nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.

nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.

Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:

  nft_mapelem_activate():
    if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask))
        return 0;   /* skip active, process inactive */

With the buggy catchall version:

  nft_map_catchall_activate():
    if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
        continue;   /* skip inactive, process active */

The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.

This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.

Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones.

Fixes: 628bd3e49cba ("netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Fasano <andrew.fasano@nist.gov>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

Currently last_gc is being updated everytime a new connection is
tracked, that means that it is updated even if a GC wasn't performed.
With a sufficiently high packet rate, it is possible to always bypass
the GC, causing the list to grow infinitely.

Update the last_gc value only when a GC has been actually performed.

Fixes: d265929930e2 ("netfilter: nf_conncount: reduce unnecessary GC")
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

In nf_tables_newrule(), if nft_use_inc() fails, the function jumps to
the err_release_rule label without freeing the allocated flow, leading
to a memory leak.

Fix this by adding a new label err_destroy_flow and jumping to it when
nft_use_inc() fails. This ensures that the flow is properly released
in this error case.

Fixes: 1689f25924ada ("netfilter: nf_tables: report use refcount overflow")
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

The -EEXIST error code is reserved by the module loading infrastructure
to indicate that a module is already loaded. When a module's init
function returns -EEXIST, userspace tools like kmod interpret this as
"module already loaded" and treat the operation as successful, returning
0 to the user even though the module initialization actually failed.

Replace -EEXIST with -EBUSY to ensure correct error reporting in the module
initialization path.

Affected modules:
  * ebtable_broute ebtable_filter ebtable_nat arptable_filter
  * ip6table_filter ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat ip6table_raw
  * ip6table_security iptable_filter iptable_mangle iptable_nat
  * iptable_raw iptable_security

Signed-off-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

During nft_synproxy eval we are reading nf_synproxy_info struct which
can be modified on update operation concurrently. As nf_synproxy_info
struct fits in 32 bits, use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE annotations.

Fixes: ee394f96ad75 ("netfilter: nft_synproxy: add synproxy stateful object support")
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

set->klen has to be used, not sizeof().  The latter only compares a
single register but a full check of the entire key is needed.

Example:
table ip t {
        map s {
                typeof iifname . ip saddr : verdict
                flags interval
        }
}

nft add element t s '{ "lo" . 10.0.0.0/24 : drop }' # no error, expected
nft add element t s '{ "lo" . 10.0.0.0/24 : drop }' # no error, expected
nft add element t s '{ "lo" . 10.0.0.0/8 : drop }' # bug: no error

The 3rd 'add element' should be rejected via -ENOTEMPTY, not -EEXIST,
so userspace / nft can report an error to the user.

The latter is only correct for the 2nd case (re-add of existing element).

As-is, userspace is told that the command was successful, but no elements were
added.

After this patch, 3rd command gives:
Error: Could not process rule: File exists
add element t s { "lo" . 127.0.0.0/8 . "lo"  : drop }
                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Fixes: 0eb4b5ee33f2 ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: Separate partial and complete overlap cases on insertion")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

This reverts commit
314c82841602 ("netfilter: nf_tables: can't schedule in nft_chain_validate"):
Since commit a60a5abe19d6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: allow iter callbacks to sleep")
the iterator callback is invoked without rcu read lock held, so this
cond_resched() is now valid.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in
nft_chain_validate():

 watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547]
[..]
 RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables]
[..]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
  nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
  nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables]
  nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables]
  nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables]
[..]

Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting
from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths
(chain jumps).  But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation.

Consider:
1  input -> j2 -> j3
2  input -> j2 -> j3
3  input -> j1 -> j2 -> j3

Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3,
because this was already checked during validation of the first rule.
We need to validate it only for rule 3.

This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed
the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump
might now exceed the allowed stack size.  We also need to update all
reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth.

Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an
issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from
invalid base chains.  For example, the masquerade expression can only be
called from NAT postrouting base chains.

Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type,
hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different
hook location.

Reported-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20251118221735.GA5477@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net/
Tested-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

This validation predates the introduction of the state machine that
determines when to enter slow path validation for error reporting.

Currently, table validation is perform when:

- new rule contains expressions that need validation.
- new set element with jump/goto verdict.

Validation on register store skips most checks with no basechains, still
this walks the graph searching for loops and ensuring expressions are
called from the right hook. Remove this.

Fixes: a654de8fdc18 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain dependency validation")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

Jakub reports spurious failures of the 'conntrack_reverse_clash.sh'
selftest.  A bogus test makes nat core resort to port rewrite even
though there is no need for this.

When the test is made, nf_nat_used_tuple() would already have caused us
to return if no other CPU had added a colliding entry.
Moreover, nf_nat_used_tuple() would have ignored the colliding entry if
their origin tuples had been the same.

All that is left to check is if the colliding entry in the hash table
is subject to NAT, and, if its not, if our entry matches in the reverse
direction, e.g. hash table has

addr1:1234 -> addr2:80, and we want to commit
addr2:80   -> addr1:1234.

Because we already checked that neither the new nor the committed entry is
subject to NAT we only have to check origin vs. reply tuple:
for non-nat entries, the reply tuple is always the inverted original.

Just in case there are more problems extend the error reporting
in the selftest while at it and dump conntrack table/stats on error.

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20251206175135.4a56591b@kernel.org/
Fixes: d8f84a9bc7c4 ("netfilter: nf_nat: don't try nat source port reallocation for reverse dir clash")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>