<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/core, branch tegra-10.11.1.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memory</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-10T18:38:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2bd84dce08a6a782925f5e34c2e87ad957c57007'/>
<id>2bd84dce08a6a782925f5e34c2e87ad957c57007</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream.

There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about
uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound
to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by
hostile user.

Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is
expensive since most filters dont even use this array.

Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of
the jumps. This might be done later.

In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters
using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.

For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.

[ Since we access fentry-&gt;k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
  and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream.

There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about
uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound
to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by
hostile user.

Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is
expensive since most filters dont even use this array.

Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of
the jumps. This might be done later.

In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters
using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.

For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.

[ Since we access fentry-&gt;k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
  and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vlan: Avoid hwaccel vlan packets when vid not used.</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesse Gross</name>
<email>jesse@nicira.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-08T21:23:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1b7cd15c8c89f5c26dc525d985e45c9bd9265fe2'/>
<id>1b7cd15c8c89f5c26dc525d985e45c9bd9265fe2</id>
<content type='text'>
[This patch applies only to 2.6.36 stable.  The problem was introduced
in that release and is already fixed by larger changes to the vlan
code in 2.6.37.]

Normally hardware accelerated vlan packets are quickly dropped if
there is no corresponding vlan device configured.  The one exception
is promiscuous mode, where we allow all of these packets through so
they can be picked up by tcpdump.  However, this behavior causes a
crash if we actually try to receive these packets.  This fixes that
crash by ignoring packets with vids not corresponding to a configured
device in the vlan hwaccel routines and then dropping them before they
get to consumers in the network stack.


Reported-by: Ben Greear &lt;greearb@candelatech.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nikola Ciprich &lt;extmaillist@linuxbox.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross &lt;jesse@nicira.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[This patch applies only to 2.6.36 stable.  The problem was introduced
in that release and is already fixed by larger changes to the vlan
code in 2.6.37.]

Normally hardware accelerated vlan packets are quickly dropped if
there is no corresponding vlan device configured.  The one exception
is promiscuous mode, where we allow all of these packets through so
they can be picked up by tcpdump.  However, this behavior causes a
crash if we actually try to receive these packets.  This fixes that
crash by ignoring packets with vids not corresponding to a configured
device in the vlan hwaccel routines and then dropping them before they
get to consumers in the network stack.


Reported-by: Ben Greear &lt;greearb@candelatech.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nikola Ciprich &lt;extmaillist@linuxbox.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross &lt;jesse@nicira.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Limit socket I/O iovec total length to INT_MAX.</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-28T18:41:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8612ab37c065833ad732341a87d2a2502b7a3b03'/>
<id>8612ab37c065833ad732341a87d2a2502b7a3b03</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.

This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers.  Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.

This works because:

1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
   writes are allowed and the application will just continue
   with another write to send the rest of the data.

2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
   one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
   packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
   than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
   check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.

Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.

This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers.  Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.

This works because:

1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
   writes are allowed and the application will just continue
   with another write to send the rest of the data.

2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
   one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
   packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
   than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
   check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.

Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: NETIF_F_HW_CSUM does not imply FCoE CRC offload</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:32:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>bhutchings@solarflare.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-22T04:38:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ffe7d99b862d4c70e1eb214605ff7e24e55c547a'/>
<id>ffe7d99b862d4c70e1eb214605ff7e24e55c547a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 66c68bcc489fadd4f5e8839e966e3a366e50d1d5 upstream.

NETIF_F_HW_CSUM indicates the ability to update an TCP/IP-style 16-bit
checksum with the checksum of an arbitrary part of the packet data,
whereas the FCoE CRC is something entirely different.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 66c68bcc489fadd4f5e8839e966e3a366e50d1d5 upstream.

NETIF_F_HW_CSUM indicates the ability to update an TCP/IP-style 16-bit
checksum with the checksum of an arbitrary part of the packet data,
whereas the FCoE CRC is something entirely different.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: clear heap allocations for privileged ethtool actions</title>
<updated>2010-10-11T19:23:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees.cook@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-11T19:23:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b00916b189d13a615ff05c9242201135992fcda3'/>
<id>b00916b189d13a615ff05c9242201135992fcda3</id>
<content type='text'>
Several other ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. Some interfaces appear safe (eeprom, etc), in that the sizes
are well controlled. In some situations (e.g. unchecked error conditions),
the heap will remain unchanged in areas before copying back to userspace.
Note that these are less of an issue since these all require CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Several other ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. Some interfaces appear safe (eeprom, etc), in that the sizes
are well controlled. In some situations (e.g. unchecked error conditions),
the heap will remain unchanged in areas before copying back to userspace.
Note that these are less of an issue since these all require CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: clear heap allocation for ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL</title>
<updated>2010-10-08T17:48:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>kees.cook@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-07T10:03:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ae6df5f96a51818d6376da5307d773baeece4014'/>
<id>ae6df5f96a51818d6376da5307d773baeece4014</id>
<content type='text'>
Calling ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL with a large rule_cnt will allocate kernel
heap without clearing it. For the one driver (niu) that implements it,
it will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and copy the full
contents back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Calling ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL with a large rule_cnt will allocate kernel
heap without clearing it. For the one driver (niu) that implements it,
it will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and copy the full
contents back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Fix the condition passed to sk_wait_event()</title>
<updated>2010-10-04T03:41:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nagendra Tomar</name>
<email>tomer_iisc@yahoo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-02T23:45:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=482964e56e1320cb7952faa1932d8ecf59c4bf75'/>
<id>482964e56e1320cb7952faa1932d8ecf59c4bf75</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes the condition (3rd arg) passed to sk_wait_event() in
sk_stream_wait_memory(). The incorrect check in sk_stream_wait_memory()
causes the following soft lockup in tcp_sendmsg() when the global tcp
memory pool has exhausted.

&gt;&gt;&gt; snip &lt;&lt;&lt;

localhost kernel: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 11s! [sshd:6429]
localhost kernel: CPU 3:
localhost kernel: RIP: 0010:[sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200]  [sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200
localhost kernel:
localhost kernel: Call Trace:
localhost kernel:  [sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200
localhost kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff802557c0&gt;] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel:  [ipv6:tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xe90] tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xce0
localhost kernel:  [sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140] sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140
localhost kernel:  [xfs:do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130] do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130
localhost kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff802557c0&gt;] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel:  [hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170] hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170
localhost kernel:  [vfs_write+0x185/0x190] vfs_write+0x185/0x190
localhost kernel:  [sys_write+0x50/0x90] sys_write+0x50/0x90
localhost kernel:  [system_call+0x7e/0x83] system_call+0x7e/0x83

&gt;&gt;&gt; snip &lt;&lt;&lt;

What is happening is, that the sk_wait_event() condition passed from
sk_stream_wait_memory() evaluates to true for the case of tcp global memory
exhaustion. This is because both sk_stream_memory_free() and vm_wait are true
which causes sk_wait_event() to *not* call schedule_timeout().
Hence sk_stream_wait_memory() returns immediately to the caller w/o sleeping.
This causes the caller to again try allocation, which again fails and again
calls sk_stream_wait_memory(), and so on.

[ Bug introduced by commit c1cbe4b7ad0bc4b1d98ea708a3fecb7362aa4088
  ("[NET]: Avoid atomic xchg() for non-error case") -DaveM ]

Signed-off-by: Nagendra Singh Tomar &lt;tomer_iisc@yahoo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch fixes the condition (3rd arg) passed to sk_wait_event() in
sk_stream_wait_memory(). The incorrect check in sk_stream_wait_memory()
causes the following soft lockup in tcp_sendmsg() when the global tcp
memory pool has exhausted.

&gt;&gt;&gt; snip &lt;&lt;&lt;

localhost kernel: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 11s! [sshd:6429]
localhost kernel: CPU 3:
localhost kernel: RIP: 0010:[sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200]  [sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200
localhost kernel:
localhost kernel: Call Trace:
localhost kernel:  [sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200
localhost kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff802557c0&gt;] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel:  [ipv6:tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xe90] tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xce0
localhost kernel:  [sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140] sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140
localhost kernel:  [xfs:do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130] do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130
localhost kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff802557c0&gt;] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel:  [hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170] hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170
localhost kernel:  [vfs_write+0x185/0x190] vfs_write+0x185/0x190
localhost kernel:  [sys_write+0x50/0x90] sys_write+0x50/0x90
localhost kernel:  [system_call+0x7e/0x83] system_call+0x7e/0x83

&gt;&gt;&gt; snip &lt;&lt;&lt;

What is happening is, that the sk_wait_event() condition passed from
sk_stream_wait_memory() evaluates to true for the case of tcp global memory
exhaustion. This is because both sk_stream_memory_free() and vm_wait are true
which causes sk_wait_event() to *not* call schedule_timeout().
Hence sk_stream_wait_memory() returns immediately to the caller w/o sleeping.
This causes the caller to again try allocation, which again fails and again
calls sk_stream_wait_memory(), and so on.

[ Bug introduced by commit c1cbe4b7ad0bc4b1d98ea708a3fecb7362aa4088
  ("[NET]: Avoid atomic xchg() for non-error case") -DaveM ]

Signed-off-by: Nagendra Singh Tomar &lt;tomer_iisc@yahoo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Fix &gt;4GB writes on 64-bit.</title>
<updated>2010-09-28T03:24:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2010-09-28T03:24:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=01db403cf99f739f86903314a489fb420e0e254f'/>
<id>01db403cf99f739f86903314a489fb420e0e254f</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes kernel bugzilla #16603

tcp_sendmsg() truncates iov_len to an 'int' which a 4GB write to write
zero bytes, for example.

There is also the problem higher up of how verify_iovec() works.  It
wants to prevent the total length from looking like an error return
value.

However it does this using 'int', but syscalls return 'long' (and
thus signed 64-bit on 64-bit machines).  So it could trigger
false-positives on 64-bit as written.  So fix it to use 'long'.

Reported-by: Olaf Bonorden &lt;bono@onlinehome.de&gt;
Reported-by: Daniel Büse &lt;dbuese@gmx.de&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fixes kernel bugzilla #16603

tcp_sendmsg() truncates iov_len to an 'int' which a 4GB write to write
zero bytes, for example.

There is also the problem higher up of how verify_iovec() works.  It
wants to prevent the total length from looking like an error return
value.

However it does this using 'int', but syscalls return 'long' (and
thus signed 64-bit on 64-bit machines).  So it could trigger
false-positives on 64-bit as written.  So fix it to use 'long'.

Reported-by: Olaf Bonorden &lt;bono@onlinehome.de&gt;
Reported-by: Daniel Büse &lt;dbuese@gmx.de&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix a lockdep splat</title>
<updated>2010-09-25T05:26:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-09-22T12:43:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f064af1e500a2bf4607706f0f458163bdb2a6ea5'/>
<id>f064af1e500a2bf4607706f0f458163bdb2a6ea5</id>
<content type='text'>
We have for each socket :

One spinlock (sk_slock.slock)
One rwlock (sk_callback_lock)

Possible scenarios are :

(A) (this is used in net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c)
read_lock(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock) (without blocking BH)
&lt;BH&gt;
spin_lock(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock.slock);
...
read_lock(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock);
...

(B)
write_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)
stuff
write_unlock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)

(C)
spin_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock)
...
write_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)
stuff
write_unlock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)
spin_unlock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock)

This (C) case conflicts with (A) :

CPU1 [A]                         CPU2 [C]
read_lock(callback_lock)
&lt;BH&gt;                             spin_lock_bh(slock)
&lt;wait to spin_lock(slock)&gt;
                                 &lt;wait to write_lock_bh(callback_lock)&gt;

We have one problematic (C) use case in inet_csk_listen_stop() :

local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(child); // spin_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock)
WARN_ON(sock_owned_by_user(child));
...
sock_orphan(child); // write_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)

lockdep is not happy with this, as reported by Tetsuo Handa

It seems only way to deal with this is to use read_lock_bh(callbacklock)
everywhere.

Thanks to Jarek for pointing a bug in my first attempt and suggesting
this solution.

Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Jarek Poplawski &lt;jarkao2@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
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We have for each socket :

One spinlock (sk_slock.slock)
One rwlock (sk_callback_lock)

Possible scenarios are :

(A) (this is used in net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c)
read_lock(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock) (without blocking BH)
&lt;BH&gt;
spin_lock(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock.slock);
...
read_lock(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock);
...

(B)
write_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)
stuff
write_unlock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)

(C)
spin_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock)
...
write_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)
stuff
write_unlock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)
spin_unlock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock)

This (C) case conflicts with (A) :

CPU1 [A]                         CPU2 [C]
read_lock(callback_lock)
&lt;BH&gt;                             spin_lock_bh(slock)
&lt;wait to spin_lock(slock)&gt;
                                 &lt;wait to write_lock_bh(callback_lock)&gt;

We have one problematic (C) use case in inet_csk_listen_stop() :

local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(child); // spin_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_slock)
WARN_ON(sock_owned_by_user(child));
...
sock_orphan(child); // write_lock_bh(&amp;sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock)

lockdep is not happy with this, as reported by Tetsuo Handa

It seems only way to deal with this is to use read_lock_bh(callbacklock)
everywhere.

Thanks to Jarek for pointing a bug in my first attempt and suggesting
this solution.

Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Jarek Poplawski &lt;jarkao2@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: use rcu_barrier() in rollback_registered_many</title>
<updated>2010-09-14T21:27:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-09-13T12:24:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ef885afbf8a37689afc1d9d545e2f3e7a8276c17'/>
<id>ef885afbf8a37689afc1d9d545e2f3e7a8276c17</id>
<content type='text'>
netdev_wait_allrefs() waits that all references to a device vanishes.

It currently uses a _very_ pessimistic 250 ms delay between each probe.
Some users reported that no more than 4 devices can be dismantled per
second, this is a pretty serious problem for some setups.

Most of the time, a refcount is about to be released by an RCU callback,
that is still in flight because rollback_registered_many() uses a
synchronize_rcu() call instead of rcu_barrier(). Problem is visible if
number of online cpus is one, because synchronize_rcu() is then a no op.

time to remove 50 ipip tunnels on a UP machine :

before patch : real 11.910s
after patch : real 1.250s

Reported-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Reported-by: Octavian Purdila &lt;opurdila@ixiacom.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benjamin LaHaise &lt;bcrl@kvack.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
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<pre>
netdev_wait_allrefs() waits that all references to a device vanishes.

It currently uses a _very_ pessimistic 250 ms delay between each probe.
Some users reported that no more than 4 devices can be dismantled per
second, this is a pretty serious problem for some setups.

Most of the time, a refcount is about to be released by an RCU callback,
that is still in flight because rollback_registered_many() uses a
synchronize_rcu() call instead of rcu_barrier(). Problem is visible if
number of online cpus is one, because synchronize_rcu() is then a no op.

time to remove 50 ipip tunnels on a UP machine :

before patch : real 11.910s
after patch : real 1.250s

Reported-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Reported-by: Octavian Purdila &lt;opurdila@ixiacom.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benjamin LaHaise &lt;bcrl@kvack.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
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</entry>
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