<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/ipv4, branch v2.6.16.26</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] NETFILTER: SCTP conntrack: fix crash triggered by packet without chunks [CVE-2006-2934]</title>
<updated>2006-06-30T21:06:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrick McHardy</name>
<email>kaber@trash.net</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-30T03:33:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=70a00d8615ea4c408978d6efc23c89d4e7c12518'/>
<id>70a00d8615ea4c408978d6efc23c89d4e7c12518</id>
<content type='text'>
When a packet without any chunks is received, the newconntrack variable
in sctp_packet contains an out of bounds value that is used to look up an
pointer from the array of timeouts, which is then dereferenced, resulting
in a crash. Make sure at least a single chunk is present.

Problem noticed by George A. Theall &lt;theall@tenablesecurity.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
When a packet without any chunks is received, the newconntrack variable
in sctp_packet contains an out of bounds value that is used to look up an
pointer from the array of timeouts, which is then dereferenced, resulting
in a crash. Make sure at least a single chunk is present.

Problem noticed by George A. Theall &lt;theall@tenablesecurity.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] NETFILTER: Fix small information leak in SO_ORIGINAL_DST (CVE-2006-1343)</title>
<updated>2006-05-31T00:31:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcel Holtmann</name>
<email>marcel@holtmann.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-26T11:50:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=11091f6a4a11feb5794aef9307c428838129ea02'/>
<id>11091f6a4a11feb5794aef9307c428838129ea02</id>
<content type='text'>
It appears that sockaddr_in.sin_zero is not zeroed during
getsockopt(...SO_ORIGINAL_DST...) operation. This can lead
to an information leak (CVE-2006-1343).

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
It appears that sockaddr_in.sin_zero is not zeroed during
getsockopt(...SO_ORIGINAL_DST...) operation. This can lead
to an information leak (CVE-2006-1343).

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] NETFILTER: SNMP NAT: fix memory corruption (CVE-2006-2444)</title>
<updated>2006-05-22T18:04:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrick McHardy</name>
<email>kaber@trash.net</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-20T07:31:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1db6b5a66e93ff125ab871d6b3f7363412cc87e8'/>
<id>1db6b5a66e93ff125ab871d6b3f7363412cc87e8</id>
<content type='text'>
CVE-2006-2444 - Potential remote DoS in SNMP NAT helper.

Fix memory corruption caused by snmp_trap_decode:

- When snmp_trap_decode fails before the id and address are allocated,
  the pointers contain random memory, but are freed by the caller
  (snmp_parse_mangle).

- When snmp_trap_decode fails after allocating just the ID, it tries
  to free both address and ID, but the address pointer still contains
  random memory. The caller frees both ID and random memory again.

- When snmp_trap_decode fails after allocating both, it frees both,
  and the callers frees both again.

The corruption can be triggered remotely when the ip_nat_snmp_basic
module is loaded and traffic on port 161 or 162 is NATed.

Found by multiple testcases of the trap-app and trap-enc groups of the
PROTOS c06-snmpv1 testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
CVE-2006-2444 - Potential remote DoS in SNMP NAT helper.

Fix memory corruption caused by snmp_trap_decode:

- When snmp_trap_decode fails before the id and address are allocated,
  the pointers contain random memory, but are freed by the caller
  (snmp_parse_mangle).

- When snmp_trap_decode fails after allocating just the ID, it tries
  to free both address and ID, but the address pointer still contains
  random memory. The caller frees both ID and random memory again.

- When snmp_trap_decode fails after allocating both, it frees both,
  and the callers frees both again.

The corruption can be triggered remotely when the ip_nat_snmp_basic
module is loaded and traffic on port 161 or 162 is NATed.

Found by multiple testcases of the trap-app and trap-enc groups of the
PROTOS c06-snmpv1 testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Netfilter: do_add_counters race, possible oops or info leak (CVE-2006-0039)</title>
<updated>2006-05-20T22:00:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Wright</name>
<email>chrisw@sous-sol.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-16T19:07:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=893acf3cd9ad9df7ccb582c009c3759abede330b'/>
<id>893acf3cd9ad9df7ccb582c009c3759abede330b</id>
<content type='text'>
Solar Designer found a race condition in do_add_counters(). The beginning
of paddc is supposed to be the same as tmp which was sanity-checked
above, but it might not be the same in reality. In case the integer
overflow and/or the race condition are triggered, paddc-&gt;num_counters
might not match the allocation size for paddc. If the check below
(t-&gt;private-&gt;number != paddc-&gt;num_counters) nevertheless passes (perhaps
this requires the race condition to be triggered), IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE()
would read kernel memory beyond the allocation size, potentially causing
an oops or leaking sensitive data (e.g., passwords from host system or
from another VPS) via counter increments.  This requires CAP_NET_ADMIN.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=191698

Cc: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill Korotaev &lt;dev@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
(chrisw: rebase of Kirill's patch to 2.6.16.16)
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Solar Designer found a race condition in do_add_counters(). The beginning
of paddc is supposed to be the same as tmp which was sanity-checked
above, but it might not be the same in reality. In case the integer
overflow and/or the race condition are triggered, paddc-&gt;num_counters
might not match the allocation size for paddc. If the check below
(t-&gt;private-&gt;number != paddc-&gt;num_counters) nevertheless passes (perhaps
this requires the race condition to be triggered), IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE()
would read kernel memory beyond the allocation size, potentially causing
an oops or leaking sensitive data (e.g., passwords from host system or
from another VPS) via counter increments.  This requires CAP_NET_ADMIN.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=191698

Cc: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill Korotaev &lt;dev@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
(chrisw: rebase of Kirill's patch to 2.6.16.16)
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] NETFILTER: SCTP conntrack: fix infinite loop (CVE-2006-1527)</title>
<updated>2006-05-02T21:38:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrick McHardy</name>
<email>kaber@trash.net</email>
</author>
<published>2006-05-02T21:23:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=25b6badde42165b717e3c232e4992b3f6761920a'/>
<id>25b6badde42165b717e3c232e4992b3f6761920a</id>
<content type='text'>
[NETFILTER]: SCTP conntrack: fix infinite loop

fix infinite loop in the SCTP-netfilter code: check SCTP chunk size to
guarantee progress of for_each_sctp_chunk(). (all other uses of
for_each_sctp_chunk() are preceded by do_basic_checks(), so this fix
should be complete.)

Based on patch from Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[NETFILTER]: SCTP conntrack: fix infinite loop

fix infinite loop in the SCTP-netfilter code: check SCTP chunk size to
guarantee progress of for_each_sctp_chunk(). (all other uses of
for_each_sctp_chunk() are preceded by do_basic_checks(), so this fix
should be complete.)

Based on patch from Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix truesize underflow</title>
<updated>2006-04-24T16:56:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-19T04:43:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5d0b6f2bdaf7e016e750cd24164a241512d968a3'/>
<id>5d0b6f2bdaf7e016e750cd24164a241512d968a3</id>
<content type='text'>
[TCP]: Fix truesize underflow

There is a problem with the TSO packet trimming code.  The cause of
this lies in the tcp_fragment() function.

When we allocate a fragment for a completely non-linear packet the
truesize is calculated for a payload length of zero.  This means that
truesize could in fact be less than the real payload length.

When that happens the TSO packet trimming can cause truesize to become
negative.  This in turn can cause sk_forward_alloc to be -n * PAGE_SIZE
which would trigger the warning.

I've copied the code DaveM used in tso_fragment which should work here.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[TCP]: Fix truesize underflow

There is a problem with the TSO packet trimming code.  The cause of
this lies in the tcp_fragment() function.

When we allocate a fragment for a completely non-linear packet the
truesize is calculated for a payload length of zero.  This means that
truesize could in fact be less than the real payload length.

When that happens the TSO packet trimming can cause truesize to become
negative.  This in turn can cause sk_forward_alloc to be -n * PAGE_SIZE
which would trigger the warning.

I've copied the code DaveM used in tso_fragment which should work here.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] ip_route_input panic fix (CVE-2006-1525)</title>
<updated>2006-04-18T21:31:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Hemminger</name>
<email>shemminger@osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-18T00:27:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a0b277b4fdcbc24c26af7c5d019e9448a51c79cf'/>
<id>a0b277b4fdcbc24c26af7c5d019e9448a51c79cf</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6388
The bug is caused by ip_route_input dereferencing skb-&gt;nh.protocol of
the dummy skb passed dow from inet_rtm_getroute (Thanks Thomas for seeing
it). It only happens if the route requested is for a multicast IP
address.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This fixes http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6388
The bug is caused by ip_route_input dereferencing skb-&gt;nh.protocol of
the dummy skb passed dow from inet_rtm_getroute (Thanks Thomas for seeing
it). It only happens if the route requested is for a multicast IP
address.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] NETFILTER: Fix fragmentation issues with bridge netfilter</title>
<updated>2006-04-17T20:16:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrick McHardy</name>
<email>kaber@trash.net</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-06T16:51:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ea0fcdd684262eed42bb40cceff450ef46a97306'/>
<id>ea0fcdd684262eed42bb40cceff450ef46a97306</id>
<content type='text'>
[NETFILTER]: Fix fragmentation issues with bridge netfilter

The conntrack code doesn't do re-fragmentation of defragmented packets
anymore but relies on fragmentation in the IP layer. Purely bridged
packets don't pass through the IP layer, so the bridge netfilter code
needs to take care of fragmentation itself.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
[NETFILTER]: Fix fragmentation issues with bridge netfilter

The conntrack code doesn't do re-fragmentation of defragmented packets
anymore but relies on fragmentation in the IP layer. Purely bridged
packets don't pass through the IP layer, so the bridge netfilter code
needs to take care of fragmentation itself.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] fib_trie.c node freeing fix</title>
<updated>2006-04-07T16:44:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-04T20:26:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=41ccbdde2b1ee3f69def6ec3b3a416abae95c25a'/>
<id>41ccbdde2b1ee3f69def6ec3b3a416abae95c25a</id>
<content type='text'>
Please apply to 2.6.{14,15,16} -stable, thanks a lot.

From: Robert Olsson &lt;robert.olsson@its.uu.se&gt;

[FIB_TRIE]: Fix leaf freeing.

Seems like leaf (end-nodes) has been freed by __tnode_free_rcu and not
by __leaf_free_rcu. This fixes the problem. Only tnode_free is now
used which checks for appropriate node type. free_leaf can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Robert Olsson &lt;robert.olsson@its.uu.se&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
Please apply to 2.6.{14,15,16} -stable, thanks a lot.

From: Robert Olsson &lt;robert.olsson@its.uu.se&gt;

[FIB_TRIE]: Fix leaf freeing.

Seems like leaf (end-nodes) has been freed by __tnode_free_rcu and not
by __leaf_free_rcu. This fixes the problem. Only tnode_free is now
used which checks for appropriate node type. free_leaf can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Robert Olsson &lt;robert.olsson@its.uu.se&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] {ip, nf}_conntrack_netlink: fix expectation notifier unregistration</title>
<updated>2006-04-07T16:44:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Josefsson</name>
<email>gandalf@wlug.westbo.se</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-03T08:47:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=334ed376d2b23896061520648dc7113c5c4ffb0b'/>
<id>334ed376d2b23896061520648dc7113c5c4ffb0b</id>
<content type='text'>
[NETFILTER]: {ip,nf}_conntrack_netlink: fix expectation notifier unregistration

This patch fixes expectation notifier unregistration on module unload to
use ip_conntrack_expect_unregister_notifier(). This bug causes a soft
lockup at the first expectation created after a rmmod ; insmod of this
module.

Should go into -stable as well.

Signed-off-by: Martin Josefsson &lt;gandalf@wlug.westbo.se&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[NETFILTER]: {ip,nf}_conntrack_netlink: fix expectation notifier unregistration

This patch fixes expectation notifier unregistration on module unload to
use ip_conntrack_expect_unregister_notifier(). This bug causes a soft
lockup at the first expectation created after a rmmod ; insmod of this
module.

Should go into -stable as well.

Signed-off-by: Martin Josefsson &lt;gandalf@wlug.westbo.se&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
