<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/mm, branch v6.17-rc5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'slab-for-6.17-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vbabka/slab</title>
<updated>2025-09-04T16:54:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-04T16:54:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=68f285e2647814754b9ba77b79cb32c9be2146aa'/>
<id>68f285e2647814754b9ba77b79cb32c9be2146aa</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull slab fixes from Vlastimil Babka:

 - Stable fix to make slub_debug code not access invalid pointers in the
   process of reporting issues (Li Qiong)

 - Stable fix to make object tracking pass gfp flags to stackdepot to
   avoid deadlock in contexts that can't even wake up kswapd due to e.g.
   timers debugging enabled (yangshiguang)

* tag 'slab-for-6.17-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vbabka/slab:
  mm: slub: avoid wake up kswapd in set_track_prepare
  mm/slub: avoid accessing metadata when pointer is invalid in object_err()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull slab fixes from Vlastimil Babka:

 - Stable fix to make slub_debug code not access invalid pointers in the
   process of reporting issues (Li Qiong)

 - Stable fix to make object tracking pass gfp flags to stackdepot to
   avoid deadlock in contexts that can't even wake up kswapd due to e.g.
   timers debugging enabled (yangshiguang)

* tag 'slab-for-6.17-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vbabka/slab:
  mm: slub: avoid wake up kswapd in set_track_prepare
  mm/slub: avoid accessing metadata when pointer is invalid in object_err()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-09-01-17-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm</title>
<updated>2025-09-02T20:18:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-02T20:18:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8026aed072e1221f0a61e5acc48c64546341bd4d'/>
<id>8026aed072e1221f0a61e5acc48c64546341bd4d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
 "17 hotfixes. 13 are cc:stable and the remainder address post-6.16
  issues or aren't considered necessary for -stable kernels. 11 of these
  fixes are for MM.

  This includes a three-patch series from Harry Yoo which fixes an
  intermittent boot failure which can occur on x86 systems. And a
  two-patch series from Alexander Gordeev which fixes a KASAN crash on
  S390 systems"

* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-09-01-17-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
  mm: fix possible deadlock in kmemleak
  x86/mm/64: define ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK and arch_sync_kernel_mappings()
  mm: introduce and use {pgd,p4d}_populate_kernel()
  mm: move page table sync declarations to linux/pgtable.h
  proc: fix missing pde_set_flags() for net proc files
  mm: fix accounting of memmap pages
  mm/damon/core: prevent unnecessary overflow in damos_set_effective_quota()
  kexec: add KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA as a legal flag
  kasan: fix GCC mem-intrinsic prefix with sw tags
  mm/kasan: avoid lazy MMU mode hazards
  mm/kasan: fix vmalloc shadow memory (de-)population races
  kunit: kasan_test: disable fortify string checker on kasan_strings() test
  selftests/mm: fix FORCE_READ to read input value correctly
  mm/userfaultfd: fix kmap_local LIFO ordering for CONFIG_HIGHPTE
  ocfs2: prevent release journal inode after journal shutdown
  rust: mm: mark VmaNew as transparent
  of_numa: fix uninitialized memory nodes causing kernel panic
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
 "17 hotfixes. 13 are cc:stable and the remainder address post-6.16
  issues or aren't considered necessary for -stable kernels. 11 of these
  fixes are for MM.

  This includes a three-patch series from Harry Yoo which fixes an
  intermittent boot failure which can occur on x86 systems. And a
  two-patch series from Alexander Gordeev which fixes a KASAN crash on
  S390 systems"

* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-09-01-17-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
  mm: fix possible deadlock in kmemleak
  x86/mm/64: define ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK and arch_sync_kernel_mappings()
  mm: introduce and use {pgd,p4d}_populate_kernel()
  mm: move page table sync declarations to linux/pgtable.h
  proc: fix missing pde_set_flags() for net proc files
  mm: fix accounting of memmap pages
  mm/damon/core: prevent unnecessary overflow in damos_set_effective_quota()
  kexec: add KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA as a legal flag
  kasan: fix GCC mem-intrinsic prefix with sw tags
  mm/kasan: avoid lazy MMU mode hazards
  mm/kasan: fix vmalloc shadow memory (de-)population races
  kunit: kasan_test: disable fortify string checker on kasan_strings() test
  selftests/mm: fix FORCE_READ to read input value correctly
  mm/userfaultfd: fix kmap_local LIFO ordering for CONFIG_HIGHPTE
  ocfs2: prevent release journal inode after journal shutdown
  rust: mm: mark VmaNew as transparent
  of_numa: fix uninitialized memory nodes causing kernel panic
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix possible deadlock in kmemleak</title>
<updated>2025-09-02T00:11:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gu Bowen</name>
<email>gubowen5@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-22T07:35:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c873ccbb2f8db46ad9b4a989ea924b6d8f19abf1'/>
<id>c873ccbb2f8db46ad9b4a989ea924b6d8f19abf1</id>
<content type='text'>
There are some AA deadlock issues in kmemleak, similar to the situation
reported by Breno [1].  The deadlock path is as follows:

mem_pool_alloc()
  -&gt; raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&amp;kmemleak_lock, flags);
      -&gt; pr_warn()
          -&gt; netconsole subsystem
	     -&gt; netpoll
	         -&gt; __alloc_skb
		   -&gt; __create_object
		     -&gt; raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&amp;kmemleak_lock, flags);

To solve this problem, switch to printk_safe mode before printing warning
message, this will redirect all printk()-s to a special per-CPU buffer,
which will be flushed later from a safe context (irq work), and this
deadlock problem can be avoided.  The proper API to use should be
printk_deferred_enter()/printk_deferred_exit() [2].  Another way is to
place the warn print after kmemleak is released.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250822073541.1886469-1-gubowen5@huawei.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250731-kmemleak_lock-v1-1-728fd470198f@debian.org/#t [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5ca375cd-4a20-4807-b897-68b289626550@redhat.com/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen &lt;gubowen5@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: John Ogness &lt;john.ogness@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Lu Jialin &lt;lujialin4@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are some AA deadlock issues in kmemleak, similar to the situation
reported by Breno [1].  The deadlock path is as follows:

mem_pool_alloc()
  -&gt; raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&amp;kmemleak_lock, flags);
      -&gt; pr_warn()
          -&gt; netconsole subsystem
	     -&gt; netpoll
	         -&gt; __alloc_skb
		   -&gt; __create_object
		     -&gt; raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&amp;kmemleak_lock, flags);

To solve this problem, switch to printk_safe mode before printing warning
message, this will redirect all printk()-s to a special per-CPU buffer,
which will be flushed later from a safe context (irq work), and this
deadlock problem can be avoided.  The proper API to use should be
printk_deferred_enter()/printk_deferred_exit() [2].  Another way is to
place the warn print after kmemleak is released.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250822073541.1886469-1-gubowen5@huawei.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250731-kmemleak_lock-v1-1-728fd470198f@debian.org/#t [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5ca375cd-4a20-4807-b897-68b289626550@redhat.com/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen &lt;gubowen5@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: John Ogness &lt;john.ogness@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Lu Jialin &lt;lujialin4@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: slub: avoid wake up kswapd in set_track_prepare</title>
<updated>2025-09-01T09:09:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>yangshiguang</name>
<email>yangshiguang@xiaomi.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-30T02:09:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=850470a8413a8a78e772c4f6bd9fe81ec6bd5b0f'/>
<id>850470a8413a8a78e772c4f6bd9fe81ec6bd5b0f</id>
<content type='text'>
set_track_prepare() can incur lock recursion.
The issue is that it is called from hrtimer_start_range_ns
holding the per_cpu(hrtimer_bases)[n].lock, but when enabled
CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS, may wake up kswapd in set_track_prepare,
and try to hold the per_cpu(hrtimer_bases)[n].lock.

Avoid deadlock caused by implicitly waking up kswapd by passing in
allocation flags, which do not contain __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM in the
debug_objects_fill_pool() case. Inside stack depot they are processed by
gfp_nested_mask().
Since ___slab_alloc() has preemption disabled, we mask out
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM from the flags there.

The oops looks something like:

BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#3, swapper/3/0
 lock: 0xffffff8a4bf29c80, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: swapper/3/0, .owner_cpu: 3
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Popsicle based on SM8850 (DT)
Call trace:
spin_bug+0x0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x80
hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x94
task_contending+0x10c
enqueue_dl_entity+0x2a4
dl_server_start+0x74
enqueue_task_fair+0x568
enqueue_task+0xac
do_activate_task+0x14c
ttwu_do_activate+0xcc
try_to_wake_up+0x6c8
default_wake_function+0x20
autoremove_wake_function+0x1c
__wake_up+0xac
wakeup_kswapd+0x19c
wake_all_kswapds+0x78
__alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1ac
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x298
stack_depot_save_flags+0x6b0
stack_depot_save+0x14
set_track_prepare+0x5c
___slab_alloc+0xccc
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x470
__set_page_owner+0x2bc
post_alloc_hook[jt]+0x1b8
prep_new_page+0x28
get_page_from_freelist+0x1edc
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x13c
alloc_slab_page+0x244
allocate_slab+0x7c
___slab_alloc+0x8e8
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x450
debug_objects_fill_pool+0x22c
debug_object_activate+0x40
enqueue_hrtimer[jt]+0xdc
hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x5f8
...

Signed-off-by: yangshiguang &lt;yangshiguang@xiaomi.com&gt;
Fixes: 5cf909c553e9 ("mm/slub: use stackdepot to save stack trace in objects")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
set_track_prepare() can incur lock recursion.
The issue is that it is called from hrtimer_start_range_ns
holding the per_cpu(hrtimer_bases)[n].lock, but when enabled
CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS, may wake up kswapd in set_track_prepare,
and try to hold the per_cpu(hrtimer_bases)[n].lock.

Avoid deadlock caused by implicitly waking up kswapd by passing in
allocation flags, which do not contain __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM in the
debug_objects_fill_pool() case. Inside stack depot they are processed by
gfp_nested_mask().
Since ___slab_alloc() has preemption disabled, we mask out
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM from the flags there.

The oops looks something like:

BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#3, swapper/3/0
 lock: 0xffffff8a4bf29c80, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: swapper/3/0, .owner_cpu: 3
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Popsicle based on SM8850 (DT)
Call trace:
spin_bug+0x0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x80
hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x94
task_contending+0x10c
enqueue_dl_entity+0x2a4
dl_server_start+0x74
enqueue_task_fair+0x568
enqueue_task+0xac
do_activate_task+0x14c
ttwu_do_activate+0xcc
try_to_wake_up+0x6c8
default_wake_function+0x20
autoremove_wake_function+0x1c
__wake_up+0xac
wakeup_kswapd+0x19c
wake_all_kswapds+0x78
__alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1ac
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x298
stack_depot_save_flags+0x6b0
stack_depot_save+0x14
set_track_prepare+0x5c
___slab_alloc+0xccc
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x470
__set_page_owner+0x2bc
post_alloc_hook[jt]+0x1b8
prep_new_page+0x28
get_page_from_freelist+0x1edc
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x13c
alloc_slab_page+0x244
allocate_slab+0x7c
___slab_alloc+0x8e8
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x450
debug_objects_fill_pool+0x22c
debug_object_activate+0x40
enqueue_hrtimer[jt]+0xdc
hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x5f8
...

Signed-off-by: yangshiguang &lt;yangshiguang@xiaomi.com&gt;
Fixes: 5cf909c553e9 ("mm/slub: use stackdepot to save stack trace in objects")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'fixes-2025-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T22:46:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-28T22:46:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5b9f3b013b33e73c6f8f2bbdc6b3fd87745b40af'/>
<id>5b9f3b013b33e73c6f8f2bbdc6b3fd87745b40af</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull memblock fixes from Mike Rapoport:

 - printk cleanups in memblock and numa_memblks

 - update kernel-doc for MEMBLOCK_RSRV_NOINIT to be more accurate and
   detailed

* tag 'fixes-2025-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock:
  memblock: fix kernel-doc for MEMBLOCK_RSRV_NOINIT
  mm: numa,memblock: Use SZ_1M macro to denote bytes to MB conversion
  mm/numa_memblks: Use pr_debug instead of printk(KERN_DEBUG)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull memblock fixes from Mike Rapoport:

 - printk cleanups in memblock and numa_memblks

 - update kernel-doc for MEMBLOCK_RSRV_NOINIT to be more accurate and
   detailed

* tag 'fixes-2025-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock:
  memblock: fix kernel-doc for MEMBLOCK_RSRV_NOINIT
  mm: numa,memblock: Use SZ_1M macro to denote bytes to MB conversion
  mm/numa_memblks: Use pr_debug instead of printk(KERN_DEBUG)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: introduce and use {pgd,p4d}_populate_kernel()</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T05:45:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harry Yoo</name>
<email>harry.yoo@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-18T02:02:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f2d2f9598ebb0158a3fe17cda0106d7752e654a2'/>
<id>f2d2f9598ebb0158a3fe17cda0106d7752e654a2</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce and use {pgd,p4d}_populate_kernel() in core MM code when
populating PGD and P4D entries for the kernel address space.  These
helpers ensure proper synchronization of page tables when updating the
kernel portion of top-level page tables.

Until now, the kernel has relied on each architecture to handle
synchronization of top-level page tables in an ad-hoc manner.  For
example, see commit 9b861528a801 ("x86-64, mem: Update all PGDs for direct
mapping and vmemmap mapping changes").

However, this approach has proven fragile for following reasons:

  1) It is easy to forget to perform the necessary page table
     synchronization when introducing new changes.
     For instance, commit 4917f55b4ef9 ("mm/sparse-vmemmap: improve memory
     savings for compound devmaps") overlooked the need to synchronize
     page tables for the vmemmap area.

  2) It is also easy to overlook that the vmemmap and direct mapping areas
     must not be accessed before explicit page table synchronization.
     For example, commit 8d400913c231 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated
     sub-pmd ranges")) caused crashes by accessing the vmemmap area
     before calling sync_global_pgds().

To address this, as suggested by Dave Hansen, introduce _kernel() variants
of the page table population helpers, which invoke architecture-specific
hooks to properly synchronize page tables.  These are introduced in a new
header file, include/linux/pgalloc.h, so they can be called from common
code.

They reuse existing infrastructure for vmalloc and ioremap. 
Synchronization requirements are determined by ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK,
and the actual synchronization is performed by
arch_sync_kernel_mappings().

This change currently targets only x86_64, so only PGD and P4D level
helpers are introduced.  Currently, these helpers are no-ops since no
architecture sets PGTBL_{PGD,P4D}_MODIFIED in ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK.

In theory, PUD and PMD level helpers can be added later if needed by other
architectures.  For now, 32-bit architectures (x86-32 and arm) only handle
PGTBL_PMD_MODIFIED, so p*d_populate_kernel() will never affect them unless
we introduce a PMD level helper.

[harry.yoo@oracle.com: fix KASAN build error due to p*d_populate_kernel()]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250822020727.202749-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250818020206.4517-3-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Fixes: 8d400913c231 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated sub-pmd ranges")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kiryl Shutsemau &lt;kas@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alistair Popple &lt;apopple@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: bibo mao &lt;maobibo@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: Borislav Betkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) &lt;cl@gentwo.org&gt;
Cc: Dennis Zhou &lt;dennis@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dev Jain &lt;dev.jain@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Gwan-gyeong Mun &lt;gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jane Chu &lt;jane.chu@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joao Martins &lt;joao.m.martins@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joerg Roedel &lt;joro@8bytes.org&gt;
Cc: John Hubbard &lt;jhubbard@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Brodsky &lt;kevin.brodsky@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Oscar Salvador &lt;osalvador@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Qi Zheng &lt;zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Thomas Huth &lt;thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" &lt;urezki@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce and use {pgd,p4d}_populate_kernel() in core MM code when
populating PGD and P4D entries for the kernel address space.  These
helpers ensure proper synchronization of page tables when updating the
kernel portion of top-level page tables.

Until now, the kernel has relied on each architecture to handle
synchronization of top-level page tables in an ad-hoc manner.  For
example, see commit 9b861528a801 ("x86-64, mem: Update all PGDs for direct
mapping and vmemmap mapping changes").

However, this approach has proven fragile for following reasons:

  1) It is easy to forget to perform the necessary page table
     synchronization when introducing new changes.
     For instance, commit 4917f55b4ef9 ("mm/sparse-vmemmap: improve memory
     savings for compound devmaps") overlooked the need to synchronize
     page tables for the vmemmap area.

  2) It is also easy to overlook that the vmemmap and direct mapping areas
     must not be accessed before explicit page table synchronization.
     For example, commit 8d400913c231 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated
     sub-pmd ranges")) caused crashes by accessing the vmemmap area
     before calling sync_global_pgds().

To address this, as suggested by Dave Hansen, introduce _kernel() variants
of the page table population helpers, which invoke architecture-specific
hooks to properly synchronize page tables.  These are introduced in a new
header file, include/linux/pgalloc.h, so they can be called from common
code.

They reuse existing infrastructure for vmalloc and ioremap. 
Synchronization requirements are determined by ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK,
and the actual synchronization is performed by
arch_sync_kernel_mappings().

This change currently targets only x86_64, so only PGD and P4D level
helpers are introduced.  Currently, these helpers are no-ops since no
architecture sets PGTBL_{PGD,P4D}_MODIFIED in ARCH_PAGE_TABLE_SYNC_MASK.

In theory, PUD and PMD level helpers can be added later if needed by other
architectures.  For now, 32-bit architectures (x86-32 and arm) only handle
PGTBL_PMD_MODIFIED, so p*d_populate_kernel() will never affect them unless
we introduce a PMD level helper.

[harry.yoo@oracle.com: fix KASAN build error due to p*d_populate_kernel()]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250822020727.202749-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250818020206.4517-3-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Fixes: 8d400913c231 ("x86/vmemmap: handle unpopulated sub-pmd ranges")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kiryl Shutsemau &lt;kas@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alistair Popple &lt;apopple@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" &lt;aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: bibo mao &lt;maobibo@loongson.cn&gt;
Cc: Borislav Betkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) &lt;cl@gentwo.org&gt;
Cc: Dennis Zhou &lt;dennis@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dev Jain &lt;dev.jain@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Gwan-gyeong Mun &lt;gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jane Chu &lt;jane.chu@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joao Martins &lt;joao.m.martins@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joerg Roedel &lt;joro@8bytes.org&gt;
Cc: John Hubbard &lt;jhubbard@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Kevin Brodsky &lt;kevin.brodsky@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Oscar Salvador &lt;osalvador@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Qi Zheng &lt;zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Thomas Huth &lt;thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" &lt;urezki@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino &lt;vincenzo.frascino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix accounting of memmap pages</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T05:45:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sumanth Korikkar</name>
<email>sumanthk@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-07T18:35:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c3576889d87b603cb66b417e08844a53c1077a37'/>
<id>c3576889d87b603cb66b417e08844a53c1077a37</id>
<content type='text'>
For !CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, memmap page accounting is currently done
upfront in sparse_buffer_init().  However, sparse_buffer_alloc() may
return NULL in failure scenario.

Also, memmap pages may be allocated either from the memblock allocator
during early boot or from the buddy allocator.  When removed via
arch_remove_memory(), accounting of memmap pages must reflect the original
allocation source.

To ensure correctness:
* Account memmap pages after successful allocation in sparse_init_nid()
  and section_activate().
* Account memmap pages in section_deactivate() based on allocation
  source.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250807183545.1424509-1-sumanthk@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 15995a352474 ("mm: report per-page metadata information")
Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar &lt;sumanthk@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang &lt;richard.weiyang@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For !CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, memmap page accounting is currently done
upfront in sparse_buffer_init().  However, sparse_buffer_alloc() may
return NULL in failure scenario.

Also, memmap pages may be allocated either from the memblock allocator
during early boot or from the buddy allocator.  When removed via
arch_remove_memory(), accounting of memmap pages must reflect the original
allocation source.

To ensure correctness:
* Account memmap pages after successful allocation in sparse_init_nid()
  and section_activate().
* Account memmap pages in section_deactivate() based on allocation
  source.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250807183545.1424509-1-sumanthk@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 15995a352474 ("mm: report per-page metadata information")
Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar &lt;sumanthk@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang &lt;richard.weiyang@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/damon/core: prevent unnecessary overflow in damos_set_effective_quota()</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T05:45:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Quanmin Yan</name>
<email>yanquanmin1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-21T12:55:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f68eabab9d9aaa764a8d234c4170119e6518102'/>
<id>9f68eabab9d9aaa764a8d234c4170119e6518102</id>
<content type='text'>
On 32-bit systems, the throughput calculation in
damos_set_effective_quota() is prone to unnecessary multiplication
overflow.  Using mult_frac() to fix it.

Andrew Paniakin also recently found and privately reported this issue, on
64 bit systems.  This can also happen on 64-bit systems, once the charged
size exceeds ~17 TiB.  On systems running for long time in production,
this issue can actually happen.

More specifically, when a DAMOS scheme having the time quota run for
longtime, throughput calculation can overflow and set esz too small.  As a
result, speed of the scheme get unexpectedly slow.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250821125555.3020951-1-yanquanmin1@huawei.com
Fixes: 1cd243030059 ("mm/damon/schemes: implement time quota")
Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan &lt;yanquanmin1@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Paniakin &lt;apanyaki@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kefeng Wang &lt;wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: ze zuo &lt;zuoze1@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.16+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On 32-bit systems, the throughput calculation in
damos_set_effective_quota() is prone to unnecessary multiplication
overflow.  Using mult_frac() to fix it.

Andrew Paniakin also recently found and privately reported this issue, on
64 bit systems.  This can also happen on 64-bit systems, once the charged
size exceeds ~17 TiB.  On systems running for long time in production,
this issue can actually happen.

More specifically, when a DAMOS scheme having the time quota run for
longtime, throughput calculation can overflow and set esz too small.  As a
result, speed of the scheme get unexpectedly slow.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250821125555.3020951-1-yanquanmin1@huawei.com
Fixes: 1cd243030059 ("mm/damon/schemes: implement time quota")
Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan &lt;yanquanmin1@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Paniakin &lt;apanyaki@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kefeng Wang &lt;wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: ze zuo &lt;zuoze1@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.16+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/kasan: avoid lazy MMU mode hazards</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T05:45:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Gordeev</name>
<email>agordeev@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-18T16:39:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c519c3c0a1133c408e83a383aa4dd30010aa5d71'/>
<id>c519c3c0a1133c408e83a383aa4dd30010aa5d71</id>
<content type='text'>
Functions __kasan_populate_vmalloc() and __kasan_depopulate_vmalloc() use
apply_to_pte_range(), which enters lazy MMU mode.  In that mode updating
PTEs may not be observed until the mode is left.

That may lead to a situation in which otherwise correct reads and writes
to a PTE using ptep_get(), set_pte(), pte_clear() and other access
primitives bring wrong results when the vmalloc shadow memory is being
(de-)populated.

To avoid these hazards leave the lazy MMU mode before and re-enter it
after each PTE manipulation.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0d2efb7ddddbff6b288fbffeeb10166e90771718.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Cc: Marc Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Functions __kasan_populate_vmalloc() and __kasan_depopulate_vmalloc() use
apply_to_pte_range(), which enters lazy MMU mode.  In that mode updating
PTEs may not be observed until the mode is left.

That may lead to a situation in which otherwise correct reads and writes
to a PTE using ptep_get(), set_pte(), pte_clear() and other access
primitives bring wrong results when the vmalloc shadow memory is being
(de-)populated.

To avoid these hazards leave the lazy MMU mode before and re-enter it
after each PTE manipulation.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0d2efb7ddddbff6b288fbffeeb10166e90771718.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Cc: Marc Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/kasan: fix vmalloc shadow memory (de-)population races</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T05:45:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Gordeev</name>
<email>agordeev@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-18T16:39:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=08c7c253e032863199da4f089bd0ccab5d1a4876'/>
<id>08c7c253e032863199da4f089bd0ccab5d1a4876</id>
<content type='text'>
While working on the lazy MMU mode enablement for s390 I hit pretty
curious issues in the kasan code.

The first is related to a custom kasan-based sanitizer aimed at catching
invalid accesses to PTEs and is inspired by [1] conversation.  The kasan
complains on valid PTE accesses, while the shadow memory is reported as
unpoisoned:

[  102.783993] ==================================================================
[  102.784008] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390
[  102.784016] Read of size 8 at addr 0000780084cf9608 by task vmalloc_test/0/5542
[  102.784019] 
[  102.784040] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5542 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE       6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e #340 PREEMPT 
[  102.784047] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  102.784049] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR)
[  102.784052] Call Trace:
[  102.784054]  [&lt;00007fffe0147ac0&gt;] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x140 
[  102.784059]  [&lt;00007fffe0112484&gt;] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x34/0x2d0 
[  102.784066]  [&lt;00007fffe011282c&gt;] print_report+0x10c/0x1f8 
[  102.784071]  [&lt;00007fffe090785a&gt;] kasan_report+0xfa/0x220 
[  102.784078]  [&lt;00007fffe01d3dec&gt;] set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390 
[  102.784083]  [&lt;00007fffe01d41c2&gt;] leave_ipte_batch+0x3b2/0xb10 
[  102.784088]  [&lt;00007fffe07d3650&gt;] apply_to_pte_range+0x2f0/0x4e0 
[  102.784094]  [&lt;00007fffe07e62e4&gt;] apply_to_pmd_range+0x194/0x3e0 
[  102.784099]  [&lt;00007fffe07e820e&gt;] __apply_to_page_range+0x2fe/0x7a0 
[  102.784104]  [&lt;00007fffe07e86d8&gt;] apply_to_page_range+0x28/0x40 
[  102.784109]  [&lt;00007fffe090a3ec&gt;] __kasan_populate_vmalloc+0xec/0x310 
[  102.784114]  [&lt;00007fffe090aa36&gt;] kasan_populate_vmalloc+0x96/0x130 
[  102.784118]  [&lt;00007fffe0833a04&gt;] alloc_vmap_area+0x3d4/0xf30 
[  102.784123]  [&lt;00007fffe083a8ba&gt;] __get_vm_area_node+0x1aa/0x4c0 
[  102.784127]  [&lt;00007fffe083c4f6&gt;] __vmalloc_node_range_noprof+0x126/0x4e0 
[  102.784131]  [&lt;00007fffe083c980&gt;] __vmalloc_node_noprof+0xd0/0x110 
[  102.784135]  [&lt;00007fffe083ca32&gt;] vmalloc_noprof+0x32/0x40 
[  102.784139]  [&lt;00007fff608aa336&gt;] fix_size_alloc_test+0x66/0x150 [test_vmalloc] 
[  102.784147]  [&lt;00007fff608aa710&gt;] test_func+0x2f0/0x430 [test_vmalloc] 
[  102.784153]  [&lt;00007fffe02841f8&gt;] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 
[  102.784159]  [&lt;00007fffe014d8b4&gt;] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 
[  102.784164]  [&lt;00007fffe299c00a&gt;] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 
[  102.784173] no locks held by vmalloc_test/0/5542.
[  102.784176] 
[  102.784178] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[  102.784186] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x84cf9
[  102.784198] flags: 0x3ffff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
[  102.784212] page_type: f2(table)
[  102.784225] raw: 3ffff00000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000122 0000000000000000
[  102.784234] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 f200000000000001 0000000000000000
[  102.784248] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  102.784250] 
[  102.784252] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  102.784260]  0000780084cf9500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784274]  0000780084cf9580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784277] &gt;0000780084cf9600: fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784290]                          ^
[  102.784293]  0000780084cf9680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784303]  0000780084cf9700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784306] ==================================================================

The second issue hits when the custom sanitizer above is not implemented,
but the kasan itself is still active:

[ 1554.438028] Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
[ 1554.438065] Failing address: 001c0ff0066f0000 TEID: 001c0ff0066f0403
[ 1554.438076] Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
[ 1554.438103] AS:00000000059d400b R2:0000000ffec5c00b R3:00000000c6c9c007 S:0000000314470001 P:00000000d0ab413d 
[ 1554.438158] Oops: 0011 ilc:2 [#1]SMP 
[ 1554.438175] Modules linked in: test_vmalloc(E+) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) sunrpc(E) pkey_pckmo(E) uvdevice(E) s390_trng(E) rng_core(E) eadm_sch(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) loop(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) nfnetlink(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha512_s390(E) sha1_s390(E) sha_common(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E)
[ 1554.438319] Unloaded tainted modules: pkey_uv(E):1 hmac_s390(E):2
[ 1554.438354] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1715 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E       6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e #350 PREEMPT 
[ 1554.438368] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 1554.438374] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR)
[ 1554.438381] Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 00007fffe1d3d6ae (memset+0x5e/0x98)
[ 1554.438396]            R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
[ 1554.438409] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 001c0ff0066f0000 001c0ff0066f0000 00000000000000f8
[ 1554.438418]            00000000000009fe 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000002
[ 1554.438426]            0000000000005000 000078031ae655c8 00000feffdcf9f59 0000780258672a20
[ 1554.438433]            0000780243153500 00007f8033780000 00007fffe083a510 00007f7fee7cfa00
[ 1554.438452] Krnl Code: 00007fffe1d3d6a0: eb540008000c	srlg	%r5,%r4,8
           00007fffe1d3d6a6: b9020055		ltgr	%r5,%r5
          #00007fffe1d3d6aa: a784000b		brc	8,00007fffe1d3d6c0
          &gt;00007fffe1d3d6ae: 42301000		stc	%r3,0(%r1)
           00007fffe1d3d6b2: d2fe10011000	mvc	1(255,%r1),0(%r1)
           00007fffe1d3d6b8: 41101100		la	%r1,256(%r1)
           00007fffe1d3d6bc: a757fff9		brctg	%r5,00007fffe1d3d6ae
           00007fffe1d3d6c0: 42301000		stc	%r3,0(%r1)
[ 1554.438539] Call Trace:
[ 1554.438545]  [&lt;00007fffe1d3d6ae&gt;] memset+0x5e/0x98 
[ 1554.438552] ([&lt;00007fffe083a510&gt;] remove_vm_area+0x220/0x400)
[ 1554.438562]  [&lt;00007fffe083a9d6&gt;] vfree.part.0+0x26/0x810 
[ 1554.438569]  [&lt;00007fff6073bd50&gt;] fix_align_alloc_test+0x50/0x90 [test_vmalloc] 
[ 1554.438583]  [&lt;00007fff6073c73a&gt;] test_func+0x46a/0x6c0 [test_vmalloc] 
[ 1554.438593]  [&lt;00007fffe0283ac8&gt;] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 
[ 1554.438603]  [&lt;00007fffe014d8b4&gt;] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 
[ 1554.438613]  [&lt;00007fffe299ac0a&gt;] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 
[ 1554.438622] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 1554.438627] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[ 1554.438632]  [&lt;00007fffe1d3d65c&gt;] memset+0xc/0x98
[ 1554.438644] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops

This series fixes the above issues and is a pre-requisite for the s390
lazy MMU mode implementation.

test_vmalloc was used to stress-test the fixes.


This patch (of 2):

When vmalloc shadow memory is established the modification of the
corresponding page tables is not protected by any locks.  Instead, the
locking is done per-PTE.  This scheme however has defects.

kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte() - while ptep_get() read is atomic the
sequence pte_none(ptep_get()) is not.  Doing that outside of the lock
might lead to a concurrent PTE update and what could be seen as a shadow
memory corruption as result.

kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte() - by the time a page whose address was
extracted from ptep_get() read and cached in a local variable outside of
the lock is attempted to get free, could actually be freed already.

To avoid these put ptep_get() itself and the code that manipulates the
result of the read under lock.  In addition, move freeing of the page out
of the atomic context.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/adb258634194593db294c0d1fb35646e894d6ead.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5b0609c9-95ee-4e48-bb6d-98f57c5d2c31@arm.com/ [1]
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Cc: Marc Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
While working on the lazy MMU mode enablement for s390 I hit pretty
curious issues in the kasan code.

The first is related to a custom kasan-based sanitizer aimed at catching
invalid accesses to PTEs and is inspired by [1] conversation.  The kasan
complains on valid PTE accesses, while the shadow memory is reported as
unpoisoned:

[  102.783993] ==================================================================
[  102.784008] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390
[  102.784016] Read of size 8 at addr 0000780084cf9608 by task vmalloc_test/0/5542
[  102.784019] 
[  102.784040] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5542 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE       6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e #340 PREEMPT 
[  102.784047] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  102.784049] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR)
[  102.784052] Call Trace:
[  102.784054]  [&lt;00007fffe0147ac0&gt;] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x140 
[  102.784059]  [&lt;00007fffe0112484&gt;] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x34/0x2d0 
[  102.784066]  [&lt;00007fffe011282c&gt;] print_report+0x10c/0x1f8 
[  102.784071]  [&lt;00007fffe090785a&gt;] kasan_report+0xfa/0x220 
[  102.784078]  [&lt;00007fffe01d3dec&gt;] set_pte_range+0x36c/0x390 
[  102.784083]  [&lt;00007fffe01d41c2&gt;] leave_ipte_batch+0x3b2/0xb10 
[  102.784088]  [&lt;00007fffe07d3650&gt;] apply_to_pte_range+0x2f0/0x4e0 
[  102.784094]  [&lt;00007fffe07e62e4&gt;] apply_to_pmd_range+0x194/0x3e0 
[  102.784099]  [&lt;00007fffe07e820e&gt;] __apply_to_page_range+0x2fe/0x7a0 
[  102.784104]  [&lt;00007fffe07e86d8&gt;] apply_to_page_range+0x28/0x40 
[  102.784109]  [&lt;00007fffe090a3ec&gt;] __kasan_populate_vmalloc+0xec/0x310 
[  102.784114]  [&lt;00007fffe090aa36&gt;] kasan_populate_vmalloc+0x96/0x130 
[  102.784118]  [&lt;00007fffe0833a04&gt;] alloc_vmap_area+0x3d4/0xf30 
[  102.784123]  [&lt;00007fffe083a8ba&gt;] __get_vm_area_node+0x1aa/0x4c0 
[  102.784127]  [&lt;00007fffe083c4f6&gt;] __vmalloc_node_range_noprof+0x126/0x4e0 
[  102.784131]  [&lt;00007fffe083c980&gt;] __vmalloc_node_noprof+0xd0/0x110 
[  102.784135]  [&lt;00007fffe083ca32&gt;] vmalloc_noprof+0x32/0x40 
[  102.784139]  [&lt;00007fff608aa336&gt;] fix_size_alloc_test+0x66/0x150 [test_vmalloc] 
[  102.784147]  [&lt;00007fff608aa710&gt;] test_func+0x2f0/0x430 [test_vmalloc] 
[  102.784153]  [&lt;00007fffe02841f8&gt;] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 
[  102.784159]  [&lt;00007fffe014d8b4&gt;] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 
[  102.784164]  [&lt;00007fffe299c00a&gt;] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 
[  102.784173] no locks held by vmalloc_test/0/5542.
[  102.784176] 
[  102.784178] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[  102.784186] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x84cf9
[  102.784198] flags: 0x3ffff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
[  102.784212] page_type: f2(table)
[  102.784225] raw: 3ffff00000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000122 0000000000000000
[  102.784234] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 f200000000000001 0000000000000000
[  102.784248] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  102.784250] 
[  102.784252] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  102.784260]  0000780084cf9500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784274]  0000780084cf9580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784277] &gt;0000780084cf9600: fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784290]                          ^
[  102.784293]  0000780084cf9680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784303]  0000780084cf9700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  102.784306] ==================================================================

The second issue hits when the custom sanitizer above is not implemented,
but the kasan itself is still active:

[ 1554.438028] Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
[ 1554.438065] Failing address: 001c0ff0066f0000 TEID: 001c0ff0066f0403
[ 1554.438076] Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
[ 1554.438103] AS:00000000059d400b R2:0000000ffec5c00b R3:00000000c6c9c007 S:0000000314470001 P:00000000d0ab413d 
[ 1554.438158] Oops: 0011 ilc:2 [#1]SMP 
[ 1554.438175] Modules linked in: test_vmalloc(E+) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) sunrpc(E) pkey_pckmo(E) uvdevice(E) s390_trng(E) rng_core(E) eadm_sch(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) loop(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) nfnetlink(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha512_s390(E) sha1_s390(E) sha_common(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E)
[ 1554.438319] Unloaded tainted modules: pkey_uv(E):1 hmac_s390(E):2
[ 1554.438354] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1715 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E       6.16.0-gcc-ipte-kasan-11657-gb2d930c4950e #350 PREEMPT 
[ 1554.438368] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 1554.438374] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR)
[ 1554.438381] Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 00007fffe1d3d6ae (memset+0x5e/0x98)
[ 1554.438396]            R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
[ 1554.438409] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 001c0ff0066f0000 001c0ff0066f0000 00000000000000f8
[ 1554.438418]            00000000000009fe 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000002
[ 1554.438426]            0000000000005000 000078031ae655c8 00000feffdcf9f59 0000780258672a20
[ 1554.438433]            0000780243153500 00007f8033780000 00007fffe083a510 00007f7fee7cfa00
[ 1554.438452] Krnl Code: 00007fffe1d3d6a0: eb540008000c	srlg	%r5,%r4,8
           00007fffe1d3d6a6: b9020055		ltgr	%r5,%r5
          #00007fffe1d3d6aa: a784000b		brc	8,00007fffe1d3d6c0
          &gt;00007fffe1d3d6ae: 42301000		stc	%r3,0(%r1)
           00007fffe1d3d6b2: d2fe10011000	mvc	1(255,%r1),0(%r1)
           00007fffe1d3d6b8: 41101100		la	%r1,256(%r1)
           00007fffe1d3d6bc: a757fff9		brctg	%r5,00007fffe1d3d6ae
           00007fffe1d3d6c0: 42301000		stc	%r3,0(%r1)
[ 1554.438539] Call Trace:
[ 1554.438545]  [&lt;00007fffe1d3d6ae&gt;] memset+0x5e/0x98 
[ 1554.438552] ([&lt;00007fffe083a510&gt;] remove_vm_area+0x220/0x400)
[ 1554.438562]  [&lt;00007fffe083a9d6&gt;] vfree.part.0+0x26/0x810 
[ 1554.438569]  [&lt;00007fff6073bd50&gt;] fix_align_alloc_test+0x50/0x90 [test_vmalloc] 
[ 1554.438583]  [&lt;00007fff6073c73a&gt;] test_func+0x46a/0x6c0 [test_vmalloc] 
[ 1554.438593]  [&lt;00007fffe0283ac8&gt;] kthread+0x3f8/0x7a0 
[ 1554.438603]  [&lt;00007fffe014d8b4&gt;] __ret_from_fork+0xd4/0x7d0 
[ 1554.438613]  [&lt;00007fffe299ac0a&gt;] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 
[ 1554.438622] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 1554.438627] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[ 1554.438632]  [&lt;00007fffe1d3d65c&gt;] memset+0xc/0x98
[ 1554.438644] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops

This series fixes the above issues and is a pre-requisite for the s390
lazy MMU mode implementation.

test_vmalloc was used to stress-test the fixes.


This patch (of 2):

When vmalloc shadow memory is established the modification of the
corresponding page tables is not protected by any locks.  Instead, the
locking is done per-PTE.  This scheme however has defects.

kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte() - while ptep_get() read is atomic the
sequence pte_none(ptep_get()) is not.  Doing that outside of the lock
might lead to a concurrent PTE update and what could be seen as a shadow
memory corruption as result.

kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte() - by the time a page whose address was
extracted from ptep_get() read and cached in a local variable outside of
the lock is attempted to get free, could actually be freed already.

To avoid these put ptep_get() itself and the code that manipulates the
result of the read under lock.  In addition, move freeing of the page out
of the atomic context.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/adb258634194593db294c0d1fb35646e894d6ead.1755528662.git.agordeev@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5b0609c9-95ee-4e48-bb6d-98f57c5d2c31@arm.com/ [1]
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9ef4 ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev &lt;agordeev@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Axtens &lt;dja@axtens.net&gt;
Cc: Marc Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
