<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/core, branch v4.2.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net/neighbour: fix crash at dumping device-agnostic proxy entries</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T05:25:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>koct9i@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-30T22:14:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=39b277a605e3ff7185f938e24c3a38d497a36061'/>
<id>39b277a605e3ff7185f938e24c3a38d497a36061</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e ]

Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e ]

Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in scm_detach_fds</title>
<updated>2015-12-15T05:25:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-19T23:11:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=72925cccf7f3aab4cd4b66c872b15882341ed5b4'/>
<id>72925cccf7f3aab4cd4b66c872b15882341ed5b4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ]

David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:

(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)

[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
               cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153]  ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162]  ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169]  ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190]  [&lt;ffffffff818129ba&gt;] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200]  [&lt;ffffffff8121f838&gt;] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209]  [&lt;ffffffff816a979e&gt;] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220]  [&lt;ffffffff81791899&gt;] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228]  [&lt;ffffffff81791c9f&gt;] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236]  [&lt;ffffffff8178dc00&gt;] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243]  [&lt;ffffffff8168fac7&gt;] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248]  [&lt;ffffffff81691522&gt;] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257]  [&lt;ffffffff81693496&gt;] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263]  [&lt;ffffffff816934fc&gt;] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271]  [&lt;ffffffff8181a3ab&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85

Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.

In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.

When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg-&gt;msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():

  int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int));  &lt;--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
  err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &amp;cm-&gt;cmsg_level);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &amp;cm-&gt;cmsg_type);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(cmlen, &amp;cm-&gt;cmsg_len);
  if (!err) {
    cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));  &lt;--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
    msg-&gt;msg_control += cmlen;
    msg-&gt;msg_controllen -= cmlen;         &lt;--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
  }                                            ... wrap-around

F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg-&gt;msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.

In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.

In practice, passing msg-&gt;msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg-&gt;msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg-&gt;msg_controllen
elsewhere.

Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).

Going over the code, it seems like msg-&gt;msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!

Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg-&gt;msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).

Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").

RFC3542, section 20.2. says:

  The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
  structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
  structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
  application may or may not include padding at the end of last
  ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
  as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
  padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
  copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
  include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
  if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
  including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
  may set MSG_CTRUNC.

Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.

Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).

No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).

Reported-by: David Sterba &lt;dave@jikos.cz&gt;
Reported-by: HacKurx &lt;hackurx@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: PaX Team &lt;pageexec@freemail.hu&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Brad Spengler &lt;spender@grsecurity.net&gt;
Cc: Wei Yongjun &lt;yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ]

David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:

(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)

[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
               cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153]  ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162]  ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169]  ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190]  [&lt;ffffffff818129ba&gt;] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200]  [&lt;ffffffff8121f838&gt;] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209]  [&lt;ffffffff816a979e&gt;] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220]  [&lt;ffffffff81791899&gt;] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228]  [&lt;ffffffff81791c9f&gt;] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236]  [&lt;ffffffff8178dc00&gt;] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243]  [&lt;ffffffff8168fac7&gt;] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248]  [&lt;ffffffff81691522&gt;] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257]  [&lt;ffffffff81693496&gt;] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263]  [&lt;ffffffff816934fc&gt;] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271]  [&lt;ffffffff8181a3ab&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85

Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.

In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.

When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg-&gt;msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():

  int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int));  &lt;--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
  err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &amp;cm-&gt;cmsg_level);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &amp;cm-&gt;cmsg_type);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(cmlen, &amp;cm-&gt;cmsg_len);
  if (!err) {
    cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));  &lt;--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
    msg-&gt;msg_control += cmlen;
    msg-&gt;msg_controllen -= cmlen;         &lt;--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
  }                                            ... wrap-around

F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg-&gt;msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.

In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.

In practice, passing msg-&gt;msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg-&gt;msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg-&gt;msg_controllen
elsewhere.

Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).

Going over the code, it seems like msg-&gt;msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!

Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg-&gt;msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).

Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").

RFC3542, section 20.2. says:

  The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
  structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
  structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
  application may or may not include padding at the end of last
  ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
  as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
  padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
  copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
  include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
  if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
  including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
  may set MSG_CTRUNC.

Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.

Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).

No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).

Reported-by: David Sterba &lt;dave@jikos.cz&gt;
Reported-by: HacKurx &lt;hackurx@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: PaX Team &lt;pageexec@freemail.hu&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Brad Spengler &lt;spender@grsecurity.net&gt;
Cc: Wei Yongjun &lt;yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix a race in dst_release()</title>
<updated>2015-12-09T19:31:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-10T01:51:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fa3ef2632e218ea0db67930a5302e17123d71d39'/>
<id>fa3ef2632e218ea0db67930a5302e17123d71d39</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d69bbf88c8d0b367cf3e3a052f6daadf630ee566 ]

Only cpu seeing dst refcount going to 0 can safely
dereference dst-&gt;flags.

Otherwise an other cpu might already have freed the dst.

Fixes: 27b75c95f10d ("net: avoid RCU for NOCACHE dst")
Reported-by: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d69bbf88c8d0b367cf3e3a052f6daadf630ee566 ]

Only cpu seeing dst refcount going to 0 can safely
dereference dst-&gt;flags.

Otherwise an other cpu might already have freed the dst.

Fixes: 27b75c95f10d ("net: avoid RCU for NOCACHE dst")
Reported-by: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ethtool: Use kcalloc instead of kmalloc for ethtool_get_strings</title>
<updated>2015-10-27T00:53:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-14T08:09:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=47f3f4f50d6f1f172e9d5911e8ff73c1ea3e2eb4'/>
<id>47f3f4f50d6f1f172e9d5911e8ff73c1ea3e2eb4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 077cb37fcf6f00a45f375161200b5ee0cd4e937b ]

It seems that kernel memory can leak into userspace by a
kmalloc, ethtool_get_strings, then copy_to_user sequence.

Avoid this by using kcalloc to zero fill the copied buffer.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 077cb37fcf6f00a45f375161200b5ee0cd4e937b ]

It seems that kernel memory can leak into userspace by a
kmalloc, ethtool_get_strings, then copy_to_user sequence.

Avoid this by using kcalloc to zero fill the copied buffer.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: clear sender_cpu before xmit</title>
<updated>2015-10-27T00:53:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@plumgrid.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-07T03:46:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7ead98c6d585f756740c4a545c91517c0ef7984f'/>
<id>7ead98c6d585f756740c4a545c91517c0ef7984f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6bf0577374cfb6c2301dbf4934a4f23ad3d72763 ]

Similar to commit c29390c6dfee ("xps: must clear sender_cpu before forwarding")
the skb-&gt;sender_cpu needs to be cleared before xmit.

Fixes: 3896d655f4d4 ("bpf: introduce bpf_clone_redirect() helper")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6bf0577374cfb6c2301dbf4934a4f23ad3d72763 ]

Similar to commit c29390c6dfee ("xps: must clear sender_cpu before forwarding")
the skb-&gt;sender_cpu needs to be cleared before xmit.

Fixes: 3896d655f4d4 ("bpf: introduce bpf_clone_redirect() helper")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix panic in SO_GET_FILTER with native ebpf programs</title>
<updated>2015-10-27T00:53:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-02T10:06:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7893724d1066f09f474639ba2cfe2a7160fd9e28'/>
<id>7893724d1066f09f474639ba2cfe2a7160fd9e28</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 93d08b6966cf730ea669d4d98f43627597077153 ]

When sockets have a native eBPF program attached through
setsockopt(sk, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_BPF, ...), and then try to
dump these over getsockopt(sk, SOL_SOCKET, SO_GET_FILTER, ...),
the following panic appears:

  [49904.178642] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
  [49904.178762] IP: [&lt;ffffffff81610fd9&gt;] sk_get_filter+0x39/0x90
  [49904.182000] PGD 86fc9067 PUD 531a1067 PMD 0
  [49904.185196] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  [...]
  [49904.224677] Call Trace:
  [49904.226090]  [&lt;ffffffff815e3d49&gt;] sock_getsockopt+0x319/0x740
  [49904.227535]  [&lt;ffffffff812f59e3&gt;] ? sock_has_perm+0x63/0x70
  [49904.228953]  [&lt;ffffffff815e2fc8&gt;] ? release_sock+0x108/0x150
  [49904.230380]  [&lt;ffffffff812f5a43&gt;] ? selinux_socket_getsockopt+0x23/0x30
  [49904.231788]  [&lt;ffffffff815dff36&gt;] SyS_getsockopt+0xa6/0xc0
  [49904.233267]  [&lt;ffffffff8171b9ae&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71

The underlying issue is the very same as in commit b382c0865600
("sock, diag: fix panic in sock_diag_put_filterinfo"), that is,
native eBPF programs don't store an original program since this
is only needed in cBPF ones.

However, sk_get_filter() wasn't updated to test for this at the
time when eBPF could be attached. Just throw an error to the user
to indicate that eBPF cannot be dumped over this interface.
That way, it can also be known that a program _is_ attached (as
opposed to just return 0), and a different (future) method needs
to be consulted for a dump.

Fixes: 89aa075832b0 ("net: sock: allow eBPF programs to be attached to sockets")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 93d08b6966cf730ea669d4d98f43627597077153 ]

When sockets have a native eBPF program attached through
setsockopt(sk, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_BPF, ...), and then try to
dump these over getsockopt(sk, SOL_SOCKET, SO_GET_FILTER, ...),
the following panic appears:

  [49904.178642] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
  [49904.178762] IP: [&lt;ffffffff81610fd9&gt;] sk_get_filter+0x39/0x90
  [49904.182000] PGD 86fc9067 PUD 531a1067 PMD 0
  [49904.185196] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  [...]
  [49904.224677] Call Trace:
  [49904.226090]  [&lt;ffffffff815e3d49&gt;] sock_getsockopt+0x319/0x740
  [49904.227535]  [&lt;ffffffff812f59e3&gt;] ? sock_has_perm+0x63/0x70
  [49904.228953]  [&lt;ffffffff815e2fc8&gt;] ? release_sock+0x108/0x150
  [49904.230380]  [&lt;ffffffff812f5a43&gt;] ? selinux_socket_getsockopt+0x23/0x30
  [49904.231788]  [&lt;ffffffff815dff36&gt;] SyS_getsockopt+0xa6/0xc0
  [49904.233267]  [&lt;ffffffff8171b9ae&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71

The underlying issue is the very same as in commit b382c0865600
("sock, diag: fix panic in sock_diag_put_filterinfo"), that is,
native eBPF programs don't store an original program since this
is only needed in cBPF ones.

However, sk_get_filter() wasn't updated to test for this at the
time when eBPF could be attached. Just throw an error to the user
to indicate that eBPF cannot be dumped over this interface.
That way, it can also be known that a program _is_ attached (as
opposed to just return 0), and a different (future) method needs
to be consulted for a dump.

Fixes: 89aa075832b0 ("net: sock: allow eBPF programs to be attached to sockets")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>skbuff: Fix skb checksum partial check.</title>
<updated>2015-10-27T00:53:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pravin B Shelar</name>
<email>pshelar@nicira.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-29T00:24:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dbce2220803222ccdaca8a22a4df9688738dbbc6'/>
<id>dbce2220803222ccdaca8a22a4df9688738dbbc6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 31b33dfb0a144469dd805514c9e63f4993729a48 ]

Earlier patch 6ae459bda tried to detect void ckecksum partial
skb by comparing pull length to checksum offset. But it does
not work for all cases since checksum-offset depends on
updates to skb-&gt;data.

Following patch fixes it by validating checksum start offset
after skb-data pointer is updated. Negative value of checksum
offset start means there is no need to checksum.

Fixes: 6ae459bda ("skbuff: Fix skb checksum flag on skb pull")
Reported-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@odin.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar &lt;pshelar@nicira.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 31b33dfb0a144469dd805514c9e63f4993729a48 ]

Earlier patch 6ae459bda tried to detect void ckecksum partial
skb by comparing pull length to checksum offset. But it does
not work for all cases since checksum-offset depends on
updates to skb-&gt;data.

Following patch fixes it by validating checksum start offset
after skb-data pointer is updated. Negative value of checksum
offset start means there is no need to checksum.

Fixes: 6ae459bda ("skbuff: Fix skb checksum flag on skb pull")
Reported-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@odin.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar &lt;pshelar@nicira.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fib_rules: fix fib rule dumps across multiple skbs</title>
<updated>2015-10-03T11:51:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wilson Kok</name>
<email>wkok@cumulusnetworks.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-23T04:40:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=45c191bb3aabf6df3db4ba5e94dd24b96edf6ab5'/>
<id>45c191bb3aabf6df3db4ba5e94dd24b96edf6ab5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 41fc014332d91ee90c32840bf161f9685b7fbf2b ]

dump_rules returns skb length and not error.
But when family == AF_UNSPEC, the caller of dump_rules
assumes that it returns an error. Hence, when family == AF_UNSPEC,
we continue trying to dump on -EMSGSIZE errors resulting in
incorrect dump idx carried between skbs belonging to the same dump.
This results in fib rule dump always only dumping rules that fit
into the first skb.

This patch fixes dump_rules to return error so that we exit correctly
and idx is correctly maintained between skbs that are part of the
same dump.

Signed-off-by: Wilson Kok &lt;wkok@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 41fc014332d91ee90c32840bf161f9685b7fbf2b ]

dump_rules returns skb length and not error.
But when family == AF_UNSPEC, the caller of dump_rules
assumes that it returns an error. Hence, when family == AF_UNSPEC,
we continue trying to dump on -EMSGSIZE errors resulting in
incorrect dump idx carried between skbs belonging to the same dump.
This results in fib rule dump always only dumping rules that fit
into the first skb.

This patch fixes dump_rules to return error so that we exit correctly
and idx is correctly maintained between skbs that are part of the
same dump.

Signed-off-by: Wilson Kok &lt;wkok@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rtnetlink: catch -EOPNOTSUPP errors from ndo_bridge_getlink</title>
<updated>2015-10-03T11:51:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roopa Prabhu</name>
<email>roopa@cumulusnetworks.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-15T21:44:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=065b4761929a2315ddcc2f4356a9efbd6d105d0e'/>
<id>065b4761929a2315ddcc2f4356a9efbd6d105d0e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d64f69b0373a7d0bcec8b5da7712977518a8f42b ]

problem reported:
	kernel 4.1.3
	------------
	# bridge vlan
	port	vlan ids
	eth0	 1 PVID Egress Untagged
	 	90
	 	91
	 	92
	 	93
	 	94
	 	95
	 	96
	 	97
	 	98
	 	99
	 	100

	vmbr0	 1 PVID Egress Untagged
	 	94

	kernel 4.2
	-----------
	# bridge vlan
	port	vlan ids

ndo_bridge_getlink can return -EOPNOTSUPP when an interfaces
ndo_bridge_getlink op is set to switchdev_port_bridge_getlink
and CONFIG_SWITCHDEV is not defined. This today can happen to
bond, rocker and team devices. This patch adds -EOPNOTSUPP
checks after calls to ndo_bridge_getlink.

Fixes: 85fdb956726ff2a ("switchdev: cut over to new switchdev_port_bridge_getlink")
Reported-by: Alexandre DERUMIER &lt;aderumier@odiso.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d64f69b0373a7d0bcec8b5da7712977518a8f42b ]

problem reported:
	kernel 4.1.3
	------------
	# bridge vlan
	port	vlan ids
	eth0	 1 PVID Egress Untagged
	 	90
	 	91
	 	92
	 	93
	 	94
	 	95
	 	96
	 	97
	 	98
	 	99
	 	100

	vmbr0	 1 PVID Egress Untagged
	 	94

	kernel 4.2
	-----------
	# bridge vlan
	port	vlan ids

ndo_bridge_getlink can return -EOPNOTSUPP when an interfaces
ndo_bridge_getlink op is set to switchdev_port_bridge_getlink
and CONFIG_SWITCHDEV is not defined. This today can happen to
bond, rocker and team devices. This patch adds -EOPNOTSUPP
checks after calls to ndo_bridge_getlink.

Fixes: 85fdb956726ff2a ("switchdev: cut over to new switchdev_port_bridge_getlink")
Reported-by: Alexandre DERUMIER &lt;aderumier@odiso.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sock, diag: fix panic in sock_diag_put_filterinfo</title>
<updated>2015-10-03T11:51:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-02T12:00:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4230591d474281936dc03c37d0177f6015aedaea'/>
<id>4230591d474281936dc03c37d0177f6015aedaea</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b382c08656000c12a146723a153b85b13a855b49 ]

diag socket's sock_diag_put_filterinfo() dumps classic BPF programs
upon request to user space (ss -0 -b). However, native eBPF programs
attached to sockets (SO_ATTACH_BPF) cannot be dumped with this method:

Their orig_prog is always NULL. However, sock_diag_put_filterinfo()
unconditionally tries to access its filter length resp. wants to copy
the filter insns from there. Internal cBPF to eBPF transformations
attached to sockets don't have this issue, as orig_prog state is kept.

It's currently only used by packet sockets. If we would want to add
native eBPF support in the future, this needs to be done through
a different attribute than PACKET_DIAG_FILTER to not confuse possible
user space disassemblers that work on diag data.

Fixes: 89aa075832b0 ("net: sock: allow eBPF programs to be attached to sockets")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b382c08656000c12a146723a153b85b13a855b49 ]

diag socket's sock_diag_put_filterinfo() dumps classic BPF programs
upon request to user space (ss -0 -b). However, native eBPF programs
attached to sockets (SO_ATTACH_BPF) cannot be dumped with this method:

Their orig_prog is always NULL. However, sock_diag_put_filterinfo()
unconditionally tries to access its filter length resp. wants to copy
the filter insns from there. Internal cBPF to eBPF transformations
attached to sockets don't have this issue, as orig_prog state is kept.

It's currently only used by packet sockets. If we would want to add
native eBPF support in the future, this needs to be done through
a different attribute than PACKET_DIAG_FILTER to not confuse possible
user space disassemblers that work on diag data.

Fixes: 89aa075832b0 ("net: sock: allow eBPF programs to be attached to sockets")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@plumgrid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
