<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/ipv4, branch v2.6.25.20</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: restore lost ifdef guarding defrag exception</title>
<updated>2008-11-10T18:50:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrick McHardy</name>
<email>kaber@trash.net</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-22T17:41:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8419d2eafe89d96cc9e5212dd9effa241ae391bc'/>
<id>8419d2eafe89d96cc9e5212dd9effa241ae391bc</id>
<content type='text'>
netfilter: restore lost #ifdef guarding defrag exception

Upstream commit 38f7ac3eb:

Nir Tzachar &lt;nir.tzachar@gmail.com&gt; reported a warning when sending
fragments over loopback with NAT:

[ 6658.338121] WARNING: at net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_standalone.c:89 nf_nat_fn+0x33/0x155()

The reason is that defragmentation is skipped for already tracked connections.
This is wrong in combination with NAT and ip_conntrack actually had some ifdefs
to avoid this behaviour when NAT is compiled in.

The entire "optimization" may seem a bit silly, for now simply restoring the
lost #ifdef is the easiest solution until we can come up with something better.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
netfilter: restore lost #ifdef guarding defrag exception

Upstream commit 38f7ac3eb:

Nir Tzachar &lt;nir.tzachar@gmail.com&gt; reported a warning when sending
fragments over loopback with NAT:

[ 6658.338121] WARNING: at net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_standalone.c:89 nf_nat_fn+0x33/0x155()

The reason is that defragmentation is skipped for already tracked connections.
This is wrong in combination with NAT and ip_conntrack actually had some ifdefs
to avoid this behaviour when NAT is compiled in.

The entire "optimization" may seem a bit silly, for now simply restoring the
lost #ifdef is the easiest solution until we can come up with something better.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: snmp nat leaks memory in case of failure</title>
<updated>2008-11-10T18:50:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilpo Järvinen</name>
<email>ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-22T17:41:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1f1b1c633ad952ea13eb36a09c6edb4748967d07'/>
<id>1f1b1c633ad952ea13eb36a09c6edb4748967d07</id>
<content type='text'>
netfilter: snmp nat leaks memory in case of failure

Upstream commit 311670f3e:

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Jarvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
netfilter: snmp nat leaks memory in case of failure

Upstream commit 311670f3e:

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Jarvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: Fix rcv socket locking</title>
<updated>2008-10-09T02:44:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2008-09-15T18:48:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8c4d2d9f936a353f3336fd521341826a70e0a9fd'/>
<id>8c4d2d9f936a353f3336fd521341826a70e0a9fd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commits d97106ea52aa57e63ff40d04479016836bbb5a4e and
   93821778def10ec1e69aa3ac10adee975dad4ff3 ]

The previous patch in response to the recursive locking on IPsec
reception is broken as it tries to drop the BH socket lock while in
user context.

This patch fixes it by shrinking the section protected by the
socket lock to sock_queue_rcv_skb only.  The only reason we added
the lock is for the accounting which happens in that function.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commits d97106ea52aa57e63ff40d04479016836bbb5a4e and
   93821778def10ec1e69aa3ac10adee975dad4ff3 ]

The previous patch in response to the recursive locking on IPsec
reception is broken as it tries to drop the BH socket lock while in
user context.

This patch fixes it by shrinking the section protected by the
socket lock to sock_queue_rcv_skb only.  The only reason we added
the lock is for the accounting which happens in that function.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: fix a range check in NAT for SNMP</title>
<updated>2008-08-20T18:15:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-09T22:06:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c119d39883ca9a7016a37fc701f7cbe7c3d03956'/>
<id>c119d39883ca9a7016a37fc701f7cbe7c3d03956</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 252815b0cfe711001eff0327872209986b36d490 upstream

Fix a range check in netfilter IP NAT for SNMP to always use a big enough size
variable that the compiler won't moan about comparing it to ULONG_MAX/8 on a
64-bit platform.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Eugene Teo &lt;eteo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 252815b0cfe711001eff0327872209986b36d490 upstream

Fix a range check in netfilter IP NAT for SNMP to always use a big enough size
variable that the compiler won't moan about comparing it to ULONG_MAX/8 on a
64-bit platform.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Eugene Teo &lt;eteo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: Fix possible deadlock in estimator code</title>
<updated>2008-08-20T18:15:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Wegener</name>
<email>sven.wegener@stealer.net</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-14T03:55:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1cc2f16f28ccfc4c0b477e3b0de7b89817876938'/>
<id>1cc2f16f28ccfc4c0b477e3b0de7b89817876938</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8ab19ea36c5c5340ff598e4d15fc084eb65671dc upstream

There is a slight chance for a deadlock in the estimator code. We can't call
del_timer_sync() while holding our lock, as the timer might be active and
spinning for the lock on another cpu. Work around this issue by using
try_to_del_timer_sync() and releasing the lock. We could actually delete the
timer outside of our lock, as the add and kill functions are only every called
from userspace via [gs]etsockopt() and are serialized by a mutex, but better
make this explicit.

Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener &lt;sven.wegener@stealer.net&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8ab19ea36c5c5340ff598e4d15fc084eb65671dc upstream

There is a slight chance for a deadlock in the estimator code. We can't call
del_timer_sync() while holding our lock, as the timer might be active and
spinning for the lock on another cpu. Work around this issue by using
try_to_del_timer_sync() and releasing the lock. We could actually delete the
timer outside of our lock, as the add and kill functions are only every called
from userspace via [gs]etsockopt() and are serialized by a mutex, but better
make this explicit.

Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener &lt;sven.wegener@stealer.net&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Clear probes_out more aggressively in tcp_ack().</title>
<updated>2008-08-01T18:50:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-25T23:53:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8017765e8d0f0ee534187956d4979c6bd29699c8'/>
<id>8017765e8d0f0ee534187956d4979c6bd29699c8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4b53fb67e385b856a991d402096379dab462170a ]

This is based upon an excellent bug report from Eric Dumazet.

tcp_ack() should clear -&gt;icsk_probes_out even if there are packets
outstanding.  Otherwise if we get a sequence of ACKs while we do have
packets outstanding over and over again, we'll never clear the
probes_out value and eventually think the connection is too sick and
we'll reset it.

This appears to be some "optimization" added to tcp_ack() in the 2.4.x
timeframe.  In 2.2.x, probes_out is pretty much always cleared by
tcp_ack().

Here is Eric's original report:

----------------------------------------
Apparently, we can in some situations reset TCP connections in a couple of seconds when some frames are lost.

In order to reproduce the problem, please try the following program on linux-2.6.25.*

Setup some iptables rules to allow two frames per second sent on loopback interface to tcp destination port 12000

iptables -N SLOWLO
iptables -A SLOWLO -m hashlimit --hashlimit 2 --hashlimit-burst 1 --hashlimit-mode dstip --hashlimit-name slow2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A SLOWLO -j DROP

iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -p tcp --dport 12000 -j SLOWLO

Then run the attached program and see the output :

# ./loop
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,1)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,3)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,5)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,7)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,9)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,11)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,201ms,13)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,188ms,15)
write(): Connection timed out
wrote 890 bytes but was interrupted after 9 seconds
ESTAB      0      0                 127.0.0.1:12000            127.0.0.1:54455
Exiting read() because no data available (4000 ms timeout).
read 860 bytes

While this tcp session makes progress (sending frames with 50 bytes of payload, every 500ms), linux tcp stack decides to reset it, when tcp_retries 2 is reached (default value : 15)

tcpdump :

15:30:28.856695 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: S 33788768:33788768(0) win 32792 &lt;mss 16396,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7&gt;
15:30:28.856711 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: S 33899253:33899253(0) ack 33788769 win 32792 &lt;mss 16396,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7&gt;
15:30:29.356947 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 1:61(60) ack 1 win 257
15:30:29.356966 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 61 win 257
15:30:29.866415 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 61:111(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:29.866427 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 111 win 257
15:30:30.366516 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 111:161(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:30.366527 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 161 win 257
15:30:30.876196 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 161:211(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:30.876207 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 211 win 257
15:30:31.376282 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 211:261(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:31.376290 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 261 win 257
15:30:31.885619 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 261:311(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:31.885631 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 311 win 257
15:30:32.385705 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 311:361(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:32.385715 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 361 win 257
15:30:32.895249 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 361:411(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:32.895266 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 411 win 257
15:30:33.395341 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 411:461(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:33.395351 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 461 win 257
15:30:33.918085 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 461:511(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:33.918096 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 511 win 257
15:30:34.418163 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 511:561(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:34.418172 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 561 win 257
15:30:34.927685 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 561:611(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:34.927698 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 611 win 257
15:30:35.427757 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 611:661(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:35.427766 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 661 win 257
15:30:35.937359 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 661:711(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:35.937376 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 711 win 257
15:30:36.437451 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 711:761(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:36.437464 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 761 win 257
15:30:36.947022 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 761:811(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:36.947039 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 811 win 257
15:30:37.447135 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 811:861(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:37.447203 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 861 win 257
15:30:41.448171 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: F 1:1(0) ack 861 win 257
15:30:41.448189 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: R 33789629:33789629(0) win 0

Source of program :

/*
 * small producer/consumer program.
 * setup a listener on 127.0.0.1:12000
 * Forks a child
 *   child connect to 127.0.0.1, and sends 10 bytes on this tcp socket every 100 ms
 * Father accepts connection, and read all data
 */
#include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;
#include &lt;netinet/in.h&gt;
#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
#include &lt;time.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/poll.h&gt;

int port = 12000;
char buffer[4096];
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        int lfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
        struct sockaddr_in socket_address;
        time_t t0, t1;
        int on = 1, sfd, res;
        unsigned long total = 0;
        socklen_t alen = sizeof(socket_address);
        pid_t pid;

        time(&amp;t0);
        socket_address.sin_family = AF_INET;
        socket_address.sin_port = htons(port);
        socket_address.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);

        if (lfd == -1) {
                perror("socket()");
                return 1;
        }
        setsockopt(lfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &amp;on, sizeof(int));
        if (bind(lfd, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) == -1) {
                perror("bind");
                close(lfd);
                return 1;
        }
        if (listen(lfd, 1) == -1) {
                perror("listen()");
                close(lfd);
                return 1;
        }
        pid = fork();
        if (pid == 0) {
                int i, cfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
                close(lfd);
                if (connect(cfd, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) == -1) {
                        perror("connect()");
                        return 1;
                        }
                for (i = 0 ; ;) {
                        res = write(cfd, "blablabla\n", 10);
                        if (res &gt; 0) total += res;
                        else if (res == -1) {
                                perror("write()");
                                break;
                        } else break;
                        usleep(100000);
                        if (++i == 10) {
                                system("ss -on dst 127.0.0.1:12000");
                                i = 0;
                        }
                }
                time(&amp;t1);
                fprintf(stderr, "wrote %lu bytes but was interrupted after %g seconds\n", total, difftime(t1, t0));
                system("ss -on | grep 127.0.0.1:12000");
                close(cfd);
                return 0;
        }
        sfd = accept(lfd, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;socket_address, &amp;alen);
        if (sfd == -1) {
                perror("accept");
                return 1;
        }
        close(lfd);
        while (1) {
                struct pollfd pfd[1];
                pfd[0].fd = sfd;
                pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
                if (poll(pfd, 1, 4000) == 0) {
                        fprintf(stderr, "Exiting read() because no data available (4000 ms timeout).\n");
                        break;
                }
                res = read(sfd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
                if (res &gt; 0) total += res;
                else if (res == 0) break;
                else perror("read()");
        }
        fprintf(stderr, "read %lu bytes\n", total);
        close(sfd);
        return 0;
}
----------------------------------------

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4b53fb67e385b856a991d402096379dab462170a ]

This is based upon an excellent bug report from Eric Dumazet.

tcp_ack() should clear -&gt;icsk_probes_out even if there are packets
outstanding.  Otherwise if we get a sequence of ACKs while we do have
packets outstanding over and over again, we'll never clear the
probes_out value and eventually think the connection is too sick and
we'll reset it.

This appears to be some "optimization" added to tcp_ack() in the 2.4.x
timeframe.  In 2.2.x, probes_out is pretty much always cleared by
tcp_ack().

Here is Eric's original report:

----------------------------------------
Apparently, we can in some situations reset TCP connections in a couple of seconds when some frames are lost.

In order to reproduce the problem, please try the following program on linux-2.6.25.*

Setup some iptables rules to allow two frames per second sent on loopback interface to tcp destination port 12000

iptables -N SLOWLO
iptables -A SLOWLO -m hashlimit --hashlimit 2 --hashlimit-burst 1 --hashlimit-mode dstip --hashlimit-name slow2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A SLOWLO -j DROP

iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -p tcp --dport 12000 -j SLOWLO

Then run the attached program and see the output :

# ./loop
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,1)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,3)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,5)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,7)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,9)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,200ms,11)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,201ms,13)
State      Recv-Q Send-Q                                  Local Address:Port                                    Peer Address:Port
ESTAB      0      40                                          127.0.0.1:54455                                      127.0.0.1:12000  timer:(persist,188ms,15)
write(): Connection timed out
wrote 890 bytes but was interrupted after 9 seconds
ESTAB      0      0                 127.0.0.1:12000            127.0.0.1:54455
Exiting read() because no data available (4000 ms timeout).
read 860 bytes

While this tcp session makes progress (sending frames with 50 bytes of payload, every 500ms), linux tcp stack decides to reset it, when tcp_retries 2 is reached (default value : 15)

tcpdump :

15:30:28.856695 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: S 33788768:33788768(0) win 32792 &lt;mss 16396,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7&gt;
15:30:28.856711 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: S 33899253:33899253(0) ack 33788769 win 32792 &lt;mss 16396,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7&gt;
15:30:29.356947 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 1:61(60) ack 1 win 257
15:30:29.356966 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 61 win 257
15:30:29.866415 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 61:111(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:29.866427 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 111 win 257
15:30:30.366516 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 111:161(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:30.366527 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 161 win 257
15:30:30.876196 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 161:211(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:30.876207 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 211 win 257
15:30:31.376282 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 211:261(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:31.376290 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 261 win 257
15:30:31.885619 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 261:311(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:31.885631 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 311 win 257
15:30:32.385705 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 311:361(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:32.385715 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 361 win 257
15:30:32.895249 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 361:411(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:32.895266 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 411 win 257
15:30:33.395341 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 411:461(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:33.395351 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 461 win 257
15:30:33.918085 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 461:511(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:33.918096 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 511 win 257
15:30:34.418163 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 511:561(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:34.418172 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 561 win 257
15:30:34.927685 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 561:611(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:34.927698 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 611 win 257
15:30:35.427757 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 611:661(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:35.427766 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 661 win 257
15:30:35.937359 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 661:711(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:35.937376 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 711 win 257
15:30:36.437451 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 711:761(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:36.437464 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 761 win 257
15:30:36.947022 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 761:811(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:36.947039 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 811 win 257
15:30:37.447135 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: P 811:861(50) ack 1 win 257
15:30:37.447203 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: . ack 861 win 257
15:30:41.448171 IP 127.0.0.1.12000 &gt; 127.0.0.1.56554: F 1:1(0) ack 861 win 257
15:30:41.448189 IP 127.0.0.1.56554 &gt; 127.0.0.1.12000: R 33789629:33789629(0) win 0

Source of program :

/*
 * small producer/consumer program.
 * setup a listener on 127.0.0.1:12000
 * Forks a child
 *   child connect to 127.0.0.1, and sends 10 bytes on this tcp socket every 100 ms
 * Father accepts connection, and read all data
 */
#include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;
#include &lt;netinet/in.h&gt;
#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
#include &lt;time.h&gt;
#include &lt;sys/poll.h&gt;

int port = 12000;
char buffer[4096];
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        int lfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
        struct sockaddr_in socket_address;
        time_t t0, t1;
        int on = 1, sfd, res;
        unsigned long total = 0;
        socklen_t alen = sizeof(socket_address);
        pid_t pid;

        time(&amp;t0);
        socket_address.sin_family = AF_INET;
        socket_address.sin_port = htons(port);
        socket_address.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);

        if (lfd == -1) {
                perror("socket()");
                return 1;
        }
        setsockopt(lfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &amp;on, sizeof(int));
        if (bind(lfd, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) == -1) {
                perror("bind");
                close(lfd);
                return 1;
        }
        if (listen(lfd, 1) == -1) {
                perror("listen()");
                close(lfd);
                return 1;
        }
        pid = fork();
        if (pid == 0) {
                int i, cfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
                close(lfd);
                if (connect(cfd, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) == -1) {
                        perror("connect()");
                        return 1;
                        }
                for (i = 0 ; ;) {
                        res = write(cfd, "blablabla\n", 10);
                        if (res &gt; 0) total += res;
                        else if (res == -1) {
                                perror("write()");
                                break;
                        } else break;
                        usleep(100000);
                        if (++i == 10) {
                                system("ss -on dst 127.0.0.1:12000");
                                i = 0;
                        }
                }
                time(&amp;t1);
                fprintf(stderr, "wrote %lu bytes but was interrupted after %g seconds\n", total, difftime(t1, t0));
                system("ss -on | grep 127.0.0.1:12000");
                close(cfd);
                return 0;
        }
        sfd = accept(lfd, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;socket_address, &amp;alen);
        if (sfd == -1) {
                perror("accept");
                return 1;
        }
        close(lfd);
        while (1) {
                struct pollfd pfd[1];
                pfd[0].fd = sfd;
                pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
                if (poll(pfd, 1, 4000) == 0) {
                        fprintf(stderr, "Exiting read() because no data available (4000 ms timeout).\n");
                        break;
                }
                res = read(sfd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
                if (res &gt; 0) total += res;
                else if (res == 0) break;
                else perror("read()");
        }
        fprintf(stderr, "read %lu bytes\n", total);
        close(sfd);
        return 0;
}
----------------------------------------

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udplite: Protection against coverage value wrap-around</title>
<updated>2008-07-28T17:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gerrit Renker</name>
<email>gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-24T07:11:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5564d385e9b0cddc7c831af9f90a2f53aa472953'/>
<id>5564d385e9b0cddc7c831af9f90a2f53aa472953</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 47112e25da41d9059626033986dc3353e101f815 ]

This patch clamps the cscov setsockopt values to a maximum of 0xFFFF.

Setsockopt values greater than 0xffff can cause an unwanted
wrap-around.  Further, IPv6 jumbograms are not supported (RFC 3838,
3.5), so that values greater than 0xffff are not even useful.

Further changes: fixed a typo in the documentation.

[ Add USHORT_MAX from upstream to linux/kernel.h -DaveM ]

Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker &lt;gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 47112e25da41d9059626033986dc3353e101f815 ]

This patch clamps the cscov setsockopt values to a maximum of 0xFFFF.

Setsockopt values greater than 0xffff can cause an unwanted
wrap-around.  Further, IPv6 jumbograms are not supported (RFC 3838,
3.5), so that values greater than 0xffff are not even useful.

Further changes: fixed a typo in the documentation.

[ Add USHORT_MAX from upstream to linux/kernel.h -DaveM ]

Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker &lt;gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: fix fragmentation for ipv4 xfrm tunnel</title>
<updated>2008-07-28T17:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steffen Klassert</name>
<email>steffen.klassert@secunet.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-24T06:55:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b5fe255cb6adab0cfe9826ce792d0f866323b269'/>
<id>b5fe255cb6adab0cfe9826ce792d0f866323b269</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fe833fca2eac6b3d3ad5e35f44ad4638362f1da8 ]

When generating the ip header for the transformed packet we just copy
the frag_off field of the ip header from the original packet to the ip
header of the new generated packet. If we receive a packet as a chain
of fragments, all but the last of the new generated packets have the
IP_MF flag set. We have to mask the frag_off field to only keep the
IP_DF flag from the original packet. This got lost with git commit
36cf9acf93e8561d9faec24849e57688a81eb9c5 ("[IPSEC]: Separate
inner/outer mode processing on output")

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fe833fca2eac6b3d3ad5e35f44ad4638362f1da8 ]

When generating the ip header for the transformed packet we just copy
the frag_off field of the ip header from the original packet to the ip
header of the new generated packet. If we receive a packet as a chain
of fragments, all but the last of the new generated packets have the
IP_MF flag set. We have to mask the frag_off field to only keep the
IP_DF flag from the original packet. This got lost with git commit
36cf9acf93e8561d9faec24849e57688a81eb9c5 ("[IPSEC]: Separate
inner/outer mode processing on output")

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>raw: Restore /proc/net/raw correct behavior</title>
<updated>2008-07-28T17:58:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>dada1@cosmosbay.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-24T06:54:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2377f8ce84aa89678c51cb764337d2f2e1133835'/>
<id>2377f8ce84aa89678c51cb764337d2f2e1133835</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 68be802cd5ad040fe8cfa33ce3031405df2d9117 ]

I just noticed "cat /proc/net/raw" was buggy, missing '\n' separators.

I believe this was introduced by commit 8cd850efa4948d57a2ed836911cfd1ab299e89c6
([RAW]: Cleanup IPv4 raw_seq_show.)

This trivial patch restores correct behavior, and applies to current
Linus tree (should also be applied to stable tree as well.)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;dada1@cosmosbay.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 68be802cd5ad040fe8cfa33ce3031405df2d9117 ]

I just noticed "cat /proc/net/raw" was buggy, missing '\n' separators.

I believe this was introduced by commit 8cd850efa4948d57a2ed836911cfd1ab299e89c6
([RAW]: Cleanup IPv4 raw_seq_show.)

This trivial patch restores correct behavior, and applies to current
Linus tree (should also be applied to stable tree as well.)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;dada1@cosmosbay.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Fix inconsistency source (CA_Open only when !tcp_left_out(tp))</title>
<updated>2008-06-16T20:20:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilpo Järvinen</name>
<email>ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi</email>
</author>
<published>2008-06-10T22:37:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7a0c866aacab51afa7a6cbf6eccf5e1aa5fd64b9'/>
<id>7a0c866aacab51afa7a6cbf6eccf5e1aa5fd64b9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ upstream commit: 8aca6cb1179ed9bef9351028c8d8af852903eae2 ]

It is possible that this skip path causes TCP to end up into an
invalid state where ca_state was left to CA_Open while some
segments already came into sacked_out. If next valid ACK doesn't
contain new SACK information TCP fails to enter into
tcp_fastretrans_alert(). Thus at least high_seq is set
incorrectly to a too high seqno because some new data segments
could be sent in between (and also, limited transmit is not
being correctly invoked there). Reordering in both directions
can easily cause this situation to occur.

I guess we would want to use tcp_moderate_cwnd(tp) there as well
as it may be possible to use this to trigger oversized burst to
network by sending an old ACK with huge amount of SACK info, but
I'm a bit unsure about its effects (mainly to FlightSize), so to
be on the safe side I just currently fixed it minimally to keep
TCP's state consistent (obviously, such nasty ACKs have been
possible this far). Though it seems that FlightSize is already
underestimated by some amount, so probably on the long term we
might want to trigger recovery there too, if appropriate, to make
FlightSize calculation to resemble reality at the time when the
losses where discovered (but such change scares me too much now
and requires some more thinking anyway how to do that as it
likely involves some code shuffling).

This bug was found by Brian Vowell while running my TCP debug
patch to find cause of another TCP issue (fackets_out
miscount).

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ upstream commit: 8aca6cb1179ed9bef9351028c8d8af852903eae2 ]

It is possible that this skip path causes TCP to end up into an
invalid state where ca_state was left to CA_Open while some
segments already came into sacked_out. If next valid ACK doesn't
contain new SACK information TCP fails to enter into
tcp_fastretrans_alert(). Thus at least high_seq is set
incorrectly to a too high seqno because some new data segments
could be sent in between (and also, limited transmit is not
being correctly invoked there). Reordering in both directions
can easily cause this situation to occur.

I guess we would want to use tcp_moderate_cwnd(tp) there as well
as it may be possible to use this to trigger oversized burst to
network by sending an old ACK with huge amount of SACK info, but
I'm a bit unsure about its effects (mainly to FlightSize), so to
be on the safe side I just currently fixed it minimally to keep
TCP's state consistent (obviously, such nasty ACKs have been
possible this far). Though it seems that FlightSize is already
underestimated by some amount, so probably on the long term we
might want to trigger recovery there too, if appropriate, to make
FlightSize calculation to resemble reality at the time when the
losses where discovered (but such change scares me too much now
and requires some more thinking anyway how to do that as it
likely involves some code shuffling).

This bug was found by Brian Vowell while running my TCP debug
patch to find cause of another TCP issue (fackets_out
miscount).

Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen &lt;ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
