<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/ipv6, branch v3.18.18</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>vti6: fix uninit when using x-netns</title>
<updated>2015-06-28T17:39:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yao Xiwei</name>
<email>xiwei.yao@6wind.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-02T15:31:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8c8e709d1b1b76b2dcd54b47fe087fd5e622ea3b'/>
<id>8c8e709d1b1b76b2dcd54b47fe087fd5e622ea3b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 092a29a40bab8bb4530bb3e58a0597001cdecdef ]

When the kernel deleted a vti6 interface, this interface was not removed from
the tunnels list. Thus, when the ip6_vti module was removed, this old interface
was found and the kernel tried to delete it again. This was leading to a kernel
panic.

Fixes: 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing")
Signed-off-by: Yao Xiwei &lt;xiwei.yao@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 092a29a40bab8bb4530bb3e58a0597001cdecdef ]

When the kernel deleted a vti6 interface, this interface was not removed from
the tunnels list. Thus, when the ip6_vti module was removed, this old interface
was found and the kernel tried to delete it again. This was leading to a kernel
panic.

Fixes: 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing")
Signed-off-by: Yao Xiwei &lt;xiwei.yao@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums</title>
<updated>2015-06-15T18:26:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-30T16:16:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ee4ab7d8328b0a505d376b6c08d569778c8689af'/>
<id>ee4ab7d8328b0a505d376b6c08d569778c8689af</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 ]

We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :

1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
   This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()

2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
   processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.

This patch is an attempt to make things better.

We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 ]

We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :

1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
   This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()

2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
   processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.

This patch is an attempt to make things better.

We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv6/udp: Fix ipv6 multicast socket filter regression</title>
<updated>2015-06-15T18:26:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Henning Rogge</name>
<email>hrogge@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-18T19:08:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=359aeb0ae4a0e461368d7859ceb79086901dea7e'/>
<id>359aeb0ae4a0e461368d7859ceb79086901dea7e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 33b4b015e1a1ca7a8fdce40af5e71642a8ea355c ]

Commit &lt;5cf3d46192fc&gt; ("udp: Simplify__udp*_lib_mcast_deliver")
simplified the filter for incoming IPv6 multicast but removed
the check of the local socket address and the UDP destination
address.

This patch restores the filter to prevent sockets bound to a IPv6
multicast IP to receive other UDP traffic link unicast.

Signed-off-by: Henning Rogge &lt;hrogge@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 5cf3d46192fc ("udp: Simplify__udp*_lib_mcast_deliver")
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 33b4b015e1a1ca7a8fdce40af5e71642a8ea355c ]

Commit &lt;5cf3d46192fc&gt; ("udp: Simplify__udp*_lib_mcast_deliver")
simplified the filter for incoming IPv6 multicast but removed
the check of the local socket address and the UDP destination
address.

This patch restores the filter to prevent sockets bound to a IPv6
multicast IP to receive other UDP traffic link unicast.

Signed-off-by: Henning Rogge &lt;hrogge@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 5cf3d46192fc ("udp: Simplify__udp*_lib_mcast_deliver")
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp/ipv6: fix flow label setting in TIME_WAIT state</title>
<updated>2015-06-15T18:26:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florent Fourcot</name>
<email>florent.fourcot@enst-bretagne.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-15T22:24:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dc3c6cb6eb811e8e27ff0acefb2cc7d16b1b976b'/>
<id>dc3c6cb6eb811e8e27ff0acefb2cc7d16b1b976b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 21858cd02dabcf290564cbf4769b101eba54d7bb ]

commit 1d13a96c74fc ("ipv6: tcp: fix flowlabel value in ACK messages
send from TIME_WAIT") added the flow label in the last TCP packets.
Unfortunately, it was not casted properly.

This patch replace the buggy shift with be32_to_cpu/cpu_to_be32.

Fixes: 1d13a96c74fc ("ipv6: tcp: fix flowlabel value in ACK messages")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot &lt;florent.fourcot@enst-bretagne.fr&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 21858cd02dabcf290564cbf4769b101eba54d7bb ]

commit 1d13a96c74fc ("ipv6: tcp: fix flowlabel value in ACK messages
send from TIME_WAIT") added the flow label in the last TCP packets.
Unfortunately, it was not casted properly.

This patch replace the buggy shift with be32_to_cpu/cpu_to_be32.

Fixes: 1d13a96c74fc ("ipv6: tcp: fix flowlabel value in ACK messages")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florent Fourcot &lt;florent.fourcot@enst-bretagne.fr&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: protect skb-&gt;sk accesses from recursive dereference inside the stack</title>
<updated>2015-04-27T20:48:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>hannes@stressinduktion.org</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-01T15:07:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c8c30b2b17f2133e953850c547e3902c3a3d80e2'/>
<id>c8c30b2b17f2133e953850c547e3902c3a3d80e2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f60e5990d9c1424af9dbca60a23ba2a1c7c1ce90 ]

We should not consult skb-&gt;sk for output decisions in xmit recursion
levels &gt; 0 in the stack. Otherwise local socket settings could influence
the result of e.g. tunnel encapsulation process.

ipv6 does not conform with this in three places:

1) ip6_fragment: we do consult ipv6_npinfo for frag_size

2) sk_mc_loop in ipv6 uses skb-&gt;sk and checks if we should
   loop the packet back to the local socket

3) ip6_skb_dst_mtu could query the settings from the user socket and
   force a wrong MTU

Furthermore:
In sk_mc_loop we could potentially land in WARN_ON(1) if we use a
PF_PACKET socket ontop of an IPv6-backed vxlan device.

Reuse xmit_recursion as we are currently only interested in protecting
tunnel devices.

Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f60e5990d9c1424af9dbca60a23ba2a1c7c1ce90 ]

We should not consult skb-&gt;sk for output decisions in xmit recursion
levels &gt; 0 in the stack. Otherwise local socket settings could influence
the result of e.g. tunnel encapsulation process.

ipv6 does not conform with this in three places:

1) ip6_fragment: we do consult ipv6_npinfo for frag_size

2) sk_mc_loop in ipv6 uses skb-&gt;sk and checks if we should
   loop the packet back to the local socket

3) ip6_skb_dst_mtu could query the settings from the user socket and
   force a wrong MTU

Furthermore:
In sk_mc_loop we could potentially land in WARN_ON(1) if we use a
PF_PACKET socket ontop of an IPv6-backed vxlan device.

Reuse xmit_recursion as we are currently only interested in protecting
tunnel devices.

Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: tcp6: fix double call of tcp_v6_fill_cb()</title>
<updated>2015-04-27T20:48:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Kodanev</name>
<email>alexey.kodanev@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-27T09:24:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=65b7ff47a780ec95012bdbf1441056a62cbf27c5'/>
<id>65b7ff47a780ec95012bdbf1441056a62cbf27c5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4ad19de8774e2a7b075b3e8ea48db85adcf33fa6 ]

tcp_v6_fill_cb() will be called twice if socket's state changes from
TCP_TIME_WAIT to TCP_LISTEN. That can result in control buffer data
corruption because in the second tcp_v6_fill_cb() call it's not copying
IP6CB(skb) anymore, but 'seq', 'end_seq', etc., so we can get weird and
unpredictable results. Performance loss of up to 1200% has been observed
in LTP/vxlan03 test.

This can be fixed by copying inet6_skb_parm to the beginning of 'cb'
only if xfrm6_policy_check() and tcp_v6_fill_cb() are going to be
called again.

Fixes: 2dc49d1680b53 ("tcp6: don't move IP6CB before xfrm6_policy_check()")

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4ad19de8774e2a7b075b3e8ea48db85adcf33fa6 ]

tcp_v6_fill_cb() will be called twice if socket's state changes from
TCP_TIME_WAIT to TCP_LISTEN. That can result in control buffer data
corruption because in the second tcp_v6_fill_cb() call it's not copying
IP6CB(skb) anymore, but 'seq', 'end_seq', etc., so we can get weird and
unpredictable results. Performance loss of up to 1200% has been observed
in LTP/vxlan03 test.

This can be fixed by copying inet6_skb_parm to the beginning of 'cb'
only if xfrm6_policy_check() and tcp_v6_fill_cb() are going to be
called again.

Fixes: 2dc49d1680b53 ("tcp6: don't move IP6CB before xfrm6_policy_check()")

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev &lt;alexey.kodanev@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface</title>
<updated>2015-04-27T20:48:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>D.S. Ljungmark</name>
<email>ljungmark@modio.se</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-25T08:28:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c85b2d7e9fa44286feaac33031db1dd0e4c9ed3b'/>
<id>c85b2d7e9fa44286feaac33031db1dd0e4c9ed3b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a ]

A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.

RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"

&gt;   1.  The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
&gt;       number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
&gt;       be dropped before they reach their destination.

&gt;   As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
&gt;   ignore very small hop limits.  The nodes could implement a
&gt;   configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
&gt;   said limit.

Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark &lt;ljungmark@modio.se&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6fd99094de2b83d1d4c8457f2c83483b2828e75a ]

A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.

RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"

&gt;   1.  The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
&gt;       number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
&gt;       be dropped before they reach their destination.

&gt;   As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
&gt;   ignore very small hop limits.  The nodes could implement a
&gt;   configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
&gt;   said limit.

Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark &lt;ljungmark@modio.se&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: prevent fetching dst twice in early demux code</title>
<updated>2015-04-27T20:48:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Kubeček</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-23T14:14:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b9a91574adb307476738fc991d6fbc2c0ac04779'/>
<id>b9a91574adb307476738fc991d6fbc2c0ac04779</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d0c294c53a771ae7e84506dfbd8c18c30f078735 ]

On s390x, gcc 4.8 compiles this part of tcp_v6_early_demux()

        struct dst_entry *dst = sk-&gt;sk_rx_dst;

        if (dst)
                dst = dst_check(dst, inet6_sk(sk)-&gt;rx_dst_cookie);

to code reading sk-&gt;sk_rx_dst twice, once for the test and once for
the argument of ip6_dst_check() (dst_check() is inline). This allows
ip6_dst_check() to be called with null first argument, causing a crash.

Protect sk-&gt;sk_rx_dst access by READ_ONCE() both in IPv4 and IPv6
TCP early demux code.

Fixes: 41063e9dd119 ("ipv4: Early TCP socket demux.")
Fixes: c7109986db3c ("ipv6: Early TCP socket demux")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d0c294c53a771ae7e84506dfbd8c18c30f078735 ]

On s390x, gcc 4.8 compiles this part of tcp_v6_early_demux()

        struct dst_entry *dst = sk-&gt;sk_rx_dst;

        if (dst)
                dst = dst_check(dst, inet6_sk(sk)-&gt;rx_dst_cookie);

to code reading sk-&gt;sk_rx_dst twice, once for the test and once for
the argument of ip6_dst_check() (dst_check() is inline). This allows
ip6_dst_check() to be called with null first argument, causing a crash.

Protect sk-&gt;sk_rx_dst access by READ_ONCE() both in IPv4 and IPv6
TCP early demux code.

Fixes: 41063e9dd119 ("ipv4: Early TCP socket demux.")
Fixes: c7109986db3c ("ipv6: Early TCP socket demux")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix backtracking for throw routes</title>
<updated>2015-03-24T12:22:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Barth</name>
<email>cyrus@openwrt.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-19T15:16:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7f249ac587bcc0ed42a8aebf5240fe57171c8314'/>
<id>7f249ac587bcc0ed42a8aebf5240fe57171c8314</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 73ba57bfae4a1914f6a6dac71e3168dd900e00af ]

for throw routes to trigger evaluation of other policy rules
EAGAIN needs to be propagated up to fib_rules_lookup
similar to how its done for IPv4

A simple testcase for verification is:

ip -6 rule add lookup 33333 priority 33333
ip -6 route add throw 2001:db8::1
ip -6 route add 2001:db8::1 via fe80::1 dev wlan0 table 33333
ip route get 2001:db8::1

Signed-off-by: Steven Barth &lt;cyrus@openwrt.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 73ba57bfae4a1914f6a6dac71e3168dd900e00af ]

for throw routes to trigger evaluation of other policy rules
EAGAIN needs to be propagated up to fib_rules_lookup
similar to how its done for IPv4

A simple testcase for verification is:

ip -6 rule add lookup 33333 priority 33333
ip -6 route add throw 2001:db8::1
ip -6 route add 2001:db8::1 via fe80::1 dev wlan0 table 33333
ip route get 2001:db8::1

Signed-off-by: Steven Barth &lt;cyrus@openwrt.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: ping: Return EAFNOSUPPORT when appropriate.</title>
<updated>2015-03-14T19:37:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Colitti</name>
<email>lorenzo@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-03T14:16:16+00:00</published>
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[ Upstream commit 9145736d4862145684009d6a72a6e61324a9439e ]

1. For an IPv4 ping socket, ping_check_bind_addr does not check
   the family of the socket address that's passed in. Instead,
   make it behave like inet_bind, which enforces either that the
   address family is AF_INET, or that the family is AF_UNSPEC and
   the address is 0.0.0.0.
2. For an IPv6 ping socket, ping_check_bind_addr returns EINVAL
   if the socket family is not AF_INET6. Return EAFNOSUPPORT
   instead, for consistency with inet6_bind.
3. Make ping_v4_sendmsg and ping_v6_sendmsg return EAFNOSUPPORT
   instead of EINVAL if an incorrect socket address structure is
   passed in.
4. Make IPv6 ping sockets be IPv6-only. The code does not support
   IPv4, and it cannot easily be made to support IPv4 because
   the protocol numbers for ICMP and ICMPv6 are different. This
   makes connect(::ffff:192.0.2.1) fail with EAFNOSUPPORT instead
   of making the socket unusable.

Among other things, this fixes an oops that can be triggered by:

    int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_ICMP);
    struct sockaddr_in6 sin6 = {
        .sin6_family = AF_INET6,
        .sin6_addr = in6addr_any,
    };
    bind(s, (struct sockaddr *) &amp;sin6, sizeof(sin6));

Change-Id: If06ca86d9f1e4593c0d6df174caca3487c57a241
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9145736d4862145684009d6a72a6e61324a9439e ]

1. For an IPv4 ping socket, ping_check_bind_addr does not check
   the family of the socket address that's passed in. Instead,
   make it behave like inet_bind, which enforces either that the
   address family is AF_INET, or that the family is AF_UNSPEC and
   the address is 0.0.0.0.
2. For an IPv6 ping socket, ping_check_bind_addr returns EINVAL
   if the socket family is not AF_INET6. Return EAFNOSUPPORT
   instead, for consistency with inet6_bind.
3. Make ping_v4_sendmsg and ping_v6_sendmsg return EAFNOSUPPORT
   instead of EINVAL if an incorrect socket address structure is
   passed in.
4. Make IPv6 ping sockets be IPv6-only. The code does not support
   IPv4, and it cannot easily be made to support IPv4 because
   the protocol numbers for ICMP and ICMPv6 are different. This
   makes connect(::ffff:192.0.2.1) fail with EAFNOSUPPORT instead
   of making the socket unusable.

Among other things, this fixes an oops that can be triggered by:

    int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_ICMP);
    struct sockaddr_in6 sin6 = {
        .sin6_family = AF_INET6,
        .sin6_addr = in6addr_any,
    };
    bind(s, (struct sockaddr *) &amp;sin6, sizeof(sin6));

Change-Id: If06ca86d9f1e4593c0d6df174caca3487c57a241
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti &lt;lorenzo@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
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