<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/ipv4, branch v2.6.32.50</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.</title>
<updated>2011-08-16T01:57:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-04T03:50:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=263b89378807581c501e4673634fee5253126812'/>
<id>263b89378807581c501e4673634fee5253126812</id>
<content type='text'>
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.

MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)

Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation.  So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed.  We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.

For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.

Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky &lt;dan@doxpara.com&gt;
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.

MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)

Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation.  So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed.  We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.

For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.

Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky &lt;dan@doxpara.com&gt;
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering</title>
<updated>2011-08-08T17:23:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-16T09:05:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=35ed3d0fb62804090a3f21a7ce84c538a6ff852f'/>
<id>35ed3d0fb62804090a3f21a7ce84c538a6ff852f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d5aa407f59f5b83d2c50ec88f5bf56d40f1f8978 upstream.

Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d5aa407f59f5b83d2c50ec88f5bf56d40f1f8978 upstream.

Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering</title>
<updated>2011-08-08T17:23:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-16T07:57:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7606088a8d06062750d6d24cab6e064d7711356e'/>
<id>7606088a8d06062750d6d24cab6e064d7711356e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794 upstream.

GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().

This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794 upstream.

GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().

This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp/recvmsg: Clear MSG_TRUNC flag when starting over for a new packet</title>
<updated>2011-07-13T03:29:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xufeng Zhang</name>
<email>xufeng.zhang@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-21T10:43:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=453d61c441601d3f4ed9df7cfade4c5c35e98526'/>
<id>453d61c441601d3f4ed9df7cfade4c5c35e98526</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9cfaa8def1c795a512bc04f2aec333b03724ca2e ]

Consider this scenario: When the size of the first received udp packet
is bigger than the receive buffer, MSG_TRUNC bit is set in msg-&gt;msg_flags.
However, if checksum error happens and this is a blocking socket, it will
goto try_again loop to receive the next packet.  But if the size of the
next udp packet is smaller than receive buffer, MSG_TRUNC flag should not
be set, but because MSG_TRUNC bit is not cleared in msg-&gt;msg_flags before
receive the next packet, MSG_TRUNC is still set, which is wrong.

Fix this problem by clearing MSG_TRUNC flag when starting over for a
new packet.

Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang &lt;xufeng.zhang@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9cfaa8def1c795a512bc04f2aec333b03724ca2e ]

Consider this scenario: When the size of the first received udp packet
is bigger than the receive buffer, MSG_TRUNC bit is set in msg-&gt;msg_flags.
However, if checksum error happens and this is a blocking socket, it will
goto try_again loop to receive the next packet.  But if the size of the
next udp packet is smaller than receive buffer, MSG_TRUNC flag should not
be set, but because MSG_TRUNC bit is not cleared in msg-&gt;msg_flags before
receive the next packet, MSG_TRUNC is still set, which is wrong.

Fix this problem by clearing MSG_TRUNC flag when starting over for a
new packet.

Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang &lt;xufeng.zhang@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv4: Check for mistakenly passed in non-IPv4 address</title>
<updated>2011-07-13T03:29:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcus Meissner</name>
<email>meissner@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-02T04:05:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4e754b40ebbd638984e33eb8509acb63b9c7f253'/>
<id>4e754b40ebbd638984e33eb8509acb63b9c7f253</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d0733d2e29b652b2e7b1438ececa732e4eed98eb ]

Check against mistakenly passing in IPv6 addresses (which would result
in an INADDR_ANY bind) or similar incompatible sockaddrs.

Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner &lt;meissner@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Reinhard Max &lt;max@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d0733d2e29b652b2e7b1438ececa732e4eed98eb ]

Check against mistakenly passing in IPv6 addresses (which would result
in an INADDR_ANY bind) or similar incompatible sockaddrs.

Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner &lt;meissner@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Reinhard Max &lt;max@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet_diag: fix inet_diag_bc_audit()</title>
<updated>2011-07-13T03:29:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-17T20:25:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ea573723636c6e7ede7cc876046a7027a02bcf2c'/>
<id>ea573723636c6e7ede7cc876046a7027a02bcf2c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit eeb1497277d6b1a0a34ed36b97e18f2bd7d6de0d ]

A malicious user or buggy application can inject code and trigger an
infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit()

Also make sure each instruction is aligned on 4 bytes boundary, to avoid
unaligned accesses.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit eeb1497277d6b1a0a34ed36b97e18f2bd7d6de0d ]

A malicious user or buggy application can inject code and trigger an
infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit()

Also make sure each instruction is aligned on 4 bytes boundary, to avoid
unaligned accesses.

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: Fix bogus UFO packet generation</title>
<updated>2011-05-09T22:54:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2010-06-15T01:52:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=548a4a8c2bffd5748f88aff92cea844a842535b8'/>
<id>548a4a8c2bffd5748f88aff92cea844a842535b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 26cde9f7e2747b6d254b704594eed87ab959afa5 upstream.

It has been reported that the new UFO software fallback path
fails under certain conditions with NFS.  I tracked the problem
down to the generation of UFO packets that are smaller than the
MTU.  The software fallback path simply discards these packets.

This patch fixes the problem by not generating such packets on
the UFO path.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@vyatta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 26cde9f7e2747b6d254b704594eed87ab959afa5 upstream.

It has been reported that the new UFO software fallback path
fails under certain conditions with NFS.  I tracked the problem
down to the generation of UFO packets that are smaller than the
MTU.  The software fallback path simply discards these packets.

This patch fixes the problem by not generating such packets on
the UFO path.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@vyatta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet_diag: Make sure we actually run the same bytecode we audited.</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T23:53:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nelson Elhage</name>
<email>nelhage@ksplice.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-03T16:35:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2dbba29d47e24703420d9331fb9bddeba4a38506'/>
<id>2dbba29d47e24703420d9331fb9bddeba4a38506</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 22e76c849d505d87c5ecf3d3e6742a65f0ff4860 upstream.

We were using nlmsg_find_attr() to look up the bytecode by attribute when
auditing, but then just using the first attribute when actually running
bytecode. So, if we received a message with two attribute elements, where only
the second had type INET_DIAG_REQ_BYTECODE, we would validate and run different
bytecode strings.

Fix this by consistently using nlmsg_find_attr everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage &lt;nelhage@ksplice.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[jmm: Slightly adapted to apply against 2.6.32]
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff &lt;jmm@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 22e76c849d505d87c5ecf3d3e6742a65f0ff4860 upstream.

We were using nlmsg_find_attr() to look up the bytecode by attribute when
auditing, but then just using the first attribute when actually running
bytecode. So, if we received a message with two attribute elements, where only
the second had type INET_DIAG_REQ_BYTECODE, we would validate and run different
bytecode strings.

Fix this by consistently using nlmsg_find_attr everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage &lt;nelhage@ksplice.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[jmm: Slightly adapted to apply against 2.6.32]
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff &lt;jmm@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ipt_CLUSTERIP: fix buffer overflow</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T23:53:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-20T14:42:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8fd563c4a38f2a9d3cec689add4294cbc18a1dad'/>
<id>8fd563c4a38f2a9d3cec689add4294cbc18a1dad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 961ed183a9fd080cf306c659b8736007e44065a5 upstream.

'buffer' string is copied from userspace.  It is not checked whether it is
zero terminated.  This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul().
Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes.

It was introduced before the git epoch.  Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are
root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be
relaxed to e.g. network admin user.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Acked-by: Changli Gao &lt;xiaosuo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 961ed183a9fd080cf306c659b8736007e44065a5 upstream.

'buffer' string is copied from userspace.  It is not checked whether it is
zero terminated.  This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul().
Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes.

It was introduced before the git epoch.  Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are
root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be
relaxed to e.g. network admin user.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Acked-by: Changli Gao &lt;xiaosuo@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: arp_tables: fix infoleak to userspace</title>
<updated>2011-04-14T23:53:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-15T12:35:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bf9717776581e3000f899fd0172d1eb448ab2679'/>
<id>bf9717776581e3000f899fd0172d1eb448ab2679</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream.

Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch;  the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1);  the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1).  To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream.

Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch;  the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1);  the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1).  To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
