linux-toradex.git/net/core, branch v2.6.32.31

filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memory

2011-03-02T14:46:35+00:00

commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream.

There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about
uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound
to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by
hostile user.

Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is
expensive since most filters dont even use this array.

Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of
the jumps. This might be done later.

In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters
using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.

For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.

[ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
  and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
[Backported by dann frazier ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: release dst entry while cache-hot for GSO case too

2011-01-07T22:43:14+00:00

commit 068a2de57ddf4f472e32e7af868613c574ad1d88 upstream.

Non-GSO code drops dst entry for performance reasons, but
the same is missing for GSO code. Drop dst while cache-hot
for GSO case too.

Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar 
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: Limit socket I/O iovec total length to INT_MAX.

2010-12-09T21:27:13+00:00

commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.

This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers.  Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.

This works because:

1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
   writes are allowed and the application will just continue
   with another write to send the rest of the data.

2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
   one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
   packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
   than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
   check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.

Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: NETIF_F_HW_CSUM does not imply FCoE CRC offload

2010-12-09T21:26:44+00:00

commit 66c68bcc489fadd4f5e8839e966e3a366e50d1d5 upstream.

NETIF_F_HW_CSUM indicates the ability to update an TCP/IP-style 16-bit
checksum with the checksum of an arbitrary part of the packet data,
whereas the FCoE CRC is something entirely different.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: clear heap allocation for ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL

2010-12-09T21:26:34+00:00

commit ae6df5f96a51818d6376da5307d773baeece4014 upstream.

Calling ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL with a large rule_cnt will allocate kernel
heap without clearing it. For the one driver (niu) that implements it,
it will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and copy the full
contents back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: clear heap allocations for privileged ethtool actions

2010-10-29T04:44:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit b00916b189d13a615ff05c9242201135992fcda3 ]

Several other ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. Some interfaces appear safe (eeprom, etc), in that the sizes
are well controlled. In some situations (e.g. unchecked error conditions),
the heap will remain unchanged in areas before copying back to userspace.
Note that these are less of an issue since these all require CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: Fix the condition passed to sk_wait_event()

2010-10-29T04:44:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit 482964e56e1320cb7952faa1932d8ecf59c4bf75 ]

This patch fixes the condition (3rd arg) passed to sk_wait_event() in
sk_stream_wait_memory(). The incorrect check in sk_stream_wait_memory()
causes the following soft lockup in tcp_sendmsg() when the global tcp
memory pool has exhausted.

>>> snip <<<

localhost kernel: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 11s! [sshd:6429]
localhost kernel: CPU 3:
localhost kernel: RIP: 0010:[sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200]  [sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0xcd/0x200
localhost kernel:
localhost kernel: Call Trace:
localhost kernel:  [sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200] sk_stream_wait_memory+0x1b1/0x200
localhost kernel:  [] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel:  [ipv6:tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xe90] tcp_sendmsg+0x6e6/0xce0
localhost kernel:  [sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140] sock_aio_write+0x126/0x140
localhost kernel:  [xfs:do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130] do_sync_write+0xf1/0x130
localhost kernel:  [] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
localhost kernel:  [hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170] hrtimer_start+0xe3/0x170
localhost kernel:  [vfs_write+0x185/0x190] vfs_write+0x185/0x190
localhost kernel:  [sys_write+0x50/0x90] sys_write+0x50/0x90
localhost kernel:  [system_call+0x7e/0x83] system_call+0x7e/0x83

>>> snip <<<

What is happening is, that the sk_wait_event() condition passed from
sk_stream_wait_memory() evaluates to true for the case of tcp global memory
exhaustion. This is because both sk_stream_memory_free() and vm_wait are true
which causes sk_wait_event() to *not* call schedule_timeout().
Hence sk_stream_wait_memory() returns immediately to the caller w/o sleeping.
This causes the caller to again try allocation, which again fails and again
calls sk_stream_wait_memory(), and so on.

[ Bug introduced by commit c1cbe4b7ad0bc4b1d98ea708a3fecb7362aa4088
  ("[NET]: Avoid atomic xchg() for non-error case") -DaveM ]

Signed-off-by: Nagendra Singh Tomar 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: Fix >4GB writes on 64-bit.

2010-10-29T04:44:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit 01db403cf99f739f86903314a489fb420e0e254f ]

Fixes kernel bugzilla #16603

tcp_sendmsg() truncates iov_len to an 'int' which a 4GB write to write
zero bytes, for example.

There is also the problem higher up of how verify_iovec() works.  It
wants to prevent the total length from looking like an error return
value.

However it does this using 'int', but syscalls return 'long' (and
thus signed 64-bit on 64-bit machines).  So it could trigger
false-positives on 64-bit as written.  So fix it to use 'long'.

Reported-by: Olaf Bonorden 
Reported-by: Daniel Büse 
Reported-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

gro: Fix bogus gso_size on the first fraglist entry

2010-09-27T00:21:37+00:00

commit 622e0ca1cd4d459f5af4f2c65f4dc0dd823cb4c3 upstream.

When GRO produces fraglist entries, and the resulting skb hits
an interface that is incapable of TSO but capable of FRAGLIST,
we end up producing a bogus packet with gso_size non-zero.

This was reported in the field with older versions of KVM that
did not set the TSO bits on tuntap.

This patch fixes that.

Reported-by: Igor Zhang 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

gro: Re-fix different skb headrooms

2010-09-27T00:21:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 64289c8e6851bca0e589e064c9a5c9fbd6ae5dd4 ]

The patch: "gro: fix different skb headrooms" in its part:
"2) allocate a minimal skb for head of frag_list" is buggy. The copied
skb has p->data set at the ip header at the moment, and skb_gro_offset
is the length of ip + tcp headers. So, after the change the length of
mac header is skipped. Later skb_set_mac_header() sets it into the
NET_SKB_PAD area (if it's long enough) and ip header is misaligned at
NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN offset. There is no reason to assume the
original skb was wrongly allocated, so let's copy it as it was.

bugzilla : https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16626
fixes commit: 3d3be4333fdf6faa080947b331a6a19bce1a4f57

Reported-by: Plamen Petrov 
Signed-off-by: Jarek Poplawski 
CC: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet 
Tested-by: Plamen Petrov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman