linux-toradex.git/net/key, branch v2.6.18

Remove obsolete #include

2006-06-30T17:25:36+00:00

Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel 
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk

[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize

2006-06-18T04:29:45+00:00

This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.

Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the
module.

LSM changes:

The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.

Use:

The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).

SELinux changes:

The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.

Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang 
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[NET] sem2mutex: net/

2006-03-21T06:33:17+00:00

Semaphore to mutex conversion.

The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[IPSEC]: Sync series - user

2006-03-21T03:16:12+00:00

Add xfrm as the user of the core changes

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[XFRM]: Eliminate refcounting confusion by creating __xfrm_state_put().

2006-02-24T00:10:53+00:00

We often just do an atomic_dec(&x->refcnt) on an xfrm_state object
because we know there is more than 1 reference remaining and thus
we can elide the heavier xfrm_state_put() call.

Do this behind an inline function called __xfrm_state_put() so that is
more obvious and also to allow us to more cleanly add refcount
debugging later.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[AF_KEY]: no message type set

2006-01-24T20:57:19+00:00

When returning a message to userspace in reply to a SADB_FLUSH or 
SADB_X_SPDFLUSH message, the type was not set for the returned PFKEY 
message. The patch below corrects this problem.

Signed-off-by: Jerome Borsboom 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[PATCH] capable/capability.h (net/)

2006-01-12T02:42:14+00:00

net: Use  where capable() is used.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[NET]: Change some "if (x) BUG();" to "BUG_ON(x);"

2006-01-09T22:16:18+00:00

This changes some simple "if (x) BUG();" statements to "BUG_ON(x);"

Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[NET]: move struct proto_ops to const

2006-01-03T21:11:15+00:00

I noticed that some of 'struct proto_ops' used in the kernel may share
a cache line used by locks or other heavily modified data. (default
linker alignement is 32 bytes, and L1_CACHE_LINE is 64 or 128 at
least)

This patch makes sure a 'struct proto_ops' can be declared as const,
so that all cpus can share all parts of it without false sharing.

This is not mandatory : a driver can still use a read/write structure
if it needs to (and eventually a __read_mostly)

I made a global stubstitute to change all existing occurences to make
them const.

This should reduce the possibility of false sharing on SMP, and
speedup some socket system calls.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.

2006-01-03T21:10:24+00:00

This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.

On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.

The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.

Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.

Testing:

The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.

The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.

Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller