[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Reduce the uses of this unnecessary typedef.

Done via perl script:

$ git grep --name-only -w ctl_table net | \
  xargs perl -p -i -e '\
	sub trim { my ($local) = @_; $local =~ s/(^\s+|\s+$)//g; return $local; } \
        s/\b(?<!struct\s)ctl_table\b(\s*\*\s*|\s+\w+)/"struct ctl_table " . trim($1)/ge'

Reflow the modified lines that now exceed 80 columns.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

With decnet converted, we can finally get rid of rta_buf and its
computations around it. It also gets rid of the minimal header
length verification since all message handlers do that explicitly
anyway.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

proc_net_remove is only used to remove proc entries
that under /proc/net,it's not a general function for
removing proc entries of netns. if we want to remove
some proc entries which under /proc/net/stat/, we still
need to call remove_proc_entry.

this patch use remove_proc_entry to replace proc_net_remove.
we can remove proc_net_remove after this patch.

Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Right now, some modules such as bonding use proc_create
to create proc entries under /proc/net/, and other modules
such as ipv4 use proc_net_fops_create.

It looks a little chaos.this patch changes all of
proc_net_fops_create to proc_create. we can remove
proc_net_fops_create after this patch.

Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- In rtnetlink_rcv_msg convert the capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) check
  to ns_capable(net->user-ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN).  Allowing unprivileged
  users to make netlink calls to modify their local network
  namespace.

- In the rtnetlink doit methods add capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) so
  that calls that are not safe for unprivileged users are still
  protected.

Later patches will remove the extra capable calls from methods
that are safe for unprivilged users.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It is a frequent mistake to confuse the netlink port identifier with a
process identifier.  Try to reduce this confusion by renaming fields
that hold port identifiers portid instead of pid.

I have carefully avoided changing the structures exported to
userspace to avoid changing the userspace API.

I have successfully built an allyesconfig kernel with this change.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Using an ascii path to register_net_sysctl as opposed to the slightly
awkward ctl_path allows for much simpler code.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This makes it clearer which sysctls are relative to your current network
namespace.

This makes it a little less error prone by not exposing sysctls for the
initial network namespace in other namespaces.

This is the same way we handle all of our other network interfaces to
userspace and I can't honestly remember why we didn't do this for
sysctls right from the start.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>