linux-toradex.git/net/key/af_key.c, branch v3.0.95

af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()

2013-08-20T15:21:01+00:00

commit 85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40 upstream.

This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel 
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: Luis Henriques 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

af_key: more info leaks in pfkey messages

2013-08-11T22:38:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit ff862a4668dd6dba962b1d2d8bd344afa6375683 ]

This is inspired by a5cc68f3d6 "af_key: fix info leaks in notify
messages".  There are some struct members which don't get initialized
and could disclose small amounts of private information.

Acked-by: Mathias Krause 
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter 
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages

2013-07-28T23:18:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 ]

key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Cc: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: convert %p usage to %pK

2011-05-24T05:13:12+00:00

The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces.  Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers.  The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.

If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs.  If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
 If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges.  Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".

The supporting code for kptr_restrict and %pK are currently in the -mm
tree.  This patch converts users of %p in net/ to %pK.  Cases of printing
pointers to the syslog are not covered, since this would eliminate useful
information for postmortem debugging and the reading of the syslog is
already optionally protected by the dmesg_restrict sysctl.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Thomas Graf 
Cc: Eugene Teo 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: David S. Miller 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

inet: constify ip headers and in6_addr

2011-04-22T18:04:14+00:00

Add const qualifiers to structs iphdr, ipv6hdr and in6_addr pointers
where possible, to make code intention more obvious.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

pfkey: fix warning

2011-03-02T06:51:52+00:00

If CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE is not defined the arguments of
pfkey_migrate stub do not match causing warning.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

pfkey: Use const where possible.

2011-02-26T02:07:06+00:00

This actually pointed out a (seemingly known) bug where we mangle the
pfkey header in a potentially shared SKB, which is fixed here.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

xfrm: Const'ify pointer args to km_migrate() and implementations.

2011-02-24T07:07:41+00:00

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

xfrm: Pass km_event pointers around as const when possible.

2011-02-24T07:07:37+00:00

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

afkey: add sparse annotation about rcu

2011-02-23T22:11:32+00:00

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller