commit 6b0f32745dcfba01d7be33acd1b40306c7a914c6 upstream.

The duplicate retransmission detection code in mac80211
erroneously attempts to do the check for every frame,
even frames that don't have a sequence control field or
that don't use it (QoS-Null frames.)

This is problematic because it causes the code to access
data beyond the end of the SKB and depending on the data
there will drop packets erroneously.

Correct the code to not do duplicate detection for such
frames.

I found this error while testing AP powersave, it lead
to retransmitted PS-Poll frames being dropped entirely
as the data beyond the end of the SKB was always zero.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 6dbda2d00d466225f9db1dc695ff852443f28832 upstream.

The code to allow EAPOL frames even when the station
isn't yet marked associated needs to check that the
incoming frame is long enough and due to paged RX it
also can't assume skb->data contains the right data,
it must use skb_copy_bits(). Fix this to avoid using
data that doesn't really exist.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9b395bc3be1cebf0144a127c7e67d56dbdac0930 upstream.

A number of places in the mesh code don't check that
the frame data is present and in the skb header when
trying to access. Add those checks and the necessary
pskb_may_pull() calls. This prevents accessing data
that doesn't actually exist.

To do this, export ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen() to be
able to use it in mac80211.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4a4f1a5808c8bb0b72a4f6e5904c53fb8c9cd966 upstream.

Due to pskb_may_pull() checking the skb length, all
non-management frames are checked on input whether
their 802.11 header is fully present. Also add that
check for management frames and remove a check that
is now duplicate. This prevents accessing skb data
beyond the frame end.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f7fbf70ee9db6da6033ae50d100e017ac1f26555 upstream.

Per IEEE Std. 802.11-2012, Sec 8.2.4.4.1, the sequence Control field is
not present in control frames.  We noticed this problem when processing
Block Ack Requests.

Signed-off-by: Javier Cardona <javier@cozybit.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Lopez <jlopex@cozybit.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 555cb715be8ef98b8ec362b23dfc254d432a35b1 upstream.

Doing otherwise is wrong, and may wreak havoc on the mpp tables,
specially if the frame is encrypted.

Reported-by: Chaoxing Lin <Chaoxing.Lin@ultra-3eti.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Cardona <javier@cozybit.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4b5ebccc40843104d980f0714bc86bfcd5568941 upstream.

When receiving an "individually addressed" action frame, the
receiver is required to return it to the sender. mac80211
gets this wrong as it also returns group addressed (mcast)
frames to the sender. Fix this and update the reference to
the new 802.11 standards version since things were shuffled
around significantly.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Cooked monitor rx was recently changed to use ieee80211_add_rx_radiotap_header
instead of generating only limited radiotap information.
ieee80211_add_rx_radiotap_header assumes that FCS info is still present if
the hardware supports receiving it, however when cooked monitor rx packets
are processed, FCS info has already been stripped.
Fix this by adding an extra flag indicating FCS presence.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

When regulatory information changes our HT behavior (e.g,
when we get a country code from the AP we have just associated
with), we should use this information to change the power with
which we transmit, and what channels we transmit.  Sometimes
the channel parameters we derive from regulatory information
contradicts the parameters we used in association.  For example,
we could have associated specifying HT40, but the regulatory
rules we apply may forbid HT40 operation.

In the situation above, we should reconfigure ourselves to
transmit in HT20 only, however it makes no sense for us to
disable receive in HT40, since if we associated with these
parameters, the AP has every reason to expect we can and
will receive packets this way.  The code in mac80211 does
not have the capability of sending the appropriate action
frames to signal a change in HT behaviour so the AP has
no clue we can no longer receive frames encoded this way.
In some broken AP implementations, this can leave us
effectively deaf if the AP never retries in lower HT rates.

This change breaks up the channel_type parameter in the
ieee80211_enable_ht function into a separate receive and
transmit part.  It honors the channel flags set by regulatory
in order to configure the rate control algorithm, but uses
the capability flags to configure the channel on the radio,
since these were used in association to set the AP's transmit
rate.

Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@chromium.org>
Cc: Sam Leffler <sleffler@chromium.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Reviewed-by: Luis R Rodriguez <mcgrof@frijolero.org>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

Not linearizing every SKB will help actually pass
non-linear SKBs all the way up when on an encrypted
connection. For now, linearize TKIP completely as
it is lower performance and I don't quite grok all
the details.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>