<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/bluetooth, branch v4.4.115</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T08:35:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Seri</name>
<email>ben@armis.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-08T14:14:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0ae86454c435e554d01c51535c3cd4312577cc74'/>
<id>0ae86454c435e554d01c51535c3cd4312577cc74</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.

In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:

struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;

In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:

...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&amp;efs, (void *)val, olen);
...

The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:

l2cap_add_conf_opt(&amp;ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &amp;efs);

So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).

This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410

Cc: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Gustavo Padovan &lt;gustavo@padovan.org&gt;
Cc: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri &lt;ben@armis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.

In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:

struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;

In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:

...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&amp;efs, (void *)val, olen);
...

The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:

l2cap_add_conf_opt(&amp;ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &amp;efs);

So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).

This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410

Cc: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Gustavo Padovan &lt;gustavo@padovan.org&gt;
Cc: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri &lt;ben@armis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Properly check L2CAP config option output buffer length</title>
<updated>2017-09-13T21:09:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Seri</name>
<email>ben@armis.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-09T21:15:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f7ec367c8ea7021517c9c04b0022c225d2d0785a'/>
<id>f7ec367c8ea7021517c9c04b0022c225d2d0785a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e860d2c904d1a9f38a24eb44c9f34b8f915a6ea3 upstream.

Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses
to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks.

Signed-off-by: Ben Seri &lt;ben@armis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e860d2c904d1a9f38a24eb44c9f34b8f915a6ea3 upstream.

Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses
to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks.

Signed-off-by: Ben Seri &lt;ben@armis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: bnep: fix possible might sleep error in bnep_session</title>
<updated>2017-08-30T08:19:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeffy Chen</name>
<email>jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-27T09:34:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e1c7a447883305fd757ca76950d5ef2b4155cebc'/>
<id>e1c7a447883305fd757ca76950d5ef2b4155cebc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 25717382c1dd0ddced2059053e3ca5088665f7a5 upstream.

It looks like bnep_session has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:

	while (1) {
		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
		if (condition)
			break;
		// may call might_sleep here
		schedule();
	}
	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);

Which fixed at:
	dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps

So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/

Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen &lt;jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris &lt;briannorris@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho &lt;acho@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 25717382c1dd0ddced2059053e3ca5088665f7a5 upstream.

It looks like bnep_session has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:

	while (1) {
		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
		if (condition)
			break;
		// may call might_sleep here
		schedule();
	}
	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);

Which fixed at:
	dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps

So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/

Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen &lt;jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris &lt;briannorris@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho &lt;acho@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: cmtp: fix possible might sleep error in cmtp_session</title>
<updated>2017-08-30T08:19:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeffy Chen</name>
<email>jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-27T09:34:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f9adf422b99309894fca52767acfa1dcdc094e84'/>
<id>f9adf422b99309894fca52767acfa1dcdc094e84</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f06d977309d09253c744e54e75c5295ecc52b7b4 upstream.

It looks like cmtp_session has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:

	while (1) {
		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
		if (condition)
			break;
		// may call might_sleep here
		schedule();
	}
	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);

Which fixed at:
	dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps

So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/

Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen &lt;jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris &lt;briannorris@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho &lt;acho@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f06d977309d09253c744e54e75c5295ecc52b7b4 upstream.

It looks like cmtp_session has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:

	while (1) {
		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
		if (condition)
			break;
		// may call might_sleep here
		schedule();
	}
	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);

Which fixed at:
	dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps

So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/

Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen &lt;jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Norris &lt;briannorris@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho &lt;acho@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hidp: fix possible might sleep error in hidp_session_thread</title>
<updated>2017-08-30T08:19:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeffy Chen</name>
<email>jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-27T09:34:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=172bbb8ee44a5a0f48fe4f06b09ec9bd7c1678f9'/>
<id>172bbb8ee44a5a0f48fe4f06b09ec9bd7c1678f9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5da8e47d849d3d37b14129f038782a095b9ad049 upstream.

It looks like hidp_session_thread has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:

	while (1) {
		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
		if (condition)
			break;
		// may call might_sleep here
		schedule();
	}
	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);

Which fixed at:
	dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps

So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/

Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen &lt;jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com&gt;
Tested-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho &lt;acho@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Rohit Vaswani &lt;rvaswani@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5da8e47d849d3d37b14129f038782a095b9ad049 upstream.

It looks like hidp_session_thread has same pattern as the issue reported in
old rfcomm:

	while (1) {
		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
		if (condition)
			break;
		// may call might_sleep here
		schedule();
	}
	__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);

Which fixed at:
	dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps

So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of:
https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/

Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen &lt;jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com&gt;
Tested-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho &lt;acho@suse.com&gt;
Tested-by: Rohit Vaswani &lt;rvaswani@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: use constant time memory comparison for secret values</title>
<updated>2017-07-27T22:06:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-10T02:59:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1e3b56033e820e0e065b3b0fc19d247118ab6532'/>
<id>1e3b56033e820e0e065b3b0fc19d247118ab6532</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 329d82309824ff1082dc4a91a5bbed8c3bec1580 upstream.

This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 329d82309824ff1082dc4a91a5bbed8c3bec1580 upstream.

This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Fix user channel for 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel</title>
<updated>2017-05-20T12:27:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Szymon Janc</name>
<email>szymon.janc@codecoup.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-25T01:25:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ff1c4cf24642a3598fd9adc7e110d0df2610d1d8'/>
<id>ff1c4cf24642a3598fd9adc7e110d0df2610d1d8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ab89f0bdd63a3721f7cd3f064f39fc4ac7ca14d4 upstream.

Running 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel results in MSG_CMSG_COMPAT being
defined as 0x80000000. This results in sendmsg failure if used from 32bit
userspace running on 64bit kernel. Fix this by accounting for MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
in flags check in hci_sock_sendmsg.

Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc &lt;szymon.janc@codecoup.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marko Kiiskila &lt;marko@runtime.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ab89f0bdd63a3721f7cd3f064f39fc4ac7ca14d4 upstream.

Running 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel results in MSG_CMSG_COMPAT being
defined as 0x80000000. This results in sendmsg failure if used from 32bit
userspace running on 64bit kernel. Fix this by accounting for MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
in flags check in hci_sock_sendmsg.

Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc &lt;szymon.janc@codecoup.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marko Kiiskila &lt;marko@runtime.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Fix l2cap_sock_setsockopt() with optname BT_RCVMTU</title>
<updated>2016-08-20T16:09:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amadeusz Sławiński</name>
<email>amadeusz.slawinski@tieto.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-07-14T08:50:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5c93b99d27ffe7d1a3c6d43429bd1966b4c353dc'/>
<id>5c93b99d27ffe7d1a3c6d43429bd1966b4c353dc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 23bc6ab0a0912146fd674a0becc758c3162baabc upstream.

When we retrieve imtu value from userspace we should use 16 bit pointer
cast instead of 32 as it's defined that way in headers. Fixes setsockopt
calls on big-endian platforms.

Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński &lt;amadeusz.slawinski@tieto.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 23bc6ab0a0912146fd674a0becc758c3162baabc upstream.

When we retrieve imtu value from userspace we should use 16 bit pointer
cast instead of 32 as it's defined that way in headers. Fixes setsockopt
calls on big-endian platforms.

Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński &lt;amadeusz.slawinski@tieto.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Fix potential buffer overflow with Add Advertising</title>
<updated>2016-04-12T16:08:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johan Hedberg</name>
<email>johan.hedberg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-11T07:56:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f0de3cec40ee0f365751e11a477e47dd5568c34e'/>
<id>f0de3cec40ee0f365751e11a477e47dd5568c34e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6a0e78072c2ae7b20b14e0249d8108441ea928d2 upstream.

The Add Advertising command handler does the appropriate checks for
the AD and Scan Response data, however fails to take into account the
general length of the mgmt command itself, which could lead to
potential buffer overflows. This patch adds the necessary check that
the mgmt command length is consistent with the given ad and scan_rsp
lengths.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6a0e78072c2ae7b20b14e0249d8108441ea928d2 upstream.

The Add Advertising command handler does the appropriate checks for
the AD and Scan Response data, however fails to take into account the
general length of the mgmt command itself, which could lead to
potential buffer overflows. This patch adds the necessary check that
the mgmt command length is consistent with the given ad and scan_rsp
lengths.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: 6lowpan: Fix handling of uncompressed IPv6 packets</title>
<updated>2016-03-03T23:07:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukasz Duda</name>
<email>lukasz.duda@nordicsemi.no</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-13T15:57:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8cf0f282de522d9f44dc2e0f6f58361fdef4d722'/>
<id>8cf0f282de522d9f44dc2e0f6f58361fdef4d722</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 87f5fedb3bebbbb566f847dd0c567fcea49a36a6 upstream.

This patch fixes incorrect handling of the 6lowpan packets that contain
uncompressed IPv6 header.

RFC4944 specifies a special dispatch for 6lowpan to carry uncompressed
IPv6 header. This dispatch (1 byte long) has to be removed during
reception and skb data pointer has to be moved. To correctly point in
the beginning of the IPv6 header the dispatch byte has to be pulled off
before packet can be processed by netif_rx_in().

Test scenario: IPv6 packets are not correctly interpreted by the network
layer when IPv6 header is not compressed (e.g. ICMPv6 Echo Reply is not
propagated correctly to the ICMPv6 layer because the extra byte will make
the header look corrupted).

Similar approach is done for IEEE 802.15.4.

Signed-off-by: Lukasz Duda &lt;lukasz.duda@nordicsemi.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Glenn Ruben Bakke &lt;glenn.ruben.bakke@nordicsemi.no&gt;
Acked-by: Jukka Rissanen &lt;jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 87f5fedb3bebbbb566f847dd0c567fcea49a36a6 upstream.

This patch fixes incorrect handling of the 6lowpan packets that contain
uncompressed IPv6 header.

RFC4944 specifies a special dispatch for 6lowpan to carry uncompressed
IPv6 header. This dispatch (1 byte long) has to be removed during
reception and skb data pointer has to be moved. To correctly point in
the beginning of the IPv6 header the dispatch byte has to be pulled off
before packet can be processed by netif_rx_in().

Test scenario: IPv6 packets are not correctly interpreted by the network
layer when IPv6 header is not compressed (e.g. ICMPv6 Echo Reply is not
propagated correctly to the ICMPv6 layer because the extra byte will make
the header look corrupted).

Similar approach is done for IEEE 802.15.4.

Signed-off-by: Lukasz Duda &lt;lukasz.duda@nordicsemi.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: Glenn Ruben Bakke &lt;glenn.ruben.bakke@nordicsemi.no&gt;
Acked-by: Jukka Rissanen &lt;jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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