linux-toradex.git/net/openvswitch, branch v4.9.106

openvswitch: Remove padding from packet before L3+ conntrack processing

2018-05-30T05:50:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9382fe71c0058465e942a633869629929102843d ]

IPv4 and IPv6 packets may arrive with lower-layer padding that is not
included in the L3 length. For example, a short IPv4 packet may have
up to 6 bytes of padding following the IP payload when received on an
Ethernet device with a minimum packet length of 64 bytes.

Higher-layer processing functions in netfilter (e.g. nf_ip_checksum(),
and help() in nf_conntrack_ftp) assume skb->len reflects the length of
the L3 header and payload, rather than referring back to
ip_hdr->tot_len or ipv6_hdr->payload_len, and get confused by
lower-layer padding.

In the normal IPv4 receive path, ip_rcv() trims the packet to
ip_hdr->tot_len before invoking netfilter hooks. In the IPv6 receive
path, ip6_rcv() does the same using ipv6_hdr->payload_len. Similarly
in the br_netfilter receive path, br_validate_ipv4() and
br_validate_ipv6() trim the packet to the L3 length before invoking
netfilter hooks.

Currently in the OVS conntrack receive path, ovs_ct_execute() pulls
the skb to the L3 header but does not trim it to the L3 length before
calling nf_conntrack_in(NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING). When
nf_conntrack_proto_tcp encounters a packet with lower-layer padding,
nf_ip_checksum() fails causing a "nf_ct_tcp: bad TCP checksum" log
message. While extra zero bytes don't affect the checksum, the length
in the IP pseudoheader does. That length is based on skb->len, and
without trimming, it doesn't match the length the sender used when
computing the checksum.

In ovs_ct_execute(), trim the skb to the L3 length before higher-layer
processing.

Signed-off-by: Ed Swierk 
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: Don't swap table in nlattr_set() after OVS_ATTR_NESTED is found

2018-05-19T08:26:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 72f17baf2352ded6a1d3f4bb2d15da8c678cd2cb ]

If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking
through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively
passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if
different from the current one.

However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we
should continue walking through attributes using the current
table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested
attributes.

For example, given this sequence:

1  OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY
2  OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL
3	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID
4	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC
5	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST
6	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL
7	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC
8	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST
9  OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT
10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK
11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS

we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3,
and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting
attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS
evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is
15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the
wrong table:

[ 7654.586496] ==================================================================
[ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430
[ 7654.610983]
[ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1
[ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
[ 7654.631379] Call Trace:
[ 7654.634108]  [] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[ 7654.639843]  [] print_address_description+0x33/0x290
[ 7654.647129]  [] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.654607]  [] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330
[ 7654.661406]  [] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40
[ 7654.668789]  [] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.676076]  [] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.684234]  [] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 7654.689968]  [] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590
[ 7654.696574]  [] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.705122]  [] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0
[ 7654.712503]  [] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
[ 7654.719401]  [] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.726298]  [] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.733195]  [] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[ 7654.740187]  [] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0
[ 7654.746406]  [] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 7654.752914]  [] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[ 7654.758456]  [] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch]

[snip]

[ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[ 7655.138226]  ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch]
[ 7655.145507]
[ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 7655.152514]  ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa
[ 7655.160585]  ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa
[ 7655.176701]                                                              ^
[ 7655.184372]  ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05
[ 7655.192431]  ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.200490] ==================================================================

Reported-by: Hangbin Liu 
Fixes: 982b52700482 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio 
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: Delete conntrack entry clashing with an expectation.

2018-03-24T10:00:14+00:00

[ Upstream commit cf5d70918877c6a6655dc1e92e2ebb661ce904fd ]

Conntrack helpers do not check for a potentially clashing conntrack
entry when creating a new expectation.  Also, nf_conntrack_in() will
check expectations (via init_conntrack()) only if a conntrack entry
can not be found.  The expectation for a packet which also matches an
existing conntrack entry will not be removed by conntrack, and is
currently handled inconsistently by OVS, as OVS expects the
expectation to be removed when the connection tracking entry matching
that expectation is confirmed.

It should be noted that normally an IP stack would not allow reuse of
a 5-tuple of an old (possibly lingering) connection for a new data
connection, so this is somewhat unlikely corner case.  However, it is
possible that a misbehaving source could cause conntrack entries be
created that could then interfere with new related connections.

Fix this in the OVS module by deleting the clashing conntrack entry
after an expectation has been matched.  This causes the following
nf_conntrack_in() call also find the expectation and remove it when
creating the new conntrack entry, as well as the forthcoming reply
direction packets to match the new related connection instead of the
old clashing conntrack entry.

Fixes: 7f8a436eaa2c ("openvswitch: Add conntrack action")
Reported-by: Yang Song 
Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme 
Acked-by: Joe Stringer 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: fix the incorrect flow action alloc size

2018-02-03T16:05:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit 67c8d22a73128ff910e2287567132530abcf5b71 ]

If we want to add a datapath flow, which has more than 500 vxlan outputs'
action, we will get the following error reports:
  openvswitch: netlink: Flow action size 32832 bytes exceeds max
  openvswitch: netlink: Flow action size 32832 bytes exceeds max
  openvswitch: netlink: Actions may not be safe on all matching packets
  ... ...

It seems that we can simply enlarge the MAX_ACTIONS_BUFSIZE to fix it, but
this is not the root cause. For example, for a vxlan output action, we need
about 60 bytes for the nlattr, but after it is converted to the flow
action, it only occupies 24 bytes. This means that we can still support
more than 1000 vxlan output actions for a single datapath flow under the
the current 32k max limitation.

So even if the nla_len(attr) is larger than MAX_ACTIONS_BUFSIZE, we
shouldn't report EINVAL and keep it move on, as the judgement can be
done by the reserve_sfa_size.

Signed-off-by: zhangliping 
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: fix skb_panic due to the incorrect actions attrlen

2017-08-30T08:21:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 494bea39f3201776cdfddc232705f54a0bd210c4 ]

For sw_flow_actions, the actions_len only represents the kernel part's
size, and when we dump the actions to the userspace, we will do the
convertions, so it's true size may become bigger than the actions_len.

But unfortunately, for OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS, we use the actions_len
to alloc the skbuff, so the user_skb's size may become insufficient and
oops will happen like this:
  skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8148fabf len:1749 put:157 head:
  ffff881300f39000 data:ffff881300f39000 tail:0x6d5 end:0x6c0 dev:
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
  [...]
  Call Trace:
   
   [] skb_put+0x43/0x44
   [] skb_zerocopy+0x6c/0x1f4
   [] queue_userspace_packet+0x3a3/0x448 [openvswitch]
   [] ovs_dp_upcall+0x30/0x5c [openvswitch]
   [] output_userspace+0x132/0x158 [openvswitch]
   [] ? ip6_rcv_finish+0x74/0x77 [ipv6]
   [] do_execute_actions+0xcc1/0xdc8 [openvswitch]
   [] ovs_execute_actions+0x74/0x106 [openvswitch]
   [] ovs_dp_process_packet+0xe1/0xfd [openvswitch]
   [] ? key_extract+0x63c/0x8d5 [openvswitch]
   [] ovs_vport_receive+0xa1/0xc3 [openvswitch]
  [...]

Also we can find that the actions_len is much little than the orig_len:
  crash> struct sw_flow_actions 0xffff8812f539d000
  struct sw_flow_actions {
    rcu = {
      next = 0xffff8812f5398800,
      func = 0xffffe3b00035db32
    },
    orig_len = 1384,
    actions_len = 592,
    actions = 0xffff8812f539d01c
  }

So as a quick fix, use the orig_len instead of the actions_len to alloc
the user_skb.

Last, this oops happened on our system running a relative old kernel, but
the same risk still exists on the mainline, since we use the wrong
actions_len from the beginning.

Fixes: ccea74457bbd ("openvswitch: include datapath actions with sampled-packet upcall to userspace")
Cc: Neil McKee 
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang 
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: fix potential out of bound access in parse_ct

2017-08-11T15:49:32+00:00

[ Upstream commit 69ec932e364b1ba9c3a2085fe96b76c8a3f71e7c ]

Before the 'type' is validated, we shouldn't use it to fetch the
ovs_ct_attr_lens's minlen and maxlen, else, out of bound access
may happen.

Fixes: 7f8a436eaa2c ("openvswitch: Add conntrack action")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang 
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: Add missing case OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_PAD

2017-03-30T07:41:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 8f3dbfd79ed9ef9770305a7cc4e13dfd31ad2cd0 ]

Added a case for OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_PAD to the switch statement
in ip_tun_from_nlattr in order to prevent the default case
returning an error.

Fixes: b46f6ded906e ("libnl: nla_put_be64(): align on a 64-bit area")
Signed-off-by: Kris Murphy 
Acked-by: Joe Stringer 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/openvswitch: Set the ipv6 source tunnel key address attribute correctly

2017-03-30T07:41:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3d20f1f7bd575d147ffa75621fa560eea0aec690 ]

When dealing with ipv6 source tunnel key address attribute
(OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV6_SRC) we are wrongly setting the tunnel
dst ip, fix that.

Fixes: 6b26ba3a7d95 ('openvswitch: netlink attributes for IPv6 tunneling')
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz 
Reported-by: Paul Blakey 
Acked-by: Jiri Benc 
Acked-by: Joe Stringer 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: orphan skbs in reassembly unit

2017-03-22T11:43:33+00:00

[ Upstream commit 48cac18ecf1de82f76259a54402c3adb7839ad01 ]

Andrey reported a use-after-free in IPv6 stack.

Issue here is that we free the socket while it still has skb
in TX path and in some queues.

It happens here because IPv6 reassembly unit messes skb->truesize,
breaking skb_set_owner_w() badly.

We fixed a similar issue for IPV4 in commit 8282f27449bf ("inet: frag:
Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()")
Acked-by: Joe Stringer 

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_wfree+0x118/0x120
Read of size 8 at addr ffff880062da0060 by task a.out/4140

page:ffffea00018b6800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null)
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180130013
raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88006741f140 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

CPU: 0 PID: 4140 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3+ #59
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
 describe_address mm/kasan/report.c:262
 kasan_report_error+0x121/0x560 mm/kasan/report.c:370
 kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:392
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:413
 sock_flag ./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:324
 sock_wfree+0x118/0x120 net/core/sock.c:1631
 skb_release_head_state+0xfc/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:655
 skb_release_all+0x15/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668
 __kfree_skb+0x15/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:684
 kfree_skb+0x16e/0x4e0 net/core/skbuff.c:705
 inet_frag_destroy+0x121/0x290 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:304
 inet_frag_put ./include/net/inet_frag.h:133
 nf_ct_frag6_gather+0x1125/0x38b0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:617
 ipv6_defrag+0x21b/0x350 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68
 nf_hook_entry_hookfn ./include/linux/netfilter.h:102
 nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x290 net/netfilter/core.c:310
 nf_hook ./include/linux/netfilter.h:212
 __ip6_local_out+0x52c/0xaf0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160
 ip6_local_out+0x2d/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:170
 ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1722
 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1742
 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:613
 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2cff/0x4130 net/ipv6/raw.c:927
 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635
 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
 sock_write_iter+0x326/0x620 net/socket.c:848
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499
 __vfs_write+0x483/0x760 fs/read_write.c:512
 vfs_write+0x187/0x530 fs/read_write.c:560
 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
 SyS_write+0xfb/0x230 fs/read_write.c:599
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203
RIP: 0033:0x7ff26e6f5b79
RSP: 002b:00007ff268e0ed98 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff268e0f9c0 RCX: 00007ff26e6f5b79
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020f50fe1 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ff26ebc1220 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ff268e0f9c0 R14: 00007ff26efec040 R15: 0000000000000003

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880062da0000
 which belongs to the cache RAWv6 of size 1504
The buggy address ffff880062da0060 is located 96 bytes inside
 of 1504-byte region [ffff880062da0000, ffff880062da05e0)

Freed by task 4113:
 save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514
 kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
 slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
 kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:2973
 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1377
 __sk_destruct+0x49c/0x6e0 net/core/sock.c:1452
 sk_destruct+0x47/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1460
 __sk_free+0x57/0x230 net/core/sock.c:1468
 sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1479
 sock_put ./include/net/sock.h:1638
 sk_common_release+0x31e/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2782
 rawv6_close+0x54/0x80 net/ipv6/raw.c:1214
 inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:425
 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:431
 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:599
 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1063
 __fput+0x332/0x7f0 fs/file_table.c:208
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
 task_work_run+0x19b/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:116
 exit_task_work ./include/linux/task_work.h:21
 do_exit+0x186b/0x2800 kernel/exit.c:839
 do_group_exit+0x149/0x420 kernel/exit.c:943
 SYSC_exit_group kernel/exit.c:954
 SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20 kernel/exit.c:952
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203

Allocated by task 4115:
 save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514
 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605
 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:544
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:432
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1af/0x250 mm/slub.c:2721
 sk_prot_alloc+0x65/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:1334
 sk_alloc+0x105/0x1010 net/core/sock.c:1396
 inet6_create+0x44d/0x1150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:183
 __sock_create+0x4f6/0x880 net/socket.c:1199
 sock_create net/socket.c:1239
 SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1269
 SyS_socket+0xf9/0x230 net/socket.c:1249
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff880062d9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff880062d9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff880062da0000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                       ^
 ffff880062da0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff880062da0100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

openvswitch: maintain correct checksum state in conntrack actions

2017-02-04T08:47:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 75f01a4c9cc291ff5cb28ca1216adb163b7a20ee ]

When executing conntrack actions on skbuffs with checksum mode
CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, the checksum must be updated to account for
header pushes and pulls. Otherwise we get "hw csum failure"
logs similar to this (ICMP packet received on geneve tunnel
via ixgbe NIC):

[  405.740065] genev_sys_6081: hw csum failure
[  405.740106] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Tainted: G          I     4.10.0-rc3+ #1
[  405.740108] Call Trace:
[  405.740110]  
[  405.740113]  dump_stack+0x63/0x87
[  405.740116]  netdev_rx_csum_fault+0x3a/0x40
[  405.740118]  __skb_checksum_complete+0xcf/0xe0
[  405.740120]  nf_ip_checksum+0xc8/0xf0
[  405.740124]  icmp_error+0x1de/0x351 [nf_conntrack_ipv4]
[  405.740132]  nf_conntrack_in+0xe1/0x550 [nf_conntrack]
[  405.740137]  ? find_bucket.isra.2+0x62/0x70 [openvswitch]
[  405.740143]  __ovs_ct_lookup+0x95/0x980 [openvswitch]
[  405.740145]  ? netif_rx_internal+0x44/0x110
[  405.740149]  ovs_ct_execute+0x147/0x4b0 [openvswitch]
[  405.740153]  do_execute_actions+0x22e/0xa70 [openvswitch]
[  405.740157]  ovs_execute_actions+0x40/0x120 [openvswitch]
[  405.740161]  ovs_dp_process_packet+0x84/0x120 [openvswitch]
[  405.740166]  ovs_vport_receive+0x73/0xd0 [openvswitch]
[  405.740168]  ? udp_rcv+0x1a/0x20
[  405.740170]  ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x93/0x1e0
[  405.740172]  ? ip_local_deliver+0x6f/0xe0
[  405.740174]  ? ip_rcv_finish+0x3a0/0x3a0
[  405.740176]  ? ip_rcv_finish+0xdb/0x3a0
[  405.740177]  ? ip_rcv+0x2a7/0x400
[  405.740180]  ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x970/0xa00
[  405.740185]  netdev_frame_hook+0xd3/0x160 [openvswitch]
[  405.740187]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1dc/0xa00
[  405.740194]  ? ixgbe_clean_rx_irq+0x46d/0xa20 [ixgbe]
[  405.740197]  __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
[  405.740199]  netif_receive_skb_internal+0x40/0xb0
[  405.740201]  napi_gro_receive+0xcd/0x120
[  405.740204]  gro_cell_poll+0x57/0x80 [geneve]
[  405.740206]  net_rx_action+0x260/0x3c0
[  405.740209]  __do_softirq+0xc9/0x28c
[  405.740211]  irq_exit+0xd9/0xf0
[  405.740213]  do_IRQ+0x51/0xd0
[  405.740215]  common_interrupt+0x93/0x93

Fixes: 7f8a436eaa2c ("openvswitch: Add conntrack action")
Signed-off-by: Lance Richardson 
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman