[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The following call chain indicates that dcb_doit() is protected
under rtnl_lock. So if we use __dev_get_by_name() instead of
dev_get_by_name() to find interface handlers in it, this would
help us avoid to change interface reference counter.

rtnetlink_rcv()
  rtnl_lock()
  netlink_rcv_skb()
    dcb_doit()
  rtnl_unlock()

Cc: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Several files refer to an old address for the Free Software Foundation
in the file header comment.  Resolve by replacing the address with
the URL <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> so that we do not have to keep
updating the header comments anytime the address changes.

CC: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
CC: Alex Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
CC: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
CC: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

With decnet converted, we can finally get rid of rta_buf and its
computations around it. It also gets rid of the minimal header
length verification since all message handlers do that explicitly
anyway.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Conflicts:
	drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c

Minor conflict in e1000e, a line that got fixed in 'net'
has been removed in 'net-next'.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
  copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
  so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
  for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
  struct,

Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add header with function definitions to quiet warnings and avoid future errors.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Allow DCB and net namespace to work together. This is useful if you
have containers that are bound to 'phys' interfaces that want to
also manage their DCB attributes.

The net namespace is taken from sock_net(skb->sk) of the netlink skb.

CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- In rtnetlink_rcv_msg convert the capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) check
  to ns_capable(net->user-ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN).  Allowing unprivileged
  users to make netlink calls to modify their local network
  namespace.

- In the rtnetlink doit methods add capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) so
  that calls that are not safe for unprivileged users are still
  protected.

Later patches will remove the extra capable calls from methods
that are safe for unprivilged users.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It is a frequent mistake to confuse the netlink port identifier with a
process identifier.  Try to reduce this confusion by renaming fields
that hold port identifiers portid instead of pid.

I have carefully avoided changing the structures exported to
userspace to avoid changing the userspace API.

I have successfully built an allyesconfig kernel with this change.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>