<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/ipv6, branch v3.2.73</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: add length argument to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec</title>
<updated>2015-11-17T15:54:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabrina Dubroca</name>
<email>sd@queasysnail.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-15T12:25:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=127500d724f8c43f452610c9080444eedb5eaa6c'/>
<id>127500d724f8c43f452610c9080444eedb5eaa6c</id>
<content type='text'>
Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in
memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the
iovec's buffers.

This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb
csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the
ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees &lt;= 3.18.

This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses
 -onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context in include/linux/skbuff.h]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in
memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the
iovec's buffers.

This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb
csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the
ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees &lt;= 3.18.

This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses
 -onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context in include/linux/skbuff.h]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: update ip6_rt_last_gc every time GC is run</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:46:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Kubeček</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-01T08:04:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=24277c76396d5ff90832f0a60c6c5987566256ea'/>
<id>24277c76396d5ff90832f0a60c6c5987566256ea</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 49a18d86f66d33a20144ecb5a34bba0d1856b260 upstream.

As pointed out by Eric Dumazet, net-&gt;ipv6.ip6_rt_last_gc should
hold the last time garbage collector was run so that we should
update it whenever fib6_run_gc() calls fib6_clean_all(), not only
if we got there from ip6_dst_gc().

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 49a18d86f66d33a20144ecb5a34bba0d1856b260 upstream.

As pointed out by Eric Dumazet, net-&gt;ipv6.ip6_rt_last_gc should
hold the last time garbage collector was run so that we should
update it whenever fib6_run_gc() calls fib6_clean_all(), not only
if we got there from ip6_dst_gc().

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: prevent fib6_run_gc() contention</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:46:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Kubeček</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-01T08:04:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2491f0184830c5f1e1c794283177179937def4b7'/>
<id>2491f0184830c5f1e1c794283177179937def4b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2ac3ac8f86f2fe065d746d9a9abaca867adec577 upstream.

On a high-traffic router with many processors and many IPv6 dst
entries, soft lockup in fib6_run_gc() can occur when number of
entries reaches gc_thresh.

This happens because fib6_run_gc() uses fib6_gc_lock to allow
only one thread to run the garbage collector but ip6_dst_gc()
doesn't update net-&gt;ipv6.ip6_rt_last_gc until fib6_run_gc()
returns. On a system with many entries, this can take some time
so that in the meantime, other threads pass the tests in
ip6_dst_gc() (ip6_rt_last_gc is still not updated) and wait for
the lock. They then have to run the garbage collector one after
another which blocks them for quite long.

Resolve this by replacing special value ~0UL of expire parameter
to fib6_run_gc() by explicit "force" parameter to choose between
spin_lock_bh() and spin_trylock_bh() and call fib6_run_gc() with
force=false if gc_thresh is reached but not max_size.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2ac3ac8f86f2fe065d746d9a9abaca867adec577 upstream.

On a high-traffic router with many processors and many IPv6 dst
entries, soft lockup in fib6_run_gc() can occur when number of
entries reaches gc_thresh.

This happens because fib6_run_gc() uses fib6_gc_lock to allow
only one thread to run the garbage collector but ip6_dst_gc()
doesn't update net-&gt;ipv6.ip6_rt_last_gc until fib6_run_gc()
returns. On a system with many entries, this can take some time
so that in the meantime, other threads pass the tests in
ip6_dst_gc() (ip6_rt_last_gc is still not updated) and wait for
the lock. They then have to run the garbage collector one after
another which blocks them for quite long.

Resolve this by replacing special value ~0UL of expire parameter
to fib6_run_gc() by explicit "force" parameter to choose between
spin_lock_bh() and spin_trylock_bh() and call fib6_run_gc() with
force=false if gc_thresh is reached but not max_size.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv6: Correct PIM6 mrt_lock handling</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:46:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Laing</name>
<email>richard.laing@alliedtelesis.co.nz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-03T01:52:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ea43243cfc86b7dbecdd23d2533c1a257390365d'/>
<id>ea43243cfc86b7dbecdd23d2533c1a257390365d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 25b4a44c19c83d98e8c0807a7ede07c1f28eab8b ]

In the IPv6 multicast routing code the mrt_lock was not being released
correctly in the MFC iterator, as a result adding or deleting a MIF would
cause a hang because the mrt_lock could not be acquired.

This fix is a copy of the code for the IPv4 case and ensures that the lock
is released correctly.

Signed-off-by: Richard Laing &lt;richard.laing@alliedtelesis.co.nz&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 25b4a44c19c83d98e8c0807a7ede07c1f28eab8b ]

In the IPv6 multicast routing code the mrt_lock was not being released
correctly in the MFC iterator, as a result adding or deleting a MIF would
cause a hang because the mrt_lock could not be acquired.

This fix is a copy of the code for the IPv4 case and ensures that the lock
is released correctly.

Signed-off-by: Richard Laing &lt;richard.laing@alliedtelesis.co.nz&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: lock socket in ip6_datagram_connect()</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:46:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-14T06:10:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c1a7dedbcb0b60ecbcda0d2398ad5d2b078c9f47'/>
<id>c1a7dedbcb0b60ecbcda0d2398ad5d2b078c9f47</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 03645a11a570d52e70631838cb786eb4253eb463 ]

ip6_datagram_connect() is doing a lot of socket changes without
socket being locked.

This looks wrong, at least for udp_lib_rehash() which could corrupt
lists because of concurrent udp_sk(sk)-&gt;udp_portaddr_hash accesses.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 03645a11a570d52e70631838cb786eb4253eb463 ]

ip6_datagram_connect() is doing a lot of socket changes without
socket being locked.

This looks wrong, at least for udp_lib_rehash() which could corrupt
lists because of concurrent udp_sk(sk)-&gt;udp_portaddr_hash accesses.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:46:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Leitner</name>
<email>mleitner@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-23T14:17:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1c825dacb615430cb384e0e3be07700013291742'/>
<id>1c825dacb615430cb384e0e3be07700013291742</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream.

Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.

If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)

The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.

Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;mleitner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream.

Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.

If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)

The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.

Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;mleitner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Fix build failure when CONFIG_INET disabled</title>
<updated>2015-10-13T02:46:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-18T18:31:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a1a1e789bed910db9f193109b4481327fa8d42db'/>
<id>a1a1e789bed910db9f193109b4481327fa8d42db</id>
<content type='text'>
output_core.c, added in 3.2.66, is only needed and can only be
compiled when CONFIG_INET is enabled.

The condition in the Makefile is already correct upstream.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
output_core.c, added in 3.2.66, is only needed and can only be
compiled when CONFIG_INET is enabled.

The condition in the Makefile is already correct upstream.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums</title>
<updated>2015-08-06T23:32:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-30T16:16:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=556574d97b6e0c2970b7e5ab693bcf35f73195fa'/>
<id>556574d97b6e0c2970b7e5ab693bcf35f73195fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 upstream.

We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :

1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
   This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()

2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
   processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.

This patch is an attempt to make things better.

We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit beb39db59d14990e401e235faf66a6b9b31240b0 upstream.

We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :

1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
   This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()

2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
   processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.

This patch is an attempt to make things better.

We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM sockets</title>
<updated>2015-05-09T22:16:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michal Kubeček</name>
<email>mkubecek@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-02T17:27:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=332640b2821f75381b1049a904d93d4fb846334f'/>
<id>332640b2821f75381b1049a904d93d4fb846334f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit acf8dd0a9d0b9e4cdb597c2f74802f79c699e802 ]

If an over-MTU UDP datagram is sent through a SOCK_RAW socket to a
UFO-capable device, ip_ufo_append_data() sets skb-&gt;ip_summed to
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL unconditionally as all GSO code assumes transport layer
checksum is to be computed on segmentation. However, in this case,
skb-&gt;csum_start and skb-&gt;csum_offset are never set as raw socket
transmit path bypasses udp_send_skb() where they are usually set. As a
result, driver may access invalid memory when trying to calculate the
checksum and store the result (as observed in virtio_net driver).

Moreover, the very idea of modifying the userspace provided UDP header
is IMHO against raw socket semantics (I wasn't able to find a document
clearly stating this or the opposite, though). And while allowing
CHECKSUM_NONE in the UFO case would be more efficient, it would be a bit
too intrusive change just to handle a corner case like this. Therefore
disallowing UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM seems to be the best option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit acf8dd0a9d0b9e4cdb597c2f74802f79c699e802 ]

If an over-MTU UDP datagram is sent through a SOCK_RAW socket to a
UFO-capable device, ip_ufo_append_data() sets skb-&gt;ip_summed to
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL unconditionally as all GSO code assumes transport layer
checksum is to be computed on segmentation. However, in this case,
skb-&gt;csum_start and skb-&gt;csum_offset are never set as raw socket
transmit path bypasses udp_send_skb() where they are usually set. As a
result, driver may access invalid memory when trying to calculate the
checksum and store the result (as observed in virtio_net driver).

Moreover, the very idea of modifying the userspace provided UDP header
is IMHO against raw socket semantics (I wasn't able to find a document
clearly stating this or the opposite, though). And while allowing
CHECKSUM_NONE in the UFO case would be more efficient, it would be a bit
too intrusive change just to handle a corner case like this. Therefore
disallowing UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM seems to be the best option.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: stop sending PTB packets for MTU &lt; 1280</title>
<updated>2015-05-09T22:16:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hagen Paul Pfeifer</name>
<email>hagen@jauu.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-15T21:34:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5862b42e60535657c44681f1c22b7256f6714281'/>
<id>5862b42e60535657c44681f1c22b7256f6714281</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9d289715eb5c252ae15bd547cb252ca547a3c4f2 ]

Reduce the attack vector and stop generating IPv6 Fragment Header for
paths with an MTU smaller than the minimum required IPv6 MTU
size (1280 byte) - called atomic fragments.

See IETF I-D "Deprecating the Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments" [1]
for more information and how this "feature" can be misused.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-00

Signed-off-by: Fernando Gont &lt;fgont@si6networks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer &lt;hagen@jauu.net&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9d289715eb5c252ae15bd547cb252ca547a3c4f2 ]

Reduce the attack vector and stop generating IPv6 Fragment Header for
paths with an MTU smaller than the minimum required IPv6 MTU
size (1280 byte) - called atomic fragments.

See IETF I-D "Deprecating the Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments" [1]
for more information and how this "feature" can be misused.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-00

Signed-off-by: Fernando Gont &lt;fgont@si6networks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer &lt;hagen@jauu.net&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
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