<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/core/secure_seq.c, branch v5.1-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>infiniband: i40iw, nes: don't use wall time for TCP sequence numbers</title>
<updated>2018-07-11T18:10:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-09T08:34:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=07f3355df7e6d043d36d4c172a18e74510fe7e7b'/>
<id>07f3355df7e6d043d36d4c172a18e74510fe7e7b</id>
<content type='text'>
The nes infiniband driver uses current_kernel_time() to get a nanosecond
granunarity timestamp to initialize its tcp sequence counters. This is
one of only a few remaining users of that deprecated function, so we
should try to get rid of it.

Aside from using a deprecated API, there are several problems I see here:

- Using a CLOCK_REALTIME based time source makes it predictable in
  case the time base is synchronized.
- Using a coarse timestamp means it only gets updated once per jiffie,
  making it even more predictable in order to avoid having to access
  the hardware clock source
- The upper 2 bits are always zero because the nanoseconds are at most
  999999999.

For the Linux TCP implementation, we use secure_tcp_seq(), which appears
to be appropriate here as well, and solves all the above problems.

i40iw uses a variant of the same code, so I do that same thing there
for ipv4. Unlike nes, i40e also supports ipv6, which needs to call
secure_tcpv6_seq instead.

Acked-by: Shiraz Saleem &lt;shiraz.saleem@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The nes infiniband driver uses current_kernel_time() to get a nanosecond
granunarity timestamp to initialize its tcp sequence counters. This is
one of only a few remaining users of that deprecated function, so we
should try to get rid of it.

Aside from using a deprecated API, there are several problems I see here:

- Using a CLOCK_REALTIME based time source makes it predictable in
  case the time base is synchronized.
- Using a coarse timestamp means it only gets updated once per jiffie,
  making it even more predictable in order to avoid having to access
  the hardware clock source
- The upper 2 bits are always zero because the nanoseconds are at most
  999999999.

For the Linux TCP implementation, we use secure_tcp_seq(), which appears
to be appropriate here as well, and solves all the above problems.

i40iw uses a variant of the same code, so I do that same thing there
for ipv4. Unlike nes, i40e also supports ipv6, which needs to call
secure_tcpv6_seq instead.

Acked-by: Shiraz Saleem &lt;shiraz.saleem@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@mellanox.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Namespaceify sysctl_tcp_timestamps</title>
<updated>2017-06-08T14:53:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-07T17:34:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5d2ed0521ac98f1ae0243fe52b8ebf95e2abf791'/>
<id>5d2ed0521ac98f1ae0243fe52b8ebf95e2abf791</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies</title>
<updated>2017-05-05T16:00:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-05T13:56:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb'/>
<id>84b114b98452c431299d99c135f751659e517acb</id>
<content type='text'>
Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker
can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps,
directly revealing server jiffies value.

Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary
depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS
drops for innocent clients.

Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies.

Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not
used from a module.

In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to
tcp_get_cookie_sock().

v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted.

Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker
can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps,
directly revealing server jiffies value.

Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary
depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS
drops for innocent clients.

Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies.

Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not
used from a module.

In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to
tcp_get_cookie_sock().

v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted.

Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Tested-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net</title>
<updated>2017-04-06T15:24:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-06T14:25:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6f14f443d3e773439fb9cc6f2685ba90d5d026c5'/>
<id>6f14f443d3e773439fb9cc6f2685ba90d5d026c5</id>
<content type='text'>
Mostly simple cases of overlapping changes (adding code nearby,
a function whose name changes, for example).

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Mostly simple cases of overlapping changes (adding code nearby,
a function whose name changes, for example).

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets</title>
<updated>2017-03-25T02:27:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-24T18:42:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=28ee1b746f493b7c62347d714f58fbf4f70df4f0'/>
<id>28ee1b746f493b7c62347d714f58fbf4f70df4f0</id>
<content type='text'>
Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1,
which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr.

Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make
such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets.

Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme &lt;yvan@vanrossomme.net&gt;
Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1,
which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr.

Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make
such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets.

Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme &lt;yvan@vanrossomme.net&gt;
Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: rename *_sequence_number() to *_seq_and_tsoff()</title>
<updated>2017-03-10T02:25:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kodanev</name>
<email>alexey.kodanev@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-09T10:53:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a30aad50c26cac63026e5dfcc2e055ae63fe6ef7'/>
<id>a30aad50c26cac63026e5dfcc2e055ae63fe6ef7</id>
<content type='text'>
The functions that are returning tcp sequence number also setup
TS offset value, so rename them to better describe their purpose.

No functional changes in this patch.

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The functions that are returning tcp sequence number also setup
TS offset value, so rename them to better describe their purpose.

No functional changes in this patch.

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>secure_seq: fix sparse errors</title>
<updated>2017-01-12T20:57:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-12T02:10:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c1ce1560a1ae1a58505c26bc0e46ce1aee982d54'/>
<id>c1ce1560a1ae1a58505c26bc0e46ce1aee982d54</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes following warnings :

net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28: warning: incorrect type in argument 1
(different base types)
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28:    expected unsigned int const [unsigned]
[usertype] a
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28:    got restricted __be32 [usertype] saddr
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 2
(different base types)
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35:    expected unsigned int const [unsigned]
[usertype] b
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35:    got restricted __be32 [usertype] daddr
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:43: warning: cast from restricted __be16
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:61: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to
integer

Fixes: 7cd23e5300c1 ("secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fixes following warnings :

net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28: warning: incorrect type in argument 1
(different base types)
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28:    expected unsigned int const [unsigned]
[usertype] a
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28:    got restricted __be32 [usertype] saddr
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 2
(different base types)
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35:    expected unsigned int const [unsigned]
[usertype] b
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35:    got restricted __be32 [usertype] daddr
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:43: warning: cast from restricted __be16
net/core/secure_seq.c:125:61: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to
integer

Fixes: 7cd23e5300c1 ("secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5</title>
<updated>2017-01-09T18:58:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-08T12:54:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7cd23e5300c1b95903859a8bdc084e79be66ce16'/>
<id>7cd23e5300c1b95903859a8bdc084e79be66ce16</id>
<content type='text'>
This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both
faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5.

Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create
a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates
rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the
short input convenience functions.

64-bit x86_64:
[    1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527
[    1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502
[    1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362
[    1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526

32-bit x86:
[    1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892
[    1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544
[    1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384
[    1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;tom@herbertland.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both
faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5.

Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create
a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates
rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the
short input convenience functions.

64-bit x86_64:
[    1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527
[    1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502
[    1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362
[    1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526

32-bit x86:
[    1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892
[    1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544
[    1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384
[    1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Herbert &lt;tom@herbertland.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: allow to turn tcp timestamp randomization off</title>
<updated>2016-12-02T17:49:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T10:32:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=25429d7b7dca01dc4f17205de023a30ca09390d0'/>
<id>25429d7b7dca01dc4f17205de023a30ca09390d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Eric says: "By looking at tcpdump, and TS val of xmit packets of multiple
flows, we can deduct the relative qdisc delays (think of fq pacing).
This should work even if we have one flow per remote peer."

Having random per flow (or host) offsets doesn't allow that anymore so add
a way to turn this off.

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Eric says: "By looking at tcpdump, and TS val of xmit packets of multiple
flows, we can deduct the relative qdisc delays (think of fq pacing).
This should work even if we have one flow per remote peer."

Having random per flow (or host) offsets doesn't allow that anymore so add
a way to turn this off.

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection</title>
<updated>2016-12-02T17:49:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T10:32:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=95a22caee396cef0bb2ca8fafdd82966a49367bb'/>
<id>95a22caee396cef0bb2ca8fafdd82966a49367bb</id>
<content type='text'>
jiffies based timestamps allow for easy inference of number of devices
behind NAT translators and also makes tracking of hosts simpler.

commit ceaa1fef65a7c2e ("tcp: adding a per-socket timestamp offset")
added the main infrastructure that is needed for per-connection ts
randomization, in particular writing/reading the on-wire tcp header
format takes the offset into account so rest of stack can use normal
tcp_time_stamp (jiffies).

So only two items are left:
 - add a tsoffset for request sockets
 - extend the tcp isn generator to also return another 32bit number
   in addition to the ISN.

Re-use of ISN generator also means timestamps are still monotonically
increasing for same connection quadruple, i.e. PAWS will still work.

Includes fixes from Eric Dumazet.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
jiffies based timestamps allow for easy inference of number of devices
behind NAT translators and also makes tracking of hosts simpler.

commit ceaa1fef65a7c2e ("tcp: adding a per-socket timestamp offset")
added the main infrastructure that is needed for per-connection ts
randomization, in particular writing/reading the on-wire tcp header
format takes the offset into account so rest of stack can use normal
tcp_time_stamp (jiffies).

So only two items are left:
 - add a tsoffset for request sockets
 - extend the tcp isn generator to also return another 32bit number
   in addition to the ISN.

Re-use of ISN generator also means timestamps are still monotonically
increasing for same connection quadruple, i.e. PAWS will still work.

Includes fixes from Eric Dumazet.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
