

With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by
slub.  Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as
redzone.  Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by
caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object
(including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible).

We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
size of really allocated area.  Such callers could validly access whole
allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible.

Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's
metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany 
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Yuri Gribov 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure

2015-02-14T05:21:40+00:00

Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector.  It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.

KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required.  v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.

This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer.  It's
not available for use yet.  The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].

Basic idea:

The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.

Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.

Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:

     unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
     {
                return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
     }

where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.

So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible.  Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).

To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.

These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory.  If access is not valid an error
printed.

Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:

	"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
	ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
	them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
	running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
	scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
	open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
	lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
	The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.

	We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
	(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
	start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
	Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
	We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
	people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.

	[...]

	As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
	performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
	shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
	programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
	kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
	running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
	have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
	finish all tuning).

	I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
	working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
	memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
	others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
	can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
	if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.

	Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
	instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
	parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
	relatively easy to port."

Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================

KMEMCHECK:

  - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can.  KASan uses
    compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
    kmemcheck.  The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
    uninitialized memory reads.

    Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
    x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:

$ netperf -l 30
		MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
		Recv   Send    Send
		Socket Socket  Message  Elapsed
		Size   Size    Size     Time     Throughput
		bytes  bytes   bytes    secs.    10^6bits/sec

no debug:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    41624.72

kasan inline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    12870.54

kasan outline:	87380  16384  16384    30.00    10586.39

kmemcheck: 	87380  16384  16384    30.03      20.23

  - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs.  It always sets
    number of CPUs to 1.  KASan doesn't have such limitation.

DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
	- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
	  granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.

SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
	- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.

	- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
	  KASan able to detect both reads and writes.

	- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
	  bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
	  bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
	  place of first bad read/write.

[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies

Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Acked-by: Michal Marek 
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany 
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov 
Cc: Yuri Gribov 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Stephen Rothwell 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation

2015-02-10T22:30:30+00:00

remap_file_pages(2) was invented to be able efficiently map parts of
huge file into limited 32-bit virtual address space such as in database
workloads.

Nonlinear mappings are pain to support and it seems there's no
legitimate use-cases nowadays since 64-bit systems are widely available.

Let's drop it and get rid of all these special-cased code.

The patch replaces the syscall with emulation which creates new VMA on
each remap_file_pages(), unless they it can be merged with an adjacent
one.

I didn't find *any* real code that uses remap_file_pages(2) to test
emulation impact on.  I've checked Debian code search and source of all
packages in ALT Linux.  No real users: libc wrappers, mentions in
strace, gdb, valgrind and this kind of stuff.

There are few basic tests in LTP for the syscall.  They work just fine
with emulation.

To test performance impact, I've written small test case which
demonstrate pretty much worst case scenario: map 4G shmfs file, write to
begin of every page pgoff of the page, remap pages in reverse order,
read every page.

The test creates 1 million of VMAs if emulation is in use, so I had to
set vm.max_map_count to 1100000 to avoid -ENOMEM.

Before:		23.3 ( +-  4.31% ) seconds
After:		43.9 ( +-  0.85% ) seconds
Slowdown:	1.88x

I believe we can live with that.

Test case:

        #define _GNU_SOURCE
        #include 
        #include 
        #include 
        #include 

        #define MB	(1024UL * 1024)
        #define SIZE	(4096 * MB)

        int main(int argc, char **argv)
        {
                unsigned long *p;
                long i, pass;

                for (pass = 0; pass < 10; pass++) {
                        p = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
                                        MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
                        if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
                                perror("mmap");
                                return -1;
                        }

                        for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++)
                                p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] = i;

                        for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++) {
                                if (remap_file_pages(p + i * 4096 / sizeof(*p), 4096,
                                                0, (SIZE - 4096 * (i + 1)) >> 12, 0)) {
                                        perror("remap_file_pages");
                                        return -1;
                                }
                        }

                        for (i = SIZE / 4096 - 1; i >= 0; i--)
                                assert(p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] == SIZE / 4096 - i - 1);

                        munmap(p, SIZE);
                }

                return 0;
        }

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix spello]
[sasha.levin@oracle.com: initialize populate before usage]
[sasha.levin@oracle.com: grab file ref to prevent race while mmaping]
Signed-off-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Dave Jones 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Armin Rigo 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm/page_owner: keep track of page owners

2014-12-13T20:42:48+00:00

This is the page owner tracking code which is introduced so far ago.  It
is resident on Andrew's tree, though, nobody tried to upstream so it
remain as is.  Our company uses this feature actively to debug memory leak
or to find a memory hogger so I decide to upstream this feature.

This functionality help us to know who allocates the page.  When
allocating a page, we store some information about allocation in extra
memory.  Later, if we need to know status of all pages, we can get and
analyze it from this stored information.

In previous version of this feature, extra memory is statically defined in
struct page, but, in this version, extra memory is allocated outside of
struct page.  It enables us to turn on/off this feature at boottime
without considerable memory waste.

Although we already have tracepoint for tracing page allocation/free,
using it to analyze page owner is rather complex.  We need to enlarge the
trace buffer for preventing overlapping until userspace program launched.
And, launched program continually dump out the trace buffer for later
analysis and it would change system behaviour with more possibility rather
than just keeping it in memory, so bad for debug.

Moreover, we can use page_owner feature further for various purposes.  For
example, we can use it for fragmentation statistics implemented in this
patch.  And, I also plan to implement some CMA failure debugging feature
using this interface.

I'd like to give the credit for all developers contributed this feature,
but, it's not easy because I don't know exact history.  Sorry about that.
Below is people who has "Signed-off-by" in the patches in Andrew's tree.

Contributor:
Alexander Nyberg 
Mel Gorman 
Dave Hansen 
Minchan Kim 
Michal Nazarewicz 
Andrew Morton 
Jungsoo Son 

Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Minchan Kim 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz 
Cc: Jungsoo Son 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm/page_ext: resurrect struct page extending code for debugging

2014-12-13T20:42:48+00:00

When we debug something, we'd like to insert some information to every
page.  For this purpose, we sometimes modify struct page itself.  But,
this has drawbacks.  First, it requires re-compile.  This makes us
hesitate to use the powerful debug feature so development process is
slowed down.  And, second, sometimes it is impossible to rebuild the
kernel due to third party module dependency.  At third, system behaviour
would be largely different after re-compile, because it changes size of
struct page greatly and this structure is accessed by every part of
kernel.  Keeping this as it is would be better to reproduce errornous
situation.

This feature is intended to overcome above mentioned problems.  This
feature allocates memory for extended data per page in certain place
rather than the struct page itself.  This memory can be accessed by the
accessor functions provided by this code.  During the boot process, it
checks whether allocation of huge chunk of memory is needed or not.  If
not, it avoids allocating memory at all.  With this advantage, we can
include this feature into the kernel in default and can avoid rebuild and
solve related problems.

Until now, memcg uses this technique.  But, now, memcg decides to embed
their variable to struct page itself and it's code to extend struct page
has been removed.  I'd like to use this code to develop debug feature, so
this patch resurrect it.

To help these things to work well, this patch introduces two callbacks for
clients.  One is the need callback which is mandatory if user wants to
avoid useless memory allocation at boot-time.  The other is optional, init
callback, which is used to do proper initialization after memory is
allocated.  Detailed explanation about purpose of these functions is in
code comment.  Please refer it.

Others are completely same with previous extension code in memcg.

Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Minchan Kim 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz 
Cc: Jungsoo Son 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: page_cgroup: rename file to mm/swap_cgroup.c

2014-12-11T01:41:09+00:00

Now that the external page_cgroup data structure and its lookup is gone,
the only code remaining in there is swap slot accounting.

Rename it and move the conditional compilation into mm/Makefile.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov 
Acked-by: David S. Miller 
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki 
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds